a s.e.R. -….,1 remaining appeals and passed appropriate orders therein; but this is unnecessary as my brethren take a different view in the two ma:in appeals. BY CouRT: In view of the majority Judgment,
there will be decree in terms as stated in ·the '>' -< Judgment of the majority. KHARDAH COMPANY LTD. v. .,,-: RAYMON & CO. (INDIA) PRIVATE LTD. (B. P. SINHA, C. J., K. SuBBA RAo, N. RAJAGOPALA
AYYANGAR, J.R. MunHOLKAR and T. L. VENKATARAMA AIYAR, JJ.) Forward Contract-Contract for Bale ·of goods-Govern- ment notification forbidding forward contracts other than non- transferable specific delivery contracts-Validity of the contract- Clause providing' for arbitration-Clause, if valid even if con- tract were invalid-Parties appearing before arbitrator-Estoppel -Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952 (74 of 1952), ss. 2 (c) (f) (i) (m) (n), 15(1), 17, 18(1).
On September 7, 1955, the appellant company entered into a contract with the respondents for the purchase of cer- tain bales of jute cuttings to be delivered by the resp@ndents in equal instalments every month in October, November anc;I December, 1955.
Under cl. 3 of the agreement the sellers were entitled to receive the price only on their delivering to the buyers the full set of shipping documents. Clause 8 conferred on the sellers certain rights against the buyers such as the right to resell if the latter refused to accept the docu- ments.
Clause 14 provided that all disputes arising out of or concerning the contract should be referred to the arbitratiou of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. As the respondents failed to deliver the goods as agreed the appellants applied to to the Bengal Chamber of Commerce for arbitration. The
respondents appeared before the arbitrators and contested the claim, but an award was made in~ favour of the appellant. Thereupon the respondents filed an application in the High poµrt of Calcutta under. s. 33 · of the Arbitration Act, 1940, fl.. Vishwanitlhiin
v. Rukn·ul-mulk Sy1d Abdul Wajiit Hidaya/ullah J, May4 • Khariah ClfTIP••J Lid ltaP,in "' c .. (Tndi•} Pfl1. ltd,. 184. challenging the validity of the award on the ground that the contract dated September 7, 1955, was illegal as it was in contravfntion of the notification of the Central Government dated October 29, 1953, issue.cl under s. 17 of the Forward Contracts lRegulation) Act, 1952, which declared that no
persOn '.'shall enter ihto any forward contract other than a non … transferable specific delivery contract for the sale or purchase of raw jute in .any form …….. ". The appellant pleaded
(I) that on the terms of the arbitration clause the question whether the contract dated September 7, 1955, was illegal Was one for the arbitrator to decide and that it was not open to the respondents to r_aise the same in proceedings under s. 33 of the Arbitration Act; (2) that the respondents were estopped froin questioning the validity of the award by reason of their having submitted to the jurisdiction of the arbitrators ; and ( 3) that, in any case, the contract was a non-trans_fcrablc specific delivery contract within s.
1 (f) of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act and was not hit by the notifica- tion dated October 29, 1953. Held, that : (I) the dispute as to the validity of the contract dated September 7, 1955, was not one which the
arbitrators were competent to decide under cl. 14 and that in consequence the respondents were entitled to maintain the application under s. 33 of the Arbitration Act. l When an agreement is invalid every part of it including
the clause as to arbitration contained therein must also bC invalid. Leyman v. Darwins Lid., [1942] A. C. 356 Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta una Brothers, [1960] 1' S. C.R. 493,
Tnlaram v. Birla Jute Manufacturiug Company Ltd I.,L. R. [1948] 2 Cal,' 17, relied on. . (2)' the respondents were not estopped by their conduct from questioning the validity Of the award.
Ex parte Wyld, ( 1861) 30 Law J. Rep. (N. S.) Bank. 10, explained. (3) on the true co~struction of the co~tract dated Sep- tem.ber 7, 1955, read ·with the terms of the import licence iri favour of the appellan[, the agreement between the parties was that the contract was not to "be transferred. ·
In. construing a contract it would be legitimate to take i~t_o~~cCO~n~_surroundirig CircumstanceS and, thf'refore, on the 'Juestton ~hcthc;r there w'.'8, ail agreement between the partii;J ·–___.r'
3 s.c.R. SUPREME COU.RT REPORTS that the contract was to be non-transferable, the absence of a specific clause forbidding transfer was not conclusive. Virjee Daya & Go. v. Ramak!-ishna Rice & Oit Mills,
A. I. R. 1956 Mad.110, approved. British Waggon Go. v. Lea, (1880) 5 Q. B. D. 149, dist- inguished. Accordingly, the contract in question was not hit 'by the notification dated October 29, 1953.
CIVIL .APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos, 98 and 99 of HJ60, Appeal from the judgment and order dated April 16, i958, and April 11, 1958, of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Order and decree
Nos. 173 and 151 of 1957, respectively. H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of lndin, JYl. G. Poddar. and D. N, Mukherjee, for the appellant. 0. B. Aggarwala and S, N. Mukherjee, for the
resopondent, 1962. May 4. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMA AIYAR, J.-These are appeals against the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta, setting aside an award of the arbitrators, which
directed the respondent t0 tpay to the appellants Rs. 41,250 as compensation for breach of contract, on the ground that the said contract was in con- travention of a notification of the Central Govern-
ment dated October 29, 1953, and was in conse- quence illegal and void. The facts are that the appellants own a Jute Mill at Calcutta and carry on the business of manufacture and sale of Jut~.
