Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
20. When we apply the above principle laid down in the said decision for the reasons to be adduced for the other questions to be dealt with in this judgment, we hold that there A was no dearth in the process of investigation based on the factum of the alleged occurrence on 21.11.2001, as reported by the complainant PW-2 and the mere delay in forwarding of the express report to the Magistrate has not caused any dent in the case of the prosecution. In other words, we have no B difficulty in stating that the FIR was factually recorded without delay and the investigation started on the basis of the FIR and in the absence of any other infirmity in that respect, the delay in forwarding the report to the Magistrate does not in any way vitiate the case of the prosecution. c
21. With this we come to the next question. The submission on behalf of the appellants was that there was communal tension prevailing and, therefore, if in that milieu, someone was injured, those who were possessing licenced arms in the village cannot be held responsible, even if it resulted in the death of D two individuals and injuries to several other persons. In support of the said contention, reference was made to the deposition of PW-13, the Investigating Officer. To a stray question put to him, PW-13 answered that; "there had been gross tension present in the said vlllage which had been communal in nature and scope thereof. I had neither recorded the time of commencement of any proceeding, in the said village nor, had I recorded culmination thereof, in the contents of leaflet No.1 of my Case Diary nor further, had I copied down the contents of the Inquest-Report [Panchaytnama], in the contents thereof."
22. Reference was also made to a suggestion made to ..J. the said witness, which was denied and the statement was to ~ the following effect: "It is also wrong and incorrect, to accordingly allege and consequently suggest, to the effect that, on account of the then prevailing communal tension, in the said village, subsequently in consultation of all licensed weapon-holders MANGA@ MAN SINGH v. STATE OF UTIARAKHAND [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.] of the community of accused of the said village, the present accused, as a matter of fact, had since been implicated, in a belied manner, on account of undue pressure, in the present matter. However, this fact remains true and correct, to the effect that, except the licensed arm- holders belonging, to the community of accused, there was no other licensed arm-holder or, any other member, from their community present, at the said spot of occurrence."
23. Except· making the said bald suggestion, which was rightly denied, there was nothing brought out or placed either C in the evidence of the prosecution witness or by way of defence evidence before the court, as to what was the nature of communal tension, who were all communally and inimically disposed of and when such communal friction occurred. In fact, what all was stated in the Section 313 statement, was 'false implication' due to enmity and political reasons. Political difference and communal difference are two different factors and, therefore, it is not known why such a specific stand of communal tension was not taken in the Section 313 questioning. If really there was any communal tension in the village, there would have been any number of witnesses who wo.µld have come forward and stated the same before the Court, as none would have been prejudiced nor affected by making such a true statement before the Court. When we consider the oral evidence of PW-13, namely, that there had been gross tension present in the village, as there was nothing recorded in the police station, it will be a dangerous proposition if simply based on the said isolated statement, one were to conclude that the present occurrence and its aftermath were solely due to communal tension. It was not even suggested to any of the witnesses that there was communal hatred as between those witnesses examined in support of the prosecution or that it was due to such communal tension they suffered such injuries, as well as casualties in their family. In fact, we are of the view that there are too many incongruities in the said submission, inasmuch as the said submission is [20131 3 S.C.R.. A made in desperation and does not deserve any consideration. Therefore, the said submission is also liable to be rejected as meritless.
24. With this, we come to the last of the questions as to B whether there were any lacunae in the case of the prosecution based on the submissions of the learned counsel. Before dealing with the submissions, we wish to note that though PWs-1 to 4 were closely related to the deceased, they also suffered fire-arm injuries at the hands of the appellants and the C injuries sustained by them were duly supported by medical evidence, both documentary as well as oral, namely, through PWs-6, 7, 8 and 9. There was nothing pointed out in the evidence of the above witnesses, namely, PWs-1 to 4, except stating that since because they were closely related, their version about the occurrence was not true in order to discredit D their version. Even before the Courts below the only argument made was that the said witnesses were related to the deceased and that they falsely implicated the appellants. In our considered opinion, merely based on such a flimsy submission as regards the credibility of those witnesses, the evidence of E those injured eye witnesses cannot be discarded.
