S14·, of Uttar Pratk1h v. Abdul Samad Sribja Rao J. March I' 934 SUPREME COC'RT REPORTS [1962) SUPP. arrest of the respondents was illegal and that the High Court rightly ordered their release.
In the result, the appeal fuils and is dismissed. BY Cov1a. In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeal is allowed. M/S. SERAJUDDIN & CO. 1;. THEIR WORKMEN (P.R. GAJENDHAGADKAR and K. ~. WA~CIIOO, JJ.)
I11dustrial DispMle-Reference b11 Stau Gol'emmenl- r alidity-"A1)1)ropriate Goi·ern1nent i -''Industrial dispute'', in relation to 1ni·ne-l'onstrur.tion of-1'J(ine"-Definilion- bidMslrial Dispuf.fs Ar.t, 1947 (J4of 1947), ss. 2(a), 2(a)(i), 2(j), 2(k)-Jfinr., Act, 1962 {-~··;of 19o2), "·'· 2(j), 2(k). 2(h). /\. <lisp:.Ite covering clain1s n1adc by the employees \Yas referred for adjudication to rhc tribunal by the State Govern- ment of \Vest Bengal. The appellant r:iisecl a preliminary objection against the validity of the refcrencr and urged th<Lc uncler s. 2(a) the appropriate Govcrnmrnt \Yhich could make a valid reference in relation to the present dispute was the Central Govr.r11mcnt and not the Govcrn1nent of lVest Bengal and so, the refr.rcnce "''as unauthorised and
inconlpet~nt and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal v.:ith it. The Tribu- nal over-ruled this objection an<l the case was set do\vn for hearing on the merit:;. Against th_is finding, the appellant
prei'errc<l the present appeal hy special leave and the only point raised \\·as that the hr.ad office of the appellant at Calcutta hcing an inte~ral part of the mine, any industrial dispute bet\vccn the said office and its ernployces is an
industrial dispute concerning a 111ine under s. 2(a)(i) and so the appropriate Governn1cnt 1nust be the Central Government and not the State Go,·ernmcnt. 'fhc q11cstion for decision \Vas \Vhcther the present dispute can h<· said to he an industrial dispute
concrrnin~ a 1nine It \Vas argur.cl that the \\'ord ''industry" is wide enough to include the Head Office of a mining company though, it may be situate<l a\\'ay from the place \vher·e the mining operations are actually carried on and it is in the light of the said definition of the word "industry" contained ins. 2(j) that the words "in relation to a mine" mtist be construed.
Held, that in construing the words "an industrial dispute" in relation to a mine, it must first be deterinined what a mine means and it must be done without reference to the broad
definition of industry prescribed by s. 2(j). In the absence of a definition of the word "mine" in the Act itself, what has to be taken into account is the dictionary meaning of the wor<l "mine" or as is contained in the Mines Act and judged in
that light, there can be no difficulty in holding that an industrial dispute between the employees engaged in the Head Office at Calcutta and the employer is not an 'industrial dis- pute concerning a mine. The Head Office is not a mine and
so, an industria! dispute raised by the employees engaged in the head office is not a.n industrial dispute concerning a mine. The rights conferred on the lessee under a mining lease
can have no direct bearing on the construction of s. 2(a) and therefore, the tribunal rightly held, that the present dispute between the appellant and its employees at its Head Office at Calcutta, is not a dispute in relation to a mine.
If el d, further that all industrial disputes which are outsides. 2(a)(i) are the concern of the State Government under s. 2(a)(ii); in other words, the g~neral rule .is that an industrial
dispute arising between a employer and his employees would be referred for adjudication by the State 0overnment except in cases falling under s. 2(a)(i); and so it Is the extent of one o~ the . exception mentioned i.n s. 2(a) (i) that has to be determined in the present case, and in determin- ing the extent of the said exception, it \vould not be irrelevant to bear in mind the scope of the provisions of the Mines Act itself.
That is why the fact !hat an office of a mine is outside the definition of a mine is of so1ne assistance in interpreting the word "mine" under s. 2(a)(l) and therefore the tribunal rightly came.to the conclusion that in the present ~ase th~ reference by the State GoverI1ment of West Bengal was vahd.
CrvIL APPELLA'f}J JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal .'fo. 35.5 of 1961. Appeal by special leave from the order No. :?8 dated January 17, 1961, of the fourth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal in Case No. VIII-71.
Se,ajuddin d:J Co. v. Their W?Jrkmen StrajiJdin 1(· Co. v. Their JJ'orkmtn G11j:ndr1i.aadkar J, P. K. Sanyal and D. N. Muklwrjee, for the appellants. Janardan Shai·ma, for the respondents.