On September 7, 1955, they entered into a contract "'ith t.he rts:pondents who are doing husineBS 8.!'I 1H2 Kh<Jrdah Com/Jany Utl. v. Raym .. d4 <Jo. (India) Pol. Lid. Aiyar J, EhardoA Company
Ltd. v. Raymon <h Co. (lndia) Pvt. Ltd. Ai70r J. dealers in jute, for the purchase of 7 50 bales of Jute cutting \raw) of Pakistan at Rs. 80 per bale of 400 lbs. to be delivered in October, November and
December at the rate of 250 bales every month. Clause 14 of the agreement provides that all dis- putes arising out of or concerning the contract should be referred to the arbitration of the Bengal
Chamber of Commerce. The respondents failed to deliver the goods as agreed whereupon the appellants applied to the Bengal Chamber of Com- merce for arbitration in accordance with cl. 14 of
the agreement. The respondents appeared before the arbitrators, and contested the claim on the merits. The arbitrators made an award in favour of the appellants for Rs. 41,25(} with interest, and
that was filed under s. 14(2) of the Indian Arbit- ration Act in the High Court of Calcutta in its original side and notice was issued to the respon- dents. Thereupon the respondents filed an applica-
tion in the High Court, presumably under s. 33· of the arbitration Act, wherein they prayed for a declaration that the contract dated September 7, 1955, was illegal, as it was in contravention· of the
notification of the Central · Government dated October 29, 1953, and that in consequence proceed- ings taken thereunder before the Chamber of Commerce and the award in which they resulted
were all void. The learned Judge on the origiaal side before whom the application came up for hearing dismissed it, and passed a decree in terms of the award. Against . both the judgment and
order, the respondents preferred appeals to a Division Bench of the High Court, Appeals Nos. 154 and 173 of 1957. They were heard by Chakravartti, C. J., and Lahari, J., who held that the contract dated September 7, 1955, was
illegal as it fell within the prohibition of the notification aforesaid and accordingly allowed the l ppea~ ~4 .set ae}de the a.ward. The appellaµt~ 3 S.C.R. then applied for a oertifi.ca.te under Art, 133 (1) of
the Constitution and the same was granted. This is how the appeals come before us. The learned Additional Solicitor-General who appeared for the appelll\.nts urged the following contentions :-
(1) On the terms of the arbitration clause the question whether the contract dated September 7, 1955, is illegal is one for the arbitrator to decide and that it was not open to the respondents to raise
the same in the present proceedings under s. 33 of the Arbitration Act, (2) The respondents are estopped from ques- tioning the validity of the award by reason of their having submitted to the jurisdiction of the
arbitrators, (3) The agreement dated September 7, 1955, is a non-transferable specific delivery contract within s, 2(f) of the Aot and it is not hit by the notification dated October 29, 1953-
We now proceed to discuss these questions seriatim : ( 1) Taking up the first questions, cl, 14 of the agreement which provides for arbitration is as follows:- •'All the matters, questions, disputes,
differences and/ or claims arising out of and/ or concerning and/ or in connection with and/ or in consequence of or relating to this con- tra.ct including matters relating to insurance
and demurrage whether or not the obligations of either or both parties under this contract be subsisting at the time of such dispute and whether or not this contract bas been termi-
pated or ,vur}:lorted to be ter:piinated or oo~- Khardah Ce111;any Lkl. v. Raym011 d: Co. (India) Pot. Ltd. Aiyar J. Khori•h Company LIN. v. Ra;ymon-aJ Co. (India) Pvt. Ltd, · d.ijar J.
· pleted shall be referred to the arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Indus- try under the rules of its Tribunal of Arbit- ration for the time being in force and accord·
ing .to snob rules the arbitration shall be conducted and any Award made by the said Tribunal under the · clause shall be final, binding and conclusive on the parties." Now the c.ontention of the appellants is that the
clause is general in its terms and is wide enough to include dispute as to the validity of the contract that in consequence the only right of the respon dents is to agitate this question before the arbit-
rators and if the award goes agafost them to move the Court either to modify it under s. 15 of the ' Arbitration Act or to remit it under s. J 6 or to set it aside under s. 30 on the grounds mentioned .
therein and that the present application for a declaration that the contract is illegal, and that the arbitration proceedings are without jurisdic- tion is therefore incompetent and misconceived.