25. In fact with regard to the reliance to be placed upon the injured witnesses, this Court has held in very many decisions as to the due credence to be given. The following F decisions can be referred to for that purpose:- (1) State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain -1990 (1) SCC 550 (2) State of U.P. v. Pappu – 2005 (3) SCC 594 '(3) State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh – 1996 (2) SCC (4) State of Orissa v. Thakara Basra – 2002 (9) SCC MANGA@ (5) State .of H.P. v. Raghubir Singh – 1993 (2) SCC (6) Wahid Khan v. State of M.P. ·- 2010 (2) SCC 9 (7) Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan -AIR 1952 SC Applying the principles laid down in those decisions, we hold that on this ground there is no scope to interfere with the orders impugned in these appeals. c
26. It was thus contended that there was delay in filing the . FIR. In fact going by the version of PWs-2 and 3 supported by PWs-1 and 4, the occurrence took place at 10 a.m. in the morning. The matter was reported by PW-2 to the police by 11.45 a.m. and it has come in the evidence that the distance 0 between the place of occurrence and the police station was 12 Kms. There was nothing brought out on the defence to contradict the said statement made by the prosecution witnesses. It was also stated that PW-2 had to reach the police station only through a bullock cart. In such circumstances, the lodging of the FIR by 11.45 a.m., cannot be held to be highly delayed. When it is stated that the occurrence took place at 10 a.m., where more than ten persons suffered injuries and one person died on the spot and while another person died after . three days, it is quite possible that every member of the injured party would have taken the immediate required time to attend to the injured, by moving them to the hospital and arranging the required transport for them, while also taking stock of the situation in order to proceed further for lodging the complaint with the police. That by itself would have taken not less than an hour for them and only thereafter, a decision might have been taken by PW-2 to go to the police station for lodging the FIR. Therefore, it can never be held that there was any delay at all in reporting the matter to the police, nor in registering the FIR. [2013) 3 S.C.R.
27. It was contended that according to the prosecution when the accused party attacked the injured party apart from the family members of the injured party, local villagers were also present but yet, none was examined by way of independent witness. The said submission has been rightly rejected by the B High Court by giving reasons. The High Court has rightly held that though the injured witnesses were related to each other, having regard to the nature of evidence tendered by them, there were no good grounds to discard their version. It has found that their evidence was natural and there was nothing to find fault c with their version. It has further held rightly that it is the quality of the witness and not the quantity that matters. It has also taken judicial notice of the fact that the public are reluctant to appear and depose before the Court, especially in criminal cases because of many obvious reasons. We fully endorse the said 0 conclusion of the High Court, while dealing with the said submission made on behalf of the appellants.
28. It was then contended that the investigating officer though visited the spot did not detect any empty cartridges or bullets. PW-13 in his evidence has stated that he had neither E detected any empty cartridges nor any pellets on the spot of occurrence. If he had not detected it, then the reason is as simple as that. It is not the case of the appellants that pellets were strewn all around the place of occurrence visibly, but yet the investigating officer failed to collect and place even some F of them before the Court. When there was enough evidence to support the version of the prosecution that the appellants, some of whom were in possession of licenced arms and others were holding unlicenced pistols and the shooting with those arms was sufficiently established by the version of the injured eye- G witnesses, we fail to understand as to how non-detection of pellets or bullets will be of any consequence as a vitiating factor to defeat the case of the prosecution. It is an undisputed fact that both the deceased died of fire-arm injuries and all the Injuries suffered by others were also firm-arm injuries. The said H contention also therefore, deserves to be rejected. MANGA@ MAN SINGH v. STATE OF UTIARAKHAND [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
29. The contention about not noting the route of arrival and A . · route of escape, in our considered opinion, are very flimsy submissions and do not deserve any consideration at all. It was then contended that PW-3 was initially accosted by A 1 to A-4 at around 8.30 to 8.45 a.m. and that he reported back at 9.00 to 9.15 a.m. at his house, by escaping from their clutches and that the alleged occurrence took place at 10 a.m. and, therefore, within such a short time, there could have been no scope for the appellants to gather fifteen persons to cause the attack on the injured party. We have concluded in the earlier part of our judgment that a one hour gap in a village was more than c .· sufficient to gather any number of persons, especially when the purpose of such gathering was to cause a physical attack on a weak and unarmed party. It is relevant to note that while thirteen persons were seriously injured, of whom two succumbed to injuries, not even a scratch was reported against 0 any of the appellants. There was not even a suggestion that any of the injured party was in possession of any weapon, like even . a stick or a 'lathi'. Therefore, all the above factors only go to show that the plea of lack of sufficient time to gather more number of persons can hardly be a ground of defence, as against the overwhelming direct evidence present before the Courts below.
