_, l . \c • l 2 s.c.R. justice. It is hardly necessary to add that cl. 8 of s. 545 of the Bombay Police Manual ca.n not be held to be b1.d a.s contravening the rules of natural justice.
'fhis finding however does not dispose of the entire matter. It is the contention of the respon- dent that the Deputy Inspector Genera.I of police was not entitled in revision to enhance the punish-
ment and this question has not been decided by the learned Judges. It is therefore necessary to remand this case for hearing on this a.nd a.11 other issues whioh might a.rise for decision. We accordingly
set a.side the order in appeal and remand the oa.se for hearing on the other points in· this oase. Coats of this appeal will a.bide the result of the hearing in the Court below. Gase remanded •
M/S. AMARCHAND LALITKUMAR .v. SHREE AMBICA JUTE MILLS LTD. (S. K. DAS, M. HmA.YA.TULLA.B a.nd J. c. SRA.H, JJ.) ..4.rbitration-Reoooation-Pt1Wtr of Ouurt-Periotlic fluctWJtion of price, if an emergency~:A.rbitralion Act, 1940 (10 of 1940), 88. 6,34-Worlcing Manval ofllie lilaetlndia Jute and Heenan lil:rcliange, Oh. IX. paMB. 7(c), 11.
The appellants as sellers of raw jute entered into forward contracts with the respondent jute mills to sell such jute to thCDI. The contracts.being transferable specific delivery contracts, were entered into . in the standard printed forms of'the ~t India Jute & Hessian Exchange Ltd., which was
an association rCcognised under the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1912, and thus were subject to the rules and bye-Jaws made by the &change which provided for arbitration of .dispu!CI by the tribllll&I of· Arbitration of the 198B
Slate of My•or1 v 8, S. Matap., Ma, a. AtrMrcAanti Lalitb:mar v. Sltrte Adica Jule Miii• U4. Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry or the Indian Chamber of Commerce in Calcutta.
The appellants failed to supply the stipulated jute within the time mentioned in the guarantee clauses. The respondents exercised their option under the rules aforesaid, canceJlcd the contracts and charged the appellants for the difference in price between the contract rate and the market rate prevailing on the date! of cancellation and on the appellants denying their liability applied for arbitration. The appellants thereupon applied
to the High Court under s. 5 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, for Tevoking the authority of the arbitrator. There case in contemplated in Para 11, in Ch. IX of the Working Manual of the Exchange sub•tance was that there was an emergency
as due to scarcity of raw jute and speculation at the relevant time and the price of raw jute shot up abnormally, tbiJ placed the buyers and sellers of r"w jute in two conflicting camp, and the majority of lhe arbitrators in the r,anel of arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and
ndustry being connected with the buyers of raw jute, the jute mills, wtre disqualified from acting as impartial arbitrators. The High Court held that no such emergent condition had been
proved as would justify revocation of the authority of an appointed arbitrator. Held, that the normal periodical ftuctuation in the price of raw jute could not constitllte an emergency within the
meaning of para. 11 in Ch. IX of the Manual since such fluctuations have been taken into consideration by those who entered Into forward contracts. Such an emergency must be one which is abnormal and which none could foresee. It
could not, therefore, be said that in the present case there was such a conflict of interest between sellers and buyers as would render the panel of arbitrators having a practical
experience of the normal fluctuations of the market disqualified to act as impartial arbitrators. Th• object of ss. 5 and 34 of the Arbitration Act was the same, namely, to prevent arbitration, with this difference tbat an application under s.5 would lie if proceedings had not yet .been
commenced in Court whereas under s. 34 an application lay when they had commenced, But a Court would not lightly exercise its discretion to grant leave to revoke an arbitrator's authority.
Before it would do so it must be satiafied that" a substantial miJcarriage of justice would otherwise take place. Parties would not be relieved from a tribunal of their own choice simply be- caUIC they feared that its decision might go agalnat them, 2 S.C.R.
and the court had to base its decision on. one 01 other of five ·• grounds, namely, execs• or refosal of jurisdiction by arbitrator, misconduct of arbitrator, disqualification .of arbitrator, charges of fraud and lastly the existence of exceptional
circumstances. In the instant cases there were no exceptional circumstances to justify the conclusion that the arbitrator was disqualified by bias due to conflicting ciaos interest. cBalabw: Aganrola v. l,achminarain J'Ute Mfg. Go. Ltd.
(194. 7) 51 C.W.N. 863, Tolaram Nat/Jmull v. Birla J'Ute Manu. facturing Go. Ltd. (1948) 2 Cal. 171, Dwarkallas Go. v. Keshar. aeoB'Ulma, (1948) I Cal. 190.and Bhuwalka lJros. Ltd. v •
FeteclianaMurlidhar,. (1951) 2 Cal. 115; distinguished . . The extension of time given to the buyers by the contracts beyond a month specified by para. 7(c) in Ch. IX of the Working . Manual for delivering letter of authority did not bring the contracts materially into conflict with that provision ·nor could the absence of the expression "without any difference on both sides", which occurred in the sold
notes, from the bought notes make any difference to the rights of the parties. CIVIL Al'l'ELLATE JuruSDIOTION : Civil Appeal No. 640 of 1961; Appeal by speoia.l leave from the judgment
and order dated September 14', 1961, of the Calcutta. High Court in Matter No. 44 of 1961. WITH Civil Appeals Nos. 173 to 175 of 1962. Appeal by special leave from the judgments and order dated September 14 and 21,. 1961, of
the .Calcutta. High Court in Matters Nos. 149, 258 and 162 of f961. A(. 0. Betdl'IJOil,, Attornev General of India, B. Ben and P. K. Bose, for the appellants in C.A. No. 640 of 61.
