J:J62 Prem Chand Garg v. 'xcis1 Commissiona, U. P., A//ah•b•d Shah, J. November, 7. calling upon the petitioners to furnish security of Rs. 2,500/- is set aside. There will be no order as to
costs. MAHENDRA LAL JAIN! v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS (B. P. StNHA, c. J., P. B. GA.TENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WA'WHOO, K. c. DAS GUPTA and J. C. SHAH, JJ.) Compulsory acquisition–J>ernianent
Lease-Statute declaring transfer vaid-1Vo provision for cornpensation-F/tatute, if provides for compulBOry acquisition-Gonstituti'.onality of- Doctrive of eclipse-If not applicable to post-Gon.stitution stat11tes-U.P. L1ind Tenures (Regulation of Transfers) Act, 1952 (U.P. I5. of J.1152), s. 3-Gonstitution of India Arts. 13, JI-Constitution (1i'ourth Amendment) Act, J9,55.
Forest-Declaration as resuve forest-Statute providing for interim confrol-Gonstitntionality of-Indian /i'orest Act; 1.927 (IU of 1.927), Ghs. lI and JI-Indian 1i'ore$t (U.P. Amen.d- ment) Act, 1.956 (U.P. ,; of l.9!jli), s. 3.
By a registered lease dated June l 4, 1952, one M granted a perpetual lease of certain lands to the petitioner. Formally a large nun1ber of trees ~tood on these lands and the lease deed
recittd that the entire land had been cleared of the trees and possession given to the petitioner who was made a hereditary tenant of the land. The U. P. Zamindari .,..bolition and Land Ref arms Act, 195 l, (hereinafter referred to as the Abolition Act) was made applicable from July I, 1952, In the mean-
time the U. P. Land Tenures (Regulation of Transfers) Act, i952 (hereinafter referred to as the Transfer Act) ~'as passed which came into force with retrospective effect from May 21, I S.C.R.
1952. By this Act all transfers made hy intermediaries after May 21, 1952, were declared void. The petitioner was ordered to desist from clearing the land and from doing anything contrary to the U. P. Private Forests Act, 1948. On March 23, 1955, the respondent issued a notification under s. 4 of the Indian Forests Act 1927, decla.ring that it had been decided to constitute certain lands including the lands in dispute a "reserve forest'".
Later, a proclamation under s. 6 was issued calling for objections from claimants but the petitioner did not file any objections. In March 1956, the Indian Forest (U. P. Amend· ment) Act, 1956, (hereinafter referred to as the Forest Amend- ment Act) was passed which introduced a new Ch. VA consist- ing ss. 38A to 38G in the Forest Act.
A fresh notification was issued prohibiting variou' acts mentioned in s. 38B. The petitioner contended that the Transfer Act and the Forest Amendment Act were unconstitutional and that the restrictions imposed upon him under these two Acts were illegal.
The res- pondent contended that the two Acts were valid and that the petitioner acquired no right under the lease and had no right to maintain a writ petition under Art. 32. Held, that so long as the lease stood, the petitioner had a right to maintain the petitio!L The lease created a right in presenti and not merely some future right. The fact that the nature of the right was disputed did not affect the right to maintain the petition.
Held, further, that the Transfer Act was unconstitutional. It deprived the petitioner of his property without providing for payment of any compensation and contravened Art. 31. The Transfer Act was law for acquisition of property when it was passed in 1952 and the constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, !955, which laid down that a law which did not provide for the transfer of ownership or right to possession to the State was not a law for the compulsory acquisition or requisition of property, was not applicable to it.
The constitutionality of a law had to be judged on the basis of the Constitution as it stood at the time the law was passed, subject to any retrospective amendment of the Constitution. The Constitution (Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1955, could not be applied to the Transfer Act by virtue of the doctrine of eclipse. This doctrine was applicable to pre-Constitution laws but not to post-Constitution laws.
State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose fl954/ S.C.R. 587, Saghir Ahmad v. The State of U. P., [1955],I S.C.R. 707, Karam Singh v. Nilial Khan, A. I. R. (1957) All. 549. {3umhay Dyeing and Manufacturing Go. Ltd.
v. The State of Mah~11dra Lal Jami v. State of U. P. ·lahendra Lr1[ Jaini v •. St•t' of U. P. Wanchoo, J. Bombay, [1958] S. C. R. 1122, Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. Ths Slate of Bombay, [1955] I S. C.R. 613, Keshavan Madhava Meno~ v.
The State of Bombay, [1951] S. C.R. 228, Bhikaji Narain Dhr:has v. 1'he State of Madhya Pradesh, (1955] 2 S. C.R. ~89 ancf Deep Chand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (1959] Supp. 2 S. C. R. 8, referred to.
Held, further, that the Forest Amendment Act was not unconstitutional. Chapter VA introduced by Ch. II in the Indian Forest Act was ancillary to Ch. II and not to Cb. V. Chapter VA was a mere interim measure to deal with the
situation arising after the Abolition Act while steps were being taken to constitute reserved forests under Ch. II. As originally enacted. Ch. VA was ancillary to Ch. II and gave further
powers of control besides those contained in Ch. II. during the period that proceedings under Ch. II were pending. These provi- sions which were for the interim protection of the forests pending declaration of forests as reserved forests were in the interests of the general public. The Amendment Act of 1960 which
enacted ss. 38H to 38M made no difference to the position that ss. 38A to 38G as originally enacted were ancillary to Ch. II. Held, further, that ss. 38A to 38G of the Forest Act were
applicable to the lands in dispute. Chapter II to which these sections were. ancillary, dealt inter alia with forest and waste land belonging to the Government. After the Abolition Act. the proprietary rights in the land vested in the Government and the petitioner who claimed to have become a bhumidar could not be a proprietor but only tenure-holder.
ORIGINAL .JURISDICTION : Petition No. 59 of 1962. Petitioner under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. C. B. Agarwala and J(. P. Gupta, for the
petitioner. G. S. Pathalc, K. S. Hajela and C. P. Lal, for the respondents. 1962. November 7. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by W ANCHOO, ].-This petition un~er ;'\rt .. 32 of
the Constitution challenges the constltutlonahty of U. P. Land Tenures (Regulation of Transfers) Act 1952, (U. P. XV of 1952), (hereinafter called the Transfer Act) and the Indian Forest (U. P. Amend-
ment) Act 1956, (U. P. V of 1956), (hereinafter referred to as the Fotest Amendment Act.) The case of the petitioner is that he obtained a permanent lease from the Maharaja Bahadur of Nahan of certain
land known as "asarori" land, situate in the district of Dehra Dun, in U ttar P~adesh. The area leased out to him was 1069.68 acres in Khewat No. 1, Mahal No. 8, Khasra Nos. IA, 1-B and ·2.
This land was originally a Crown grant and had been free from revenue since 1866. Initially, it belonged to Major P. Innes· but was subsequently transferred to the Maharaja Bahadur of Nahan. On January 25,
1951, an agreement was executed by the Maharaja Bahadur in favour of the petitioner and one Virendra Goyal for lease of this land for a consideration of an annual rent of Rs. 2,200/-
and a premium of Rs. 64,000/-. The petitioner's case further is that the possession of the land in dispute . was delivered to him at the time the agreement to lease was executed. It appears tl_iat at that time a large number of trees
were standing on this land and the Maharaja Bahadur had give,n a contract for the removal of the trees to another person with a view to making the land cultur- able, and the intention of the lessor was to demise the
land to the petitioner after the trees were removed, so that the petitioner may carry on agricultural opera- tions thereon. On June 14, 1952, a registered lease was executed by the Maharaja Bahadur in favour of
the petitioner and Virendra Goyal and it was recited therein that the entire land had been cleared of the trees and had been in possession of the lessees from the date of the agreement referred to above.
There- fore, in fulfilment of the agreement, the lease was executed demising to the lessees the land in question on an annual rent of Rs. 2,200/-. The lease was permanent, heritable and transferable. The lease
also provided that the lessor hacl given the right of Mahendra I.al Jaini v. State of U. P. Wanc~oo, J. ..ta/undra Lal Jaini v. State of U. P. Wanchoo, J. hereditary ten'!ncy within the meaning of the U. P.
Tenancy Act, l!l89 to the lessees. The lessees were also given the right to put the land to any other use whatsoever besides agriculture and subterranean rights were also confer~ed. Tliey had also the right
to sub-let and assign the land. The petitioner's case further is that Virendra Goyal is merely a benamirlar and has no right, title or interest in the land in dispute and that a suit for
declaration in that behalf is pending in the Civil Court at Dehra Dun between the petitioner and Virendra Goyal. A day after the agreemept of lease was executed, the U. P Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, No. 1of19fil, (hereinafter referred to as the Abolition Act), came into force on January 26, 195], and the land in dispute is land within the meaning of this Act. The Abolition Act was actually
applied to this area by a notification issued under s. 4 thereof from July ] , l 9fi2, shortly after the registered lease in favour of the petitioner and another had been made. The contention of the petitioner is that in
consequence of the application of the Abolition Act to this ar~a, the petitioner became a bhurnidhar of the land under s. 18 (d) (iii) of the Abolition Act and that his bhurnidhari rights still subsist.