It cannot be disputed that the expression "arising out of" or "concerning" or " in connec- tion with" or "in consequence of" or "relating to this contract" occurring.in cl. 14 are of sufficient
amplitude to take in a dispute as to the validity of the a,greement dated September 7, 1955 Vide Ruby General Insurance Go. Ltd. v. Pearey Lal .Kumar ( 1). But the question is not whether cl. 14
is all comprehensive but whether it could be enfor- ped when the argeement of which it forms an integral part ·is held to be illegal. Logically speaking, it is difficult to conceive how when an
agreement found to be llad, any portion of it can held to be good. When the whole perishes, ite parts also must perish. 'Ex nihilo nil fit'. On principle therefore it must be ~eld that w~el\ ~
pl 11952) s.c.R. SOf: · … ~/ 3 S.C.R. argeement is invalid every pa.rt of it including the clause as to arbitration contained therein must also be invalid. That indeed is what haR been laid down in
the decisions which have been cited before us. The leading case on the subject is the decision of the House of Lords in Heyman v. Daowins Ltd ( 1). There the question was whether repudiation of a contract
by a. party thereto had the effect of annulling the arbitration clause contained therein. It was held that it had not. It was in this context that the law as to the circumstances under which an arbit-
ration clause in an agreement would become unen- forceable came in for elaborate discussion. Summ- ing up the law Jn the subject Viscount Simon, L. C. observed: "If the dispute is whether the contract
which .contains the clause has ever bee1a entered into at all, that issue cannot go to aribitration under the clause, for the party who denies that he has ever entered into the contract is thereby deny-
ing that he has ever joined in the submission. Similarly, if one party to the alleged contract is contending that it is void ab initio (because, for example, the making of such a contract is illegal),
the arbitration clause cannot operate, for on this view the clause itself also is void. But, in a situ- ation where the parties are at one in asserting that they entered into a bindinll contract, but a differ-
ence has arisen between them whether there has been breach by one side or the other, or whether circumstances have arisen which have discharged one or both parties from further performance, such
differences should be regarded as differences which ,have arisen "in respect of" or "with regard to1' or "under" the contract, and an arbitration clause which uses these, or similar, expressions should be
construed accordingly." ( 1) (1942) A.C. 356. IHI Khardah CMlll•ii.11 1:,,,, v. Raym,on • c., (In,ia) Pt11. Lt~. Aiyar J. ·1P6S Khard•h· Company Ltd. Ro )'llUn d: Oe. (I1dia) P,t. _Ltd.
..4{1a1 J. . Str:PltEME COURT REPoRTS (1963] Lord Macmillan with whom Lord Russel agreed observed: ~'If it appears that the dispute is whether there has ever been a. binding contract
between the parties, such a dispute cannot be cover· ed by an arbitration clause in the challenged con· tract. If there has never been a contract at all, there has never been as part of it an agreement to
arbitrate. The greater includes the less. Further, a claim to set aside a contract on such grounds as fraud, duress or essential error cannot be the subject matter of a reference under an arbitration clause
in the contract sought to be set aside." In the speech of Lord Wright there are -the ·following observations on which thJ appellants rely: "Hence, if the question is whether the alleged
contract was void for illegality or being voidable was avoided because induced by fraud or misrepre- sentation, or on the ground of mistake, it dependll on the terms of the submission whether the dispute·
falls within the arbitrator's jurisdiction." The . argument is that if the arbitration clause is gene- ral and unqualified it will include a question as to the legality of a contract also. The above obser-
vation does lend support to the view that if it was a term of the contract that a dispute as to its legality could be referred to arbitration, then it is valid. If that is what was meant by Lord Wright
it may be difficult to reconcile it with the view expressed in the passages already cited. But it is to be noted that the noble Lord wound up with the following observation "Finally, I
agree with the general conclusions oUI the matter summarised by the Lord Chancellor in the closing paragraphs of his opinion". The appellants also rely on the following observations in· the speech of Lord Porter: "If
two parties purports to enter into a contract and a dispute arises whether they have done so or not, ~ S.C.R. or whether the .alleged contract is binding on them. I see no reason why they should not submit that
dispute to arbitration. Equally I see no reason why, if at the time when they purport to make the contract they foresee the possibility of such a dis- pute arising, they should not provide in the contr-
act itself for the submission to arbitration of a dis- pute whether the contract ever bound them or con- tinues to do so ………… It may require very clear language to effect this result, and it may be true
to say that such a contract is really col lateral to the agreement supposed to have been made, but I do not see why it should not be done". But these dicta must be read with the follow-
ing observations in the same speech: "Where the contract itself is repudiated in the sense that the original existence or its binding force is challenged, e. g., where it is said that the parties never were
ad idem, or where it is said that the contract is void- able ab initio ( e. g ., in cases of fraud, misrepresent- ation or mistake) and that it has been avoided, the parties are not bound by any contract and escape
the obligation to perform any of its terms includ- ing the arbitration clause unless the provisions of that clause are wide enough to include the question of jurisdiction." According to Lord Porter. then; there can be
an agreement to refer a dispute as to the validity of a contract to arbitration, that where such an agreement is part of the contract which is impugned as invalid, then it can have no existence apart from
it and there can be no reference based thereon, but where such an agreement is distinct and separate from the impugned contract, a reference pursuant thereto will be valid and it is possible that both
these agreements might be contained in one document. lflJB Khardah aom;a11y Lid.. Roym•n th Oo, (India) hi. LU. .A~ar J. lt·~_ardah C1m;11n:; Lid. v. r a;·~on "' c •. (/n¢i&j Pvt. li!g·
Aiyar J. The law is thus summarised in Halsburys Laws of England, Third Edition, Vol. 2, p. 24, para . 56: The matter in question in the legal proceed· ings which it is sought to stay must be within the
scope of the arbitration agreement ………… If, how- ever, the point in dispute is whether the contract cont11ining the clause was ever entered into at a.ll, or was void ab initio, illegal, or obtained (for
example) by fraud, duress or undue influence, .. the clause does not apply and a stay will be refused." This question arose incidentally for discussion in- the Union of India v. Kisharilal Gupta and'13rothers(1)
