Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
115. On a concatenation of the stream of events, traced from the acquisition of the land involved, we are thus of the G view that the circular dated 13.12.2001 is indeed a policy decision of the State Government regarding the allotment of developed land in lieu of compensation to the persons referred to therein and is thus enforceable against it.
116. Even otherwise, having regard to the consistency in approach of the State Government in the matter of allotment of developed land in lieu of compensation as is evident from the series of circulars commencing from 22.4.1992 to 27.10.2005 in continuum, motivated by the objective of early B culmination of the process of acquisition of land on the spirit of mutual settlement, the same irrefutably present an inviolable scheme of proclaimed State action for compliance, thereby making it invocable against the respondents, more particularly as the same had been acted upon over the years. The plea of c the respondents, at this belated stage, to take refuge of unenforceability of the circular dated 13.12.2001 in isolation, as not being a binding policy, cannot receive judicial imprimatur.
117. The process leading to the allotment of !and at D Lalchandpura and Anantpura villages, as the records produced discloses, did originate from the circular dated 13.12.2001, and received the approval of the Chief Minister at an appropriate stage. It would thus be conspicuously patent, that all concerned State functionaries were not only aware of the E relevance and the obligatory bearing of the said circular, but also had participated in the exercise, contemplated by it for allotment of developed land in lieu of compensation. The respondents, in the totality of the existent facts and circumstances are thus estopped from questioning the status F and efficacy of the said circular in vesting a right in the appellants to claim their due in law there under.
118. To recall, not only in the meeting dated 18.10.2001 under the chairmanship of the departmental minister, which G indeed, as the minutes thereof would disclose, was called to formulate a composite policy on various aspects and procedures in relation to allotment of 15% developed land in lieu of compensation, but also in the resultant circular dated 13.12.2001, it had been resolved in clear terms that the developed land would normally be allotted in the scheme area LALARAM v. JAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [AMIT AVA ROY, J.] and at the place where the land had been acquired and that, if A it was not possible to develop the scheme within a fixed period of five months or it was not possible to give land in the same area, it was only then that land would be allotted in some other area. In that eventuality as well, a sincere endeavour was to be made to allot land nearthe scheme area. Developed status B of the land to be allotted and its proximity to the site from where the land had been acquired for a scheme, were thus the two imperatives to identify the land to be allotted. It was only if the developed land within the scheme area was not available for allotment, that a plot near the scheme area was to be made C available. In any case, the requirement of developed character of the land could not be undermined, disregarded or waived.
119. As by the time, the allotment was contemplated, the JDAAct had been brought into force, the concept of developed land was clearly traceable to one informed with the concept of D "development" and "amenities" defined thereunder. Any land to be allotted in lieu of compensation, thus, was required to mandatorily comply with the requisites of 'development' and 'amenities' as envisaged under the JOA Act. As only a certain percentage of land acquired was offered by way of allotment E and understandably as the same was in lieu of compensation i.e. the market value along with the incidentals, it was expectedly assessed to be proportionate thereto in value/ worth. 15% developed land was, thus construed to be equivalent to the amount of compensation then payable for F the land acquired. However, for the purpose of identification of developed land as on today, equivalence of the value thereof with that of the land acquired as on date after three decades would not be a correct measure. The appellants were entitled to 15% developed land in the year 2001, the point of time when G the value thereof was comparable to the compensation then payable for the acquisition of their land. Had the developed land, as conceived of, been allotted to them, then the value thereof over the years, as on date, would have been much higher than their land so acquired. Though the development of a plot of land depends upon various factors e.g. location, potential, facilities, use etc., it. is a matter of common experience that the pace of enhancement of the value of an already developed land would be increasingly higher in B comparison to the one not developed. The value of the acquired land of the appellants, thus, as on today, cannot be taken to be an unmistakable index to identify the developed land to be allotted to them.