On July 5, 1952, the petitioner and his employees went to the land to carry on agricultural operations, but they were stopped from doing so by the City l\1agistrate, Dehra Dun along with the Divisional Forest Officer
and the Tehsildar, Dehra Dun. He was ordered to desist from clearing the land until further orders. The matter was then referred to the Government of l1ttar Pradesh, and the petitioner was ordered to desist from
doing anything, which was contrary to the U. P. Private Forests Act, 1948 (U. P. VI of 1949). It may be mentioned that in the meantime the Transfer Act which was passed on June 28, J 952, came into force
with retrospective effect from May 21, 1952. By this Act all transfers made by intermediaries after May 21, "' • 1952, were declared void. The petitioner was there- fore asked by the City Magistrate not to do anything
contrary to the Transfer Act until the orders of the Government were received or the matter was decided by a court of law. The petitioner's case is that the land was no longer forest land when the registered
lease in his favour was made in June 1952. The petitioner then took up the matter with the Govern- ment but his representation in that behalf was reject- ' ed in September 1952. Thereupon in November 1952, the penuoner
filed a writ petition in the High Court at Allahabad challeging the applicability of the U. P. Private Forests Act to the land in dispute and also challenging the constitutionality of the Transfer Act.
An ad interim order was passed by the High Court in Dece- mber 1952 restraining the respondents from interfering with the possession of the petitioner over the land in dispute and directing that the parties should maintain
the status quo. In February 1955, the petitioner withdrew the petitoin filed in the High Court for various reasons into which it is unnecessary to go. Thereafter the petitioner requested the Collector,
Dehra Dun, to allow him to carry out agricultural operations over the land in dispute and he supported this prayer by a further allegation that he had at any rate become a sirdur within the 1111.:aning of s. :!l 11 of the Abolition Act and was thus entitled to retain the
land in dispute. The Collector again informed thl' petitioner that the matter had been 1:cfen cd to the Government and in the meantime the st11.tas rtno should be maintained. In his present petition also,
the petitioner in the alternative raises the plea that he has become a .sfrdar of the land in dispute and as no steps were taken by the State to eject him within two years of the date of vesting, namely, July I, 1952,
he was entitled to retain the possession of the land as 8irdf4r. .Wahendra Lal Jain• v. State of U. P. ~Vanchoo, J. Mahendrtl Lal Jaini v. 'Stat4Df U. P. Wanrhoo, J. On March 23, 1955, the Government of Uttar
Pradesh issued a notification under s. 4 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, (XVI of l.927), (hereinafter referred to as the Forest Act), declaring that it had been decided to constitute Asarori village including the
land in dispute a "reserved forest", and appointing the Forest Settlement Officer Dehra Dun to call for objections from claimants under ·Chap. Il of that Act. On April 26, 1955, a proclamation was issued
under s. 6 of the Forest Act, calling for objections from claimants. The petitioner, however, has made no claim so far in persuance of the proclamation issued under s. 6 of the Forest Act, and his reason for
this is that his matter was still under the consideration of the Government as intimated to him by the Colle- ctor of Dehra Dun, and no orders had been passed by the Government thereon.
On December 3, 1955, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh promulgated an Ordinance, named as "The Indian Forest (U. P. Amendment) Ordinance, 1955" adding Chap. V-A to the Forest Act, and a notifica-
tion was issued thereunder restraining the claimants as defined in s. 38-A from doing acts prohibited under s. 38-B. This Ordinance was made into an Act in March 1956, namely, the Indian Forest (U.P.
Amendment) Act, 1956 (U. P. V of 1956) by .which Chap. V-A was introduced into the Forest Act, and a fresh notification was issued under the Act prohibi- ting various acts mentioned in s. 38-B thereof. This
is one of the Acts which. the petitioner challenges as unconstitutional. The petitioner asserts . that the notification, of March 17, 1956, was cancelled on December 19, 1956, and thereupon he applied to the
Collector again to.allow him to reclaim the land. The Collector told him in reply that the orders of the Government were awaited in that connection. The petitioner further alleges that in November 1957 the
State of Uttar Pradesh released over 293 acres out of the land in dispute in favour of Yirendra Goyal, his f 1. 1 S.C.R. benamidar. The petitioner then made a representa· tion to the Government in that behalf protesting
against the release of land in favour of Virendra Goyal, and was informed that order had been can- celled on August 14, 1958. In May 1959, the legis- lature ofUttar Pradesh passed another Act known as
the Government Grants (U. P. Amendment) Act, No. IX of 1959, and the petitioner contends that by virtue of this Act all other laws ceased to apply to the land in dispute but as this Act was admittedly repeal-
ed by the Government Grants (U. P. Amendment) Act, No. XIII of l 960, with retrospective effect, noth- ing turns on this Act now, though the petitioner approached the Collector of Dehra Dun immediately
after U. P. Act No. IX of 1959 was passed to be allow- ed to carry on reclamation operations. The Collector however told him that he should do nothing till spe- cific orders were received from the Government or the
matter was decided by a court of law. Thereupon the petitioner filed a writ petition in this Court under Art. 32 which was admitted in February 1960. When this writ petition cam~ up
for hearing on October 25, 1961, this Court was informed that certain notifications had been issued under ss.38-B and 38.C of the Forest Amendment Act. The petitioner was then .. fore allowed on March
19, 1962 to withdraw that petition with liberty to present a fresh writ petition and thereupon the present petition was filed in April 1962. The main contentions of the petitioner with
respect to the two Acts, the constitutionality of which he challenges, are these. He con tends that the Transfer Act .is unconstituti~mal, as it deprives the l~s~ees of thell' lease-hold nghts without any pro-
v1s1011 for payment of compensation in violation of Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution as it stood before the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. In the alernative, he claims that even if the Transfer Act
A1 ahendra Lal J aini v. State of U. P. Wanchoo, J. Mahindra Lal Jaini v. State of U. P. Wanchoo, J. is valid, he has become a sirdar under s. 210 of the Abolition Act. As to the Forest Amendment Act it
1s contended that it is unconstitutional as it imposes unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental right of the petitioner enshrined in Art. 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. Besides these two main objections,
the petitioner further contends that the notification under s. 4 of the Forest Act dated March 23, 1955, was cancelled so far as the land in dispute was con· cerned and therefore would not affect the petitioner's
case. It is also urged that as no notification under s.20 of the Forest Act has been issued, it must be held that the purpose of the notification under s. 4 had been abandoned. As to the notification under s. 38-B
of the Forest Amendment Act, it mav be mentioned that the petitioner made no objections as required under that Act; but he claims that he could not do so because before the time within which he had to
file objections had expired, U .P. Act IX of J 959 had come into force and it was not necessary for him to file any objection in view of that Act. The peti- tioner therefore p~ays that the Transfer Act and the
Forest Amendment Act be declared ultra vires and all actions taken thereunder be held to be void as against the petitioner. He further prays that he may be declared a bhumidhar or in the alternative a
sirdar under the provisions of the Abolition Act and the respondents be restrained from interfering with his possession of the land. He also prays that in case it is found that he has been dispossessed, a writ
in the nature of inandarnus or any other appropriate direction be issued against the respondents directing them to withdraw from possession of the land in dispute and to permit the petitioner to enjoy such
rights to which he may be found entitled. The petition has been opposed on behalf of the State of U ttar Pradesh and it is maintained in the first place that t.he Transfer Act is valid and constitu-
tional. If that is held in favour of the respondent, l S.C.R. nothing else will survive. for no rights would then arise in favour of the peritioner under the registered lease of June 1952.
Further, it has been strenuously contended on behalf of the state that the petitioner never obtained possession over the land in dispute. It has also been contended that the land in dispute
was never denuded of trees and that it is still forest land on which a large number of trees are standing. The petitioner's claim that he has become a bhurnidhar under the Abolition Act is also denied.
His further claim that he has become a sirdar is also repelled. The case of the State is that the petitioner acquired no rights under. the registered lease of June l952 and has no right to maintain the present petition
n consequence, irrespective of whether the Transfer \ct is valid and constitutional or not. It is also contended that the Forest Amendment Act is a valid and constitutional piece of legislation and the various
notifications issued under the For est Act and the Forest Amendment Act are perfectly good. Lastly it is contended that the notification under s. 4 of the Forest Act has never been withdrawn though no
notification under §. 20 has yet been issued in defer- ence to the fact that the writ petitions filed by the petitioner one after the other were pending either in the High Court or in this Court.
The three main points therefore which arise for decision in the present petition are these : — (I) Has the petitioner no right whatsoever to any property by virtue of the registered
lease deed of June 1952 in his favour irrespective of whether the Transfer Act is valid and constitutional or not, and there- fore has no locns stwndi to maintain the present petition ?