where on an examination of the authorities; in- cluding Heyman v. Darwins LU.(') this Court held that an arbitration clause embodied in an agreement is an integral part thereof and that if that agree-
ment is non est either because it waB .never legally in existence or because it was void ab initio, then the arbitration clause would also perish witJ;i. it. Similar decisions had beeµ given in Tolaram Nath-
mull v. Birla Jute Mfg. Company Ltd.(3 ) and Hussain Kasam Dada v. . Vijayanagaram Oommercfal · .Association (•). Reference might in this. connection be made to s. · 33 of the Arbitration Act which enacts that
a party to an arbitration agreement who desires to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement should apply to the Court for determin- ation of the question. This section represents the
· law on the subject as understood in England at the time of that legislation and as declared later ·by the House of Lords in Heyman v. Darwins Ltd. ('). The scop1 of s. 33 came up for consideration before
this Court in Shiva Jute Baling LU. v. Hindky & Oo. Ltd. ( •). .There a petition had been filed under that section praying inter alia for a declaration that the cohtraot between the parties containing an
(1) [1960] l S.C.R. 493. (2) l.L.R. [1948] 2 Cal. 171. (9) A.l.R.19.45 Mad.528. 5Sl. (4) [1960] l S.C.li. .589. (5) (1881) !IO Law.j. Rep. (N.S.) Bantr.10. r s s.c.R. arbitrathn clause, was void ab initio on the ground
of uncertainty and that there was in fact no cont- ract owing to' mutual mistake and it was held that thef'\e were questions for decision by Courts and not by arbitrators. We are accordingly of the
opinion that the dispute that the contract dated Septem her 7, 1!:155, is illegal and void is not one which the arbitrators are competent to decide under cl. 14 and that in ronsequonce the respondents
are entitled to maintain the present application under s. 33 of the Arbitration Act. (2) It is next contended for the appellants that even if cl. 14 should be held to be inoperative
by reason of the fact that the dispute is one relat- ing to the validity of the contract, the respondents are estopped from now challenging the award on that ground, because they appeared before the
arbitrators and took part in the proceedings before them. The decision in Exp. Wyld (1) is relied on in support of this contention. In that case a dis- pute between an assignee in bankruptcy and a
creditor, Mr. Wyld, was . referred to arbitration on the basis of an agretiment in writing between them. An award having been pronounced against Mr. Wyld, he disputed its validity on the ground that
the assignee had not obtained the leave of the Court for entering in~o the arbitration. ln reject- ing this contention the Court observed that under the law the agreement was binding on J1r. Wyld
even though the leave of the Court was not obtain- ed and that therefore he was not entitled to take this objection based on the informality of the sub- mission as be had himself acted on it. This deci-
sion is clearly of no assistance to the appellants be- cause there was a valid and.subsisting submission on which the jurisdiction of the arbitrators to hear the dispute was complet", rnd that was not affected by
the failure of the a sig11ee to obtain the requisite ( 1) (1861) SO Law J. . e l'o (N.S.) Banke. 10. 196B Khardah Company Ltd. Raymon &: Co. (India) Pot. Ltd. . ' 1961 K'hqrikJh Cmnpany
Ltd. v. , Raymon &t \India) Pvt.Ltd, leave because that was a matter between him and ·v the Court. But here if the agreement dated September 7, 1955, is void then there was no sub-
mission which was alive on which the arbitrators could act and the proceedings before them would be wholly without jurisdiction. If there had been another arbitration agrnement apart from and
independent of cl. 14 of the contract dated Sep- >-"' tember 7, 1955, it might have been possible to sus- tain the proceedings before the arbitrators as refe- rable to that agreement. But none such has been
set up· or proved in the present case.. All that is alleged is that the responjents acquiesced in the , proceedings. But what confers jurisdiction on the arbitrators to hear and decide a dispute is an arbi-
tration agreement as defined in s. 2(a) of the Arbi- tration Act, and where there is no such agreement, there is an initial want of jurisdiction which cannot be cured by acquiescence. It may also be mention-
ed that the decision· in Ex. p. Wyld 0) has been understood ~s an authority for the position that when one of the parties to the submission is under a disability that will not be a ground on which the \.(
other party can dispute the award if he was aware of it. · Vide Russel on Arbitration, 16th Edn, p. 320. We are therefore· unable to accept the contention of Mr. Sanyal, that the respondents are .estopped,
by their conduct · from questioning the validity of the award. (3) We may now proceed to consider the question whether the . contract dated September 7, 1955, is illegal as falling within the prohibition
enacted in the notification of the Central Govern- ment dated October 29, 1953. It will be conven- ient to set out ths relevant statutory provisions bearing on -this question. Section 2( i) of .the Forward
Contracts (H.egulation) Act, 1952, (Act 74 of 1952) hereinafter referred to as 'th~ Aot' (I) (1861) sOLawJ.Rcf. (N,S.) Bankf, .Io • ~ s.c.it. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS defines 'ready delivery Mntract' as meaning
"a contract which provides for the delivery of goods and the payment of .a price there- for, either immediately or within such period not exceeding eleven days after the date of the cont-
ract". 'Forward contract' is defined in s. 2(c) as meaning "a contract for the delivery of goods at a future date and which is not a ready delivery contract". Section 2(m) defines 'specific delivery
contract' as meaning "a forward contract which provides for the actual delivery of specific qualities or types of goods during a specified future period at a price fixed thereby or to be fixed in the
manner thereby agreed and in which the names· of both the buyer and the seller are mentioned". Sec- tion 2(f) defines 'non-transfe:able specific delivery contract' as meaning "a specific delivery contract
the rights or liabilities under which or under any delivery order, railway receipt, bill of lading, warehouse receipt or any other document of title relating thereto are not transferable" and finally
s. 2(n) defines 'transferable specific delivery con- tract' as meaning "a specific delivery contract which is not a non-transferable specific delivery contract". Chapter IV of the Act contains provisions
conferring authority on the Central Government to prohibit certain classes of forward contracts. Section 15(1) of the Act enacts: ' 115(1) The Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette, declare
thia section to apply to such goods or class of goods and in such areas as may be speci- fied in the notification, and thereupo.n, sub- ject to the provisions contained in section 18,
every forward contract for the sale or pur- chase of any goods specified in the notifica- tion which is entered into in the area specified Khardah Com;any Lid. v. flaymott & Co. (India) Pvt. Lrd.
