Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
15. The correctness of the aforesaid judgment in V.M. Shah KISHAN SINGH (D) THROUGH L.RS. v. GURPAL , 25 SINGH & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.] (supra) was doubted by this Court and the case was referr~d to A a larger Bench in K. G. Premshankar Vs. Inspector of Police & Anr., AIR 2002 SC 3372. In the said case, the Judgment in V.M. Shah (supra) was not approved. While deciding the case, this Court placed reliance upon the Judgment of the Privy Council in Emperor Vs. Khwaja Nazair Ahmad, AIR 1945 PC 18 wherein B it has been held as under :- "It is conceded that the findings in a civil proceeding are not binding in a subsequent prosecution founded upon the same or similar a/legations. Moreover, the police investigation was stopped and it cannot be said with C certainty that no more information could be obtained. But even if it were not, it is the duty of a criminal court when a prosecution for a crime takes place before it to form its own view and not to reach its conclusion by reference to any previous decision which is not binding upon it." (Emphasis D a~e~
16. In Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr. vs. Meenakshi Marwah & Anr (2005) 4 SCC 370, this Court held as under:- "Coming to the last contention that an effort should be E made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and criminal courts, it is necessary to point out that the standard of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the F entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given. There is neither any statutory provision nor any legal principle that the findings recorded in one proceeding may be treated as final or binding in the other, as both the cases have to be decided G on the basis of the evidence adduced therein."
17. In Dr. Swaroopa Rani vs. Hari Narayana Alias Hari Babu AIR 2008 SC 1884, this Court held as under:- c [2010) 10 S.C.R. ~·t is, however, well settled that in a given case, civil proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed simultaneously. Whether civil proceedings or criminal proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and circumstances of each case …… Filing of an independent criminal proceeding, although initiated in terms of some observations made by the civil court, is not barred under any statute …… It goes without saying that the respondent shall be at liberty to take recourse to such a remedy which is available to him in law. We have interfered with the impugned order only because in law simultaneous proceedings of a civil and a criminal case is permissible."
18. In Syed Aksari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam & Anr. Vs. State (Delhi Admn) & Anr., (2009) 5 SCC 528, tnis Court considered all the earlier Judgments on the issue and held that D while deciding the case in Karam Chand (supra), this Court failed to take note of the Constitution Bench Judgment in M.S. Sherrif (supra) and, therefore. it remains per incuriam and does not lay down the correct law. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Vishnu Dutt Sharma Vs. Daya Prasad, (2009) 13 SCC 729, wherein it has been held by this Court that the decision in Karamchand (supra) stood overruled in K. G, Premshankar (supra).
19. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue stands crystallized to the effect that the findings of fact recorded by the Civil Court do not have any bearing so far as the criminal case is concerned and vice-versa. Standard of proof is different in civil and criminal cases. In civil cases it is preponderance of probabilities while in criminal cases it is proof beyond reasonable G doubt. There is neither any statutory nor any legal principle that findings recorded by the court either in civil or criminal proceedings shall be binding between the same parties while dealing with the same subject matter and both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein. However, there may be cases where the provisions of Sections KISHAN SING.H (D) THROUGH L.RS. v. GURPAL SINGH & ORS. (DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.] ~.1Jo 43 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, dealing with the A relevance of previous Judgments in subsequent cases may be taken into consideration.
20. In view of the above, the Judgment and order of the High Court dated 13.02.2009 is not sustainable in the eyes of law and is liable to be set aside. However, the facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant so. The agreement to sell in favour of the appellants' father is dated 22.10.1988 and sale deed was to be executed and registered by 15.06.1989. The respondent Nos.1 to 4 filed Civil suit No. 60/1989 in 1989. It is difficult to believe that the appellants' father was not aware of the pend ency C of that suit. No explanation has been furnished as to why after expiry of the date of execution of the sale deed in favour of Kishan Singh, i.e. 15.06.1989, the appellants' father did not file the suit for specific performance which was subsequently filed on 6.2.1996 as Civil Suit No. 81/1996. Even if it is presumed that D Kishan Singh was not aware of pendency of suit filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 4, no explanation could be furnished that in case, the appellants' father filed another suit No. 1075/1996 for setting aside the decree dated 8.5.1996 in Civil Suit no.60/ 1989, why did he wait till the decision of that suit for lodging FIR, as the civil and criminal proceedings could have proceeded simultaneously. The FIR has, been filed only on 23.07.2002 i.e. after filing the RFA No. 2488/2002 before the High Court on 15.07.2002. Therefore, there is an inordinate delay on the part of the appellants' father in filing the FIR and there is no explanation whatsoever for the same.