30. It will be relevant to take note of the alleged motive, which was not seriously disputed on behalf of the appellants. It was unfortunate that in spite of the fact that members of the injured party earnestly attempted to dissuade the situation by pacifying the appellants, no good sense appeared to hava prevailed upon the appellants, who seem to have taken ari upper hand and caused the onslaught on the unarmed members of the injured party, of whom one was a female. The submissions of the appellants, therefore, do not merit consideration on this ground as well.
31. A feeble submission was made that the FIR does not even reveal that PW-2 was injured. On the other hand, a H [2013) 3 S.~.~~ A reading of the FIR discloses that PW-2 specifically mentioned that he along with others was injured due to the onslaught of the appellants. Yet another feeble submission was that PW-3 stated that they were all standing outside the house at the time when the accused party approached the place of occurrence, · B while the case of the prosecution was that only after the arrival of the accused the members of the injured party came out of their house. We see absolutely no substance in the said submission as we do not find that such a silly discrepancy can cause any dent in the case of the prosecution, which is c otherwise supported by overwhelming evidence, both oral as well as documentary.
32. On behalf of the first appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1165 of 2008, it was contended that he belonged to a different village and that he was falsely implicated. In fact, the said D contention was dealt with by the trial Court extensively, which has noted that the said accused claimed that he was the resident of the village Manduwala of District Saharanpur and that he was actually present at Saharanpur on that date. In the Section 313 statement, the said accused had admitted that he E was 50 years old and at the time of the incident he would have been 46-47 years old, while the family register which was produced at his instance disclosed that his age was 38 years. The trial Court, therefore, held that by relying upon such an age old register, the abode of the said accused at the time of F occurrence could not have been arrived at. On the other hand, the evidence of PW-1 disclosed that the father-in-law of the said accused is the resident of the village concerned, that since he had no male child, the said accused was living along with his father-in-law and that in the family register of the year 1999 G produced by the prosecution, as well as the copy of the electoral list, the name of the said accused was clearly mentioned. The contention on behalf of the said accused that due to enmity with his father-in-law he was implicated, was rejected by saying that if that was the case, there was no reason for the prosecution H to leave out the father-in-law and implicate the son-In-law alone. MANGA@ ·The said point raised on behalf of the said accused also, therefore, does not merit any consideration. We, therefore, hold that none of the points raised alleging lacunae in the case of . the prosecution merit any consideration and the same are, I therefore, rejected. The said question is also answered against the appellant~.