..iiJi•r J. 196B Khardah Company Lid. i' v. :Raymon & Co. Hndia) Pvt •. Ltd. A!,var .J. i96 SUPREMECOlJRT REPORTS [1963] . th(lrein otherwise than between members of a recognised association or through or
with any such member shall be illegal." Where a notification has been issued under s. 15( 1) it is provided in s. 16 tha,t all forward con· tracts falling within the notification shall be deemed
to be closed out and thri t "the seller shall not be bound to give and the buyer shall not be bound to ,take delivery of the goods". Then comes s. 17 which is as follows:- " 17(1 ).
The. Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare that no person shall, save with the permission of the Central Government, enter into any forward contract for the. sale or purchase of
any goods or class of goods specified in the notification and to which the provisions of · section 15 have not been made applicable, e:x:cept to the e:x:tent and in the manner, if
any, as may be specified in the notification. ( ") All forward contracts in · contra- vention of the provisions of sub-sectidi;i (1) entered into after the date of publi- cation of the notification thereunder shall
be illegal. (3) Where a notification has been issued under sub-section (1 ), the provisions of sec- tion 16 shall, in the absence of anything to the contrary in the notification, apply .to all
forward contracts for the sale·· or purchase of any goods specified in the notification entered into on or before the date of the notification and remaining to be performed after the said date as they apply to all for-
ward contracts for the sale or purchase of ariy goods specified in the notification under sec- tion 15." 3 S.C.R. Section 18(1) provides that these provisions shall .not apply to non-transferable Epecific delivery
contracts for the sale or purchase of any goods. To analyse the scheme of the Act; it divides ~ontracts of sale of goods into two categories, 'ready delivery contracts, and 'Forward Contracts'.
Forward Contracts are classified into those which are 'specific delivery contracts' and those which are not. Then again 'specific delivery contracts' are divi«;Ied into 'transferable specific delivery contracts'
and 'non-transferable specific delivery contracts.' Section 18( l) exempts from the operation of the Act 'non-transferable specific delivery contracts'. The net result of these provisions is that all forward
contracts except those which are non-transferable specific delivery contracts can be declared illegal by notification issu~d under the Act. Such a notification was issued by the Central
Government in cxerci~e of the powers conferred by s. 17 of the Act, on October ·29, 1953. It is as follows:- f "No. 2(24) Jute/53-In exercise of the powers conferred by section 17 of the For-
ward Contracts (Regulation) Act, (LXXIV of 1952), the Central Government hereby declarrs that no person shall enter into any forward contract other than a non- transferable specific delivery contract for the
sale or purchase of raw jute in any form, except to the extent and in the manner speci- fied below, that is to say: (1) all forward contracts, other than non-transferable specific delivery contracts
for the sale or purchase of raw jute entered into before the date of this notification and remaining tc l:e rnfcimtd after the said date Khatdah Company Lid. v. Raymon & Co. (India\ Pvt. Ltd.