llaehine Ohaud'/w,ri, Ellis Meyer, B'lllrr.ota K. Ohawlhuri and I. N. Shroff, for the respondent in C.A~ No. 640/61. Amarcluajd Lofill:wr.ar Sliru drnbidd Juli MitlJ Lid. t/1111 r…tiflt·•·
s~_…J.,,. tltllt LU. Da1J. SUPREME OOURT REl'ORTS [1963] N. 0. Ohatterjee, B. L. Kanodia and B. P. JJlaheawari, for the appellants in C.A. No. 173 of 1962. B. Sen, B. L. Kanodia and B. P. Mahuhwari,
for the appellants in C.Aa. No. 174 and 175 of 1962. G. 8. Pathak, M. G. Poddar and D. N. Mt.l/dierjee for the respondents in C.A. No. 173/62. P. L. Kliaitan, 8. N. Andley and Ramuhwar
Nalh, for the respondents in CA. No. 174/62. A. 0. Bhabra, M. G. Poddar, P. L. Khaitan and D.N. Mukherjee for the reapondents in C. A. No. 175/62. 1962. May 3. The Judgment of the Court wae
delivered by S. K. DAS, J.-These four appeals, all with speoial leave of this Court, have been heard together because they raise common questions of law and fact. This judgment will govern them all.
In the High Court of Calcutta, in or about February-July, 1961, a series of applications numbering about 170 were filed by sellers of raw jnt.e. The main relief askt1d for by those applioationa
was the revocation of the authority of an arbitrator appoint.ed under certain contracts which the applicants had entered into with the respondents iD circumatanoee whioh we aha.II presently state;
Bxoept iD two or three oaeo& the respondent.I were . all jute mill companies which pnrchase raw jute and manufacture finished goods therefrom. The main oontroveray which theee applioa.tiona gave rise
to was deAlt with by the High oourt in its judgment dat:ed September 14, 1961, in the application entitled Ram Kumar OMotaria v, TUaghur Juk Faclofoy Go. LU. (Matter No. 20 of 1961 before the Hip Court).
:!f i .. . ' i 2 S.C.R. SUPRl!:ME COURT REPORTS Certain special points arising in some of the other applications were dealt with in separa.te judgments. ) The· High Court stated in its judgment in Ram·
Kumar Ohhotaria v. Titaghur Jute Factory Oo. Lt<l. that the only relief, among the many included in the petition, preSBed at the hearing WaB leave to revoke the authority of the appointed arbitrator
under the provisions of s. 5 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (Act 10 of 1940) which provides that "the authority of an appointed arbitrator or umpire shall not be revocable except With the leave of the Court,
unless a contrary intention is expressed in the arbitration agreement." We shall now state t.he circumstances in which the applications were made for leave to revoke the authority of the appointed arbitrator and in doing
so we shall state somewhat fully the facts alleged in the application of M/s. Amarohand Lalitkumar a firm registered under the Indian Partnership Act, and carrying on business in Calcutta, which, firm
is the appeJlant before us in Civil Appeal No. 640 of196L The facta being similar we shall not repeat them with regard to the other three appeals, but refer to such 11pecial facts or points in those '.appeals
as have been pressed before us . -t On. April 22, 1960, M/s. Amarchand Lalit- kumar, whom we shall refer to as the appellant, entered into a contract being contract No. 1786 with Shree Ambica Jute Mills Ltd., respondent
0in Civil Appeal No. 640 of 1961, whereby the appellant agreed to sell and the respondent agreed to buy some 10,000 mannds of Middle and Bottom Jute at a particular price. The contract was negotiated
by a firm of brokers M/s. A. M. Mair & Co. (Private) Ltd., and was entered into in the standard printed form prescribed by the East India Jute & Hessian Exchange Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the
1961. Amar Mand Loli·kumdr Shrte ,Jmbica Jule .lfil/1 Ltd. DasJ. f 1HI A•..M.nd Lalfl•llllfOr v. ,\Ar.1 Ambit11 Jrtle Muu LU. Dcu J, SUPREME OOURT REPOR'l'B [1963] 'Exchange) and was suhject to the rules and bye·
. aws made by it. The oonti:act was a forward contract being a transferable specific delivery contract in raw jute, the contract providing by a guarantee clause for "shipment or despatch during
August/September, 1960'. By the operation of the provisions of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act 1952 (Aot 74 of 1952), and the notifications made by the Central Government thereunder,
forward contracts for tho sale or purchaee of raw jute in the city of Calcutta ,,.hicb included the area within the municipal limits of Calcutta, the Port. of Calcutta and the districts of 24 Parganas, Nadia,
Howrah and Hooghly, could only be entered into between members of a recognised asaociation or •hrough or with any such member. The exchange was such a recognised as11oeiation. The Aot empowered
recognised &88ociations to make bye-laws for the regulation and control of forward contracts subject to the previous approval of the Central Government. The Exchange made such bye-laws relating to the
transferable specific <lelivery contracts in raw jute which bye-laws will be found in Chapter IX of the Working Manual issued by the Exchange. Terms and conditions of transferable specific delivery
contracts in raw jute as pr6tioribed by the said bye- laws provided for arbitration of all claims and disputes arising out of or in relation to such contracts by the Tribunal of Arbitration of the
Bengal Chamber of Commeree and Industry or the Indian Chamber of Commerce in Calcutta in accordance with the rules framed by the said Chambers. In some appeals before us the oontraots