33. With that we come to the main question as to the interpretation to be given to Section 141 'third', read along with Section 149, IPC. In the forefront, we wish to highlight the extent of power of this Court in the matter of interpretation of words in the provision of a statute. In this context, at the outset, we wish to quote the words of Justice G.P. Singh in the celebrated book on 'Principles of Statutory Interpretation', where the learned author in Chapter II under the caption 'Guiding Rules' in sub-para 1 (d) stated as under, under the caption 'Departure from rule':- "(d) Departure from the rule In dischargi.ng its interpretative function, the Court can correct obvious drafting errors and so in suitable cases "the court will add words, or omit Words or substitute words". But "before interpreting a statute in this way the Court must be abundantly sure of three matters : (1) the intended purpose of the statute or provision in question, (2) that by inadvertence the draftsman and Parliament failed to give effect to that purpose in the provision in question: and (3) the substance of the provision Parliament would have made. although not necessarily the precise words Parliament would have used. had the error in the Bill been noticed." Sometimes even when these conditions are satisfied, the court may find itself inhibited from interpreting .the statutory provision in accordance with underlying intention of Parliament, e.g. when the alteration in language is too far reaching or too big or when the subject matter calls for strict interpretation such as a oenal provision." (See lnco Europe Ltd. v. First Choice Distribution (a firm) (2000) 2 ALL ER 109, p.115 (HL)" (Emphasis added)
34. In the decision of this Court reported in Surjit Singh B Kalra v. Union of India and Another – 1991 (2) SCC 87, while laying down the principle of purposive construction to be adopted by Courts, it has been held as under in paragraph 19:- c "19. True it is not permissible to read words in a statute which are not there, but "where the alternative lies between either supplying by implication words which appear to have , been accidentally omitted, or adopting a construction which deprives certain existing words of all meaning, it is permissible to supply the words" (Craies Statute Law, 7th edn., p. 109). Similar are the observations in Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar where it was observed that the court construing a provision should not easily read into it words which have not been expressly enacted but having regard to the context in which a provision appears and the object of the statute in which the said provision is enacted the court should construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful. An attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute. (See: Sirajul Haq Khan v. Sunni Central Board of Waqf.)" (Emphasis added)
35. The principle statute in Maxwell's Interpretation of G Statutes under the Chapter "Exceptional Construction" is also relevant, which was applied in one of the judgments of this Court reported in Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd. – 2008 (4) SCC 755. The said principle has been extracted in para 53 of the said judgment, which reads as H under:- MANGA@ MAN SINGH v. STATE OF UTIARAKHAND [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.] "53. In the chapter on "Exceptional Construction" in his book on Interpretation of Statutes, Maxwell writes: "WHERE the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. Tb is may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words, by altering their collocation, by rejecting them altogether, or by interpolating other words, under the influence, no doubt, of an irresistible conviction that the legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications thus made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning."
36. Keeping the above basic principles in mind, we considered the submission of Shri S.R. Singh, learned senior counsel who appeared for the appellants in Criminal Appeal Nos.1157/2008, 1158/2008, 1161/2008 and 1164/2008. According to the learned counsel, under Section 141 'third', the expression 'other offence' used therein for the purpose of ascertaining the common object of a person in an unlawful assembly, would only be relatable to offences similar to those such as, mischief or criminal trespass, referred to in the said clause. The learned senior counsel submitted that such an interpretation should be laid by applying the principle of ejusdem generis. The learned counsel, therefore, contended that if that be the legal position, reading Section 141 'third' and Sections 147, 148 and 149 together, none of the offences referred to in Sections 147 and 148 or any of the' other grave offences falling under other provisions of the Indian Penal Code will get attracted. The learned counsel, therefore, contended that conviction for offences under Section 302 read with Sections [2013J 3 S.C.R. A 149 and 307 read with Section 149 IPC, as well as Sections 147 and 148 of IPC with the aid of Section 141, could not have been made. Though the said submission looks quite attractive in the first blush, on a deeper scrutiny of the other provisions contained in the Code, we are afraid that such a narrow B interpretation, which is sought to be applied by the learned senior counsel cannot be made.