1962. March, 19. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GA.JE:'>DRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leavefraises a very short question about the cons- truction or a part of section 2( a) of the Industrial
Disputes Act (14of1947)(bereinafter called the Act). That question arises in this \vav. On the 14th ·March, 1960, the Government of West Bengal refer- red for adjudication to the Fourth Industrial Tri-
bunal six items of dispute between four employers and their respective employees. Amongst the emp- loyers was the appellant M/s. Serajuddin & Co.,p-16, Bentinck Street, Calcutta-I. and tho items of dis-
pute covered claims made by the employees for grade aud scale, Dearness Allowance, House rent, leave and holidays, Provident Fund and Gratuity, and condition of service. It appears that all tht'l
workmen employed in the tbreo other industrial concerns filed affidavits before the Tribunal intima- ting to it that they did not want to proceed with tbe case because the dispute between them and
their respective employers had been settled. That is bow the only dispute which waR loft before tho Tribunal for its adjudication was tho dispute bet- ween the appellant and its workmen.
On behalf of the appellant, a preliminary objection was rais<ld against the validity of the reference itself. It was urged that under s.2(a), tho appropriate Government which could make a
valid reference in relation to the present dispute between the parties was the Central Government and not the State Govt. of West Bengal and so, tho reference made by the latter Government was unau-
thorised and incompetent and the Tribunal bad, thereforo no jurisdiction to deal with it. Thi R 3 s.c.R. objection has been over.ruled by the Tribunal and the case has been set down for hea.ring on the
merits. It is against this finding that the a ppel· !ant has come t.o this Court by special leave and so the only point which has been raised by Mr. Sanyal on behalf of the appellant is that the appro-
priate Government under s. 2(a) '.is the Central Government and not the State Government of West Bengal. Before dealing with this point, it is necessary to refer to the relevant and material facts in regard
to the work which is carried on by the workmen at the appellant's office. The appellant's office at Calcutta generally manages the work of the mines and looks after the sale of its mine products. The
mining operations of the appellant are, however, carried on the State of Orissa, under a lease execut- ed in favour of the appellant by the said State. These operations. relate to the work of chromite
and manganese. The function of the Calcutta office is merely to exercise general control over the mining operations and look after the sale of the minerals produced in the said mines. It appears that the
staff engaged in the Head Office at Calcutta can be ·transferred to the office in Orissa where the mines are situated. For the purpose of exercising direct supervisory control over the mining operabions,
the appellant employs staff at the site of the mines. Mr. Sanyal contends that the Head Office of the appellant at Calcutta being an integral pl)>rt of the mine, any industrial dispute between the said
Office and its employees .is an industrial dispute concerning a mine under s. 2(a)(i), and so the appropriate Government must be the Central Government and not the State Government.
Section 2( a) ( i) provides, inter aila, that unlesA there is anything repugnant in the subject or con- text, "appropriate Government" means – in rela- tion to an industrial dispute concerning a mine tqe ·
Serajuddin ~ Co. v. Their Workmen Gajendr6gadkar J. Snajuddi" d.• Cn. v. Tlvir lfor!mtr1 Gajrndragod/r.Gr J. Central GO\·ernmont. The question which ariseB for our decision is whether the present dispute can .
be said to be an industrial dispute concerning a mine. Mr. Sanyal'a argument is that the word "industry" is wide enough to include the Head Office of a mining company, though it may
be situatod away from the place where the mining operations are actually carried on; and it is in the light of the said ddinition 0f the word "industry" contained ins. 2(j) tha1 the words "in relation to
a mine" must be construed. An "industrial dispute" under s. 2(k) m<•ans inter a/ui any dispute between employers and workmrn and the expression "work· man" means any person employed in any industry
to do any skilled or uuskilled work of the type described by section 2 (H). Therefore, th1• words "industrial dispute" used in s. 2(a)(i) necessarily take us to the definition of the word "industn"' in
s. 2(j) because au industrial dispute takes us to tho definition of the workman and the definition of a workman inevitably brings in the c;Jefinition of "industry" in s. 2(j). That is how in construing
the clause "an indu~trial dispute concerning a mine" we cannot iwoid hringing in the wide 1.fofi· nition of tho worrl "in<luHtry" in s. ?. (j) and in the light of the said definition, a mine mu~t
mean the indw;try of mining and that woul<l in- clude the Head Office which exercise~ gi·neral super- vision over the mining operations of a company though it may be bituatcd far away from the place
where the en.id ope mt ions arn cunduotod. That, in brief, ia the arg11mP11t urge<l in support of 1he appeal. On tho other hand, if we look at the definition in s.2(a)(i), it would be noticed that where it was
intended to refer to an industry <is such, the defini· tion uses the wurd industry as for instance, it refer" to industrial disputn concerning any such controlled industry as may he spoeified in this behalf by tho
Central Government, wheread iii referring to the 3 S.C.R. dispute in regard to a mine the definition does not refer to an industrial dispute concerning a mining industry but it merely says an industrial dispute con-
cerning a mine. In the context, a mine is referred to just as a banking or an insurance company is referred to or an oil-field or a major port is referred. Therefore, in construing the words "an industrial
dispute" in relation to a mine, we must first deter- mine what a mine means and this .must be done without reference to the broad definition of industry prescribed by section 2(j).
