Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
64. In Report No.85 dated 4.4.2011, ‘CAPTION’ is the same as in Report No.1. A complaint was made by the Monitoring Committee as to the order of the Lt. Governor of Delhi for “de-sealing” some of the establishments under “commercial/ mixed land use” in violation of orders of this Court. The details of “construction on public land” by Dr. Lal Path Labs, 54, Hanuman Road, and encroachment on public land, unauthorized construction, and misuse of “shops/flats in Khan Market” area was concerned. REPORT NO.103
65. In Report No.103 dated 12.4.2016, it was pointed out that pursuant to remitting the cases by this Court to the Delhi High Court, various difficulties in the implementation of the order were pointed out. The details were given with respect to the hearing of the cases by the Delhi High Court and progress on disposal of appeals before the Tribunals. The details of de-sealing of properties in the unauthorized colony, village & abadi area (including urban villages constructed on public land) were given. The details were given about the refusal of the Standing Committee of the erstwhile MCD to de-notify 140 Roads in Shahdara North, Rohini, Central, South, and West Zones resurveyed. Violations of the orders dated 3.1.2012 and 30.4.2013 by various commercial establishments were pointed out and other facts regarding interference of Lt. Governor of Delhi in the sealing matter of Dr. Lal Path Labs Pvt. Ltd. etc. and unauthorized construction on Government and public land were given thus: “The Monitoring Committee would submit to the Hon’ble Court that the Municipal Authorities, NDMC and DDA are lax in the performance of their duty with respect to unauthorised construction and encroachment on public/ govt. land. The public at large is violating the laid down orders i.e. Building Bye Laws and Master Plan etc. The fear factor with respect to the punitive action by the Authorities is totally missing from the public mind thereby creating a chaotic situation on the ground in whole of Delhi. The officers concerned are not performing there assigned duties. The DDA has not been able to safe guard/ protect its land and there is rampant encroachment. The DDA must as a policy make a boundary wall to protect the land from any type of encroachment and also carry out regular inspection of their land holdings.” REPORT NO.104
66. Report No.104 dated 30.10.2017 deals with the “conversion charges” regarding “mixed use land”, de-notification of 140 roads, “unauthorized construction” on “public and Government land” and “unauthorized colonies were being constructed by way of encroachments in the Government land”. The Report further states regarding violations by commercial establishments like Delhi Cloth Mills and other institutions where “commercial shops” were built and regarding Ambassador “Hotel” etc. REPORT NO.106
67. In Report No.106 dated 10.1.2018 submitted by the Monitoring Committee, public land use was acquired where unauthorized structures were raised. The Monitoring Committee has mentioned the following facts: M.C. MEHTA v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.] “The Monitoring Committee has finalized its plan to carry out the assigned task of sealing the unauthorized structures, eradicate misuse and remove encroachment on DDA/ Government land and making the public aware of the seriousness of their crime for any illegal act in this process. Retrieval of DDA land and Forest land is the priority task set by the Monitoring Committee.” REPORT NO.111
68. In Report No.111 dated 7.2.2018 concerning E-5A, Hauz Khaz Market, New Delhi, it was submitted that the same falls under Shops- cum-Residential use, not as a Local Shopping Centre. The Report was regarding “use of basement for professional activities in residential premises”. It further dealt with the “encroachments on the public land” and submits that the “commercial activities are not permitted in the converted shops cum residence”. REPORT NO.112
69. Report No.112 dated 9.2.2018 of the Monitoring Committee is concerning large scale “commercial activities in the residential premises” at Shahdara, South Zone. REPORT NO.114
70. Report No.114 dated 3.4.2018 is concerning the construction of unauthorized colonies on Gram Sabha land, acquired land, DDA land, and MCD land. It was submitted that no regularization could be done in respect of residential premises used for non-residential purposes. REPORT NO.118
71. Report No.118 dated 7.5.2018 concerns the “Khan Market” where “verandahs were encroached and amalgamated in the shops” causing hardship to the visitors in the market. The report further states regarding encroachment of DDA land at Sanjay Market, Mangolpur Kalan in Rohini Zone and misuse of premises for commercial activities REPORT NO.119