37. In this context, Section 40 IPC, which defines 'offence' is also required to be noted. In order to appreciate the submission and to arrive at a correct conclusion, we feel that C Section 40 IPC, Sections 141, 147, 148 and 149 are required to be extracted which are as under:- "40. "Offence"- Except in the Chapters and sections mentioned in clauses 2 and 3 of this section, the word "offence" denotes a thing made punishable by this Code. In Chapter IV, [Chapter VA] and in the following section, namely, sections [64,65,67,71], 109,110,112,114,115, 116,117, [118,119,120] 187, 194, 195, 203, 211, 213, 214, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 347, 348, 388, 389 and 445, the word "offence" denotes a thing punishable under this code, or under any special or local law as hereinafter defined. And in sections 141, 176, 177, 201, 202, 212, 216 and 441, the word "offence" has the same meaning when the thing punishable under the special or local law is punishable under such law with imprisonment for a term of six months or upwards, whether with or without fine. 141. Unlawful assembly – An assembly of five or more persons is designated an "unlawful assembly", if the common object of the persons composing that assembly is- First- To overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal ' MANGA.@ force, the Central or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State, or any public servant in the exercise of the lawful power of such public servant; or Second- To resist the execution of any law, or of any legal process; or Third – To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence; or Fourth – By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to any person, to take or obtain possession of any c property, or to deprive any person of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the use of water or other incorporeal right of which he is in possession or enjoyment, or to enforce any right or supposed right; or Fifth – by means of criminal force, or show of criminal · D force, to compel any person to do what he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally entitled to do. Explanation – An assembly which was not unlawful when it assembled, may subsequently become an unlawful assembly. 147. Punishment for rioting- Whoever is guilty of rioting, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 148. Rioting, armed with deadly weap.on- Whoever is guilty of rioting, being armed with a deadly weapon or with anything which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. 149. Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object- If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence"
38. Section 141 'third', clearly mentions that an assembly of five or more persons is designated as an unlawful assembly if the common object of the persons composing that assembly C as among other offences namely, mischief or criminal trespass or commission of other offence. A literal interpretation, therefore, only means that apart from the offence of mischief and criminal trespass, all other offences would fall within the said clause 'third' mentioned in Section 141. Other related D sections falling under the said Chapter VIII are up to Section 160. Reading Section 141 'third' along with Section 149, ifthe commission of any other offence apart from mischief or criminal trespass and such commission of offence was by a member of an unlawful assembly, the prescription of common object will E automatically get satisfied. When we refer to Section 144 in this context, we find that joining an unlawful assembly armed with a deadly weapon, which is likely to cause death, can be inflicted with a punishment prescribed therein. If the interpretation placed by learned senior counsel is accepted, we F wonder whether the prescription placed in Section 144 could be held to be in consonance with section 141 'third'. The definite answer can only be in the negative. If mere possession of a deadly weapon by a member of an unlawful assembly, which is likely to cause death would attract Section 141'third' G as a corollary, it will have to be held that the expression 'or other offence' mentioned in Section 141 should without doing any violence to the said provision, include all other offences apart from the offence of mischief or criminal trespass. Similar will be the interpretation that can be made relating to the offence, H namely, rioting prescribed under Section 146 punishable under MANGA@ Sections 147 as well as 148, namely, rioting, armed with deadly weapons.
39. The principle 'ejusdem generis' means 'where a law lists specific classes of persons or things and then refers to them in general, the general statements only apply to the same kind of persons or things specifically listed'. The learned senior counsel for the appellants, therefore, contended that since the expression "other offence" under Section 141 'third' has been used along with the offence, mischief or criminal trespass, it can only relate to similar such offences of the same species and not commission of all other offences as in the case on hand, namely, murder or attempt to commit murder.
40. When we test the said submission by making reference to the Chapter, in which the offence of mischief and trespass are specified in the Code, we are able to expose the glaring fallacy in the submission of the learned senior counsel. Mischief and criminal trespass fall under Chapter XVII. The caption of the said Chapter is "of offences against property". The offences dealt with in the said Chapter are governed by Sections 378 to 462. The offences dealt with apart from mischief and trespass are theft, extortion, robbery, dacoity, dacoity with murder, misappropriation of property, criminal breach of trust, dealing with stolen property and cheating.
41. While referring to the offence of mischief, Sections 435 to 438 deals with mischief by fire or any explosive substance with the intent to destroy a house or other properties or to destroy or make unsafe a decked vessel etc., for which imprisonment for life or a term which may extend to ten years · apart from fine can be imposed. While dealing with the offence of trespass under Sections 449 and 450, whoever commits G house-trespass for committing an offence punishable with death can be punished for imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term not. exceeding ten years, apart from fine. Similar such provisions for other types of criminal trespass · have also been provided fo· in the said Chapter.
42. We fail to appreciate as to how simply because the offences mischief or criminal trespass are used preceding the expression "other offence" in Section 141 'third', it should be taken that such offence would only relate to a minor offence of mischief or trespass and that the expression "other offence" B should be restricted only to that extent. As pointed out by us above, the offence of mischief and trespass could also be as grave as that of an offence of murder, for which the punishment of life imprisonment can be imposed as provided for under Sections 438, 449, 450 etc. Therefore, we straight away hold C that the argument of learned senior counsel for the appellants to import the principle of 'ejusdem generis' to Section 141 'third', cannot be accepted.