Kliertiala Company Ltd . .. Raym1n t6 CfJ. ( India) Z'vt. Ltd. Aiyar J. SUPREME COUR.T REPORTS [1963) shaU be deemed to be 'closed out at the rate prevailin~ at the time at which the Forward
Market closed on the saiil date: . ( 2) all differences arising · out of any contracts so deemed to be closed out shall be payable on the basis of the rate specified in clause (I) of this notification and the seller
shall not be bound to give and the buyer shall not be bound to take delivery of raw jute." The contract with which we are concerned in these 1tppeals was entered ·into on September 7, 1955,
when the uotification aforesaid was in force, and so it would be hit by it, unless it is a non-transfer· able specific delivery contract and the point for decision is whether it is that. There is no dispute
between the parties that it is a specific delivery contract. It is between named buyers and sellers the goods are specified, as also the period during which they have to be. actually delivered and their
price. isfixed. What is in controversy is whether it is transferable or non-transferable. There was considerable argument before us on the question as to assignability of a contract. The law of the~
subject is well settled and might be stated in sim- ple terms. An assignment of a contract. might result by transfer either of the rights or of the obligation8 thereunder .. But there is a well·re'cog-
nised distinction between these two classes of assignments. As a rule obligations under a contract cannot be assigned except with the consent of the .promisee, and when such consent is given, it is
rea\ly a novation resulting in substitution of liabi- lities. On the other hand rights under a contract "re assignable unless the contract is personal in its nature the rights are incapable of assignment either
. under the law or under an agreement between the partje1J1 ' · · ' · · …. .,. 3 S.C.R. In the light of the principles stated above, we shall now consider whether the contract dated
September, 7, 1955, is or is not transferable. As it is only a benefit under a contract that can be assigned, the discussion really centres round two questions, are the buyers entitled to assign their right to get the
goods on payment of price ? And are the . sellers entitled to assign their right to receive the price on delivery of the goods ? On the question as to the rights · of the buyers to assign their right to the
goods, the matter is clear beyond all doubts, The licence which authorises the appellants to import the goods from East Pakistan also prohibits them expressly from assigning the same. In this connec-
tion it should be noted that, owing to the exigencies of Foreign Exchange, there have been in force, at all material times, restrictions on import of goods. The nature of these restrictions and the policy be-
hind them wer~ examined by this Court quite recently ia Daya v. Joint Controller of Imports and Exports (1) and it is unnPcessary to repeat them. It is sufficient for the presPnt purpose to st\tte that
the issue of import lirJences by the Government was restricted to persons who had been engaged in the business of import during a specified period and there were also limitations on the extent to which
they could import. Manufacture ,,f jute occupies the pride of place among the industries of West Bengal. Raw jute required for the business is largely imported from Ea.st Pakistan, and for that purpose import licences
were being granted from time to time, to manufac- tures of jute. During the period of the contract with w'hich we are concerned the appellants held two import licences from the Government of India
(1) No. A 062290/52 and (2) A 063733/52. The licence No. A 062290/52 which is in the standard (I) (I 963) 2 S.C.R. 7a. 196:. Khardah Company Ltd. v. Raymon dt Co; (India) Pvt. Ltd.
Aiyar J. . 1.962 Khardalf€ump&ny Lli. v. Ra,mn II Co. (I nlilo) ~ol: Lt«. SUPREME COUR;t' REPORTS [1963] form is, so far as it is material for the present dis- cus.sion, as follows :-
"Import Trade Control. Office of the Joint Chief Controller of Imports, Calciutta. Licence No. A 062290/52/A.U./C.C.I/C. For Exchange Control purposes only.· '> • Class of Importer.
Actual User or Contract. (Valid at any Ii°tdian Port). (Not transferable except under a Jetter of authority from the authority who issued the licences' ,or from any Import Trade Control-
ler). Messrs .. Khardah Co. Ltd. of 7, Wel- lesle~ Place, Calcutta are hereby authorised to import the good8 of which particulars are given below :-. I. Country from which consig: .
ed Pakistan · \… – 2. Country of origin 3. Description of goods …. Raw Jute 4. Serial No. and part of the I.T.C. Schedule … 174-IV 5. Quantity 50,000Mds. (Fifty thou- sant ma-
unds only). This licence is issued subject to the con- dition that the goods will be utilised only for consumption as raw material or accessories in the licence holder's factory and that no por-
'y r' 0 tioµ t1ierrof 'IVill bl' rnld to an! partr." 3 S.C.R. It will be n~ticed that the licence is non-transferable and that further the goods to be imported are not to be sold to any party but to be utilised for manu-
facture in the factory of the licencee. In view of the terms of the licence there can be no question of aesignment of the contract by the buyers. That is not disputed. Turni~g next to the sellers, can they assign
their right to the price on delivery of the goods ? The learned Judges in the Court below held that they could, because, there was noting personal in the contract, and nothing in its terms which barred
the right to· assign a benefit which a party had under the general law. The appellants assail the , correctness of this decision. They contend the terms of the contract must be construed in the light
of the surrounrling circumstances, and especially of the import licenc~, and that if that is done, the pro- per conclusion to come to is that the agreement is not transferable. This contention must now be ex-
amined. The appellants sought, in the first instance, to establish on the basis of clauses 12 and 14 that. the agreement is personal in its character, and iR therefore not assignable.
Now the contract in ques- tion is one for the sale of goods, and ordinary there can be nothing personal about it. It is of no con- sequence to the buyer as to who delivers the goods.
What matters to him is that the goods delivered should be in accordance with the specifications. But it is argued that the status of the parties was a determinative factor in the making of the
agreement, and that is f!ought to be de1foced from cl. 12 of the C')ntract. That clause providPs that if either or both the parties to the contract are mem- bers of the Indian Jnte Mills Association and if
either of them is placed in the disapproved list of Association then the contract shall be deemed to Khardah Oompany Lid. v. Raymon& Co. (India) Pol. Ltd. Ehardah Campany Ltd. .. .
Raymon &: Co. (Inda) Pvt . .Gld. A{varJ. have been broken by that party. That shows, it is said, that the contract was entered into on the faith of the status of the parties as members of the Jute
Mills Association. But it is clear from the wording of, the clause that the parties to the contract need not necessarily be members of the Association and that being so, the element of status does not enter
into it. Clause l 4, which is the arbitration clause, is also relied on. as an indication that · the contract is personal in its character and incapable of assign- ment on that ground. But it i~ settled law that an
arbitration clause doe9 not take away the right of ·a party to a contract to assign it if it is otherwise assignable. Vide Slwyler v. Woolf (1) and Russel on Arbitation, 16th Edition, p. 65.