(2) Is the Transfer Act, 1952, valid and cons·· titutional ? (3) Is the Forest Amendment Act of l!J5G valid and constitui:imrnl ? Mahmdra L.t J ainl Stat• of U. P. Wanchoo, J, Mahnidra lAI Jaini
v. Stale of U. P. Wanehoo, J. There are ·some subsidiary points with respect to the notifications issued which also arise for consi- deration with which we shall deal when considering
the three main points mentioned above. Re. (1). The petitioner bases his right to move this Court to protect his fundamental right on the basis of the registered lease in his favour of June 14, 1952. There
can be no doubt after a perusal of that lease which is not said to be a fictitious document, that if various laws had not been passed and had not come into force that might have affected this land, it would have
conferred a right of property on the petitioner, and he would be entitled at least to be a permanent lessee of the land in dispute with such rights as the lease confers upon him. It is therefore difficult to under-
stand how it can be said in the face of this lease that the petitioner has no right to maintain the present petition. It may be that the lease may be of no force and effect, if the Transfer Act is held valid–which
is a question we shall consider later-; but once it is conceded that the lease is not fictitious, it does confer rights in the land affected by it on the petitioner. We cannot see how the petitioner would have no right to
maintain the present petition irrespective of whether the Transfer Act is valid and constitutional or not. What rights are conferred on the petitioner by this registered lease is a different matter. The petitioner
claims that he has become a bhumidhar under the Abolition Act by virtue of this lease; in the alterna- tive he claims that he has become a sirdar, as he is in possession. The State however denies that the peti-
tioner has become a bhumidhar under the Abolition Act; it also denies that the petitioner is in possession and in consequence has become a sirdar, under the Abolition Act. The petitioner prays that his rights
as a bhnmidhar or a sirdar, may be decided in the present petition. We are however of opinion that it will' not be fair to either party to d.ecide the question whether or not the petitioner is either bhumidhar or
sirdar by virtue of the registered lease or the possess- ion of the land demised which he claims, in view of the provisions of the Abolition Act. The petitioner's status as bhumidhar or sirdar will depend upon the
decision of various questions of fact, and we do not think that it will be fair to either party to decide those questions of fact merely on the scanty document- ary evidence available on this record, in particular
as the question of possession is also seriously disputed and further there is a serious dispute as to whether any trees stand on this land even now or whether trees had been cleared as recited in the registered lease,
before that lease was registered; these are all questions of fact on which oral evidence will be necessary. There is a provision in the Abolition Act, s. 229-B, which allows a person claiming to be a bhumidhar or
sirdar under it to file a suit to establish that right. We think, considering the serious dispute as to facts which exists in this case between the parties both as to the nature of the land and as to the possession of the
petitioner, that the petitioner should be left to esta- blish his rights as bhumidhar or as sirdar by suit, or it may also be possible for him to establish that right by fling objections in response to the proclamation under
s. 6 of the Forest Act with which we shall deal in detail later. Therefore even though we are not prepared to decide the question whether the petitioner is a bhumidhar or a sirdar, it seems to us that in the
face of the deed of lease in favour of the petitioner, it cannot be said that he has no right to maintain the pr.esent petition (irrespective of whether the Transfer .\ct is valid or not). As we have already indicated,
if the Transfer Act is valid, then the lease in favour of the petitioner will confer no right on him and in that case his petition must fail. But if the Transfer Act is not a valid piece of legislation, the lease will
stand and so long as it stands, the petitioner would in our opiniort' be competer, 😮 ~aintain the present Malundra LIJI Jaial v. Stau of U. P. Wanchao, J, 924 SUPREME GOUR T REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
petition, though we make it clear that we do not Mahm;;;;z;; Jaini decide in this petition what right is conferred on the · petitioner by the lease and whether he is a bhumUlhar or a sirdar by virtue of the lease and his alleged
possession over the land demised therein. We are therefore of opinion that so long as the lease s'tands, State of U. P. Wanclzoo1 J. the petitioner would have a right to maintain the
present petition, though we express no opinion as to the nature of that right and leave it to the petitioner to have that determined in a proper forum. It is also urged that no present tenancy right
was conferred by the lease on the petitioner though cl. (2) of the lease purports to confer hereditary tenancy rights within the meaning of U. P. Tenancy Act, as the land was at the time covered by trees and
was not fit for cultivation. This again raises the same question of fact, namely, the nature ofland at the time of the execution of the lease. It may be that no tenancy rights may be created in favour of
the petitioner by the lease, if it is found that the land in dispute was not land within the meaning of the U. P. Tenancy Act. But that again is a question which will have to be decided in· the proper forum as
indicated above by us. There can however be no doubt that the lease did create some right, whatsoever be its nature, iq. presenti and though the nature of that right may be disputed, it js not a case where only
some future right is conferred. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that no right whatever in presenti was created by the lease, and therefore the petitioner is not entitled to maintain the present petition.
Lastly, it is urged that the lease was in favour of two persons, namely, the petitioner and Virendra Goyal, and the present petition has been filed only by the petitioner and Virendra Goyal has not been made
a party to it, even as respondent. It is urged there- fore that the present petition is not maintainable on that ground aiso, and reliance in this connection is l S.C.R. placed on the analogy of suits, where all co·owners
must join in a suit to recover property unless the law otherwise provides, and if some co-owners refuse to sue, the proper course to adopt ,;is to the rest is to make them defendants in the suit. It is enough to say
that this principle applicable to suits for possession caa have no application to a petition under Art. 32, which is not a suit for possession. Besides the case of the petitioner is
that the other lessee was a mere beru.imidar and if that case is right (on which again we express no opinion, as the matter is 8Ub judice in a civil court at Dehra Dun), it would be unnecessary
to make Virendra Goyal even a respondent. If the petitioner has a right to maintain the present petition, the fact that he has not made another person who would have equal right with him to maintain the
petition, even a party to the petition, would not in our opinion entail that his petition should be thrown out on that ground alone and he should not be grant· ed any relief in the matter of enforcing his funda-
mental right. We are therefore of opinion that the petitioner has a right to maintain the present petition, though we express no opinion as to the nature of that right. Re. (2). The Transfer Act is a short Act of three sections.
The preamble to the Act says that as the Abolition Act !1as come into force and it is expedient for the avoidance of transitional difficulties consequent upon the said enforcc~ent to regulate certain transfers of
land by intermediaries, the Act was enacted. Section 1 gives the short title, the extent to which the Act extends and the date from which it came into force, namely, :May 21, 1952 .. though it was actually publi·
shed on June 23, 1952. Section 2 is the definition section. Section 3 is the main section, which lays down that notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract to the contrary, a lease of land by
an intermediary either granted or registered on or A1afundra f,aJ J ait v. Stale nf U. P. H'.ini:hoo, J. .falwndra Lal Jaini v. Stai. of U. P. Wanehoo, J, after May 21, 1952 shall be and is hereby declared
null and void from the date of the execution and the lessee shall for purposes of s. 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act and s. 209 of the Abolition Act be deemed to be a person in possession of the land otherwise than in
accordance with the provis10ns of the law for the time being in force. It is further provided that a transac- tion between an intermediary and a tenant conferring on the tenant a right to transfer by sale his holding or
any part thereof either made or entered into or regis- tered on or after May 21, 1952 shall be and is here- by declared null and void from the date of execution. It will thus be seen that the Transfer Act makes two
kinds of transfers made on or after May 21, 1952 null and void and thus deprives the transferee of the right which he ,would otherwise acquire under the transfer. The contention of the petitiorn;r is that the Transfer
Act contravenes Art. 31 of the Constitution, as it was at the time the Act was passed, and therefore is un- constitutional, for though the transferee is deprived of his property, no compensation is provided in the
Act as required by Art. 31(2) of the Constitution. Reliance in this connection is placed on the State of West Bengal v. Suhodh Gopal Bose(1), where dealing with Art. 31, the majority of the Court held that Art.
31 protects the right to property by defining the limits on the power of the State to take away private property. It was further held that clause (1) and (2) of Art. 31 were not mutually exclusive in scope and
content, but should be read together and understood as dtaling with the same subject, namely, the protec- tion of the right to property by means· of the limita- tions on the State power referred to above, the
deprivation contemplated in cl. t l) being no other than the acquisition or taking possession of property referred to in cl. ( 2). The decision in Subodh Gopal' s case(1) was refered to in Saghir Ahmad v. The State
of U. P.('), and it was pointed out that in view of the majority decision in that case, it must be taken to be settled that "clauses (1) and (2) of article 31 are not (1) [1954] S.C.R. 587.
