Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
11. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellants have preferred this appeal by way of special leave.
12. Heard Mr. B. Adinarayan Rao, learned senior counsel for the appellants and Mr. A.T.M. Ranga Ramanujam, learned senior counsel for the respondents.
13. Mr. B. Adinarayana Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, while assailing the legality and correctness of the impugned order urged two submissions. In the first place, he submitted that the High Court erred in allowing the respondents' revision petition and thereby erred in interfering in its revisionary jurisdiction by upsetting a well reasoned findings of facts recorded by the first appellate Court in favour of the appellants. He further submitted that the first appellate Court while hearing the appellants' appeal was within its jurisdiction to probe into all issues of facts and the evidence and record its finding de hors the findings of the Ren! Controller and once any finding of fact was recorded by the first appellate Court then such finding is binding on the High Court while hearing the revision against such judgment of the first appellate Court. Learned counsel pointed out from the impugned ·judgment that the High Court in this case decided the revision like the first appeal without keeping in mind the subtle distinction between the revisionary and the first appellate jurisdiction thereby committed a jurisdictional error in rendering the impugned judgment.
14. In the second place, learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted that even otherwise, there was no justification on the part of the High Court on facts to have reversed the well reasoned findings of fact recorded by the first appellate Court because, according to the learned c c (2016) I S.C.R. counsel, the appellants were able to prove with adequate evidence adduced by them that firstly, they were the owners of the suit premises and secondly, there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the predecessor-in-title of the appellants and the respondents' predecessor-in-title in relation to the suit premises. It was also urged that in the eviction petition filed before the Rent Controller under the Act, the issue of title to the suit premises could not be gone into like a regular title suit yet the appellants adduced adequate evidence to prove their title over the suit premises and the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties whereas the respondents failed to prove that the sale of suit premises in favour of the appellants' predecessors was not a sale but was a transaction of mortgage and that their predecessor- in-title redeemed the alleged 11101tgage by repaying the debt.
15. In support of his submissions, learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Cou1t in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited vs. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78.
16. In contra, Mr. A.T.M. Ranga Ramanujam, learned senior counsel forthe respondents, supported the impugned judgment and prayed for its upholding calling no interference therein.
17. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we find force in the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants.
18. The Constitution Bench of this Court settled the law relating to exercise ofjurisdiction of the High Cou11 while deciding revision in rent matters under the Rent Control Act in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (supra). Justice R.M. Lodha the learned Chief Justice speaking for the Bench held in para 43 thus: "43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court/first appellate authority because on reappreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the court/authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by court/ M/S BOORUGU MAHADEV & SONS v. SIRIGIRI NARASJNG RAO & ORS.[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE. J.] authority below, if perverse or bas been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself as to the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to reappreciate or reassess the evidence for coming to a· different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity."
19. It is also now a settled principle of law that the concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation governed by Rent control laws has to be distinguished from the one in a title suit. Indeed, ownership is a relative term, the import whereof depends on the context in which it is used. In rent control legislation, the landlord can be said to be the owner if he is entitled in his own legal right, as distinguished from for and on behalf of someone else to evict the tenant and then to retain control, hold and use the premises for himself. What may suffice and hold good as proofofownership in landlord-tenant litigation probably may or may not be enough to successfully sustain a claim for ownership in a title suit. (vide Sheela & Ors. vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, (2002) 3 sec 375).
20. Coming now to the facts of this case. keeping in view the principle oflaw laid down in the aforementioned two cases and on perusal of the order of the first appellate Court, we find that the first appellate Court properly appreciated the facts and evidence adduced by the parties c c [2016] I S.C.R. and on that basis recorded all necessary findings (detailed above) in favour of the appellants. This the appellate Court could do and, in our opinion, rightly did in the facts of this case.
21. Likewise, when we peruse the impugned order. we find, as rightly urged by the learned counsel for the appellants, that the High Cowi did not keep in mind the aforesaid principle of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (supra) while deciding the revision petition and proceeded to decide the revision petition like the first appellate Court. The High Court as is clear from the judgment probed in all the factual aspects of the case, undertook the appreciation of whole evidence and then reversed all the factual findings of the appellate Court and restored the order of the Rent Controller. This, in our view. was a jurisdictional error, which the High Court committed while decidingthe revision petition and hence it deserves to be corrected in this appeal. In other words, the High Court should have confined its inquiry to examine as to whether any jurisdictional error was committed by the first appellate Court while deciding the first appeal. It was, however, not done and hence interference in this appeal is called for.
22. That apart, we find that the appellants were able to prove their ownership through their predecessor-in-title on the strength of sale deed (Ex-P.6/7) of the suit premises whereas the respondents failed to prove their defence. Indeed, the burden being on them, it was.necessary for the respondents to prove that the sale in favour of the appel I ants' predecessor-in-title of suit premises was a transaction of mnrtgage and not an outright sale. Since the respondents did not adduce any documentary or oral evidence to prove their defence, the first appellate Court was justified in allowing the eviction petition. In our view, the evidence adduced by the appellants to prove their title over the suit premises was sufficient to maintain eviction petition against the respondents and it was, therefore, rightly accepted by the first appellate Court.
23. As observed supra, the first appellate Court having recorded categorical findings that the relationship of landlord-tenant was proved and secondly, the respondents had committed a willful default in payment of monthly rent and its arrears from 01.06.1987, these findings were binding on the High Court while deciding the revision petition. It was MIS BOORUGU MAHADEV & SONS v. SIRIGIRI NARASING RAO & ORS.[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] more so when these findings did not suffer with anyjurisdictional error which alone would have entitled the High Corn1 to interfere.
24. Learned counsel for the respondents lastly argued that there was an encroachment made by the appellants on the suit premises and document (Ex-P-6) was inadmissible in evidence, hence the eviction petition was liable to be dismissed on these two grounds also. These submissiOns, in our considered view, deserve to be rejected at their threshold because the same were not raised in the written statement filed by the respondents before the Rent Controller and nor were urged at any stage of the proceedings. We cannot, therefore, allow such factual submissions to be raised for the first time in this appeal.
25. In the light of foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside and that of the judgment of the first appellate Cou11 dated 17.09.2002 in R.A. No. 93 of 1998 is restored. As a consequence thereof, the eviction petition filed by the appellants against the respondents in relation to the suit premises is allowed. The respondents are, however, granted three months' time to vacate the suit premises from the date of this order subject to furnishing of the usual undertaking in this Com1 to vacate the suit premises within 3 months and further the respondents would deposit all arrears of rent till date at the same rate at which they had been paying monthly rent to the appellants (if there are arrears) and would also deposit three months' rent in advance by way of damages for use and occupation as permitted by this Court. Let the unde11aking, arrears of rent, damages for three months and cost awarded by this Court be deposited within 15 days from the date of th is order.
26. The appeal is accordingly allowed with cost which quantify at Rs.5000/- to be paid by the respondents to the appellants. Nidhi Jain Appeal allowed. c