120. Be that as it may, the land offered to the appellants C at Lalchandpura and Anantpura as well as at Boytawala and Mansarampura have been held by this Court, as recently on 7.5.2015, to be not fully developed and more importantly ·conceded to be so by the JOA as recorded in the said order. According to the JOA, it would require further two years to develop the land thereat. The land of the appellants, as acquired, was situated at Boytawala which, thus.has not yet been fully developed as on date. Thus, in any view of the matter, the market value of the land at Boytawala cannot be an acceptable yardstick to identify the developed land to which E they are entitled. This is more so, as for the last thirty years and above, the respondents have failed to allot 15% developed land as envisaged by the policy to the appellants. Admittedly, two of the land oustees had been allotted developed land at Vidyadhar Nagar and as the letter dated 16.10.2007 referred F to hereinabove would reveal, till then, land at the same site was available. As a matter of fact, allotment of land at Lalchandpura, Anantpura, Boytawala and Mansarampura, which admittedly had not been fully developed, was in breach of the promise engrafted in the policy dated 13.12.2001. The G approach of the respondents, when viewed in the backdrop of compulsory acquisition of land in the exercise of the State's power of eminent domain and its persistent failure to act on this policy, only demonstrates a highly insensitive and evasive orientation at the cost of its citizenry by a show of dominant .H LALARAM v. JAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [AMITAVAROY, J.] bargaining power. The policy, though was to allot developed A land in lieu of compensation to ensure quick and unhindered completion of the process of acquisition, the respondents have remained apathetically inert, having obtained the land, without living up to their commitments. To gloss over this inexplicable default, would signify effacement of decades of indifference B and mute inaction of the respondents, more particularly.the State, inspite of a binding policy decision, to the suffering detriment and preiudice to the appellants without their fault. In this overwhelming conspectus of facts, the respondents cannot be permitted to dictate terms to the appellants in the matter of C allotment of land inter alia on the consideration of equivalence· of the value of their land as acquired with the one offered to them as developed land as on date.
121. The assertions founded on the right to property and the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate D expectation assumes significance at this juncture.
122. The rightto property though no longer a fundamental right is otherwise a zealous possession of which one cannot be divested save by the authority of law as is enjoined by Article E 300A of the Constitution of India. Any callous inaction or apathy of the State and its instrumentalities, in securing just compensation would amount to dereliction of a constitutional duty, justifying issuance of writ of mandamus for appropriate remedial directions.
123. This Court in Indore Vikas Pradhikaran (supra) had an occasion to refer to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (dated 26.8.1789) to expound that though earlier, human rights existed to the claim of individuals' right to health, livelihood, shelter and· employment etc., these have G started gaining a multifaceted approach, so much so that property rights have become integrated within the definition of human rights.
124. The right of the owner of a land to receive just compensation, in the context of his claim to access to justice as declared by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, had been underlined by this Court in Steel Authority of India Limited (supra).
125. While recognising the power of the State to acquire B the land of its citizens, it has been proclaimed in Dev Sharan (supra) that even though the right to property is no longer a fundamental right and was never a natural right, it has to be accepted that without the right to property, other rights become illusory. c
126. In a catena of decisions of this court, this prize privilege has also been equated to human right. Jn Mukesh Kumar (supra), this Court has succinctly propounded this proposition in the following terms: "The right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutorv right but also a human right. Human rights have already been considered in the realm of individual rights such as the right to health, right to livelihood, right to shelter and employment etc. But now human rights are gaining a multifaceted dimension. Right to property is also considered very much a part of the new dimension. Therefore, even the claim of adverse· possession has to be read in that context. The changing attitude of the English courts is quite visible from the judgment of Beaulane Properties Ltd. vs. Palmer (2005)4All ER 461. The Court here tried to read the human rights position in the context of adverse possession. But what is commendable is that the dimensions of human rights have widened so much that now property dispute issues are also being raised within the contours of human rights. With the expanding jurisprudence of the European Courts of Human Rights, the Court has taken an unkind view to the concept of adverse possession. LALARAM v. JAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [AMITAVAROY, J.]
