Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
9. The subject matter of this case is the stock of kerosene which the appellants cleared to industrial users during the period of dispute, on payment of duty at the concessional rates under the notifications. The appellants have estimated such clearances at about 1 % of their total production of kerosene of the said period. The appellants have no case that any part of the said stock was used as illuminant in oil burning lamps. They have not contested the fact that the entire quantity was used for industrial pun;ioses. It follows that the sai.d stock of kerosene did not s'atisf~· – description ordinarily used as an illuminant in oil burning lamps and therefore did not attract the benefit of the notifications. The fact that about 99% of the total production of kerosene was ordinarily used as illuminant in oil burning INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. COMMNR. OF CENTRAL EXCISE, VADODARA [D.K. JAIN, J.] lamps is not determinative of the question whether the . remaining 1 % (which was cleared to industrial users) was ordinarily used as illuminant in oil burning lamps. Whether the kerosene cleared to industrial users was suitable for use in oil burning lamps as illuminant is also not relevant to the said question…. … .. . .. . . .. . … . … . … . …. … . … . We are also not impressed by the learned DR's argument that the word "ordinarily" used in the notifications should be understood in the same way as that word used under Section 4 of the CE Act."
10. Hence, the present appeals.
11. Mr. Alok Yadav, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the assessee, assailed the judgment of the Tribunal on the ground that the conditions mentioned in the notifications relate only to the quality of the kerosene, which should be such that it is capable of illumination, and the said conditions do not relate to the end-user of the kerosene. Therefore, it is immaterial for the purposes of the said notifications that the kerosene was cleared to industrial users, as long as the said kerosene was capable of illumination in oil burning lamps. Commending us to the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai Vs. J.D. Orgochem Ltd. 1and the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Viswa & Co. Vs. The State of Gujarat2, learned counsel contended that the word "ordinarily" used in the notifications means "in the majority of cases, but not invariably", and therefore, the fact that 1 % of the kerosene manufactured by the assessee was cleared to industrial users does not change the fact that most of the kerosene manufactured by the assessee was cleared to the Public Distribution System (for short "PDS").
12. Per contra, Mr. P.P. Malhotra, learned additional 1. c2oos) 16 sec 576 A Solicitor General, while supporting the impugned Judgment strenuously urged that the twin conditions contemplated in the notifications should be fulfilled for attracting the concessional rate of duty, and therefore, the assessee could not claim the benefit of the said notifications as kerosene was supplied to B industrial consumers.
13. It is manifest that the object of providing concessional rate of duty on kerosene used for illuminating burning oil lamps was to provide some relief to those economically backward C sections of society who use kerosene·for illumination and other domestic purposes, and therefore, the benefit of concessional rate of duty was available only on the kerosene cleared by the assessee to the PDS.
14. In relation to the import of the expression "ordinarily" D used in the said notifications, it would be instructive to refer to the observations made by this Court in Union of India & Anr. Vs. Hemraj Singh Chauhan & Ors. 3 , wherein it was held that:- "The word "ordinarily" must be given its ordinary meaning. While construing the word the Court must not be oblivious of the context in which it has been used." (See also: Union of Jndia & Ors. Vs. Vipinchandra Hirala/ Shah4).
15. Similarly, in State of A.P. Vs. V. Sarma Rao & Ors. 5, this Court held that:- 'The expression "ordinarily" may mean "normally", as has been held by this Court in Kai/ash Chandra v. Union of lndia5 and Krishan Gopal v. Prakashchandra7 but, the said G 2. (19961 16 sec 576. 3. (2010) 4 sec 290. 4. (1996) 6 sec 721. 5. (2007) 2 sec 159. 6. (1962) 1 SCR 374. 7. (1974) 1 sec 12s. INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. COMMNR. OF CENTRAL EXCISE, VADODARA [D.K. JAIN, J.] expression must be understood in the context in which it has been used."
16. Therefore, in light of the object and context of the notifications, it becomes abundantly clear that the word "ordinarily" implies that the kerosene must be ordinarily used for illumination purposes, and it would be immaterial if the kerosene is also used for other domestic purposes.
17. From a bare perusal of the two notifications it is plain that the benefit of concessional rate of duty extends only to that variety of kerosene that: (i) has a smoke point of 18mm or more, and (ii) is ordinarily used as an illuminant in oil burning lamps. It is manifest that these two conditions are conjunctive, and therefore, the twin conditions need to be satisfied in order to avail of the concessional rate of duty. In the instant case, the fact that the assessee cleared kerosene manufactured by it to industrial consumers would entail that the assessee cannot claim the benefit of Notifications No. 5/98-CE and 5/99-CE.
18. In light of the foregoing discussion, the impugned order of the Tribunal cannot be flawed, and deserves to be affirmed and we order accordingly. Resultantly, the appeals, being devoid of any merit, are dismissed with costs, quantified at Rs. 20,000/-. K.K.T. Appeals dismissed.