It is also argued that the rights conferred on the sellers under cl. 8 are incapable of assignment . in law, and that is an indication that the rights under the agreement are .not transferable. Clause
8 confers on the sellers certain rights against bu- yers, such as the rights to resell and so forth, when the latter refuse to accept the documents. What is said is that these rights cannot be assigned in law
as they are really claims founded on breach of con- tract by the buyers. That undoubtedly is so, but that noes not conclude the question. There is in . law a clear distinction bepween assignment of rights
under a contract by a party who has performed his obligations thereunder, and assignment of a claim for compensation .which one party has against .the other for breach of contract. Tile letter is a mere
claim for damages which cannot be assigned in law, the former js a benefit under an agreement, which is capable of assignment. The fact therefore that the rights under cl. 8 are incapable of assignment
does not stand in the way of the respondents assig- ning their rights to receive the {!rice after they 4aq performed their obligations. p> p946) ~ Alj, ,.,.. ~· 5t· 3 S.C.R. That brings us on to cl. 3 on which the appel-
lants mainly. Under that clause the sellers are entitled to receive the price only on their delive- ring to the buyers the full set of shipping docu- ments. Now the argument is that as the delivery
of documents and payment of cash are to be simul- taneous, it is a case of benefit under a contract be- ing burdened with a liability, and that such a bene- fit is incapable of assignment under the law. The
learned Judges in the Court below took the view that there was nothing in this clause which prevent- ed the Eeller from transferring the documents to a third party authorising him to deliver them to the
buyers, and then to receive the price from them, and they further observed. "Although in present- ing the shipping documents the transferee from the seller may act as his agent, he will not he an agent
in receiving payment from the buyer, because the right to receive the payment has been transfer- red to him and has become his own right". The respondents maintain that that is the correct
view to take of the rights of the parties under this clause and rely on the statements of law in Halsbury's Laws of England, and thP decision British W aggon Go. v. Lea (1). In Halsbury's
Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 8, p. 258, para 451, the law is thus stated : •'There is, however, no objection to the substituted performance by a third person of the duties of a party to the contract
where the duties are disconnected from the skill, character, or other personal qualifications of the party to the contra.ct. In such a circumstance, however, the liability of the original contracting
party is not discharged, and the only effect is that the other party may be able to look to the third party for the performance of the contractual obli- gations in addition to the original contracting
party". In British Waggon Oo. v . .Leg( 1), the faots (I) (1880) 5 Q,B.D. 1491 JSt. Khardah Oompa•.1 Ltd • .. Raymon & Ca. (India) Pvt. Ltd. Aiyr.rJ, Khardah Compciny Ltd. i v. Rnymon c6 Co.
(Jndio) Pvt. Ltd. Af)'ar J, . were that a company called the Parkgate Waggon Company had hited waggons to the defendant on the terms that he should pay rent for their use, and that the Company should execute the necessary
. repairs for them. The company then assigned its rights under the contract to another company called the British Company, subject to the obliga- tion to execute the repairs. In accordance with
this agreement the assignee did execute the repairs. , Thereafter l'arkgate Waggon Qo, demanded rent from the defendant, who resisted the claim on the ground that the Company had disabled itself from
performing theoontract, by reason of assignment to which · he had not consented. In overruling this contention the Court observed that as the work to be done under the contract did not require
personal skill or confidence, the. Parkgate Waggon Company could get it done by any person, and that would be sufficient performance. This decision. would be in point if the respondents had arranged
· to deliver the jute to the appellants through 'another person, and then claimed the price; and that claim was disputed. But it is not· an authority ·on the question which we have to decide, whether the
assignment of the benefit under the contract burdened as it is with an obligation would itself be valid. It is true that the Court observed in passing "That a debt accruing due under a· contract
can, since the passing of the Judicature Acts, be assigned at law as well as equity, cannot since the decision in Brice v. Bannister(1) be disputed". But it should be noted that. both the companies figured .