provided for arbitration by the Bengal Chamber of Oommeroe and Industry and some by the Indian Chamber of Commerce in Calcutta. The rules of the two Chambers for constituting Tribunals of
Arbitration are similar and such difference as is material for j/Ur purpose will be advertecl to later in this judgment. Paragraph 11 in Ch. IX of the 2 S.O.R. SUPREME OOuRT REPORTS
Workin~ Manual of the Exchange made certain provisions for unavoidable delay in the supply of goods by the sellers of jute. · In order to appreciate the main controversy between ·the parties it is
n1ecessary to quote the relevant .portion of that paragraph. "11. (a) In the case of jute and in the E1venl! of seller being prevented or delayed in carrying out their obligations under the con-
tract by the occurrence of fire, strikes, riots, polil!ical or communal disturbances, hartals and or civil commotions, breakdown of public transport services, suspension of bookings,
they . shall give immediate intimation thMeof to buy,,rs. · The sellers' an<'.l buyers' rights shall thereupon be a.s follows : – (i) On the sellers producing satisfac- tory evidence of the prevention or delay,
they shaH be granted an extensfon of time for delivering not exceeding thirty days from due date of all penalties. (ii) If the cont,ract be not implemen- ted within the extended period referred to
in clause (i) above bu;yers shall thereupon be entitled to exercise any one of the following option : – (I) Of cancelling the contract,· (2) Of buying against sellers in the open market on the day on which the
option is declared and cha.rging them any difference, (3) Of cancelling the · contract and charging sellers the difference between contract and the market ,price on the. day ~ 1'hich the option is ch!eland,
Ama1chatul LaliUumar Yo Shrta A1t1bicaJuk Mi/11 Ltd. va. .T. 191~ .fJWJJeAolld LalN.bma• S~rt1 A.mbita Jur1 Mills Lid. Dcu '. SUPREME OOUBT REPORTS (1963] Sellere shall notify buyere that the goods will
or will not be shipped within such extended period referrf'd to in clause (i) and in the case of sellers intimating that they will be unable to ship within the extended time buyer shall
exercise their option under clause (ii) on the fifth working day of receiving such notice and notify sellere. Iu the absence of any such notice from sellel'll it shall be deemed ·that the
goods have not been shipped and buyers shall exercise thejr aforesaid option on the fifth working day after expiration of the extended date and notify sellers. ……………………
The a&Be of the appellant was that at the relevant time certain emergent conditions a.rose in the raw jute tra. -le and induatry. which prevented the appel- lant from au pplying the raw jute stipulated for in
the contract within the time mentioned in the guar- ntee cla.us11. By I\ Jetter dated October I 0, 1960, the respondent exerciaed ita option under para. l l q11oted earlier, canoolled
the contra.ct and charged the appellant for the difference in price between the contract rate and the market rate prevailing on the date of Cl\ncella.tion. The a.ppelJant denied that it bad any liability to pay
the difference. Thereupon th.e reapondent applied .. for arbitration by the Tribunal of Arbitration conatituted in accordance with the rules • of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce end Indus-
try. The Registrar of the Chamber wrote to tho appellant that the arbitration case (No. 10 of 19 61) would be heard by the Tribunal on a certain date. The date was then extended and before the
Arbitration Tribunal could decide the matter the ,_ applications in the High Court were made for rovo king the authority of the appointed arbitrator. The facts 111d d1t11m•h11fu 11'hith arcl>rding
\o \be &}'ftlla11l ~ih1attd the t11lt1g01cJ 11e1e _j ' ' • 2 S.C.R. state.d in para 11 of the petition and the substance of the allegations was that owing to the two causes of scarcity of raw jute and speculation, the prices of
raw jute· shot up abnormally giving rise to an emer- gent condition in the jute trade and industry and especially in respect of trading in future contracts in raw jute. The appellant's oase was that by
reason of that emergency the buyers and sellers of raw jute were placed in two conflicting camps and the vast majority of the arbitrators in the panel of arbitration comprising the Tribnnal of Arbitration
of the Bengr.1 Chamber of Commerce and Industry were either directly or indirectly connected with one or other of the jute mills which were all buyers of raw jute. ·In I araR. 21; 22 and 23 of its petition
the appellant stated -that when the parties entered into the contract they never contemplated that there would happen such an exceptional situation as arose in the jute trade during .the relevant
period of Septem her-October, 1960 ; that the· arbi· trators of the Tribunal of Arbitration of: the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry' were disqualified from.actin&: as arbitrators inaBinuch · as
they were all connected with the buyers and there was every probability that they would .be biased in favour of the buyers; therefore,· the appellant reaso- · nably apprehended that. it would not be possible
for the arbitrators to act as iw partial or disinterest- ~ ed judges. In para 33 the .appellant stated : "The interest of the . sellers of raw jute are in conflict with the interest of the buyers
of raw jute. In the events that have happened th~ sellers of raw jute have formed them· selves into a group and the buyers of raw jute have formed another group. The Indian Jute Mills Association is dominated by the buyers.