43. The submission of the learned senior counsel cannot also be countenanced by applying Section 40 of the Code, D which specifically mentions as to how the term 'offence' will have to be construed. In the main clause of the said section it has been clearly set out that the word "offence" denotes a thing made punishable by this Code except the Chapters and Sections mentioned in clauses 2 and 3 of the said section. E Therefore, going by the main clause of Section 40, the word "offence" since denotes the thing made punishable under the Code, 'other offence' mentioned in Section 141 'third', can only denote to offences, which are punishable under any of the provisions of the Code. Therefore, by applying the main clause F of Section 40, it can be straight away held that all offences referred to in any of the provisions of the Code for which the punishment is provided for would automatically fall within the expression "other offence", which has been used in Section 141 'third'.
44. What has been excepted in the main clause of Section 40 are what has been specifically mentioned in sub-clauses 2 and 3 of the said section. As far as sub-clause 2 is concerned, while making reference to Chapter IV and Chapter VA, as well as other sections mentioned therein, it states that the word H "offence" would denote a thing punishable under the Code, MANGA@ namely, Indian Penal Code or under any special or local law, which have been defined to mean a law applicable to a particular subject or a law applicable only to a particular part of India. When we read sub-clause 3 of Section 40, Section 141 has been specifically mentioned in the said sub-clause. To understand the. purport of the said clause, it will be worthwhile to extract that part of the provision which reads; "And in sections 141, 176, 177, 201, 202, 212, 216 and 441, the word "offence" has the same meaning when the thing punishable under the special or local law is punishable under such law with imprisonment for a term. C of six months or upwards, whether with or without fine".
45. It is quite apparent that the said sub-clause in regard to the offences under any special or local law, wherein punishment of imprisonment for a term of six months or upwards with or without fine is prescribed, the meaning assigned in those special or local laws are to be imported while invoking Section 141 or other sections mentioned in the said sub-clause 3 of Section 40.
46. Therefore, a conspectus reading of Section 40 makes the position abundantly clear. that for all offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code, the main clause of Section 40 would straight away apply in which event the expression "other offence" used in Section 141 'third', will have to be construed as any offence for which punishment is prescribed under the Code. To put it differently, whomsoever is proceeded against for any offence punishable under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, Section 40 sub-clause 1 would straight away apply for the purpose of construing what the offence is and when it comes to the question of offence under any other special or G local law, the aid of sub-clauses 2 and 3 will have to be applied for the purpose of construing the offence for which the accused is proceeded against. Therefore, having regard to sub-clause 1 of Section 40 of the Code read along with Section 141 'third', the argument of learned senior counsel for the appellants will A have to be rejected.
We are, therefore, of the firm view that only such a construction would be in tune with the purport and intent of the law makers while defining an unlawful assembly for commission of an offence with a common object, as specified under Section 141 of the Code. In the case on hand, since mo B special law or local law was attracted and the accuses were charged only for the offence under the Indian Penal Code, Section 40(1) gets attracted along with Section 141 'third' IPC. Having regard to such a construction of ours on Section 141, read along with Section 40 IPC, the offence found proved c against the appellants, namely, falling under Sections 302 read with 149, 307 read with 149 along with 147 and 148 of the Code for which the. conviction and sentence imposed by the Court below cannot be found fault with. 4'7. In the 'light of our above conclusions on the various D submissions made by the counsel for the appellants, we do not find any merit in these appeals.
The appeals, therefore, fail and the same are dismissed. Appellant Soma in Criminal Appeal No.1158/2008 who is on bail is directed to surrender before Magistrate forthwith for serving out the remaining period of E sentence, if any, failing which the Chief Judicial Magistrate Haridwar is directed to take him into custody and send him to jail to serve out the sentence, if any. A copy of the judgment be sent to the said CJM by the ·Registry forthwith. F R.P. Appeals dismissed.