72. Report No.119 dated 24.5.2018 is regarding the slow progress of the “sealing operations” in Lajpat Nagar-IV and Amar Colony- Refugee Colony, where large scale “encroachments” were made by owners/ occupants on the “Government land”. REPORT NO.120
73. Report No.120 dated 11.6.2018, again referred to this Court’s order dated 29.9.2006 regarding “conversion of residential user into commercial” user except with the leave of this Court. It was observed that the Government’s obligation was to ensure compliance of the order of this Court, and the Special Task Force and the Monitoring Committee were directed to continue with its duties and responsibilities. REPORT NO.121
74. Report No.121 dated 13.6.2018 was concerning “non- cooperation” of the local bodies with the Sealing Officer, where after inspection, it was found that certain “rooftops” were being used as “pubs” and “dance floors” after clubbing the plots illegally. REPORT NO.124
75. In Report No.124 dated 4.7.2018 again, a complaint was made relating to “non-cooperation” of authorities in the sealing process as the Master Plan (MPD-2021) was under consideration. REPORT NO.125
76. Report No.125 dated 31.7.2018 is concerning the constitution of the Special Task Force. It was pointed out that there was “non- cooperation” by the “Special Task Force”. Details were mentioned about sealing action at Amar Colony, Lajpat Nagar, where the “tenements” built by the Government for residential purposes only were allotted to refugees in various colonies in Delhi on a lease basis. Most of them were used for “commercial activities by raising unauthorized construction” on the Government and common land. Details about the roads were also given. REPORT NO.127
77. Report No.127 dated 20.8.2018 was again concerning illegal/ unauthorized construction. With respect to “Burari Area” (North MCD) the report was submitted that the area was vandalized and huge unauthorized construction has come up. Concerning “Vishwas Nagar” (EDMC), report was relating to “residential premises being used as Go- downs” and storing places for “prohibited industries,”. In Kishangarh area at South Zone, large scale unauthorized construction was reported M.C. MEHTA v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.] on DDA land by way of encroachment. Similarly, the encroachment on DDA land at Karkardooma Metro Station was pointed out. At Bhatti Mines area of SDMC, “encroachment of Revenue/Forest land” was pointed out. REPORT NO.128
78. In Report No.128 dated 5.9.2018 suggestions were made regarding permanent de-sealing norms. Dubious deviations regarding misuse of unauthorized constructions were pointed out. “Unauthorized constructions” were being raised in unauthorized colonies on the “public land”. Details were given about “encroachment on the DDA land”. REPORT NO.129
79. In Report No.129 dated 18.9.2018 report was furnished regarding illegal dairy running at Gokulpur, which was sealed but the seal was tampered. REPORT NO.131
80. Report No.131 dated 8.10.2018 is related to the “contempt notice” issued by this Court to one of the Members of Parliament. REPORT NO.134
81. Report No.134 was submitted concerning the “Motels/ Farm Houses” who have constructed “pandals, shamianas, sheds,” etc. in their plots. Order dated 12.10.2018 of this Court was also stated which is extracted hereunder: “…….As an interim measure, we direct that the basement of the premises in question shall remain sealed until further orders. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant says that no pandal will be constructed on the premises in question. In view of this undertaking, the seal on the premises may be opened. The Monitoring Committee as well as the South Delhi Municipal Corporation should give their report within ten days. The applicant may respond to these reports within four days thereafter.”
82. Certain violations of MPD-2021 were also pointed out to be complied with by the concerned authorities. REPORT NO.144
83. Report No.144 dated 11.12.2018 is in respect of the “cases pending” before the “High Court of Delhi” regarding property situated at 22A, Janpath. The report was submitted regarding “change of the land” used for “residential purposes as commercial” and the residential premises were used to run a chemist shop. Similarly, other cases were also pointed out. Regarding the 20 Point Programme (TPP) certain “allotments” of plots were made for the “residential purpose” but they were being used for the “commercial activities”. Showrooms, Restaurants, Gyms, etc. were reported to be in operation on those plots. The report further states with respect to Singla Sweets (commercial) at Madhu Vihar and Vanasthali Public School, which were constructed on public and acquired land.