(2) [1955] 1 S.C.R, 707. mutually exclusive in scope but should be read to- .gether as dealing with the same su~ject, namely, the Mahendra Lal Jair protection of the right to property by means of limi-
tations on the State's powers, the deprivation contem- plated in clause (1) being no other than acquisition or taking possession of the property referred to in clause (2)". Soon after the decision in Suhodh Gopal' s case('),
Art. 31(2) was amended by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, and cl. (2A) was introduced in Art. 31, the amendment being prospective. The new cl. (2-A) of Art. 31 lays down that "where a law
does not provide for the transfer of the ownership or right to possession of any property to the State or to a corporation owned or controlled by the State, it shall not be deemed to provide for the compulsory
acquisition or requisition of property, notwithstanding that it deprives any person of his property." This amendment thus accepted the minority view of Das, J., as he then was, in l:Jubodh Gopal's case(') and
made it clear that mere deprivation of property, without the ownership or right to possession being transferred to the State, would not attract the provi- sions of Art. 31(2). The contention on behalf of the
petitioner is that the amendment to Art. 31 being not retrospective would not apply to the consideration of the constitutionality of the Transfer Act, which would have to be considered on the basis of the Constitution
as it ~.tood in 1952. It is not seriously disputed on behalf of the respondents that if the Constitution as it stood in. 1952 has to be applied to judge the cons- titutionalitv of the Transfer Act, the case would be
completely' covered by the decision in Subodh Gopal's case('), and the Transfer Act not having provided for payment of compensation, as required by Art. 31(2), as it stood in 1952, would be unconstitutional.
We are unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court at Allahabad in Karam Singh v. Nihal Khan(') insofar as it upholds the validity of the Transfer Act. '11·' (I} [l 954) S.C.R:: 587,
(2) A.I.R. (1957) All. 549, v. Stall of U. P. Wanchoo, J. MaMndra Lal laid v. Stal• oJ U. P. Wanchoo, J. The contention on behalf of the respondents in support of the constitutionality of the Transfer Act
is, however, two·fold. In the first place, it is urged that the constitutionality of the Transfer Act must be judged on the basis of the Constitution as it stood on the date of the present petition and not as it stood
on the date of the Transfer Act. Reliance in this connection is placed on Bombay Dye·inq and Manu- facturing Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bombay (1), where it was observed at p. 1131, that it was not disputed
that the Constitution Fourth Amendment Act which introduced cl. (2-A) in Art. 31 was not retrospective, and that the rights of the parties must be decided in accordance with the law as on the date of the writ
petition. It is urged that this observation is an authority for the proposition that in every case the constitutionality of an Act has to be judged by the Constitution as it stood on the date of the writ peti-
tion. We are of opinion that this observation is not capable of this interpretation and could not have intended to lay down any such proposition. The judgment in the Bombay Dyeing case (') nowhere
considers the question whether the constitutionality of an Act has to be judged on the basis of the Constitu- tion as it stood on the date on which the Act was passed or on the basis of the Constitution as it stood
on the date the writ petition was made. In that case it made no difference whether the Constitution as it stood on the date the Act was passed or on the date when the writ petition was filed, was applied, for the
writ petition was filed long before the Constitution Fourth Amendment was enacted. The observation therefore in that case that the constitutionality of an Act has to be judged on the basis of the Constitution
as it stood on the date of the writ petition, cannot be ·given the meaning which the learued counsel for the respondents put on it,, particularly, as the context shows that the amendment of the Article
by the Constitution (~ourth Ame?d~ent). Act was not retrospective. Now, if the const1tutionahty Wall to be (I) [1958] S.C.R. 1122. I S.C.R. judged by the date of the writ petition, the result
would be that sometime the Fourth Amendment of Art. 31 would become retrospective and sometimes it would not, depending upon whether the writ petition was filed before the Fourth Amendment Act was
passed or after the said amendment. If the writ petition was filed before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, the same provision of an Act would be unconstitutional while if it was filed after the
Fouth Amendment Act, it may be constitutional. .Such a result is obviously impossible to accept and could not have been meant by the observation in Bornhay Dyeing case (1). It is in our opinion absolu-
tely elementary that the constitutionality of an Act must be judged on the basis of the Constitution as it was on the date the Act was passed, subject to any retrospective amendment of the Constitution. There-
fore, the argument that the constitutionality of the Transfer Act must be judged on the basis of the Constitution as it stood on the date of the present writ petition has no force and must be rejected. We have
already indicated that if the constitutionality is to be judged on the basis of the Constitution as it stood when the Transfer Act was passed, it is not seriously disputed that the Transfer Act would be unconstitu-
tional, in view of the decision of this Court in Subodh Gopal's case ('). The secon~ contention on behalf of the respon- dents is that even if the Transfer Act was unconstitu- tional, when it was passed, the inconsistency having
been removed on the enactment of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act by which Art. 31 was amended, the Transfer Act revived and became effec- tive, at any rate from the date the Fourth Amend-
ment Act came into force. This brings us to a con- sideration of the doctrine of eclipse, on which the con- tention is based. This doctrine first came to be considrred in Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. The 8t,ate
of Bomby (3) where Venkatarama Aiyar, J. drew a (I) (1958] s.C.R. 1122. (2) (1954] s.c.R. 587. (31 (1955] I S. C. R, 6131 J.fakndra la! Jaini v. Slate of U. P. Wanehoo 1 .I. fahenndra L21 Jaini
v. State of U. P. Wanchoo, J. distinction between the invalidity arising out of lack of legislative competence and that arising by reason of a check imposed upon the legislature by the provisions contained in the Chapter on
Fundamental Rights. He relied on an earlier decision of this Court in Keshavan ]}f adhava ,~fenon v. The State of Bombay (1) and was of the view that the word "void" in Art. 13 (1) should _be con-
strued as meaning in the language of the American Jurists as "relatively void". It may however be observed that the laws under consideration in Keshavan Madhava JJ!enon's case (') as well as in
Behram Khurshed Pasikaka (') were both pre-Con- stitution laws, and the effect of Art. 13 (1) had to be considered with respect to their constitutionality. llehrnm Khurshed Pesikaka's (')case was later referr-
ed to a larger Bench in view of the constitutional questions involved and in the majority judgment of the Constitution Bench, Ivfahajan, C. J., pointed out that there was no scope for introducing terms like
"relatively void", coined by AmericanJurists in con- struing a Constitution . which is not drawn up in similar language. The majority also observed that they were not able to endorse the opinion expressed
by Venkatarama Aiyar, J., that a declaration of un- constitutionality brought about by lack of legisla- tive power stood on a different footing from a decla- ration of unconstitutionality brought about by reason
of abridgement of fundamental rights, and that it was "not correct to say that constitutional provisions in Part III of the Constitution merely operated as a check on the exercise of legislative power. It was
also observed that when the law-making power of a State is restricted by a written fundamental law, then any law enacted, which is opposed to the funda- mental law was in execs~ of the legislative authority
and was thus a nullity. Both these declarations of unconstitutionality go to the root of the power itself and there was no real dtstinction between .them and they represent two aspects of want of legislative power.
(I) (1951) s. a. R. 228. (2~ (1955] 1 s. a. R. 613, 1 S.C.R. Finally, it was added that a mere reference to the provisions of Art. 13 (2) and Arts. 245 and 246 was sufficient to indicate that there was no competency
in Parliament or a State legislature to make a law which comes into clash with part III of the Constitu- tion after the coming into force of the Constitution. Then came the decision in Saghir Ahnwd's
case (1). In that case the law under consideration had been pased after the coming into force of the Consitu- tion, and the judgment of the Constitution Bench was unanimous. The question
there to be considered was the effect of the Constitution (First Amendment} Act, which was passed shortly after the Act under challenge there was pas~ed. It was ob- served that "amendment of the Constitution which
came later cannot be invoked to validate an earlier legislation which must be regarded as unconstitu- tional when it was passed", and the observation of Prof. Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limita-
tions to the effect that "a statute void for unconstitu- tionality is dead and cannot be vitalised by a subsequent amendment of the Constitution removing the constitutional objection but must be re-enacted"
was accepted as sound, and the Court therefore came to the conclusion that the legislation in question which violat-ed the fundamental right of the appe- llants under Art. 19 ( 1) (g) of the Constitution and
was not shown to be protected by cl. 6 of the Article, as it stood at the time of the enactment must be held to be void under Art. 13 (2) of the Constitution. The Court further held that the Act then under considera-
tion also violated Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution and thus was invalid. It will be seen therefore th~t the doctrine of eclipse was not applied to the case of a post-Constitution law, which was unconstitutional as
it was in violation of the Art. 17 ( 1) (g) and was not protected by Art. 19 (6) and also because it was in violation of Art. 31 (2) .. Saghir Ahmad's case(') in effect completely demi:ihshes the argument raised on
(I} [1955] I S.C.R. 707. Mahendra Lal Jai1 v. State of U. P, Wanchoo, J. 1ahendra Lal Jaini v. Staie of[) P. Jt'anchoo1 J. behalf of the respondents that a post-Constitution law which is void under Arts. 19 (1) and 31 (2) of the
Constitution and is thus void from birth can be revived under the doctrine of eclipse. The respondents, however, rely on the next case in this seriet, namely, _Bhikaji Narain Dhakaras
v. 'Phe State of Jlrfadhya Pradesh('). That case was however dealing with a pre-Constitution law and not with a post-Constitution law. In that case an argument was put forward that Saghir Ahmad's
case(') would apply. But it was held that thatwould not be so far the simple reason that Saghir Ahmad's case (') was dealing with a post-Constitution law, while that case was concerned with a pre-Constitution
law. It was in that connection that Art. 13 (1) came to be considered, and it was observed that tr.e true cff cct of the Article is to render an Act, inconsistent with a fundamental right, inoperative to the extent
of the inconsistency. It was further observed that "it is overshadowed by the fundamental right and remains dormant but is not dead". With the amendment made in the Constitution, it was pointed
out, the provisions of the particular Act were no Jonget inconsistent therewith and the result was that the impugned Act began to operate once again from the date of such amendment. In that connection, it was
observed at p. 599 that "the true position is that the impugned law became, as it were eclipsed, for the time being, by the fundamental right. The effect of the Constitution (First Amendment), Act, 1951, was
to remove the shadow and to make the impugned Act free from all blemish or infirmity". It was further pointed out that "the American authorities refer only to post-Constitution laws which were inconsistent with
the provisions of the Constitution. Such laws never came to life but were still-born as it were. The American authorities therefore cannot (ully apply to pre-Constitution laws which were perfectly valid
before the Constitution". The respondents, however, (IJ [1955] 2 s.c.R. 589. (2) [1955) 1 s.c.R. 101. ,. _ I S.C.R. rely on the following passage at p. 599 :- "But apart from this distinction between pre·
Constiution and post-Constitution laws on which, however, we need not rest our decision, it must be held that these American authorities can have no application to our Constitution.