The Indii.n Jute Mills Association dominates the 11eid Chamber and its Arbitrator. ·The · Jndian ;Jgt.e lljlls Al!lleeiatio!l is 00mrnitte4 Amarchand Lalitkumar v. ShNI Ambica Jute
Mills Lid. D.sJ. 19'1 AmGr&'·M Lal;- SJ,rt1 Adioa Jute Mollo Lid. DuJ. SUPRDIE OOURT REPORTS [1063) to the view that the said contracts have not been frustrated. The said ABBociation has
also formed an opinion in respect of the disputes between the buyers and the sellers of raw jute." These were the allegations on which the appellant prayed that the authority of the appointed arbi-
trator should be revoked under e. 5 of the Arbit- ration Act, 1940. The application was opposed by the respon· dent which denied the allegations made by the appellant both as to the facts and oiroamstancee
which were said t'l constitute the emergency and &B to the alleged reasonable apprehension of bias in the appointed Arbitration Tribunal. We have stated earlier that in the High Court to main controversy between
the parties centred round the question, (1) if there was such an emergent condition in the jute trade and indus- try at the relevant ti'Yle as divided the sellers and buyers of raw jute into two opposing camps, and
(~)if the existence of such opposing oa.mpe. provid- ed en.ch opposing camps were proved to exist, would jnetify the revocation of the authority of tlul appoio,ted arbitrator. 'Jh~ learned Judge who heard
the applications dealt first with the legal position in England and India, in the matter of rtiv:ooation • of the authority of an appointed arbitrator. llav- ing dealt with the legal po~ition, he went into the
fact. of the case and held that no such emergent condition has been proved as would justify the revocation of the authority of an appointed arbit- rator. He l"Xpreseed his final oonclueion in
these words: "ln my opinion; the allegations about I he buyers and sellers in raw jute being ~hrov.n into conflidin~ camp6 bJ the opera. ti.on of e111e1gmt. circalllatancee or ·~•
2 S.C.R. • SUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S reasonable apprehension' of-bias in the minds of the sellers that they ·will not get justice from the persons· whose names appear on the list of the panel. of arbitrators of ti..e Bengal
Chamber of Commerce ~nd Industry are unsubstantial." He accordingly dismissed th~ <I applications with costs, · l •We consi<;ler that as a matter of logical seque- nce, we should deal with the que~tiqn of fact first-
• whether there was any suoh -embrgent condition·in the jute trade a:u'd industry 'il.t the re.levant tim.e as di vi~ed the sellera and buyera of raw jute into two conflicting oamps so as to give 'ri~e to a
reasonable apprehension in the minds of the sellers that they will µot get a just decision from the appointed arbitrat:ir., .ft is only when we answer 4 the questiqn of faot. !ri favour of the appellants
that a cronsideration of'the legal position would be necessary. wli,at are the circmvsiances. on which' the appellimts rely in support of their . allegation of an em~rgent condition in the jute trade dividing
the buyers and sellers of raw conflict.ing camps ? It is poin,ted out that on 0.otober 18, 11160, the ~ Exchange issu~d a press note in which it was stated . inter alia that owing to emergtint conditions prevail-·
~ ing in the jute trade, the Director ·of the Exchange had imposed from time to time various cont:rol measures in respect of trading in future contracts in raw jute and had taken up a review of the trading
position in transferable specific delivery contracts. On October 31, ·1960, a notice by the Exchange -,. directed thatJ,rading in transferable specific· deli- -( very contracts in raw jute shall be registered with
the Exchange. In their petitions for leave to revoke the authority of the arbitrator, thtr a ppel- lantB alao refernid to.:~ts 1JJ84e bf reporter& of A mare hand LolUA1umar Shree A.mbiaJ Juf 1
Mula .Gld. 9aa.T. A,,..,,,_d L111thmar y, S Mt' _Ambiea J rde Mil/I Ud. Da1J. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963] certain newpapers a.e also news items published • j therein. We do not think
that these news- , papt1rs report.a eshblish anything beyond what tho Mporters heard from people whose identity is not disclosed, and they aro not admis- sible in evideDoe to establish either that an
emergency had arisen or the nature thereof. At brat they show that there wore reports in tbe market of a short: fall in jutE' production, a shortage of supply of raw jute from Pakistan, sea.ling of
some of the looms in the mills, and a reduction in working hours. The affidavits filed on behalf of t the appellants do Dot, however, establish that there had been a.11.Y failure of the jute crop in
Bengal, Bihar and ABBa.m or that jute had become unavailable at its normal sources or that such a crisis bad a.risen as would divide the buyers and sellers into oon(Jioting camps. It is worthy of
