Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
22. Particularly in matters governed by the Rent Acts to take into account subsequent events would inflict hardship to landlords, in a case like the present one. In this context, it was G held in para 9 of Joginder Pal vs. Naval Kishore Behal (2002) 5 sec 397 that:- "9. The rent control legislations are heavily loaded in favour of the tenants treating them as weaker sections of the SPEEDLINE AGENCIES v. T. STANES & CO. LTD. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.] society requiring legislative protection against exploitation and unscrupulous devices of !;!reedy landlords. The legislative intent has to be respected by the courts while interpreting the laws. But it is being uncharitable to le~islatures if they are attributed with an intention that they lean only in favour of the tenants and while being fair to the tenants, go to the extent of being unfair to the landlords. The legislature is fair to the tenants and to the landlords both …… "
23. It is pointed out by Mr. Parasaran, learned senior counsel that the tenant, in the present case, is an affluent company and is not a tenant falling under the category of weaker sections of tenants of small properties. He further submitted that the principle of taking into consideration subsequent event is to be confined only to appeals on the principle that an appeal is a continuation of the proceedings and the appellate court exercises all the powers of the trial Court. [Vide Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul and Ors. vs. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri & Ors. AIR 1941 F.C. 5 at page 13.)
24. In the present case, subsequent event of amalgamation cif a company took place during the pendency of the revision in the High Court. Though, subsequent events which have occurred during the pendency of a revision petition in the High Court or the matter was pending before this Court, have been taken into consideration by this Court in some cases, the question as to the difference between the exercise of jurisdiction in appeal and revision was not argued or decided in those cases.
25. In a revision under Section 25 of the Act, the Court is exercising a restricted jurisdiction and not wide powers of the appellate court. In Mis Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and Ors. vs. Rangaswamy Chettiar (1980) 4 SCC 259 at page 262 it was held:· " …… Therefore, despite the wide language employed in [201 O] 7 S.C.R. Section 25, the High Court quite obviously should not interfere with findings of fact merely because it does not agree with the finding of the subordinate authority. The power conferred on the High Court under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act may not be as narrow as the revisional power of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure but in the words of Untwalia, J., in Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate v. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagava/1; "it is not wide enough to make the High Court a second Court of c first appeal".
26. Mr. Parasaran reiterated that the High Court having only the power of limited jurisdiction and not powers of appellate court, the subsequent event which occurred during the pendency of the revision petition is not to be taken into account, D the High Court will decide only as to the legality of the order under revision.
27. Coming to the expression "for its own use/occupation", it has to be construed widely and given wide and liberal E meaning. When a company wants to expand its business and amalgamates with another company, this would also be a case of "for its own use". If a landlord which is a company cannot advance its interest in the business by amalgamating with another company by putting to use its own property, it would F be unjust, unfair and unreasonable. Further, the provisions of Rent Control Act should not be so construed as to frustrate and defeat the legislation. If in a case of landlord requiring the prE!mises for its own use, to amalgamate with another company and expands its business, the rent control legislation may clash G with the provisions of the Companies Act. The Companies Act and the Rent Control Act have to be harmoniously interpreted and not to be so interpreted as to result in the one Act destroying a right under the other Act.
28. As stated earlier, death of a landlord after passing the H order of eviction does not ipso facto destroy the accrued right \__SPEEDLINE AGENCIES v. T. STANES & CO. LTD. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.] under the decree. The cases which have taken into account the subsequent event in favour of the tenant are cases where during the pendency of the appeal or revision, the requirement of the landlord had been fully satisfied and met or ceased to exist. In the case on hand, the landlord required it for its own business and for residential purposes of its employees. That requirement continues to exist also for the transferee company since the entire business of the transferor company stood transferred to the transferee company. The requirement of the company has neither been satisfied nor extinguished. The right to evict has already crystallized into a decree to which the company after c amalgamation has succeeded by involuntary assignment. As · the decree for eviction was under stay, the decree could not be executed. Once the stay is vacated or dissolved, the respondent would be entitled to execute the decree. In the present case, the amalgamation order has also preserved the said right. As per Clause 1. 7 of the Scheme, all assets vest in the transferee company. As per Clause 6, any suit, petition, appeal or other proceedings in respect of any matter shall not abate or be discontinued and shall not be prejudicially affected by reason of the transfer of the said assets/liabilities of the Transferor Company or of anything contained in the scheme but the proceedings may be continued, prosecuted and enforced by or against the transferee company in the same manner and to the same extent as It would be or might have been continued prosecuted and enforced by or against the Transferor company as if the scheme has not been made. In view of the same, by virtue of the provisions in the Scheme of Amalgamation and operation of Order 21 rule 16 of C.P.C., the decree holder is deemed to execute the decree. Section 18 of the Act provides that the order of eviction shall be executed by the Controller as if such order is an order of a civil court and for this purpose, the Controller shall have all the powers of the civil court. For the purpose of execution of the order, all the powers of civil court have been invested in the Rent Controller. Therefore, the principle of Order 21 Rule 16 of the C.P.C. will apply. In any event, as rightly pointed out by learned senior counsel for the A respondent that the C.P.C. provisions to the extent advance public interest or ensure a just, fair and reasonable procedure and does not conflict with the Act\will apply to execution of the order of eviction.