84. The order dated 7.5.2019 was pointed out time and again by the learned counsel for the parties. On 7.5.219 this Court directed the Monitoring Committee as under: “Heard Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel and Amicus Curiae, and the learned senior counsel appearing on both the sides. I.A.No. 61593/2019 and 61594/2019 A question has been raised whether the Committee has the jurisdiction to decide about the premises which have been erected for residential purposes only and are not being used for commercial purposes and the buildings have not been erected and used for industrial purposes. Question is also raised whether the Committee has been empowered to take care of unauthorised construction, when they are purely for residential purpose. We request the Committee to send its opinion whether in the past, it has exercised its power and jurisdiction where the premises are only constructed and are used as residential one and there is an allegation of raising unauthorised construction or some deviation has been made in the existing structure. We request the Committee to furnish its considered opinion in this regard before this Court. M.C. MEHTA v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.] It was also submitted that as per the provisions contained in Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 and Delhi Development Act, 1957, notification was issued by the DDA on 22.03.2016. Chapter 1 contains the provision of regularisation. Paragraph 2.27 is extracted hereunder :- “2.27 Any building or part thereof constructed unauthorisedly with or without obtaining the Sanction/ Completion Certificate communicated thereof by a written intimation/undertaking can be regularised, if the same is within the ambit of BBL and MPD provisions by paying requisite fees and charges as per Annexure IV.” It was also submitted that the construction is in accordance with the Master Plan and is in low density residential area. Whether it is a case of deviation or wholly unauthorised construction in view of the report of measurement, may also be gone into by the Committee and thereafter, the matter may be decided in an objective manner, whether it can be compounded or not in accordance with the aforesaid provisions. Let the Committee decide the matter afresh within 15 days of the receipt of the report after hearing the concerned parties. Factual position from SDM may also be ascertained as he has written letter dated 03.04.2019. As prayed for by Mr. Abhimanyu Bhandari, learned counsel, it is open to the applicants to maintain the horticulture and watering of the plants etc. For taking out the essential items etc., it is open to the applicant to apply to the Committee.” This Court directed the Monitoring Committee to give its considered opinion specifically as to whether at any point in time in the past, it sealed any residential premises, which were not misused for commercial purposes. The Monitoring Committee kept silent on this aspect and did not cite even a single such instance. Four orders referred to by the Monitoring Committee neither deal with the question of the power of the Monitoring Committee, nor they are relevant to the point in question.
85. It is apparent from the various orders passed by this Court from time to time and from the various reports of the Monitoring Committee that it was never authorized by this Court to take action against the residential premises that were not being used for commercial purposes. It was appointed only to check the misuser of the residential properties for commercial purposes. After that, this Court directed that the Monitoring Committee should also look into the matter of “encroachment on the public land” and “unauthorized colonies” that have come up on the public land and were wholly unauthorized without sanction. At no point in time, this Court had empowered the Monitoring Committee to act vis-à-vis to the purely residential premises.
86. The power of sealing of property carries civil consequences. A person can be deprived of the property by following a procedure in accordance with law. The Monitoring Committee is not authorized to take action concerning the residential premises situated on the private land. If there is unauthorized construction or in case of deviation, the requisite provisions are under the DMC Act, such as sections 343, 345, 347(A), 347(B). The mode of action and adjudication under the Act is provided including appellate provisions and that of the Tribunal. It would not be appropriate to the Monitoring Committee to usurp statutory powers and act beyond authority conferred upon it by the Court. The Monitoring Committee could not have sealed the residential premises, which were not misused for the commercial purpose as done vide Report No.149, nor it could have directed the demolition of those residential properties.
87. Article 300A of the Constitution provides that nobody can be deprived of the property and right of residence otherwise in the manner prescribed by law. When the statute prescribes a mode, the property’s deprivation cannot be done in other modes since this Court did not authorize the Committee to take action in the matter. An action could have been taken in no other manner except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law as laid down in the decisions referred to at the Bar thus: (a) State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata, (2005) 12 SCC 77, wherein this Court observed: “59. ….In absence of any substantive provisions contained in a parliamentary or legislative act, he cannot be refrained from dealing with his property in any manner he likes. Such statutory interdict would be opposed to one’s right of property as envisaged under Article 300-A of the Constitution.” M.C. MEHTA v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.] (b) K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd v. State of Karnataka (2011) 9 SCC 1 in which it was opined: “168. Article 300-A proclaims that no person can be deprived of his property save by authority of law, meaning thereby that a person cannot be deprived of his property merely by an executive fiat, without any specific legal authority or without the support of law made by a competent legislature. The expression “property” in Article 300-A confined not to land alone, it includes intangibles like copyrights and other intellectual property and embraces