note that Jike any other trade in goods in . a short . market, the jute trade, especially tho trade in future • ' contracts, is 1>.ery sensitive and rea.cl ily responds to any stimulus, !Deluding forces which affect supply
and demand ~l>en temporarily. Such responses can even be sa.1d to be the normal feature of the jute trade like any other trade in commodities. As there was no evidence of the rise and
fall in prices of raw jute during the relevant period except from what we could gather from " the differences in price between the contra.ct v rate and the market rate claimed by the respon-
dents, we allowed the parties to produce before us the rates quoted by authorised brokers for various kinds of jute from April 11160 to August HIBi These figures show that the market in raw jute
almost always fluctuates; sometimes there is steady rise; sometimes a fa.II; sometimes there is a steep " rise (Jf a steep fall. Take for example, the period between Auj.tust 1960 to January lll61-the period
of deli'lery iD 111oa\ cf the ea1e1-in c11e of &he "fariet.ies of jute "'8. A- Bottom Ju~ Iu -. — 2 S.C.R. August 1960 there was a steaey rise from Re.35/- to about Rs.40/- per maund. In 8eptember 1960 the rise
continued and reached to about Rs. 43/-. It continued also, in October and reached about Rs. 54/-. Towards the, middle of November there was a fall. In January 1961 there was again a rise which conti-
. nued till March .. In April there was again a fall whfol:i continued till July 1961. We have taken only one example, but these ups and downs in price levels are noticable in other varieties -of jute
also, such as, Pakistan N. C. Cuttings etc. A person trading in future contracts must take these ups and· downs into consideration when entering into ·contracts, and we fail to appreciate how these·
ups and downs can constitute an emergent condition which will divide the buyers and sellers ·into two conflicting camps. The question whether the seller was entitled to an extension of time in the circums-
tances then prevailing would undoubtedly arise for determination by the appointed arbitrator, who having practical experience of the fluctuations which tho trade normally undergoes would be in a
position to judge the validity of such a claim.. But it is difficult to appreciate how this periodical rise or fall in pi;ices can be called. an emergency which made the contracts impossible of performance or
divided the ·buyers and sellers into two conflicting camps at the relevant time. Much was made of the fact that the Indian Jute Mills Association was a very influential body of· jute -mill owners, affiJiated with the Bengal
Chamber of Commerce and Industry. It was alleged that they were sister bodies having their offices at the ~ame place and that they carried out. a. common policy in matters of trade.
It was ·pointed out that the majority of arbitrators in the . pan~l of arbitration of the Behgal 'Chamber of Commerce and Industry were either directly or in- .·. ditec\\?' •:onned~il ll'it!i o~e or ot'!ier of \he Fe
Ama1cha11d L,,~itkumar y. SJ,ree Ambica Jute Mills Lid, Doi J • 1"62 Amarchond Lalitf:~mar v. mills. The relevant rules of B£lngal Chamber of · Shre• .A.mhica Jut• Mills IJd .. Commerce and Industry, it was pointed out, pro-
. vided that "tho Tribunal shall·· consist of such members or assistants to members and of such_ . other persons who were ·from time to time on the panel of special Advisory Board to
·the Indian Jute Mills Association, as may from . _ time to time be selected by the Registrar". In this · · · respect there is a difference in tho rules made by the Indian Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta. Thoso
rules provide for an unrestricted selection and say that in making an appointment and nomination, the Registrar shall select, as far as possible, persons or a person having practical knowledge of the subject
matter of the contract_ or contracts in question and the Registrar shall not appoint any person who for any reason within his knowledge would not be a proper person to act as Arbitrator etc. in the parti-
cular matter. · The appellant in Civil Appeal No. 640 brought to our notice the .. circumstance that his solicitor wrote to the Registrar of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and In<iustry for the names
ofthe arbitrators and was told in reply that it was not the practice of the Tribunal to disclose the names · · of ·the arbitrators; but a . classification of arbi- trators of some of the cases was furnished and this
showed that one of the arbitrators would be a mill representative and the other a jute ·broker or We ·have taken all these circumstances into our consideration and we are unable to agree with
the appellants that tl:rey made out a case of a reasonable apprehension of bias on the basis alleged, namely, that of a clash of interests between buyers and sellers on the ground of a rise in prices.