29. The landlord's entitlement to evict the tenant had merged with the decree. Further, the amalgamation took place long after the decree for eviction and rights had crystallized under the decree for eviction and merged into it. The tenant has been in possession of vast extent of property which comprises C of a big building with built up area of 5,274 sq. ft. together with appurtenant space i.e. vacant land total measuring 61,872 sq. ft. from the year 1965 for a period of over 45 years. The appellant was initially paying rent of Rs. 400/- for the building and Rs. 300/- for the furniture and fixtures which was raised to Rs. 400/- and Rs. 4 75/- respectively in 1970's. The Rent 0 Controller fixed the fair rent as Rs. 6,465/- by order dated 18.10.1994 which was enhanced by the appellate authority in an appeal filed by the appellants to Rs. 7 ,852/- by order dated 19.12.2001.
30. The assets of the erstwhile company had vested in the amalgamated company. A decree constitutes an asset. The said asset of erstwhile company has devolved on the amalgamated company. The eviction was on the ground of its own requirement of the erstwhile company. The said business F will be continued to be carried by the amalgamated company. If the amalgamated company is deprived of the said benefit, it will frustrate the very purpose of amalgamation and defeat the order of amalgamation passed by the High Court exercising jurisdiction under the Companies Act.
31. Further, the vacant land which was leased along with the building is the subject matter of the proceedings under the Ceiling Act. The landlord has obtained an order of exemption under Section 21 of the Act vide G.O. Rt. No. 2900 dated 04.11.1981 and the order G.O. Rt. No. 852 dated 25.06.1986. H The exemption was expressly for the extension of the industry SPEEDLINE AGENCIES v. T. STANES & CO. LTD. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.] which is a public purpose. It is relevant to mention that under A Section 21, only when the requirement of public interest is satisfied, the Government has power to grant exemption. It is also pointed out the conduct of the tenant when the landlord obtained an order of exemption under Section 21 of the Ceiling Act, the tenant moved the Government for cancellation of B exemption and to assign the land in its favour. It also challenged the order of exemption before the High Court in Writ Petition No. 6434 of 1987 which was dismissed by the High Court by order dated 18.04.1991 and Writ Appeal No. 1177 of 1992 which was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court c by order dated 12.07.1993.
32. The reliance placed on behalf of the tenant, Section 10, sub-clause 3, first proviso, is a new plea. The said proviso reads as under:- "Provided that a person who becomes a landlord after the commencement of the tenancy by an instrument inter vivos shall not be entitled to apply under this clause before the expiry of three months from the date on which the instrument was registered." It has no application to pending revisions. On the other hand, it applies only to an application made before the Rent Controller. The proviso enjoins that the landlord "is not occupying" the building. Even if the landlord owns other properties but is not in occupation thereof, the proviso will not be attracted. The Rent Act does not deal with the ownership or title, but only with regard to the entitlement to occupation. Even otherwise, this Court will not permit this new plea to be raised for the first time. In any event, it is pointed out that the plea taken in the application for permission to place on record additional facts G and documents that the amalgamated company owns other land, it is not pleaded that it is in occupation of such land, therefore, the proviso to Section 10(3)(iii) is not attracted.
33. The object of the Act is to prevent unreasonable H A eviction of the tenant in occupation and to control rents. Similarly, when landlord wants the property for its own purpose, it takes into account the fact of the landlord's occupation of other properties and not its ownership of other properties which does not in occupation. The Act permits eviction on reasonable B grounds as provided for in the Act. It may be that there may be cases where it would be reasonable to evict the tenant, but that requirement may not strictly fall in any one of the provisions of Section 10 of the Act to entitle the landlord to evict the tenant. Section 29 of the Act therefore, enables the Government to c grant exemption of the building in such cases so that the landlord may be entitled to evict the tenant under the ordinary remedy of suit.
34. The present case being one where the order of eviction is eminently just, fair and equitable as ordered by two D authorities a,i:d confirmed by the High Court, we do not find any valid ground for interfe1ence, on the other hand. we are in agreement with the conclusion a1 rivt:d at by the authorities as well as the High Court. Taking into consideration the appellant- tenant is continuing in the premises for more than four decades, E we grant time for handing over possession till 31.12 2010 on usual condition of filing an undertaking within a period of four weeks. With the above observation, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. No order as to costs. N .. J. Appeal dismissed.