Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
18. This court in State of Karnataka v. Laxuman(2005) 8 SCC 709 considered the question where no time limit is fixed under section 18(3) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (as amended in Karnataka State). No time limit was fixed by the statute to apply before the court but since the application is to the court, though under a special enactment of Article 137, the residuary article of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be attracted aild the application has to be made within three years of the application relying on the Addi. Special Land Acquisition Officer. Bangalore v. Thakoredas, Major, and Ors. (l 997) 11 SCC 412. This court has observed: "9. As can be seen, no time for applying to the court in terms of subsection (3) is fixed by the statute. But since the application is to the court, though under a special enactment, Article 13 7, the c (2017] l I S.C.R. residuary article of the Limitation Act, 1963, would be attracted and the application has to be made within three years of the application for making a reference or the expiry of90 days after the application. The position is settled by the decision of this Court in Addi. Sp!. Land Acquisition Officer v. Thakoredasl. It was held: (SCC p. 414, para 3) "3. Admittedly, the cause of action for seeking a reference had arisen on the date of service of the award under Section 12(2) of the Act. Within 90 days from the date of the service of the qotice, the respondents made the application requesting the Deputy Commissioner to refer the cases to the civil court under Section 18. Under the amended subsection (3 )(a) of the Act, the Deputy Commissioner shall, within 90 days from 1-9- 1970 make a reference under Section 18 to the civil court which he failed to do. Consequently, by operation of subsection 3(b) with the expiry of the aforestated 90 days, the cause of action had acqrued to the respondents to make an application to the civil court with a prayer to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference. There is no period of limitation prescribed in subsc;ction (3)(b) to make that application but it should be done within limitation prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Since no article expressly prescribed the limitation to make such application, the residuary article under Article )37 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act gets attracted. Thus, it could be seen that in the absence of any special period of limitation prescribed by clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Act, the application should have been made within three years from the date of expiry of90 days prescribed in Section 18(3)(b) i.e. the date on which cause ofaction had accrued to the respondent claimant. Since the application had been ad~ittedly made beyond three years, it was clearly barred by limitation. Since, the High Court relied upon the case in Municipal Council2 which has stood overruled, the order of the High Court is unsustainable." This position is also supported by the reasoning in Kerala SEB v. T.P. Kunhaliurnma3. It may be seen that under the Central Act sans the Karnataka amendment there was no right to approach the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction to MAHAVIR & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. compel a reference and no time-limit was also fixed for making such an approach. All that was required of a claimant was to make an application for reference within six weeks of the award or the notice of the award, as the case may be. But obviously the State Legislature thought it necessary to provide a time- frame for the claimant to make his claim for enhanced compensation and for ensuring an expeditious disposal of the application for reference by the authority under the Act fixing a time within which he is to act and conferring an additional right on the claimant to approach the civil court on satisfying the condition precedent of having made an application for reference within the time prescribed. I 0. A statute can, even while conferring a right, provide also for a repose. The Limitation Act is not an equitable piece of legislation but is a statute of repose. The right undoubtedly available to a litigant becomes unenforceable if the litigant docs not approach the"court within the time prescribed. It is in this context that it has been said that the law is for the diligent. The law expects a litigant to seek the enforcement of a right available to him within a reasonable time of the arising of the cause of action and that reasonable time is reflected by the various articles of the LimitationAct."
19. The court is duty bound to prevent the abuse of the process of law in the cases which have been concluded several decades before, in our considered opinion, the provisions of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act cannot be invoked in such cases of dead claims or stale claims. There are several numbers of cases coming to this court in which matters had been contested up to this court questioning the acquisition and the petitions have been dismissed by this court, and acquisition has attained finality, possession was taken, the award passed. Notice had been issued under Section 12(2) of the Act tendering the awarded amount but it has not been collected by the claimants/land owners deliberately or they had refused to collect it and are not ready and willing to accept it and, thereafter, it has been deposited in the name and account of the owners in the treasury which i·s also deposited as per the State Government's instructions issued time to time relating to how Government money is to be dealt with. The act of failure to deposit money under section 31 after possession is taken only imposes liability to pay higher interest under section 34. The acquisition would not lapse under the Act. c c (2017] ll S.C.R.