The High· Court has rightly pointed out that it is . not quite correct to say. that the persons who made the applications were only sellers of raw jute .and JlClt _bn~us _i,n tpeir t:uii-; tht_y &re peoplt who ca~
-.._…, 2 s.o.:R .• on business m Oaloutta and some of them probably have buying e.ienoies in the mofussil. They must ,, be. buying jute from others and selling them to .-..,,, shippers, balers, and jute mills. The jute mills
usually buy· raw jute and turn out manufacturerl products therefrom, which they sell: Balers and shippers buy re.IV jute and sell the same after press- ing and baling. At one end of the chain there are
jute growers who are only sellers while others are both buyers and sellers of jute or jute goods: This latter category of persons must be taking note of the trends in the market in en taring into their con-
t tra.ots and unless there . was an emergency of the kind which nobody could foresee, it is impossible to say th~t there was such a olash of interests betweeL buyers and sellers that the appointed arbitrator
havil\g practical experience of normal fluotuations of the market would not be able to judge with fai,r- neBB and impartiality the olaim of the sellers that they were entitled to an extension of time or other
relief, The High Court further. pointed that tihough there were 170 applioations, the number of appli- cants was only 42 and _some only of the jute mills in Wt>st Bengal were involved. The High Colirt
then said: "If one takes . into consideration. the number of jute mills situate in the distrlot of ·24 Parga.nae, Howarh,. Hooghly and .Nadia md considers further that there are thousands
.of persons who are engaged in th!! trade of raw jut!! it is signifioa,nt that only l!o f!lw dozen of them heive come to this Cour~ in .between the period Fe,bruMy, 1961, 'to the end.of June, 1961, It appears to me .that the
difficulty, real or as1!1111¥l4, is confined .. to a very small number of persons, · n<>t brqlight a~ut by .r.ny !lmergent c~DQ.itwns at all >l!B alleged. There can be no denying the fact
that the outtum of jute baa · be~n small!lr Am!lrchrmd Lalitlrumar S/sr19AmbieaJure Mills Ltd. Da1J. I Ht .f.vc~ L""'-' ,·h It 4.ftbito Jui1 Mill, Lt,/, Dul. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [10031
than expected and that jute mills have had to reduoe their working hours. Such a shortage , ' ~ in jute oannot be said to have brought about • t an uphe11.val in the trade throwing buyers and
sellers into sharply divided conflicting oampe." We are in agreement with the view thus expreBBed by the High Court. As to the arbitrators to be appointed by the Indian Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta, and in
some of the appeals before us the arbitrators have to be so appointed, there -O&ll hardly be any ground • for a rea.eonable apprehllnsion. The names of the arbitrators are not known nor even their cla.BBi-
ftoation. The rules contemplate that the Registrar shall not appoint any peraon aa arbitrator who for any reason within his knowledge would not be a proper person to aot aa arbitrator. What grounds
oan there be of a reaaonable appreh1msion in such • oaeee? We have held that there are no oonflioting camps of buyers and eellers, and even if there are m<lh oampe, the Registrar oan aele1:t peraons who
have practical experience of the subject matter of the contract and not othe1 wise improper peraone to aot as arbitrator&. The differenoe between an application under 8. 5 of the Arbitration Act and
one under a. M is a dit'rerenoe aa to the point of ,. time when the application i8 made. If prooeeding8 are commenced in Oourt, appliaation is made under 8. 34; if prooeedinp have not oommenoed in Court
the application la made under 8. 5. The object of both the aeotion ill the Bame, namely, to prevent arbitration. But different oonsideratiODB would arise on an application to 1111t aaide an award on
the ground that the arbitrator wu biased. It J8 true that on an application under 8, 5 itt is " not neoeeaary to tlhow that the arbitra or ii in faot blaH d aD4 it ii eDOllih to lhow tibat.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COUltT REPORTS there is a reasonable ground for apprehension –..; that the arbitrator will be biased. But the " reasonable grou)ld must be established to the satis-
faction of the Court to· which an application for leave to n;voke the authority· of ah appointed arbitrator is made. No such reasonable ground . is made out in the present appeals.
We now tum to the legal position which seems to us to be quite clear. Before the Court exercises its discretion t<i give leave to revoke an arbitrator's authority, it should be satisfied that . a substantial
~ miscarriage of justice will take place in the event of its refusal. In considering the exeroise by the Court of the power of revocation it must not· be .forgotten that arbitration is a particular method for the settle-
ment of disputes. Parties not wishing 'the · 1aw's delays' know,· or ought to know, that in referring a dispute to arbitration they take arbitrator for better · or wrose, and that his decision is final both as to
-<: ' fact and law. In many oases the parties prefer arbitration for these reasons. In exercising its discre- tion cautiously an<i sparingly, the Court has no doubt these circumstances in view, and considers
that the parties should not be relieved from a tribu- nal they have chosen because they fear that the . arbitrator's decision may go against them.- (See Russel on Arbitration, 16th edition, page. 54).
rhe " grounds on which leal'e to revoke may be given . . >1 have been put under five heads :- I. Excrss or refusal of jiirisdlction by ar bitra- tor. 2. Misconduct of arbitrator •.