127. In sum ma, the right to property having been elevated A to the status of human rights, it is inherent in every individual, and thus has to be venerably acknowledged and can, by no means, be belittled or trivialized by adopting an unconcerned and nonchalant disposition by anyone, far less the State, after compulsorily acquiring his land by invoking an B expropriatory legislative mechanism. The judicial mandate of human rights dimension, thus, makes it incumbent on the State to solemnly respond to its constitutional obligation to guarantee that a land looser is adequately compensated. The proposition does not admit of any compromise or laxity. c
128. Added to this, is the promissory estoppel perspective, the State being the promisor. Estoppel is a rule of equity which has entrenched itself with time in the domain of public life. A new class of estoppel recognised as "promissory estoppel" has assumed considerable significance D in the recent years. So far as this Court is concerned, it invoked the doctrine in Anglo Afghan Agencies (supra) in which it was enounced that even if a case would not fall within the purview of Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, it would still be open to a party, who had acted on a E representation made by the Government, to claim that it should be bound to carry out the promise made by it, even though the promise was not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution of India. This principle, evolved by equity, to avoid injustice is trC1ceable as well in the leading case on the subject in Central London Property Trust Ltd. vs. High Trees House Ltd ( 194 7) 1 KB 130.
129. In a later decision of this Court in Motila/ Padampat G Sugar Mills Co. (supra), responding to the plea of the State Government, inter alia, that there could be no promissory estoppel against it, so as to inhibit it from formulating and implementing its policies in public interest, this Court underlined, in reiteration, the well-known preconditions for the operation of the doctrine as under: (1) A clear and unequivocal promise, knowing and intending that it would be acted upon by the promisee; (2).0n such acting upon the promise by the promise, it would be inequitable to allow the promisorto go back on the promise.
130. This Court in Nestle India Limited (supra), while referring to the decision of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills C (supra) quoted para 24 of that judgment to the effect that the Government stood on the same footing as a prjvate individual so far as the obligation in law was concerned and that the former was equally bound as the latter and it was difficult to see on what principle, could a Government, committed to the D rule of law, claim immunity from the doctrine of promissory . estoppel.
131. This hallowed notion of equitable estoppel has stood the test of time with peripheral variations to reverberate in the E following exposition in Monnet /spat (supra) in the following terms: 182.1. Where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in the future. knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is. in fact. so acted upon by the other party. the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it. if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties. and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not. LALARAM v. JAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [AMITAVA ROY, J.] 182.2 The doctrine of promissorv estoppels may be A applied against the Government where the interest of justice. morality and common fairness dictate such a course. The doctrine is applicable against the State even in its governmental. public or sovereign capacity where it is necessary to present fraud or manifest injustice. B However, the Government or even a private party under the doctrine of promissory estoppels cannot be asked to do an act prohibited in law. The nature and function which the Government discharges is not very relevant. The Government is subject to the rule of promissory c estoppels and if the essential ingredients of this doctrine are satisfied, the Government can be compelled to carry out the promise made by it.
132. Adding a caveat to the State Government otherwise inescapably bound by the doctrine, this Court in S. V.A. Steel D Re-Rolling Mills (supra) ruled that before extending benefits to its subjects by laying down any policy, it must ponder over the pros and cons thereof and its capacity to accord the same, as it would be unfair and immoral on its part thereafter, not to act as per its promise.
133. A parallel doctrine founded .on the doctrine of fairness and natural justice baptised as "legitimate expectation" has grown as well in the firmament of administrative law to ensure the predication of fairness in State F action. The concept of "legitimate expectation" is elaborated in Halsbury"s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume. 1 ( 1) 151 as hereunder: "81. Legitimate expectations.- A person may have a legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way G by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The · expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority, including an implied representation. or from consistent past practice. (2015] 14 S.C.R. The existence of a legitimate expectation may have a number of different consequences; it may give locus standi to seek leave to apply for judicial review; it may mean that the authority ought not to act so as to defeat the expectation without some overriding reason of public policy to justify its doing so: or it may mean that, if the authority proposes to defeat a person's legitimate expectation. it must afford him an opportunity to make representations on the matter: The courts also distinguish, for example in licensing cases, between c original applications, applications to renew and revocations; a party who has been granted a licence may have a legitimate expectation that it will be renewed unless there is some good reason not to do so, and may therefore be entitled to greater procedural protection than o a mere applicant for a grant."