All laws, existing or future, which are inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of our Constitution are, by the express provision of article 13, ren· dered void 'to the extent of such inconsistency'.
Such laws were not dead for all purposes. They existed for the purpose of pre-Constitution rights and liabilities and they remained operative, even after the Constitution, as against 1,on citi-
zens. It is only as against the citizens that they remained in a dormant or moribund condition". It is true that the learned Judges did say that they need not rest their decision on the distinction between pre·
Constitution and post-Constitution laws ; but the later part of these observations where the learned.Judges say that such laws are not dead for all purposes shows that they had in mind pre-Constitution laws, for other-
wise they could not have said that they existed for the purpose of pre-Constitution rights and liabilities and they remained operative even after the Constitution as against non-citizens. We are therefore of opinion
that the decision in Bhikaji Narain's case (')must be confined to pre-Constitution laws to which the doctrine of eclipse would apply. We are fortified in this opinion by the fact that the learned Judges in
Bhikaji Narain's case(') themselves distinguished the earlier decision in Saghir Ahmad's case('), to which Das Acting C. ], who delivered the judgment in Bhikaji Narain's case(') was also a party.
Next we come to the last case on the point, namely, Deep Ohandv. The Stateo.fUttar Pradesh("). In that case, the majority after referring to all these (ll [1959] 2 s.c.R. 589. 12) [1955] l s.c.R. 101.
(3) [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. B. Mahendra Lal Jaini v. Stattof U. P. Mahend1a Lal Jaini v. Stale of U. P. Jt'anchoo, J. cases pointed out the distinction between Arts. 13(1) and 13(2), and further held that the limitations impo-
sed by Chap. III on legislative power were on the same level as the competence of the legislature to make laws. The following observations at p. 20 will bring out the position clearly :-
"Parliament and the Legislatures of States have power to male laws in re~pect of any of the matters enumerated in the relevant Lists in the Seveth Schedule and that power to make laws is
subject to the provisions of the Constitution, including Art. 13., i.e., the power is made subject to the limitations imposed by Part III of the Constitution. The general power to that extent
is limited. The Legislature, therefore, has no power to make any law in derogation of the injunction contained in Art. 13. Art. 13(1) deals with laws in force in the territory of India
before the commencement of the Constitution and such laws insofar as thev are inconsistent with the provisions of Part, III shall to the extent of such inconsistency be void. The clause, therefore, recognises the validity
of the pre-ConstitUtion laws and only declares that said laws would be void there- after to the extent of their inconsistency with Part III ; whereas clause (2) of that Article imposes a prohibition on the State making laws
taking away or abridging the rights conferred by Part III, and declares that laws made in contravention of this clause shall to the extent of the contravention be void. There is a clear
distinction between the two clauses. Under clause (1) a pre-Constitution law subsists except to the extent of its inconsistency with the provi- sions of Part III, whereas no post-Constitution
law can be made contravening the provisions of Part III and therefore the law to that extent, though made, is a nullity from its inception". 1 S.C.R. The minority however thought that it was not neces-
sary to decide this question in that case, and therefore did not finally express its views. Mahenrfro I.al Jain: State of U P. A review of these authorities therefore in our Wanchoo J.
opinion elearly shows that the doctrine of eclipse will apply to pre-Constitution laws which are governed by Art. 13(1) and would not apply to post-Constitution laws which are governed by Art. 13(2). It is, how-
ever, urged bn behalf of the respondents that on the language of Art. 13(1) and (2) there should be no difference in the matter of the application of the doctrine of eclipse. It is said that Art .. 13(1) pres-
cribes that insofar as the existing laws are inconsis- tent with the provisions of Part III, they shall to the extent of such inconsistency be void. Similarly, Art. la(2) provides that any law made in contravention of
this clause shall to the extent of the contravention be void. The argument is two-fold. In the first place, it is urged that the words "to the extent of the incon- sistency" or "to the extent of the contravention"
mean '·so long as the inconsistency continues or so long as the contravention continues." We are of opinion that this is not the meaning of these words in Art. 13(1) and (2). Obviously, the Constitution
makers when they used the words "to the extent of" in both clauses intended that the pre-existing law or the post-Constitution law should only be void as far as the inconsistency or the contravention went i.e. if
only a part of the law was inconsistent or contraven- ed the constitutional prohibition, that part alone would be void and not the entire law. The obvious intention behind the use of the words "to the extent
of" was to save such parts of a law as were not in- consistent with or in making which the State did not contravene the prohibition against infringement of fundamental rights and that distinction may concei-
vably introduce considerations of severability ; it has in our opinion no reference to the time for which the voidness is to continue. Where the Constitution Mah1ndra L2l Jaiui v.
Stal• of U. P. Wuncho°' J. makers intended to refer to time they have used spe- cific words for that purpose ; as, for instance, in Art. 251. That Article deals with "inconsistency between
laws made by Parliament under Articles 249 and 250 and laws made by the Legislatures of States", and provides that" ……….. the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the
Legislature of the State, shall prevail, and the law made by the Legislatur11 of the State shall to the extent of the repugnancy but so long only as the law made by Parliament continues to have effect, be in-
operative." If therefore the Constitution makers intended that the provisions in Art. 13(1) and (2) would only affect laws so long as inconsistency continued or contravention lasted, they could have
provided specifically for it. On a plain construction of the clause, the element of time must be excluded. We cannot therefore accept the contention that the words "to the extent of" import any idea of time. In
our opinion, they only import the idea that the law may be void either wholly or in part and that only such portions will be void as are inconsistent with Part III or have contravened Part III and no more.