every possible interest recognised by law. 169. This Court in State of W.B. v. Vishnunarayan and Associates (P) Ltd.6, while examining the provisions of the West Bengal Great Eastern Hotel (Acquisition of Undertaking) Act, 1980, held in the context of Article 300-A that the State or executive officers cannot interfere with the right of others unless they can point out the specific provisions of law which authorises their rights.” (emphasis supplied) (c) In T. Vijayalakshmi v. Town Planning Member, (2006) 8 SCC 502, the Court observed: “13. Town Planning legislations are regulatory in nature. The right to property of a person would include a right to construct a building. Such a right, however, can be restricted by reason of a legislation. In terms of the provisions of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, a comprehensive development plan was prepared. It indisputably is still in force. Whether the amendments to the said comprehensive development plan as proposed by the Authority would ultimately be accepted by the State or not is uncertain. It is yet to apply its mind. Amendments to a development plan must conform to the provisions of the Act. As noticed hereinbefore, the State has called for objection from the citizens. Ecological balance no doubt is required to be maintained and the courts while interpreting a statute should bestow serious consideration in this behalf, but ecological aspects, it is trite, are ordinarily a part of the town planning legislation. If in the legislation itself or in the statute governing the field, ecological aspects have not been taken into 6 (2002) 4 SCC 134 consideration keeping in view the future need, the State and the Authority must take the blame therefor. We must assume that these aspects of the matter were taken into consideration by the Authority and the State. But the rights of the parties cannot be intermeddled with so long as an appropriate amendment in the legislation is not brought into force. * * * 15. The law in this behalf is explicit. Right of a person to construct residential houses in the residential area is a valuable right. The said right can only be regulated in terms of a regulatory statute but unless there exists a clear provision the same cannot be taken away. ….” (emphasis supplied) (d) In the matter of State of U.P. v. Manohar (2005) 2 SCC 126, this Court observed: “7. Ours is a constitutional democracy and the rights available to the citizens are declared by the Constitution. Although Article 19(1)(f) was deleted by the Forty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution, Article 300-A has been placed in the Constitution, which reads as follows: “300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law.—No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.” 8. This is a case where we find utter lack of legal authority for deprivation of the respondent’s property by the appellants who are State authorities. …” (e) In Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Anr. (2011) 9 SCC 354, this Court held: “83. The expression “law” which figures both in Article 21 and Article 300-A must be given the same meaning. In both the cases the law would mean a validly enacted law. In order to be valid law it must be just, fair and reasonable having regard to the requirement of Articles 14 and 21 as explained in Maneka Gandhi. This is especially so, as “law” in both the Articles 21 and 300-A is M.C. MEHTA v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.] meant to prevent deprivation of rights. Insofar as Article 21 is concerned, it is a fundamental right whereas in Article 300-A it is a constitutional right which has been given a status of a basic human right.” (f) It was further argued that planning laws are expropriatory and should be strictly construed, and any ambiguity is to be construed in favour of the property owner as laid down in Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd.v. & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Anr. (supra) thus: “129. Statutes which encroach upon rights, whether as regards person or property, are subject to strict construction in the same way as penal Acts. It is a recognised rule that they should be interpreted, if possible, so as to respect such rights and if there is any ambiguity, the construction which is in favour of the freedom of the individual should be adopted. (See Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn. by P. St. J. Langan.) 130. This Court in Devinder Singh7 held that the Land Acquisition Act is an expropriatory legislation and followed the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. v. Darius Shapur Chenai8. Therefore, it should be construed strictly. The Court has also taken the view that even in cases of directory requirements, substantial compliance with such provision would be necessary.” (emphasis supplied) (g) In Ramchandra Ravindra Waghmare v. Indore Municipal Corporation, (2017) 1 SCC 667, it was opined: “67. It was also submitted that town planning and municipal institutes are regulating and restricting the use of private property under the aforesaid Acts. They are “expropriatory legislation”. Thus they are liable to be construed strictly as laid down in Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd.9" (h) In Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. & Ors., (2007) 8 SCC 705, it was held: 7 (2008) 1 SCC 728 8 (2005) 7 SCC 627 9 Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. & Ors.(2007) 8 SCC 705. “57. The Act being regulatory in nature as by reason thereof the right of an owner of property to use and develop stands restricted, requires strict construction. An owner of land ordinarily would be entitled to use or develop the same for any purpose unless there exists certain regulation in a statute or statutory rules. Regulations contained in such statute must be interpreted in such a manner so as to least interfere with the right to property of the owner of such land. Restrictions are made in larger public interest. Such restrictions, indisputably must be reasonable ones. (See Balram Kumawat v. Union of India10; Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Pilibhit Pantnagar Beej Ltd.11 and Union of India v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd.12) The statutory scheme contemplates that a person and owner of land should not ordinarily be deprived from the user thereof by way of reservation or designation. 