134. In espousing this equitable notion of exacting fairness in governmental dealings, this Court in Food Corporation of India (supra) proclaimed that there was no unfettered discretion in public law and that a sovereign authority E possessed powers only to use them for public good. Observing that the investiture of such power imposes with it, the duty to act fairly and to adopt a procedure which is 'fair play in action', it was underlined that it also raises a reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his dealings F with the State and its instrumentalities.
135. The observance of this obligation as a part of good administration, is obligated by the requirement of non- arbitrariness in a state action, which as a corollary, makes it incumbent on the State to consider and give due weight to the G reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons, likely to be affected by the decision, so much so that any failure to do so would proclaim unfairness in the exercise of power, thus vitiating the decision by its abuse or lack of bona fide. The besieged decision would then be exposed to the challenge . LALARAM v. JAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [AMITAVAROY, J . .J on the ground of arbitrariness. It was propounded that mere A reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, may not by itself be a di~tinct enforceable right in all circumstances, but· the failure to consider and give due weight to it, may render the decision arbitrary. It was thus, set down that the requirement of due consideration of legitimate expectation formed a part B of the principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. In reiteration to the above enunciation, this· Court in Monnet /spat (supra) did rule as well, that the doctrine of legitimate expectation is founded on the principle of reasonableness and fairness and arises out of the principles c of natural justice and can be invoked as a substantive and enforceable right.
136. In course of the arguments, as adverted to hereinabove, host of pleadings have been exchanged portraying contrary view points on the developed status of the D · land sought to be allotted, the summary whereof has been extracted hereinabove. It appears there from that the sites at Boytawala, Lalchandpura, Anantpura and Mansarampura are located within a range of 14. 70 K.M. to 39 K.M. from the central point Jaipur, the nearest being at Boytawala. All these lands E have been recorded by this Court, as admitted by the JDA, to be not fully developed. The plots offered by the respondents at . Rohini Phase I, Anupam Vihar, Pitambara Scheme including Rajbhawan Yojana , Rohini Phase II, Abhinav Vihar Vistar and Harit Vihar are situated within a distance of 25.40 K.M. to 36.80 · F K.M. from the central point, Jaipur.
137. The appellants, in categorical terms, have asserted that the plots at these places are not developed inasmuch as they are bereft of the essential facilities like water, electricity, communication/connectivity, sewerage, drainage etc. and . have sought to substantiate their plea on the basis of recent . photographs along with sworn pleadings. On the other hand, … they have suggested plots at Vidyadhar Nagar, Gokul Nagar, Truck Terminal and Vaishali Nagar, located within a distance (2015] 148.C.R. A of 5 K.M. to 15.6 K.M. from the central point Jaipur for allotment. That these plots of land are developed has been unreservedly admitted by the respondents, their ~lea being chat, the appellants are not entitled thereto, judged by the factor Qf equivalence of the value of the acquired land.
138. At this distant point of time, we are disinclined to sustain this demur of the respondents. As the facts have unfolded, the appellants cannot be held accountable for the delay in between, the respondents having failed to offer developed land as contemplated in the policy. This stands C fortified, amongst others, by the order dated 7 .5.2015 vis-a- vis the land at Boytawala, Lal Chandpura, Anantpura and Man sarampura. The other plots offered by the respondents, also having regard to the attributes of developed land as envisioned by the Rajasthan Act do not accord with the letter and spirit of D the policy.