In the absence of any definition of the word "mine" in the Act, we may take into account the dictionary meaning as excavation in earth for metal, coal, salt etc. The mines Act (:'15 of 1952)
also contains a definition of "mine" in s. 2(j). The said definition shows, inter aUa, that a "mine" means any excavation where any operation for the purpose of searching for or obtaining
minerals has been or is being carried on. It is significant that the definition of mine under s.2(j) excludes an office of a mine which is separately defined by s.2(k) as meaning an office at the surface
of the mine concerned so th:it there is no doubt that the office of the mine, though it may bt1 situated at the surface of the mine itself, is not within the defini- tion of mine. This position is further clarified when
we consider the definition of the person employed in a mine which is prescribed by s. 2(h). A person is said to .be employed in a mine who works under appointment by or with the knowledgo
of the manager, whether for wages or not, in any mining operation, or in cleaning or oiling any part of any machinery used in or about the mine, or in any other kind of work whatsoever incidental to, or connected
with, mining operations. It is obvio11s that the persons employed in the Head Office wherever it may be situated cannot be said to do the mi11ing opera- tion within the first part of the definition. In our
opinion, they cannot be said to be ordinarily Serajuddin & Co. v. Their .1 orkm1n Go.jendragadkar J. Illf2 SuojudJlri d~ C:o. v. Tluir JV 0rl:111tn Oojrndragadkor J. engaged in any other kind of work which is inciden-
tal to or connected with mining operations either. Th'3 work which is incidental to or connected with mining operations must have some connection with or relation to the mining operations themselves.
The work that is carried on in the Head Office which consists principally of the sale operations really begins after the minerals are ready and all opern.- tions incidental to or connected with them are over.
This position is not disputed. Therefore, there can be no doubt that under the ~lines Act, office of tho mine, though sit1mtcd at the surface of tho mine, is not necessarily a mine and the employees in the said
office cannot 1wcessarily be Raid to be 1mr~ons employed in a mine and so, the regulatory provi· sions of the i\IineH Act would not necessarily apply to the offi"" and would not go,·crn the conditions
of service of the cmployN•s in the said office. It is in the light of the dictionary meaning of the word "mine" or. in the light. of the definition of the word "min"" co11t11in<•d in the ~lines Act that
we have to rlenirle what an industrial diRput~i ecm- cerning a min,-, moans unrl11r s.:!(a)(i). Judged in that way, there criu be no <lifficulty in holdi11g thnt nu industrial rlispute het.\\·rr·n the employees engage< I in the Hea{l Office at Cakut,tn and t.hn employer iR not
an industri:il dispute '1onc!'rning a mine. The Head Offico is not. a mine and SP, an industrial disput<• raiRed by the <!mployoes c11gagod in the Head Office is not an inrlustrial dispute coneerning 11 mine.