21. Prompt and early reporting of the occurrence by the informant with all its vivid details gives an assurance regarding truth of its version. In case, there is some delay in filing the FIR, the complainant must give explanation for the same. G Undoubtedly, delay in lodging the FIR does not make the complainant's case improba~le when such delay is properly explained. However, deliberate delay in lodging the complaint is always fatal. [vide: Sahib Singh Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1997 SC 324 7]. c [2010) 10 S.C.R.
22. In cases where there is a delay in lodging a FIR, the Court has to look for a plausible explanation for such delay. In absence of such an explanation, the delay may be fatal. The reason for quashing such proceedings may not be merely that the allegations were an after thought or had given a coloured version of events. In such cases the court should carefully examine the facts before it for the reason that a frustrated litigant who failed to succeed before the Civil Court may initiate criminal proceedings just to harass the other side with mala fide intentions or the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance on the other party. Chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustrations by cheaply invoking the jurisdiction of the criminal court. The court proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment and persecution. In such a case, where an FIR is lodged clearly with a view to spite the other party because of a private and personal grudge and to enmesh the other party in long and arduous criminal proceedings, the court may take a view that it amounts to an abuse of the process of law in the facts and circumstances of the case. (vide: Chandrapal Singh & Ors. Vs. Maharaj Singh & Anr., AIR 1982 SC 1238; State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors., AIR 1992 SC 604; G. Sagar Suri & Anr. Vs. State of UP. & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 754; and Gorige Pentaiah Vs. State of A.P. & Ors., (2008) 12 SCC 531).
23. The case before us relates to a question of the genuineness of the agreement to sell dated 4.1.1988. The said agreement was between Kishori Lal and respondents and according to the terms of the said agreement, the sale deed was to be executed by 10.6.1989. As the sale deed was not executed within the said time, suit for specific performance was filed by the other party in 1989 which was decreed in 1996. So far as the present appellants are concerned, agreement to sell dated 22.10.1988 was executed in favour of their father and the sale deed was to be executed by 15.6.1989. No action was taken till 1996 for non-execution of the sale deed. The appellants' father approached the court after 7 years by filing Suit No.81/1996 for specific performance. However, by that time, the suit filed by the 1,., .. KISHAN SINGH (D) THROUGH L.RS. v. GURPAL SINGH & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.] present respondents stood decreed.
The appellants' father filed another Suit No.1075/96 for setting aside the judgment and decree passed in favour of the respondents 1 to 4. The said suit was dismissed by the Additional District Judge (Senior Division), Khanna on 10.6.2002. Subsequently, the appellants preferred RFA No. 2488/02 on 15. 7 .2002 against the aforesaid order, and the said appeal is still pending before the Punjab & Haryana High Court. 24: It is to be noted that the appellants' father Kishan Singh lodged FIR No.144/02 on 23.7.2002 through his attorney Jaswant Singh Mann under Sections 420/323/467/468/471/120-8 IPC,. C against the respondents. The allegations made in the FIR were substantially similar to the allegations r1"tade by the appellants in Civil Suit No.1075/96, which had been'decided against them. It is evident that the aforesaid FIR was filed with inordinate delay and there has been no plausible explanation for the same. The D appellants lodged the aforesaid FIR only after meeting their Waterloo· in the Civil Court. Thus, it is evident that the FIR was lodged with the sole intention of harassing the respondents and enmeshing them in long and arduous,eriminal proceedings'. We are of the view that such an action on the part of the appellants' father would not be bona fide, and the criminal proceedings initiated by him against the respondents amount to an abuse of the process of law.
25. In view of the above, and to do substantial justice, we are not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings against the respondents in spite of the fact that the impugned judgment dated 13.02.2009 passed in Criminal Misc. No. 4136 of 2003 is not sustainable in the eyes of law. of. R.P.
26. With these observati~ns, the appeal stands disposed Appeal disposed of.