20. In our opinion. the cases in which there is deliberate action of the owners for not collecting the compensation and they do not want to receive it, section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not come to their rescue as provisions are to help those persons who are deprived of compensation but not for those who deliberately had not received it and litigated for decades for quashing of proceedings avoiding to receive compensation by willful act. The failure to deposit in court under section 31 ( l) in such cases would at~ract only interest as envisaged under section 34 of the Act and the provisions of section 24 cannot be so invoked in such cases.
21. In the instant case, the claim has been made not only belatedly, but neither the petitioners nor their previous three generations had ever approached any of the authorities in writing for claiming compensation. No representation had ever been filed with any authority, none has been annexed and there is no averment made in the petition that any such representation had ever been filed. The claim appears not only stale and dead but extremely clouded. This we are mentioning as additional reasons, as such claims not only suffer from delay and !aches but courts are not supposed to entertain such claims. Besides such claims become doubtful, cannot be received for consideration being barred due to delay and !aches.
22. The High Court has rightly observed that such claims cannot be permitted to be raised in the court, and cannot be adjudicated as they are barred. The tligh Court has rightly observed that such claims cannot be a subject matter of inquiry after the lapse of a reasonable period of time and beneficial provisions of Section 24 of the 2013 Act are not available to such incumbents. In ow· opinion, Section 24 cannot revive those claims that arc dead and stale.
23. The High Court has observed that Raisina is a part of the Lutyens zone ofDelhi. It is prime ofNew Delhi and Government offices etc. are located. The petitioners asked the High Court to infer and conclude that in the absence of some indication of the record being made available by them that their ancestors have not ever received any compensation. How the petitioners came to know that their ancestors had not received compensation has not been disclosed in the petition. The High Court has rightly declined to entertain such claims. The protective umbrella of section 24 is not available to barred claims. If such claims are entertained under section 24, it would be very-very difficult to distinguish with the frivolous claim that may be made even after tampering the records etc. or due to non-availability of such record after so much MAHAVIR & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. lapse of time. Once right had been lost due to delay and !aches or otherwise, it cannot be revived under provisions of section 24 of the Act of 2013. The intendment of Act 2013 is not to revive stale and dead claims and in the concluded case y;hen rights have been finally lost. If there is delay and !aches or claim is otherwise barred. it is not revived under section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. The provision docs not operate to revive legally barred claims. The provision of Section 24 does not invalidate courts judgments/ orders in which right have been finally lost or due to inaction is barred. Law docs not permit examination of barred or totally fraudulent claims. The provisions of the law cannot be permitted to be defrauded or misused. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act cannot be invoked in such· cases. The High Court has rightly declined to entertain the writ petitions filed by the petitioners. It is not conceivable how the petitioners could file such a petition in a laconic manner relating to the prime locality at New Delhi that too for hundreds of acres with the delay of more than I 00 years.
24. The prayel's that have been made in writ petition are not only misconceived, there is an attempt to stop the ongoing construction activity. It has also been mentioned that Government offices etc. have come up and the Government has leased property to private parties also but still, the prayer has been made to stop the construction activity. It passes comprehension how such relief could ever be asked for. No authority had ever been approached by the petitioners or by their ancestors. As such the petition is aimed at the total misuse of the process oflaw. Even for a moment, such a petition could not have been received for consideration. c
25. We have seen in a large number of cases that the acquisition had attained finality, compensation had been tendered but not received and development had also taken place. Petitions are being filed in the couits under the provisions of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act that they have not been paid any compensation. In fact, if there is any such grievance, they themselves are responsible for not collecting the compensation that was offered and tendered to them. The provision of G section 24 is not intended to apply and extend help in such cases.
26. We arc not at all inclined to entertain the instant petition. The Special leave petition is liable to be dismissed, and the same is hereby dismissed with cost as in the facts and circumstances of the case we find that there is not only misuse but an abuse of the process of law. [4017] II S.C.R. Therefore, we irrwose the costs ofRs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand Only) which is to be deposited by the petitioners with the Supreme Court Bar Association in the welfare fund of Advocates within four weeks from today and compliance be reported to this Court. Kalpana K. Tripathy SLP dismissed.