58. Expropriatory legislation, as is well-known, must be given a strict construction.” (i) In State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas & Ors., (1969) 1 SCC 509, it was held: “55. …… Once the draft town-planning scheme is sanctioned, the land becomes subject to the provisions of the Town Planning Act, and on the final town-planning scheme being sanctioned, by statutory operation the title of the various owners is readjusted and the lands needed for a public purpose vest in the local authority. Land required for any of the purposes of a town planning scheme cannot be acquired otherwise than under the Act, for it is a settled rule of interpretation of statutes that when power is given under a statute to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all:” (emphasis supplied) (j) In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111, it was opined: “40. The statutory interdict of use and enjoyment of the property must be strictly construed. It is well settled that when a statutory authority is required to do a thing in a particular manner, the same M.C. MEHTA v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 10 (2003) 7 SCC 628 11 (2004) 1 SCC 391 12 (2004) 2 SCC 747 must be done in that manner or not at all. The State and other authorities while acting under the said Act are only creature of statute. They must act within the four corners thereof.” (emphasis supplied) (k) In Shrirampur Municipal Council v. Satyabhamabai Bhimaji Dawkher (2013) 5 SCC 627 it was held: “43. …… This is the reason why time-limit of ten years has been prescribed in Section 31(5) and also under Sections 126 and 127 of the 1966 Act for the acquisition of land, with a stipulation that if the land is not acquired within six months of the service of notice under Section 127 or steps are not commenced for acquisition, reservation of the land will be deemed to have lapsed. Shri Naphade’s interpretation of the scheme of Sections 126 and 127, if accepted, will lead to absurd results and the landowners will be deprived of their right to use the property for an indefinite period without being paid compensation. That would tantamount to depriving the citizens of their property without the sanction of law and would result in violation of Article 300-A of the Constitution.” (emphasis supplied) 88. It is quite apparent that particularly when the Monitoring Committee is not empowered to take action, the incumbents could not have been deprived of the due process of protection in accordance with law. As against the action of the Monitoring Committee, no appeal lies elsewhere. Even High Court is not authorized to entertain any matter and scrutinize its action, such is the drastic step taken by this Court by way of an exceptional measure in public interest, and it is confined to the misuse of residential property for commercial purpose and encroachments and unauthorized construction on the public land, roads. 89. After going through the report of the Monitoring Committee and other reports which have been relied upon by the Amicus Curiae, there is no scintilla of doubt that the Monitoring Committee in the past at any point of time did not seal any residential premises being used for residential purposes, situated on the private land nor it could have ordered demolition. The ‘caption’ of the various reports of Monitoring Committee i.e. “PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE MONITORING COMMITTEE FOR SEALING OF COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS IN RESIDENTIAL PREMISES” makes it absolutely clear that Monitoring Committee did not entertain any doubt about the purpose for which it was constituted. Apart from that, it was authorized by subsequent orders to act with respect to unauthorized construction on the public land and roads that too, which violated the MPD-2021. 90. Learned Amicus Curiae raised the alternative submission that the Monitoring Committee acted bonafidely at the instance of the letter written by the Sub Divisional Magistrate. We are of the opinion that the Monitoring Committee could not have acted based on any such letter. It was not permissible for the Monitoring Committee to act in the matter. May be that it acted under some confusion created by the letter. Be that as it may. We do not want to go further into the matter of bona fide. However, it is apparent that its action was beyond the purpose for which it had been appointed. 91. We are not going into the merits of the other submissions, whether the premises are authorized or unauthorized, can be regularized or not, compounding can be done, or whether there is any deviation made. The report of the Monitoring Committee and findings recorded by it are of no use as it had no such authority to go into the various questions. This Court did not appoint the Monitoring Committee concerning each and every residential building on private land not misused for commercial purposes and to deal with the same. In the present matter, this Court itself is monitoring the matter for a limited public purpose. It has not taken away the powers of statutory authorities under the Act concerning other matters except specified in the order. 92. Since we have considered only the ambit of powers of the Monitoring Committee, we have not touched with the submissions which were not relevant to decide, as raised by Mr. Govardhan. 93. We quash Report No.149 and other reports submitted subsequently in connection with Report No.149 and entire action of sealing pursuant thereto. We also quash notices issued directing demolition where the matter was being heard by this Court and the Monitoring Committee had no power to look into the matter and to take any action. Let the property sealed as per Report No.149 be de-sealed, and possession be restored to the owners forthwith. Let this order be complied with within three days. However, we clarify that this order does not at all mean to M.C. MEHTA v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.] belittle the yeomen service done by the Monitoring Committee for protection of Delhi. We also place on record our deep appreciation for the selfless service done by Shri Ranjit Kumar, Amicus Curiae, for the last 24 years, with unflinching hard work and dedication along with his team of other Amicus in the matter. Issue notice in IA No.64993 of 2020. Divya Pandey Directions issued.