Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
9. The Tribunal concurred with the above view taken by the Co~mission and repelled the contention based on the principle of promissory estoppel not only on the ground that there had been no unequivocal representation regarding continuation of the scheme till 31st March, 2007 but also on the ground that there was no material to support the contention that the appellants had indeed made any investment or changed their position to their detriment so as to attract the doctrine of D promissory estoppel. In coming to that conclusion the Commission has also relied upon several decisions of this Court to which we have made a mention above. We do not see any perversity in any one of those findings nor do we see any substantial question of law arising in the fact situation of these appeals. We have, therefore, no hesitation in dismissing these appeals on merits although the same have been filed beyond the period stipulated for the purpose under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003.
10. We may before parting mention that in Civil Appeal No.3814 of 2007 filed by DSR Steel (P) Ltd., one of the questions that was urged before us was whether the period of limitation would start running from the date of pronouncement of the order or the date of communication thereof. Relying upon the decision of this Court in Chhattisgarh State Electricity G Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and Ors. (2010) 5 sec 23 it was contended on behalf of the respondent that the date on which the order was pronounced would also be the date on which the same is deemed to have been communicated.
11. Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 makes it abundantly clear that the period of limitation commences from the date of communication of the decision or order and not from the date of its pronouncement. As a matter of fact, Rules 94 and 98 of the Rules framed under the Act make a clear B distinction between intimation regarding pronouncement of the order on the one hand and the communication of the order so pronounced to the partiies on the other. While Rule 94 appears to us to provide for notice of pronouncement of an order, it makes no mention about the 'communication' of such an order c as is referred to in Section 125 of the Act. Transmission of the order by the Court Masb~r to the Deputy Registrar of the Tribunal and its onward communication to the parties is dealt with by Rule 98 of the said Rules which communication alone can be construed as a communication for purposes of Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003. The decision of this Court in the Chattisgarh State Electricity Board's case (supra) may in that view require reconsideration if the bame were to be understood to be laying down that the date of pronouncement is also the date of communication of the order. We would have, in the ordinary course, made a reference to a larger Bench for that E purpose but having regard to the fact that we have dismissed the appeals on merits, we consider it unnecessary to do so in the present case.
12. So also the question whether an order passed by the Tribunal in appeal mer~1es with an order by which the Tribunal has dismissed an application for review of the said order was argued before us at some length. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that since a review petition had been filed by two of the appellants namely, J.K. Industries Ltd. (Now known G as J.K. Tyres and Industries Ltd.) and J.K. Laxmi Cement Ltd. in this case, the order~; made by the Tribunal dismissing the appeals merged with the orders passed by it in the said review applications so that it is only the order dismissing the review application that was appealable before this Court. If that were DSR STEEL (P) LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.] so the period of limitation could be reckoned only from the date of the order passed in the review applications.
13. Different situations may arise in relation to review petitions filed before a Court or Tribunal. One of the situations could be where the review application is allowed, the decree or order passed by the Court or Tribunal is vacated and the appeal/proceedings in which the same is made are re-heard and a fresh decree or order passed in the same. It is manifest that in such a situation the subsequent decree alone is appealable not because it is an order in review but because it is a decree that is passed in a proceeding after the earlier decree passed in the very same proceedings has been vacated by the Court hearing the review petition. The second situation that one can conceive of is where a Court or Tribunal makes an order in a review petition by which the review petition is allowed and the decree/order under review reversed or D modified. Such an order shall then be a composite order whereby the Court not only vacates the earlier decree or order but simultaneous with such vacation of the earlier decree or order, passes another decree or order or modifies the one made earlier. The decree so vacated reversed or modified is then the decree that is effective for purposes of a further appeal, if any, maintainable under law.
14. The third situation with which we are concerned in the instant case is where the revision petition is filed before the Tribunal but the Tribunal refuses to interfere with the decree or order earlier made. It simply dismisses the review petition. The decree in such a case suffers neither any reversal nor an alteration or modification. It is an order by which the review petition is dismissed thereby affirming the decree or order. In such a contingency there is no question of any merger and anyone aggrieved by the decree or order of the Tribunal or Court shall have to challenge within the time stipulated by law, the original decree and not the order dismissing the review petition. Time taken by a party in diligently pursing the remedy by way of review may in appropriate cases be excluded from consideration while condoning the delay in the filing of the appeal, but such exclusion or condonation would not imply that there is a merger of the original decree and the order dismissing the review petition.
15. The decision:; of this Court in Manohar S/o Shankar Nale and Ors. v. Jaipalsing S/o Shiva/a/sing Rajput (2008) 1 sec 520 in our view, correctly settle the legal position. The view taken in Sushi/ Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar (1975) 1 SCC 774 and Kunhayammed and Ors. v. State of Kera/a & C Anr. (2000) 6 SCC 35!3, wherein the former decision has been noted, shall also have to be understood in that light only.
16. In the result, we dismiss these appeals as no substantial question of law arises for our consideration. The respondent shall also be entitled to cost of Rs.20,000/- in each case to be deposited in the SCBA Lawyers' Welfare Fund within six weeks from today. K.K.T. Appeals dismissed.