3. Disqualification of arbitrator.· 4. Charges of Fraud. ' 5. Exceptional ca.ilea. .4tn1Jrchu11d 1.tJ/ilftuma1 Slate Ambie-1 Jut,, Mills Ltd. Da1J. JPfJ AmneAo.d Loi.-, s11,,, AdUo Jut,
Mills Ud 1Ja1 J. 9'10 sUPREME OOURT REMRTs (1963] We have held that there were no such ei:oep- tional circumste.noes in these oe.ses e.s would justify us to come to the conclOBion that the appointed
arbitrator would be disqualified as a result of hie.a • . by reason of a conflicting class interest. In view of this finding it is unnecessary to examine the deci- sions, English or Indian, e.s respects the principle
that an interest of which the parties were fully aware at the date of the arbitrator's appointment will not in general disqualify him, n_or will the fact that he stands in a particular relationship to the
parties or to the mattere in dispute, if it oe.n bt1 aaid that the parties selected him with knowledge that ' this was or muet be so. Nor are we concerned with the exception to which the aforesaid rule is subject
in relation to arbitrators appointed to determine future disputes, and the statutory changes made in English law relating thereto. There are, however, four decisions of the Calcuth High Court which bear an apparent reeem· •
blance to the oe.see under our oonsideration and to those decisions we mUBt now turn.· In Bakrhux Aganoola v. Lachminarain Jute Manufacturi1UJ Oo. /Ad. ( 1) the question was of a certain suits on appli-
oatione under s. 34 of the Arbitration Aot and one of the grounde taken was .that persons interested in or connected with vario118 jute mill oompe.niee were members of th~ Bengal Chamber of Commerce and ,
were on the panel Crom which arbitrators were chosen; and a reference was made to a circular letter ~ which showed that the arbitrator~ or the firms they repreeented were all buyers and as 1111oh interested in
seeing that the points in iellue were decided against the eellere. After eorutinielng the allegations made in support of ~hia ground, the Court said • "For all I know the tremendoUB rise in •
prioea which, it is 11&id, will prompt the · ,., (I) (l!lt7) 51C.W.N.863,875. 2 s.c.R.. SUPRl!'.ME COURT REPORTS arbitrators who are. buyers to decide against the plaintiffs who are sellers so a.a to make huge
profit for themselves, may well have induo.ed the plaintiffs to make these allegations against the arbitrators or their firms so as to get out oft.heir submission and to take their cha.nee of
winning the suit in. Court and get.ting the benefit of that rise in prioos. In my.. opinion the allegations in the affidavits a.re not such as I may a.ct upon them. The Bengal Chamber
of Comme~ce has gained a reputation for the excellence of their arbitration proceedings and I shall require much more •specific averments offacts properly verified showing that in any
particular case justice will be denied by the Be~gal Cha.mber of Commerce to a.ny pa.rty." These observa.tie>ns do not help the a.pp~lla.nts of the present oa.ses. Rather they show that the Court
must be folly satisfied before it exercises its discre- tion under s. 5 to revoke the a1fthority of a.n a.ppointed arbitrator. The same learned Judge came to a. contra.ry conclusion in TolaramNathm'l.dl v. Birla Jute Manu-
facturing Co. Ltd.(1), Tha.t was also a case of stay under s. 34, and one of the questions raised was whether there wa.s sufficient reason why the ma.tter should not be referred to arbitra.Uon·. One of the points to be
decided in tha.t connexion wa.s whether 'mesta' was jute within the·meaning of the Jute. (Price Control) OrdPr and if the Jute Mills Association had issued a circular, while the arbitration was pending, stating
or decidin~ that 'mesta'. was not included. in that Order. It wa.s hPld that at a . meeting of the representatives of five associations the view was expressed tha.t. •mesta.' did not come within the
Order. Io thos&.circumsta.oces the learned Judge said : (I) I 1948) 2 .Cal. 171; 1.96. Amarchancl Lalit1<umar v. Shree Ambicj Jut Mi.lta IJtd. DaaJ, IY61 Amtvchantl La/iCkuma, '"firt~ Antbfra Jui.
M1ll.tLtd. D., .!. "In the light of these principleH, the ques- tion I have to consider is whether, in the events that have h~ppcned, it will b~ fair to drive the plaintiff-firm to a tribunal both the
members of which are members of associations which have exprel!Bed some clofinito views on the question in controversy. .There is, to my mind, considerable justification for the appreheneion expressed by the plaintiff-firm
of probable bias of the arbitrators. I do not question tho honesty and integrity of the two arbitrators, but, in the circumstances appear- ing in the evidence before me, it will be unfair
aliku to them ancl to plaintiff-firm to put them in a position of conflict with their own associa- tions. On the whole I have come to the conclusion that this is a case where circum-
Rtances exist which are calculated to bias the minds of the arbitrators and where the plaintiff-firm may legitimately ask the Court to release it from its barge.in to go to arbitra-
tion". The decision rested on the facts established in that case and cannot help the appellai.te to prove their case on the present applications. ·In fairness to learned Counse 1 for the respon-
dents we must say that he"submitted before us that the decision in Tolamm Nathmull v. Bir/,a J'lde Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (1) went much beyond what was accepted as the correct legal position in English
d'3cisionH referred to by the learned Judge; but that is an aspect of the matters which we consider it unncc088Rry to clecide. We hold that the facts which must b'3 l'Stablisbed to call in aid that deci-
sion have not. been established in these cases. In Dwarkadas Co. v. KMhardeo Bubna (') the same learned Judge explained the poaition suooini::tly by holding (see headnote, pa.n1, 4)-
(1) (1948) 2 Cal. 171, 196. (2) (1948) I Cal. 190. 2 S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS . . "The fa.ct that members of a committee · of an association of commercial men dealing in a pa.rtioular.oommodity are themselves the
arbitrators and a.re also buyers and sellers of that . · commodity will not ordinary · diapt1te between a particular buyer and a particular seller. . But extraordinary circumstance may
nevertheless arise, as in the case of a commer· cial crisis, when the members of the associa· tion may be sharply divided into two opposing groups as buyers in general and ·sellers in
general as may make it improper for the committee, which may be packed ,with an overwhelming majority of buyers or sellers, as the case may be, to adjudicate upon a dispute between a buyer and a seller."