139. Administrative discretion, irrespective of its ostensible expanse, it is a trite proposition, can never be unregulated, omnipotent and fanciful. A public authority vested E with power has to essentially exercise its discretion, if . conferred, conditioned by the dictates of duty as envisaged, to effectuate the exercise of the prerogative to achieve the objective therefor. The central and cardinal canon of administrative governance, enjoins a framework of controlled F use of discretion coupled with duty which is inscribed in felicitous terms in Administrative Law, 10th Edition by H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth at Page 286 as quoted: "The first requirement is the recognition that all power has legal limits. The next requirement. no less vital. is that the courts should draw those limits in a way which strikes the most suitable balance between executive efficiency and legal protection of the citizen. Parliament constantly confers upon public authorities powers which on their face might seem absolute and arbitrary. But arbitrary power and unfettered discretion are what the LALARAM v. JAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [AMITAVAROY, J.] courts refuse to countenance. They have woven a network A of restrictive principles which require statutory powers to be exercised reasonably and in good faith, for proper purposes only, and in accordance with the spirit as well as the letter of the empowering Act." Vis-a-vis public duties it has been expressed at page 496.thus: · "As well as illegal action, by excess or abuse of power. there may be illegal inaction. by neglect of duty. Public authorities have a great many legal duties. under which c they have an obligation to act, as opposed to their legal powers. which give them discretion whether to act or not. The remedies so far investigated deal with the control of powers. The remedies for the enforcement of duties are necessarily different. The most important of them is D mandamus.
140. Dwelling· upon the constitutional imperative of fairness in State action in Naida Entrepreneurs Association vs. Naida and others (2011 )6 SCC 508, this Court revisited the dynamics of the interplay between administrative power E and discretion vis-a-vis public duty accompanying the same. Underlying the essentiality of non-arbitrariness and transparency in executive functioning as a guarantee of certitude and probity, it was observed thus: "39: State actions are required to be non-arbitrary and F justified on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. Action of the State or its instrumentality must be in conformity with -some principle which meets the test of · reason and relevance. Functioning of a "democratic form of Government demands equality and absence of G arbitrariness and discrimination". The rule of law prohibits arbitrary action and commands the authority concerned to act in accordance with law. Every action of the State or its instrumentalities should neither be suggestive of c discrimination. nor even apparently give an impression of bias. favouritism and nepotism. If a decision is taken without any"principle or without any rule, it is unpredictable and such a decision is antithesis to the decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. 40: The public trust doctrine is a part of the law of the land. The doctrine has grown from Article 21 of the Constitution. In essence. the action/order of the State or State instrumentality would stand vitiated if it lacks bona tides, as it would only be a case of colourable exercise of power. The rule of law is the foundation of a democratic society. [Vide Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State ofW.B., Ramana Dayaram Shettyv. /nternationa/ Airport Authority of India, Haji T.M. Hassan Rawtherv. Kera/a Financial Corpn, Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P and M./. Builders (P) Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu.] 41: Power vested by the State in a public authoritv should be viewed as a trust coupled with duty to be exercised in larger public and social interest. Power is to be exercised strictly adhering to the statutory provisions and fact situation of a case. "Public authorities cannot play fast and loose with the powers vested in them." A decision taken in an arbitrarv manner contradicts the principle of legitimate expectation. An authority is under a legal obligation to exercise the power reasonably and in good faith to effectuate the purpose for which power stood conferred. In this context, "in good faith" means "for legitimate reasons". It must be exercised bona fide for the purpose and for none other. [Vide Commr. of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji, Sirsi Municipalityv. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis, State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, Collector (District Magistrate) v. Raja Ram Jaiswa/, DelhiAdmn. v. ManoharLaland N.D. Jaya/v. Union of India.] LALARAM v. JAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [AMITAVAROY, J.]