We may in this connection also refer to the di- fference in the language and scope of Art. 13(1) and 13(2). Art. 13(1) clearly recognises the existence of pre-existing laws in_ force in the territory of India
immediately before the commencement of the Cons· titution and then lays down that in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of Part III, they shall be void to the extent of such inconsistency. The pre·
Constitution laws which were perfectly valid when they were passed and the existence of which is recog- nised in the opening words of Art. 13( 1) revive by the removal of the inconsistency in question. This in
effect is the doctrine of eclipse, which if we may say so with respect, was applied in Bhikaji Narain's case.(') !Il [1955] 2 s.c.R. 589. r- Art. 13(2) on the other hand begins with an
injunction to the State not to make a law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III. There is thus a constitutional prohibition to the State against making laws taking away or abridging funda-
mental rights. The legislative power of Parliament and the Legislatures of States un<ler Art. 245 is subject to the other provisions of the Constitution and there- fore subject to Art. 13(2), which specifically prohibits
the State from making any law taking away or abridging the fundamental rights. Therefore, it seems to us that the prohibition contained in Art. 13( 2) makes the State as much incompetent to make a law
taking away or abridging the fundamental rights as it would be where law is made against the distribution of powers contained in the Seventh Schedule to the Consittution between Parliament and the Legis-
lature of a State. Further, Art. 13(2) pro- vides that the law shall be void to the exte11t of the contravention. Now contravention in the context takes place only once when the law
is made, for the contravention is of the prohibition to make any law which takes away or abridges the fundamental rights. There is no ques- tion of the contravention of Art. 13 (2) being a con-
tinuing matter. Therefore, where there is a question of a post-Constitution law, there is a prohibition against the State from taking away or abridging funJamen ta! rights and there is a further provision
that if the prohibition is contravened the law shall be void to the extent of the contravention. In view of this clear provision, it must be held that unlike a law covered by Art. 13(1) which was valid when made,
the law made in contravention of the prohibition contained in Art. 13 (2) is a still-born law either wholly or partially depending upon the extent of the c<;>ntravention. Such a law is dead from the begin-
nm·~ and there can be no question of its revival under the doctrin~ of eclipse. A plain reading therefore of the words m Art. 13(1) and Art. 13(2) brings out a Maherulr4 Lal J11ir
v. Si.te of U. P U112nchoo J .\fahendrtt Lal Jaini v. Slat# of U.P, Wanchoo, f. 938 SUPREME GOURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP. clear distinction between the two. Art. 13( 1) declares such pre-Constitution laws as are inconsistent with
fundamental rights void. Art. 13 (2) consists of two parts; the first part imposes an inhibition on the power of the State to make a law contravening fundamental rights, and the .second part, which is merely a conse-
quential one, mentions the effect of the breach. Now what the doctrine of eclipse can revive is the opera- tion of a law which was operative until the Constitu- tion came into force and had since then become
inoperative either wholly or partially; it cannot confer power on the State to enact a law in breach of Art. 13(2) which would be the effect of the application of the doctrine of eclipse
to post-Constitution laws. Therefore, in the case of Art. 13(1) which applies to existing law, the doctrine of eclipse is applicable as laid down in Bhikuji Narain's case (1), but in the
case of a law made after the Constitution came into force, it is Art. 13(2) which applies and the effect of that is what we have already indicated and which was indicated by this Court as far back as Saghir Ahinvd' s
cuse ("). It is however urged on behalf of the respon- dents that this would give a different meaning to the word "void" in Art. 13 (1). as compared to Art. 13 (2). We do not t1iink
so. The meaning of the word "void" in Art .. 13 (1) was con- sidered in Keshava Madhava Menon's case (8) and again in Behrain Khurshed Pesikaka's case ('). In the later case, Mahajan, C. J., pointed out that the
majority in Keshava JJ1adhava Menon's case (3) clearly held that the word "void" in Art. 13(1) did not mean that the statute stood repealed and therefore oblite- rated from the statute book; nor did it mean that the
said statute was void ab initio. This, in our opinion, if we may say so with respect, follows clearly from the language of Art. 13(1), which pre-supposes that the existing laws are good exc~pt to the extent of the
inconsistency with the fund2mental rights. Besides (I) [1955) I S.C.R. 589 (2) [1935) I S.C.R. 7!Y/. cs) (1951) s.c.R. 288. c+i (1955] 1 s.c.a. &1s. I S.C.R. there could not be any question of an existing law
being void ab initio on account of the inconsistency with Art. 13(1), as they were passed by competent legislatures at the time when they were enacted. Therefore, it was pointed out that the effect of
Art. 13(1) with respect to existing laws insofar as they were unconstitutional was only that it nullified them, and made them "ineffectual and nugatory and devoid of any legal force or binding effect". The meaninl:(
of the word "void" for all practical purposes is the same in Art. 13(1) as in Art. 13(2), namely, that the laws which were void were ineffectual and nugatory and devoid of any legal force or binding effect. But
the pre-Constitution laws could not become void from their inception on account of the application of Art. 13(1). The meaning of the word "void" in Art. 13 (2) is also the same viz., that the laws are
ineffectual and nugatory and devoid of any legal force on binding effect, if they contravene Art. 13(2). But there is one vital difference between pre-Constitution and post-Constitution laws in this
matter. The voidness of the pre-Constitution laws is not from inception. Such voidness supervened when the Constitution came into force; and so they existed and operated for sometime and
for certain purposes; the voidness of post-Constitution laws is from ~heir very .inception and they cannot t~e~efo~e contmue to cxISt. for any purpose. This d1stmct10n between the v01dness in one case and the
voidness in the other arises from the circumstance that one is a pre-Constitution law and the other is a post-Constitution law; but the meaning of the word "voi?" ~s the same in either case, namely, that the
law 1s meffectual and nugatory and devoid of any legal force or binding effect. Then comes the question asto what is the effect of an amendment of the Constitution in the two types of cases. So far as pre-Constitution
lav.:s are ~oncerned, the amendment of the Consti- tution which removes the inconsistency will result Mahendrs Lal l•iri· v. Stai- of U. P. Wanchoo, J. Molundra Lal Jaini v. State of U. P.
Wanchoo, J, in the revival of such laws by virtue of the doctrine of eclipse, as laid down in Bhikaji Narain' s case (1) for the pre-existing laws were not still-born and would still exist though eclipsed on account of the
inconsistency to govern pre-existing matters. But in the case of post-Constitution laws, they would be still born to the extent of the centravention. And it is this distinction which results in the impossibility
of applying the doctrine of eclipse to post-Constitu- tion laws, for nothing can be revived which never had any valid existence. We are therefore of opinion that the meaning of the word "void" is the
same both in Art. 13 ( 1) and Art. 13 (2), and that the application of the doctrine of eclipse in one case and not in the other case does not depend upon giving a different meaning to the word "void" in
the two parts of Art. 13; it arises from the inherent difference between Art. 13 (1) and Art. 13 (2) aris- ing from the fact that one is dealing with pre-Con- stitution laws, and the other is dealing with post-
Constitution laws, with the result that in one case the laws being not still-born the doctrine of eclipse will apply while in the other case the laws being still- born-there will be no scope for the application of the
doctrine of eclipse. Though the two clauses form part of the same Article, there is a vital difference in the language employed in them as also in their content and scope. By the first clause the Constitu-
tion recognises the existence of certain operating laws and they are r'eolared void, to the extent of their inconsistency with fundamental rights. Had there been no such declaration, these laws would have con-
tinued to operate. Therefore, in the case of pre- Constitution laws what an amendment to the Con- stitution does is to remove the shadow cast on it by this declaration. The law thus revives.
However, in the case of the second clause, applicable to post- Constitution laws, the Constitution does not recognise their existence, having been made in defiance of a prohibition to make them. Such defiance makes the
11) [1955] 2 s.a.R. 589, . l I S.C.R. 9-!l law enacted void. In their case therefore there can be no revival by an amendment of the Constitution, though the bar to make the law is removed, so far as
the period after the amendment is concerned. In the case of post-Constitution laws, it would be hard- ly appropriate to distinguish between laws which arc wholly void-as for instance, those which contravene
Art. 31-and those which are substantially void but partly valid,-as for instance, laws contravening Art. 19. Theoretically, the laws falling under the latter category may be valid qua non-citizens; but
that is a wholly unrealistic consideration and it seems to us that such notionally partial valid existence of the said laws on the strength of hypothetical and pendantic considerations cannot justify the applica-
tion of the doctrine of eclipse to them. All post- Constitution laws which contravene the mandatory injunction contained in the first part of Art. 13 (2) are void, as void as are the laws passed without
legislative competence, and the doctrine of eclipse does not apply to them. We are therefore of opinion that the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act cannot be applied to the Transfer Act in this case
by virtue of the doctrine of eclipse It follows there- fore that the Transfer Act is unconstitutional because it did not comply with Art. 31 (2), as it stood at the time it was passed. It will therefore have to be
struck down, and the petitioner given a declaration in his favour accordingly. Re. (3). We now come to the constitutionality of the Forest Amendment Act. By this Act, Chap. V-A was added to the Forest Act, and the main provision
of it which has been attacked is s. 38-B. It lays down that the State Government may by notification regulate or prohibit in any forest situate in or upon any land of a claimant the doing of certain acts where
.Jluch regulation or prohibition appears necessary. A1ahtndra Lal Jain v. Stale of U. P. JJ'ancboo, J. MaluttJr• Lal J aini v. Stale •f U. P. H1anchoo, J. Claimant is defined in s. 38-A
as meaning a person claiming to be entitled to the land or any inte- rest therein acquired, owned, settled or possessed or purported to have been acquired, owned. settled or possessed whether under, through or by any lease or
licence executed prior to the commencement of the Abolition Act or under and in accordance with any provision of any enactment, including the Abolition Act. It may be added that in 1960 there was an
amendment to this Act by which certain other sections have been added in Chap. V-A. We shall deal with the effect of that amendment later; for the present we are dealing with the attack on s .. 38-B. It is contended
that the regulation or prohibition contemplated in s. 38-B is of a permanent nature and interferes even with forestry operations. It is also contended that it takes away rights without any provision for
compensation. In short, the attack on Chap. V-A, as originally enacted, is based on a contrast of its provision with Chap. V of the Forest Act. Now if this is really so, there may be something in favour of
the petitioner's contention that certain parts of Chap. V-A, as originally enacted, are unconstitutional. But the contention on behalf of the respondents is that Chap. V-A, as originally enacted (i. e. ss. 38-A
to 38-G) is not supplementary to Chap. V, but is supplementary to Chap. II of the Forest Act, and is thus intended to serve as a temporary provision for protection of forests while proceedings under Chap. II
are going on. If this contention on behalf of the res- pondents is correct, the attack of the petitioner on Chap. V-A, as originally enacted, would lose all force because that attack is based on the assumption that
Chap. V-A, as originally enacted, allows the State to make permanent orders under it and then the contrast between Chap. V-A as originally enacted and Chap. V would bring out the infirmities in Chap. V-A.