as plaintiffs, and therefore it is not possible to read those observation as a decision that an assignment .of a benefit burdened with an obligation is v;i,lid. It was argued for the respondents that it
would have been open to them to first obtain the requisite certificate from the Bank in East Pakist~ \ll (1878) s Q.IJ.I>. 5<ill, 3 S.C.R. SUPREl\IE COURT REPORTS then deliver it to the appellants, and then assign
their right to the price. But the question is not what could have been done by a Bl·dler fo a forward contract generall.v, but what was in fact contemp· lated by the partiios to this contract under .cl, 3,
The provisiomr that tb.e shipping documents in Pakistan should be taken in the name of the buyer that the sellers should deliver them to the. buyers and receive the price, and that the goods should
be delivered at the Mills of the buyers, strongly suggest that the intention of the parties was, that neither ef them should assign the contract, Whatever doubts one might have as to the
true import of cl, 3-it may be conceded, that it_ lends itself to the construction put on it by the learned Judges in the Court below, the position becomes unmistakably clear when it is construed in
the light of the import licence iu favour of the appellants. It has been already mentioned that it is this which authorises the appellants to import ra.w jute from East Pakistan. It is statcdly' not
transferable, and further the goods imported there- under are to be need only for consumption in the Mills of the appellants. It is 'contended for the respondents that they are not parties to this licence
and that · their rights under the general law to assign benefits under· the contract remain unaffected by it. This is to take too narrow a view of the true position. Far from being st1 angers to the licence,
the evidence clearly establishes that they are very intimately associated with it. On 8eptember 26, 1955, acting under licence No, A 062290/52 the appellants wrote to the Joint Chief Controller of
Imports and Exports, Government of India, to "issue a letter of authority in favour of sellers Messrs. Raymon & Company (India) Ltd., for 2,500 maunds jute cuttings t.c be imported from Narayan-
ganj, (East Pakistan), against the above (licence)." Khardah Company Lid. v. Rayman "1 Co· (lndi•) Pot. Ltd. Khardali Cam;any Ltd. v. Raymon&! Co. (India) Pvt. Ltd. Aiyar J. SUPREN'J1 COURT REPORTS (1963)
The letter of authority was received by the appe· llants on September 29, 1956, and they sent it on to the respondents with the following letter :- "Dear Sirs, Oootract No. 2306 ·
We are sending here with the Exchange Control Copy of Letter of Authority for 1250 Mds. Jute cuttings against the abovi>." Contract No. 2306 referred to in this letter is the contract dated September 7, 1955, involved
in this dispute. It ia on the strength of this letter of authority that the respondents opened a letter of credit with a Bank in East Pakistan and the goods were imported. We have not overlooked
the fact that while the contract is dated September 7, 1955, the licence is dated S~ptember 22, 1955, and the letter of authority to the respondents is even later, and it might strike one as· an anachro·
nism to read the licence and the letter of authority into the contract. But it should be remembered that the licences are in standard form and are renewed from time to time except as to details
concerning the imports, and the course of business followed in the jute market was throughout in conformity with· the conditions laid down in the licence and wa~ of the same pattern. Now the
agreement provides that the shipping documents in Pakistan are to be taken in the name of the buyers that the sellers are "to open letter of credit" and that the goods are to be delivered "at the
buyer's Mill siding" .. We have no doubt that these terms have been inserted with a view to give effect to the conditions on which licences are granted and that it was the understanding of both the sellers
and buyers that the righte under the contract were not to be transferred •. 20i But it is argued for the respondents that unless there is in the contract itself a specific clause pro-
hibiting transfer, the plea that it is not transferable is not open to the appellants and that evidence aliunde is not admissible to establioh it and the decision in $eetharamaswami v. Bhagwathi Oil Oom-
pany(1 ), H anumanthiah v. Thimanthiah{ 2) and Hussain Kasam Dada v. Vijayanagaram Comm. Asson. (3 ) are relied on in support of this position. We agree that when a contract has been reduced to writing we
must look only to that writing for ascertaining the terms of the agreement between the parties but it does not follow from this that it is only what is set out expressly and in so many words in the
document that can constitute a term of the contract between the p11.rties. If on a reading of the document as a whole, it can fairly be deduced from the words actufl.lly used therein that the parties had
agreed on a particular term, there is nothing in law which prevents them from setting up that term. The terms of a contract can be expressed or implied from what has been expressed. It is in the ultimate
analysis a question of construction of the contract. And again it is well established that in construing a contract it would be legitimate to take into account surrounding circumstances. Therefore on
the question whether there was an agreement between the parties that the contract was to be non-transferable, the absence of a specific clause forbidding transfer is not conclusive. What has
to be seen is whether it could be held on a reason- able interpretation of the contract, aided by such considerations as can legitimate'ly be taken into account that the agreement of the parties was that it
was not to be transferred. When once a conclusion is reached that such was the understanding of the parties, there is nothing in law which prevents effect from being given to it. That was the view
(I) [1951] I M.L.J. 147. (2) A.I.R. 1954 Med. 87. ( 3) A.I,R • .1958 Mod. 528, 5111. 196Z &hard ah Comp my Ltd. Ravmo~ & Co. (India) /'Vt. Ltd. ,962 lfhardah Oompony Ltd. v. Raymon & Co.
(Indio) Pvi. Ltd .A.iyar J. taken in VirjeeDaya & Oo. v. Ramakrishna Rice & Oil Mills( 1), and that in our opinion is correct. It remains· to deal with one other. question on which the parties have been at issue. It turns on
a consideration of . s. 2( f) of the Act. A non- transferable specific delivery contract is defined in s. 2(f), omitting what is not material, as a specific delivery contract the rights or liabilities under
which are not transferable. ,Now the contention of the appellants is that as admittedly the liabilities under the contract are not transferable it is a non- transferable contract within s. 2(f).
But the res- pondents argue that on that construction. no for- ward contract 'will be hit by the notification because liabiliti~s under the contract can never be trans- ferred and so the notification would become futile. ·
They accordingly contend that word 'or' should be read as 'and' and that on that construction unless both the rights and liabilities under the contract are non-transferable it is not a nou-transforable
contract as defined in s. 2(f). The appellants· urge that on this construction no contract would be non- transferable as rights under a contract can always be transferred unless it is personal in its character
and the section would be~ome practically useless. The inten.tion of the legislature as expressed· in the section· is, it must be admitted, clouded in obscurity and uncertainty. But in the view we have taken,
that the contract is on its terms prope.rly construed, non-transferable, it becomes unnecessary to decide between the arrival contentions as to the .true import of s. 2(f). In the result the appeals are allowed with
costs.one set throughout and one hearing fee. Appeals allowea . . (I) A.1.R. 1956 Med. no.