It is, however, urg<'d by ~Tr. Sunyal on hehalf of the appellant that a mining l"ase unrler tho l\Iines and Mi11orals (Regulation and Development) Act (53 of l 048) means a lease granted for tho pur-
pose of searching for, winning, working, getting mak- ing mcrchant:iblc, carrying away or dis1~osing of minerals or for purposes connected therewith, and includes an exploring or 11. prospecting license. This
Act 4as been substantially amended in 1957. But_ for .,t the purpose of the argument urged on the definition of the "mining lease" contained in s.3( d), it is not necess&ry to refer to the subsequent amendments
made in the Act or in the said definition itself. The argument is that a mining lease contains a provision which enables the lessee to carry away or dispose of the minerals and so, the process of
disposal of the minerals being covered by the mining lease must be held to be integrally connected with the mining operations and since sales of minerals are looked after in the Head Office, the Head Office
itself is a part of the mine. In our opinion, there is no substance in this argument. The purpose of granting a mining lease obviously is to enable the Jessee to search for and win minerals and make
them merchantable. The said purpose must neces- sarily include the right of the lessee to carry a way the minerals and to dispose of them in the market. But the rights conferred on the lessee
under a mining lea8e can have no direct bearing on the question of the construction of s. 2(a) with which we are concerned. As we have already poin- ted out, in the absence of a definition of the word
"mine" in the Act itself, we have to take either the dictionary meaning of the word or the definition of the word "mine" in the Mines Act. The rights confer- red on the lessee in whose favour a mining lease is
executed can he of no assistance in interpreting the word "mine" in section 2(a)(i). Therefore, we are satisfied that the Tribunal was right in holding that the present dispute between the appellant and its
employees at its Head Office at Calcutta is not a dispute in relation to a mine. On general considerations also, the conclusion of the Tribunal appears to be right. The Central Government would be interested in industrial dis-
putes in relation to a mine and so, in regard to such disputes, the Central Government is made the appropriate Government by s.(2)(a). In this con- . nection, it would not be unreasonable to assume
ScrojuJdin &: Co. Their Wor~m~A Gajendragodkar J. Snajucldin &: Co. v. l"hth Workmrn that the Central Government would be int(lrested in industrial disputes relating to mines as defined by
the mines Act. 'fhe relevant provisions of the mines Act are intencicd to regulate labour in mine~ and as tho scheme of the Act showH, several provisions havo been m11.de by the Act fur t.he health and
safety of the persoIJs working in the mines and provisions have also ~een made for hours and limitation of employment in that behalf. If the scheme of the Act shows that office of the mine is
outside the purview of the Act and the employees engaged in the office would, therefore, not ordina- rily be governed by tho major provisions of the Act, it would not be unreasonable to hold that an indus-
trial dispute between such employees of the office of the mine and the omµloyer iH not a dispute in · which the Central Government would be interested. It may be that some of the work done in the office of
the mine situated at the surface of the mine may be incidental to or connected ~ ith ·the mining opera- tions, al!, e.g., keeping muster roll of workmen or payment register maintained for them. Clerks
engaged in such type of work may be said to be persons omployed in a mine; but the work in the Hoad Office with which we are directly concerned in this a.ppeal is wholly unconnected with mining
operatiom. All industrial dispuw,s which are out- side s. 2(a)(i) are the eo11cern of the St.ato Govern- ment under section :l(a)( ii); in othor words, the genera.I rule is that an industrial dispute arising be-
tween a employer and his employ<'es would be ruforred for adjudication by the State Government, except in cases falling under section 2(a)(i); and so it is t.hc ext.out of one of the exceptions mentioned
ins. 2(a)(i) that we have t<! detorminc in the prc- Ment case. In determining the oxtent of the said exooption, it would not be irrelevant to bear in mind the scope nf the provisions of the Mines Act
itself. That is why we think the fact that an office of a mine is outside the definition of a mine is of 3 s.c.R. some assistance in interpreting the word "mine" under section 2(a)(i).
Serajuddin &:: Co •. T!ieir Workmen We must, therefore, hold that the Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that the reference by the State Govemment of West Bengal in the present case was valid.
The appeal accord- ingly fails and is dismissed with costs, Gajtndragodk11r J. Appeal dismissed. THE STATE OF KERALA v. NARAYAN! AMMA KAMALA DEVI (J. L. KAPUR·, K. C. DAs GUPTA and
RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.) Criminal Trial-Conviction-Death of ·accused-Revision ta High Court, after the death of the accused if maintainable- Appellate and Revisianal jurisdiction-Distinction between- Cade of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), ss. 481, 439. One N, a cashier of a bank, was convicted of an · offence
under s. 381 of the Indian Penal Code on a charge of theft of a certain amount belonging to the Bank and was convicted to one year's rigorous imprisonment. His appeal to the Sessions Court was unsuccessful.
On that very date within few hours after the pronouncement of the judgment by the Sessions Court he died. A revision petition was filed in the High Court by his wife and his fwo minor sons under s. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The High Court of Kerala set aside the conviction of the deceased accused. The State of Kerala came up in an appeal to the Supreme Court by a certificate granted by the High Court.
The question is whether an application for revision under s. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could be entertained by the High Court after the death of the accused person against whom the order was made.
Held, that in a proper case the High Court can exercise its power of revision of an order made against an accused person even after hi• death, and the High C@urt was right in March 19.