It is necessary therefore to look at the scheme of Chap. Il of the Fo.rest Act, which contains sections 3 I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPOR1 c 01~ to 27 and deals with reserved forests.
Section 3 pro- vides that the State Government may constitute any forest land or waste land which is the property of Government or over which the Government has pro- prietary rights, or to the whole or any part of the
forest produce of which the Government is entitled, a reserved forest. Section 4 provides for the issue of a notification declaring the intention of the Government to constitute a reserved forest.
Section 5 bars accrual of forest rights in the area covered by notification under s. 4 after the issue of the notification. Section 6 then inter ali({, gives power to the Forest Settlement
Officer to issue a proclamation fixing a period of not less than three months from the date of such procla- mation and requiring every person claiming any right mentioned in s. 4 and s 5 within such period either
to present to the Forest Settlement Officer a written notice specifying or to appear before him and state the nature of such right and the amount and parti- culars of the compensation (if any) claimed in respect
thereof. Section 7 gives power to the Forest Settle- ment Officer to make investigation himself to discover these rights. Section 8 prescribes the powers of the Forest Settlement Officer, and lays down inter az.ia
that he will have the same powers as a civil court has in the trial of suits. Section 9 inter alia provides for the extinction of rights where no claim has been made under s. G c.ll the making of a notification under s. ~II. Section 11(1) lays down that ''in the case of a claim
to a right in or over any land, other than a right-of- way or right of pasture, or a right to forest-p~·oducc or a water-course, the Forest Settlement Officer shall pa~s an or~,er admitting or rejecting the same in whole
or m. part: Section 11 (2) lays that "if such claim is admitted m whole or in part, the Forest Settlement ~~cer shall either (i) exclude such land from the hm1ts o~ the proposed forest, or (ii) come to an agrec-
n_1ent with th~.owner thereof for the surrender ~f his nghts ; or (!11) proceed to acquire such land in the manner provided by the ,Land Acquisition Act, 189;!." 1962. 1\lahendra Lal Jain
v. Stat• of U.P. iranchoo, J. All1htndra Lal Jaini v . .'tt1tc af !J.P. IVanch110 1 J. Sections 12 to 16 provide for the determination of rights other than rights in or over any land, including
commutation by the payment of a sum of money or by the grant of land, or in such other manner as he thinks fit. Section 17 provides for appeals from orders passed under ss.11, 12, 15 and 16, whiles. 18(4) pro-
vides for revising an appellate order by the State Government. Section 19 permits lawyers to appear before the Forest Settlement Officer or in appeal. When all these proceedings are over, the State
Government has to publish a notification under s. 20 specifying definitely the limits of the forest, which is to be reserved and declaring the same to be reserved from the date fixed by the notification, and from such
date the forest shall be deemed to be a reserved forest. We need not refer to the remaining sections which provide for ancillary matters after the notification under s. 20. It is clear from this review of the provisions of
Chap. II that it applies inter alia to forest land or waste land which is the property of the Government or over which the Government has proprietary rights. By the notification under s. 4, the Forest Settlement
Officer is appointed to inquire into and determine the existence, nature and extent of any rights alleged to exist in favour of any person in or over any land comprised within such limits, or in or over any forest
produce, and to deal with the same as provided in this Chapter. Section 11 then provides for the adju- dication of rights in or over land, and provides that if it is held that rights in or over land exits, the land
may be excluded from the limits of the proposed forest or there may be some agreement lnetween the owner of that right and the Government with respect to it, or the Forest Settlement Officer may proceed to
acquire such land in the manner provided in the Land Acquistion Act. It will be clear therefore that Chap. II contemplates that where forest land 01: waste land is the property of Government or over which the
I S.C.R. Government has proprietary rights, the Forest Settle- ment Officer shall proceed to determine subordinate rights in the land before a notification under s. 20 is issued making the area a reserved forest. In the deter-
mination of these rights, the Forest Settlement Officer has the same powers as a civil court has in the trial of suits, and his order is subject to appeal and finally to revision by the State Government. Section 5 also
shows that after a notification under s. 4, no further forest rights can accrue. It appears, however, that after the Abolition Act came into force, it was felt that more powers should be taken to control forests
than was possible under s. 5 as under the Abolition Act all lands to which the Abolition Act applied had vested in the State and become its property. That is why, according to the respondents, the Forest Amend-
ment Act was passed in 1956, and though there is no express or specific provision therein to show that as originally enacted it was a mere provision to tide over the difficulties arising during the time proceedings
under Chap. II were pending, it appears that there is force in the contention of the respondents that this was a mere interim measure to deal with the situation arising after the Abolition Act came into force while
steps were being taken to constitute reserved forests under Chap. JI, as all lands had become the property of the State in the area to which the Abolition Act applied. This is in our opinion made clear by the
definition of the word "claimant" in s. 38-A, and the rest of the Chapter, as originally enacted, deals with claimants. The heading of the Chapter does appear to be somewhat ambiguous inasmuch as it says "of the
Control over Fores ts of Claimants." The idea one gets prirn<S faeie from this heading is that the forests belong to claimants and the intention is to control such forests. This heading is in line with the heading
of Chap. V of the Forest Act, which is "Of the control over Forests and Lands not being the property of Government", and so the first impression created on one's mind is that just as Chap. V deals w}tl;i
Mllr•nd,. Lal Jain i v. $14'4 of U. P. Wolll<l\to;J. Mahendra la.J Jaini v. Stattof U. P. H' anchoo, J. 946 SUPREi\JE COURT REPORTS [HJ63) SUPP. fore5ts and lands not being the property of Govern·
ment, Chap. VA aho deals with forests which are not the property of Government but of claimants. But the definition of "claimant" in s. 38-A clearlv shows that the claimant therein is a person making ~
claim and not a person whose claim has been recog- nised. Therefore it would not in our opinion be in· correct to connect Chap. V-A, as originally enacted, with Chap. IT of the Forest Act, which clearly deals
with claims and has here and there usecl the word "claimant" (as for instance in s. ll(b) ), though the word · "claimant" has not been defined in that Chapter. It seems to us therefore that Chap. V-A, as
originally enacted (ss. il8-A to :18-G) was only dealing with claimants who were making claims under Chap. II and whose claims would be dealt with there- under, and so the heading of Chap. V-A rea!ly means
control of forests in respect of which claims arc made by claimants. If these claims arc with respect to rights in or over land, they would be dealt with under s. 11 and if they arc claims with respect to other
matters, thcv would be dealt with under ss. 12 to 16. It seems to us that if the claimant defined in s. 38- A was not the person making a claim under Chap. II, Chap. V -A, as originally enacted, would have little
sense, for it provides no machinery for dealing with claims of claimants. Further, it is on this basis that one can understand the use of the word "prohibition" tn s. 38-B, which even restricts genuine forestry ope-
rations. It seems to us unthinko.ble that genuine forestry operations should be restricted permanently without any procedure for deciding the claims of claimants. Therefore Chap. V-A, as originally enact·
ed, is ancillary to Chap. II and gives further power of control besides those contained in Chap. II, during the period that proceedings under Chap. II are pend- ing. Looked at in this way Chap. V-A as originally
enacted would be constitutional, as it will be in the interest of the general public to provide for interim protection of the forests pending disposal of claims 1 S.C.R. under Chap. II and the declaration of the forest as
reserved forest under s. 20 thereof. But it is urged that the amendment in Chap. V-A by the Indian Forest (U.P. Amendment) Act 1960, (U.P. XXI o'f 1960) destroys this character of
the Forest Amendment Act, as originally enacted. By this amendment, ss. 38-H to 38-M were added to Chap. V.A. Section 38-H (1) provides for taking over the management of any particular forest or forest land
for a period not exceeding fifteen years. Sub-section (2) thereof says that no notification under sub-s. (I) shall be issued unless notice is issued to a claimant, owner or tenure-holder of the forest or forest land.
Obviously, therefore, the provisions of s. 38-H and the subsequent sections are wider than the provisions of ss.38-A to 38-G, which were originally enacted. We are not actually concerned with the provisions of s.38-H
onwards, for no action has been taken under those provisions; nor has the petitioner alleged that there is any threat of such action. The argument, however is that this new provision shows that ss.38-A to 38-G
are not connected with Chap II and really go with this new provision. We cannot accept this argument, for, in the first place, the lagislature when it passed ss. 38-A to 38-G never had ss. 38-H to 38-M in mind.
In the second place, s. 38-H also deals with the land of claimants though it further deals with the lands of tenure-holders_ or owners. So far as the claimants are concerned, the position still remains that there must
be some provision for deciding their claims and no such provisions are found up to s. 38-M, and we are therefore thrown back on Chap. II so far as the clai- mants are <:oncerned. It must therefore be held that
the enactment of new ss. 38-H to 38-'M made no difference to the position that ss. 38-A to 38-G as originally enacted, are supplementary to Chap. II, though s. 38-H onwards may not be so and may stand
by themselves, so far as owners or tenure-holders are concerned. There is no doubt, however, that ss. 38-A Mahmdr• Lal J 11ini v. State of U. P. Wanchoo, J. Jahendra Lal laini v. Stall of U. P.