The pre-requisite condition (of the applic~ticm of the principle which be laid down is not fulfilled ·in th ti present. cases. . 1'h•dast decision is Bhuwalka Brothe~1{ Lt,d. v. Fatechand Murlidhar (1). That was a case which
proceeded on dilf~rent ~rounds, viz. ( 1) frustration and (2) applicability of an Ordinance to the ·contract under consideration. On those .two grounds,. the lea.med Judge thought that he should give leave to
the petitioner to revoke ·. the authority Of the appointed arbitrator. We say nothing as to the correctness of the decision; but. merely point out that the facts of the cases under· our consideration
are entirely different. · We have,. therefore; . come to the conclusion that . on . .the .· · Il).&in poirit of controversy between . the parties, . the . High Court ca ue to a correct findirig on facts · and there are
no grounds for interference. , It remains now to consider two special points taken on behalf oftbe appellants in. Civil Appeals fl) (1951) 2Cal,115. Amarchand Lililkumar · Shree .tf. mbica J ut1
Mil{1 Ltd. DaaJ. Ama,.cliMUI I..11/cumar Bhm Ambka Ju14. MwbLld. D41J. SUl'RE!lfE COURT REPORTS [1063] Nos. 174 and 175. The points taken were: (1) that the oontraots were not in :i.ccordance with law, and
(2) that the parties were not ad idem with regard to one of the olauses thereof. Both these points have been dealt with by the learned Judge of the Hiqh Court in his judl!"meu t dated September 21,
1961, in great detail and as we are in agreement with him it is not fleceesary to deal with these two points in detail. On point number (I) the argu- ment before ns was based on para. 7(o) .of the byo-
laws in Ch. IX of the Working Manual. That paragraph, so far as it is relevant here, reads as follows : "7(c) In the case of Pakistan Jute, buyers to deliver to sellers, or sellers' nominee,
letter of authority to import the Pakistan Jute or open confirmed, irrevoc,bl9 Letter of Credit in terms of paragraph 8(b)(ii) with- in 14 working days from the commencement of th" delivery period of the contract failing
which t.h9re shall be free extension for delivery equal to the period of delay occur- ring after the 14 working days but where stipulated quantities monthly are sold the free extension shall only be in respect of
the delivery flr the first month. If buyers do not deliver letter of authority or open oonfil"med irrevocable Letter of Credit within one month from the commencement of the delivery period of the oontraot, the sellers
shall be entitled to exercise any one of the following options . on the next working day following the expiry of the said month : – (i) Cancelling the contraot. (ii) Canoelling the contract and charging
buyers the dilFerenoe (if any) between the oontraot prioe and the market price .ti 2 S.C.R. .975 on the date of ca.ncellation of the contract. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . The clause in the bought note said :
"The buyers to give letter of authority to the sellers and the sellers to open letter of credit. If the buyers fail to furnish the license up to December 1960 the contract will be deemed as ca.ncelled."
The corresponding clause in the sold note said : ti "The buyers to give letter of authority to the sellers l\nd the sellers to open letter of credit. If the buyers fail to furnish the
license up t.o December 1960 the contract will be deemed as canc~lled without any difference on the both sides." The argument was that the cla.uaes in the bou.ght and sold notes were not in conformity with
para. 7 (c) and therefore the· contracts were not in conformity with law. We do not see any material conflict between para. 7( c) of the bye-laws and the clauses in the bought and sold note. Instead of
one month given to the buyers for delivery of letter of authority in para 7(c) the time given in the contracts was up to December 1960. We do not think that this extension of time brought the
contracts into any material conflict with the provisions of para. 7 ( c). As to the second point the argument was ,that the expression "without any difference on both aides" occurred in the sold notes
not in the bought notes, a.nd therefore, the parties were not ad idem with regard to this clause. The learned Judge riglitly pointed out that the expres- sion "without any difference on both sides" made
no real d!fference. Clearly th~ parties 9ont~mplatid ed that in case the buyer failed to furmsh the license to import Pakistan. Jute .lfithin the period Amarchantl Lalitkumar Shree AmbieO Jut1
Milli Lia. DasJ. 198' Arnarchand Lalitkuma~ Shrtt tfmbica Ju't M1ll4 l.1td. DatJ. MoyJ. SOPH.EME OOOR'l' REPORTS [1963) mentioned, the contract would be deemed to be cancelled which mE>ant that the contract was to be
treated as mm est for all purposes. If the con- tract was deemed to be oaooolled, it must mean that the right and obligations of the parties came to an end simultaneously. It was not really neceB-
sary to insert the words "with out any difference on both sides" in the bought notes and such addition in the sold notes did not make any difference to the rightB of the parties. For the reasons given above we hold that
there is no merit in any of the appeals. The appeals are accordingly diam issed with costs ; one hearing fee. Appeals dismissed. THE OOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX v. THE MYSORE SUGAR CO., LTD.
(S. K. DA.s, A. K. SA.RKA.R, M. lIJDA.YA.TULLAH and RA.OHUBA.R DAYAL, JJ.) Income Ta:i-Dduction-E:ipenditur• l>y way of inyeat""n and e:ipendihtre in the courBe of b1Uinua-.Di.timtion-Tut1 applkAbk-IndW.n [nco,,,..Ta:t A.ct, 1922 (II of 1922), "· 1 (I), (2) (:ti), 2 (zv).
The assessee Company used to purchase sugarcane from the sugarcane growers to prepare sugar in ill factory, in which a very large percentage. of shares was owned by the Government of Mysore. As a part of its business operation it entered into written agreemen!J with the sugarcane growers and advanced them seedlings, fertilizen, and also cash .. The cane growers entered into these agreements known as "oppige" by which they agreed to sell sugarcane exclusively to the
assessee company at current market rates and to have the