141. In the over!lll perspectives, in our discernment, the A respondents have utterly failed to abide by a public policy upon which, the appellant had altered their position and had suffered immense prejudice. The persistent denial to the appellants of their right to the developed land in lieu of compensation and that too without any legally acceptable justification, has ensued · B in manifest injustice to the appellants over the years. Neither have they been paid just compensation for the land acquired nor have they been provided with the developed land in place thereof, as assured. They are thus predominantly entitled for the remedial intervention of this court to ensure fair, just, C efficacious, tangible and consummate relief in realistic terms. lffaimess is an indispensable and innate constituent of natural justice, this imperative indubitably has to inform as well the judicial remedy comprehended. In the overwhelming factual scenario, as obtains in the instant case, refusal to gr<mt the o . relief to which they are entitled, would amount to perpetuation of gross illegality, unjustness and unfairness meted out to them. The textual facts demand an appropriate response of the judicial process to effectu;;ite the guarantee of justice, engrafted in the preamble of the Constitution reinforced by the canons of E equity.
142. The remedy indeed has to be commensurate to the cause and the prejudice suffered. The invocable judicial tools, predominantly in the form of a writ of mandamus, and the plentitude of the powers of constitutional courts, and more F particularly, this court under Article 142 of the Constitution are assuredly the potential redressal aids in fact situations akin to . the one in hand.
143. A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is intended to supply deficiencies in law and is thus G discretionary in nature. The issuance of writ of mandamus pre-supposes a clear right of the applicant and unjustifiable failure of a duty imposed on an authority otherwise obliged· in law to imperatively discharge the same. c [2015) 14 S.C.R.
144. The dominant features of a writ of mandamus authoritatively figures in the following exfract from the Halswbusy Laws of England, 4'h Edition (page 111 ): "Nature of mandamus. The order of mandamus is of a most extensive remedial nature, and is, in from, a command issuing from the High Court of Justice, directed to any person, corporation, or inferior tribunal, requiring him or them to do some particular thing therein specified which appertains to his or their office and is in the nature of a public duty. Its purpose is to remedy defects of justice; and accordingly it will issue, to the end that justice may be done, in all cases where there is a specific legal right and no specific legal remedy for enforcing that right; and it may issue in cases where, although there is an alternative legal remedy, yet that mode of redress is less convenient. beneficial and effectual.
145. An insight into the equitable theory in the application of law was explored by the celebrated jurist Roscoe Pound in his treatise "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law'' in the following excerpts: "To the adherents of this theory the essential thing is a reasonable and just solution of the individual controversy. They conceive of the legal precept. whether legislative or traditional. as a guide to the judge, leading him toward the just result. But they insist that within wide limits he should be free to deal with the individual case so as to meet the demands of justice between the parties and accord with the reason and moral sense of ordinary men. They insist that application of law is not a purely mechanical process. They contend that it involves not logic only but moral judgments as to particular situations and courses of conduct in view of the special circumstances which are never exactly alike. They insist that such judgments involve intuitions based upon LALARAM v. JAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [AMITAVA ROY, J.] experience and are not to be expressed in definitely A formulated rules. They argue that the cause is not to be ·fitted to the rule but the rule to the cause Equity uses its powers of individualizing to the best 8 advantage in connection with the conduct of those in whom trust and confidence has been reposed Philosophically the apportionment of the field between C rule and discretion which is suggested by the use of rules and of standards respectively in modern law has its basis in the respective fields of intelligence and intuition. Bergson tells us that the former is more adapted to the inorganic, the latter more to life. The rule. mechanically applied, works by repetition and precludes individuality in results, which would threaten the security of acquisitions and ·the security of transactions. On the other hand. in the hand-made as distinguished from the machine-made product. the E specialized skill of the workman gives us something infinitely more subtle than can be expressed in rules. In law some situations cal or the product of hands, not of machines, for they involve not repetition. where the . general elements are significant. but unique events, in which the special circumstances are significant. Where the call is for individuality in the product of the legal mill we resort to standards. And the sacrifice of certainty in so doing is more apparent than actual. For G the certainty attained by mechanical application of fixed rules to human conduct has always been illusory."
146. The above extracts authoritatively underscore the indispensable essentiality 6f individuality in results in a persuasive fact situation to obviate mechanical application of fixed rules, by invoking equity and discretion to secure realistic remedies tailor-made to the situational demands justifying the B paramountcy of the rule of law.