Wancho11, J. to 38-G are ancillary to Chap. II and must be read as such and in this view their constitutionality as interim provisions cannot be successfully assailed. It is next urged that even if ss. 38-A to 38-G
are ancillary to Chap. II, they would not apply to the petitioner's land, as Chap. II deals inter alia with waste land or forest land, which is the property of the Government and not with that land which is
not the property of the Government, which is dealt with under Chap. V. That is so. But unless the petitioner can show that the land in dispute in this case is his property and not the property of the State,
Chap. II will apply to it. Now there is no dispute that the land in dispute belonged to the Maharaja Bahadur of Nahan before the Abolition Act and the said Maharaja Bahadur was an intermediary. There-
fore, the land in dispute vested in the State under s. 6 of the Abolition Act and became the property of the State. It is however, contended on behalf of the petitioner that if 'he is held to be a bhumidhar in
proper proceedings, the land would be his property and therefore Chap. V-A, as originally enacted, if it is ancillary to Chap. II would not apply to the land in dispute. We are of opinion that there is no force
in this contention. We have already pointed out that under s. 6 of the Abolition Act all property of inter- ~ediaries including the land in dispute vested in the State Government and became its property. It is true
that under s. 18, certain lands were deemed to be settled as bhumidhari lands; but it is clear that after land vests in the State Government under s. 6 of the Abolition Act, there is no provision therein for dives-
ting of what has vested in the State Government. It is however urged on behalf of the petitioner that he claims to be' the proprietor of this land as a bhumidhar because of certain provisions in the
Act. There was no such proprietary right as bhumidhari right before the Abolition Act. The Abolition Act did away with all proprietary l s.c.R. rights in the area to which it applied and created
three classes of tenure by s. 129: bhumidhar, sirdar and asami, which were unknown before. Thus bhumidlw,r, sirdar and asarni are all tenure-holders under the Abolition Act and they hold their tenure
under the State in which the proprietary right vested under s. 6. It is true that bhumidhars have certain wider rights in their tenures as com pared to sirdars ; similarly sirdars have wider rights as compared to
asamis ; but nonetheless all the three are mere tenure- holders-with varying rights-under the State which is the proprietor of the entire land in the State to which the Abolition Act applied. It is not disputed that
the Abolition Act applies to the land in dispute and therefore the State is the proprietor of the land in dispute and the petitioner even if he were a bhumidhar would still be a tenure-holder.
Further, the land in dispute is either waste land or forest land (for it is so far not converted to agriculture) over which the State has proprietary rights and therefore Chap. II will
clearly apply to this land and so would Chap. V-A. It is true that a bhumidhar has got a heritable and transferable right and he can use his holding for any purpose including industrial and residential purposes,
and if he does so that part of the holding will be de- marcated under s.143. It is also true that generally spea- king, there is no ejectmant of a bhumidhar and no for- feiture of his land. He also pays land revenue (s.241)
but in that respect he is on the same footing as a sirdar who can hardly be called a proprietor because his interest is not transferable except as expressly permit- ted by the Act. Therefore, the fact that the payment
made liy the bhmmidhar to the State is called land revenue and not rent would not necessarily make him a proprietor, because sirdar also pays land-revenue, though his rights are very much lower than that of a
bhumidlw,r. It is true that the rights which the bhumidhar has to a certain extent approximate to the rights which a proprietor used to have before the Abolition Act was passed; but it is clear that rights of
NJ alundra Lal J ai11i v. Slat1 of U. P. rYanchoo, J. Ma"'ndra Lal Jaini v. Sta/t of U. P. Warrchoo, J. 950 SUPRl<:ME COURT REPORTS [i963]SUPP. a bhumidhar are in many respects less and in many
other respects restricted as compared to the old proprietor before the Abolition Act, For example, the bhumidhar has ro right as such in the minerals under the sub-soil. Section 154 makes a restriction on
the power of a bhumidhar to make certain transfers. Section 155 forbids the bhumidhar, from making usufructury mortgages. Section 156 forbids a bhumidhar, sirdar or asami from letting the land to
others, unless the case comes under~- 157. Section 189 (aa) provides that where a bhumidhar lets out his holding or any part thereof in contravention of the provisions of this Act, his right will be extinguished.
It is clear therefore that though bhumidhar have higher rights than sirdars and asamis, they are still mere tenure-holders under the State which is the propri~tor of all lands in the area to which the Aboli-
tion Act applies. The petitioner therefore even if he is presume::! to be a bhumidhar cannot claim to be a proprietor to whom Chap. II of the Forest Act does not apply, and therefore Chap. V-A, as originally
enacted, would not apply: (see in this connection, Mst. Govindi v. The State of Uttar Pradesh)(1). As we have alrcay pointed out ss. 4 and 11 give power for determination of all rights subordinate to those of
a proprietor, and as the right of the bhumidhar is t)lat of a tenure-holder, subordinate to the State, which is the proprietor, of the land in dispute, it will be open to the Forest Settlement officer to consider the claim
made to the land in dispute by the petitioner, if he claims to be a bhumidhar. This is in addition to the provisior.. of s.229-B of the Abolition Act. The petitioner therefore even if he is a bhumidhar cannot claim that
the land in dispute is out of the provisions of Chap. II and therefore Chap. V-A, even if it is ancillary to Chap.II would not apply. We must therefore uphold the constitutionality of Chap. V-A, as originally enacted,
in the view we have taken of its being supplementary to Chap. II, and we further hold that Chap. II and Chap. V-A will apply to the land in dispute even (I) A.l.R. (1952) AU.88. if the petitioner is assumed to be the bhumidhar, of
that la:id. M•lundra Lal Jaini The only other question that remains to be considered is whether the notification under s. 4 is still in force. That ·notification was issued under Chap. II of the Forest Act on Mareh 23, 1955 and
thereafter a proclamation under s. 6 ibid was issued on April 26, 1955. The petitioner contends that the notification under s. 4 was withdrawn so far as his land was concerned by notification dated December
19, 1956. That is however not a notification at all. It is a mere government order issued to all Conserva- tors of Forests, Divisional Forest Officers and District Officers as well as the Secretary, Board of Revenue,
and all that is stated there is that a number of repre- sentations had been made to the Government by claimants of lands situated in the erstwhile private forests under agreements executed before July 1952
by them with their owners, and the Governor, on careful consideration, had decided that all such lands in respect of which valid legal reclamations leases were executed by the owners should be released in
favour of the lessees. It was also pointed out that if such land was included in any of the notifications issued under s. 4 of the Forest Act, it should be deem- ed to have been excluded from that notification. It
may be mentioned that this government order was cancelled. by a later government order dated July 7, 1958, which was also not published. Now a notifica- tion . unde~ s. 4 of the Forest Act is required to be
pu~l1Shed m the Gazette and unless it is so published, 1t 1s of no effect. The notification of March 23 1956, was published in the Gazette and was therefor~ a proper notification. It is also not disputed that
in view of s. 21 of the U. P. General Clauses Act (No. I of 1904) a notification issued under s. 4 could !rnve be~n cancelled or modified but it could be done m thr hk~ . man~er and subject to the like sanction
and cond1t1ons, 1. e. by notification in the gazette. v. Stat• of U. P. Wanclwo, J. 191i2 1ahmdra Lal Jaini v. Stateof U. P. Wanci\oo, J. 952 StJl>REMF. COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
The Government order of December 1956 therefore cannot amount to excluding anything from the noti- fication issued under s. 4, for it was never published; it was a mere departmental instruction by Government
to its officers which was later withdrawn. The noti- fication therefore stands as it was originally issued and the petitioner cannot claim any benefit of the government order of December 1956, which was later
cancelled. Further in view of the fact that we have held that Chap. V-A, as originally enacted, is valid, being a measure supplementary to Chap. II, the notification issued under Chap. V-A must also be
upheld. In the result therefore the petition is allowed to this extent that the Transfer Act No. XV of 1952 is struck down as unconstitutional and of no force and effect. We may add, however, that learned counsel
for the respondents has stated before us that if a claim is made even now under Chap. II by the petitioner within thirty days of our judgment, even though it may be time-barred as from the date of the procla-
mation issued under s. 6, the Forest Settlement Officer will entertain it and consider the claim as re- quired under Chap. II. We therefore allow the petition in part and strike down the U. P. Land Tenures (Regulation of
Transfers) Act, No. XV of 1952 as unconstitutional. The rest of the prayers in the petition are rejected, subject to the petitioner being free to take such steps as may be open to him in law to establish his right
whatever it may be under the registered lease of June 1952 and subject to the State having the right to contest the said claim. In the circumstances, the parties will bear their own costs of this petition.
Petiti<m allowed in part.