147. Our national charter, being a living and organic document, no provision thereof can remain static or stale and must be accorded a vibrant import to guarantee the effectuation of the preambular pledge in its fullest.content. The plenary C powers of this Court enshrined in Article 142 of the Constitution of India for achieving complete justice is only an insignia of empowerment so that the constitutional guarantees are not reduced to mere ritualistic incantations.
148. This Court extra-ordinarily does exercise its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India as warranted in a given fact situation, for making order (s) as is felt necessary for doing completejustice in a case a matter pending before it.
149. As the nature and extent of the power indicates, there can be no straight jacket formula, for its exercise nor there can be any fetter thereto, it being plenary in nature. The invocation of this power is to reach injustice and redress the same, if it is not feasible otherwise to achieve this avowed objective. In doing so, this Court acts in its equity jurisdiction to balance the conflicting interests of the parties and advance the cause of administration of even handed justice. The purport and purpose of this power being justice oriented and guided by equitable principles, it chiefly aims at the enforcement of a G public duty, if not forthcoming on legitimate justification ensuing in oppressive injustice, militating against the constitutional ordainment of equality before law and equal protection of laws enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India and entrenched as are, among others, in the invaluable right to life LALARAM v. JAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [AMITAVAROY, J.] envisioned in Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
150. The Constitutional Courts are sentinels of justice and vested with the extra-ordinary power of judicial review to ensure thatthe rights of the citizens are duly protected. That the quest for justice is a compulsion of judicial conscience, found its expression in C. Chenga Reddy and Others vs. State of A.P. (1996) 10 SCC 193 in the following extract: "A court of equity must so act. within the permissible limits so as to prevent injustice. "Equity is not past the age of child-bearing" and an effort to do justice between the c parties is a compulsion of judicial conscience. Courts can and should strive to evolve an appropriate remedy. in the facts and circumstances of a given case. so as to further the cause of justice. within the available range and forging new tools for the said purpose. if necessarv to 0 chisel hard edges of the law."
151. This underlying thought found erudite elaboration in Manohar Lal Sharma ~s. Principal Secretary and Others (2014) 2 sec 532 .. "The Supreme Court has been conferred very· wide powers for proper and effective administration of justice. The Court has inherent power and jurisdiction for dealing with any exceptional situation in larger public interest which builds confidence in the rule of law and strengthens democracy. The Supreme Court as the sentinel on the qui vive, has been invested with the powers which are elastic and flexible and in certain areas the rigidity in exercise of such powers is considered inappropriate."
152. Thus failure to discharge an obligatory duty defined G by public policy without any justification in disregard thereto viewed in the context of the sacrosanct content of human rights in Article 300A is an inexcusable failure of t!le state to discharge its solemn constitutional obligation, the live purpose for its existence. The predominant facts herein, justifiably demand a fitting relief modelled by law, equity and good conscience. Thus, the elaborate preface.
153. In the overall view of the. matter, we are of the confirmed opinion, that in the singular facts and circumstances of the case and for the sake of complete justice, the appellants B are entitled to be allotted their quota of 15% developed land in the terms of policy/circular dated 13.12.2001 in one or more available plots at Vidyadhar Nagar, Gokul Nagar, Truck Terminal and Vaishali Nagar as enumerated by them in their affidavit dated 17.8.2015. The respondents are hereby directed to C accommodate them accordingly.
154. In the wake up of above, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment and order is set-aside. The respondents would allot the developed land as per policy decision dated 13.12.2001 to the appellants at the places indicated hereinabove without fail and within a period of six weeks herefrom. To secure a permanent resolution to the · lingering lis, the respondents would ensure that a transparent and fair process is undertaken, if necessary, to be overseen E by an appropriate authority to obviate any disparity in treatment in the matter of allotment as ordered.
155. We part with the belief and expectation that the respondents would be alive to their duty cast by law and would not precipitate any further cause of action necessitating the intervention of this Court with stringent initiatives. No costs. Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Appeals allowed.