MANTRI TECHZONE PVT. LTD. versus FORWARD FOUNDATION AND ORS.

22. Appearing for the appellants in C.A. No.5016 of 2016, Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel, has submitted that the State Government in exercise of the power conferred under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act (for short ‘KIAD Act’) declared the land in question as an industrial area. Thereafter, the land in question has been acquired by the State Government in the year 2004. Following the acquisition, on 28.06.2007, the land was allotted to the appellant by the KIADB. The SEIAA granted environmental clearance which was MANTRI TECHZONE PVT. LTD. v. FORWARD FOUNDATION [S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.] followed by public notice concerning clearance on 14.03.2012. Neither the allotment of land nor the environmental clearance was challenged before the Tribunal. Thus, none of the statutory decisions or processes, are the cause of action for the purpose of the application. The averments made in the original application does not satisfy or meet the requirements of Section 14(1) and (3) of the NGT Act and the original application does not spell out the cause of action relevant for the purpose of said provision. Since the statutory processes and clearances could not have been challenged for being hit by Section 14(3), the construction activities which were the alleged cause of action could not have been challenged. Therefore, the Tribunal ought to have held that the application was not maintainable.

23. Further the application is barred by limitation. Though environmental clearance was granted on 17.02.2012 and it was published in two leading newspapers on 12.03.2012 and 14.03.2012, modified plan was approved by the KIADB on 30.08.2012, the application ought to have been filed within six months from the date on which cause of action for the dispute first arose in terms of Section 14 of the NGT Act. The present application has been filed in March, 2014 which was much beyond the prescribed period of limitation. No application seeking condonation of delay has been filed accompanying the application. Hence, the Tribunal ought to have dismissed the application on the ground that as it is barred by time.

24. It was also argued that buffer zone laid down by the NGT is substantially higher as compared to buffer zone which is required to be maintained as per the Revised Master Plan, 2015 issued on 22.06.2007. This is contrary to the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961 (for short ‘the Planning Act’).

25. Shri Neeraj Kishan Kaul and Shri R.Venkataramani, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, in this case have also made similar submissions. It was argued that the direction imposing penalty/ compensation is illegal on the ground that the applicants did not allege that the construction work of the project has caused environmental wrong. No wrong or injury either to Bellandur lake water body or to Bellandur lake area, has been alleged and established. As such, there is no question of any enquiry relating to imposition of penalty or any compensation.

26. Shri Maninder Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, in C.A. Nos.5016 and 10995 of 2016, while supporting the submissions made by Shri Rohatgi, has submitted that the appellant has obtained sanction and approvals for the project from the competent authorities. It could not start construction despite grant of all the permissions, including environmental clearance as early as possible i.e. 30.09.2013. Hence, imposing penalty/compensation is entirely unsustainable.

27. Learned Advocate General, Shri Udaya Holla, appearing for the appellant-State of Karnataka in C.A.Nos.4923-4924 of 2017, has submitted that the State of Karnataka is also aggrieved by the order of the NGT to the extent of setting aside the buffer zone in respect of water bodies and drains specified in the Revised Master Plan, 2015, and enlargement of the buffer zone in respect of lakes and Rajakaluves. It is also aggrieved by the order of the NGT directing the authorities to demolish all the offending constructions raised/built in the buffer zone, which will result in demolition of 95% of the buildings in Bengaluru. It is submitted that the Revised Master Plan is statutory in nature and NGT has no power, competence or jurisdiction to consider the validity or vires of any statutory provision/regulation. Therefore, the order of the NGT to that extent is liable to be set aside.

28. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants in other cases, have also supported the arguments of the learned Advocate General. It was contended that the Revised Master Plan provides for a 30 meters buffer zone around the lakes and a buffer zone of 50 meters, 25 meters and 15 meters from the primary, secondary and tertiary drains, respectively to be measured from the centre of the drain. Vide the impugned judgment, the NGT has revised these buffer zones and has directed that the buffer zone be maintained for 75 meters around the lake and 50, 35 and 25 meters respectively from the primary, secondary and tertiary drain, respectively. Variation of buffer zone, as directed by the NGT is without any legal and scientific basis and has the effect of amending the Revised Master Plan, 2015, without there being any challenge to the same or any relief sought with respect to the said Revised Master Plan.

29. On the other hand, Shri Sajan Poovayya, learned senior counsel, appearing for the applicants, has fairly submitted that the applications MANTRI TECHZONE PVT. LTD. v. FORWARD FOUNDATION [S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.] were filed only against the appellants in C.A Nos. 5016 of 2016 and 8002-8003 of 2016 (respondent Nos. 9 & 10). He has no objection to set aside the order in so far as the appellants in other appeals including the State of Karnataka are concerned. He has also no objection to set aside the general conditions and directions of the NGT in paragraph (1) of the order dated 04.05.2016 except the directions issued against respondent Nos. 9 and 10. In view of the above, it is not necessary to examine the contentions of the learned Advocate General in Civil Appeal Nos. 4923-4924 of 2017. It is also not necessary to consider the contentions urged in the other civil appeals except the appeals filed by respondents Nos. 9 and 10.

30. Shri Poovayya has strongly opposed the submissions made by the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants in C.A. No. 5016 of 2016 and C.A. Nos. 8002-8003 of 2016. It is submitted that the Tribunal is a specialized body for effective and expeditious disposal of cases relating to environmental protection and conservation of forests and other natural resources including enforcement of any legal right relating to environment. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is provided under Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the NGT Act. Section 14 provides for the jurisdiction over all civil cases where a substantial question relating to environment is involved. However, such question should arise out of implementation of the enactments specified in Schedule I. The Tribunal has the jurisdiction under Section 15(1)(a) of the NGT Act to provide relief and compensation to the victims of pollution and other environmental damage arising under the enactments specified in Schedule I. Under Sections 15(1)(b) and 15(1)(c), the Tribunal can provide for restitution of property damaged and for restitution of the environment for such area or areas, as the Tribunal may think fit. Sections 15(1)(b) and 15(1)(c) have not been made relatable to enactment specified in Schedule I of the Act. Section 15(1)(c) is an entire island of power and jurisdiction read with Section 21 of the Act. He submits that whenever ecology is being compromised and jeopardized, the Tribunal can apply Section 20 for taking restorative measures in the interest of environment. The limitation provided in Section 14 is period of six months from the date on which cause of action first arose whereas in Section 15 it is five years. Therefore, the petition is not barred by time.

31. He has further submitted that the provisions of Section 33 shall have the effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law for the time being in force. This gives the Tribunal overriding powers over anything inconsistently contained in KIAD Act, Planning Act, Revised Master Plan of Bangalore, 2015 and Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 (for short ‘KMC Act’). Therefore, the Tribunal while providing for restoration of environment in an area can specify buffer zone around specific lakes and water bodies in contravention with zoning regulation.

32. Regarding limitation, he has submitted that the application filed by respondents 1 to 3 was not an application simplicitor under Section 14 of the Act. It was an application where a specific prayer has been made with reference to Lake Development Authority’s report dated 12.06.2013 and the Ministry of Environment Forest and Climate Change Monitoring Committee report dated 14.08.2013 for restoration of ecologically sensitive land and for maintaining sensitive area in its natural condition so that ecological balance of the area is not disturbed. Therefore, the petition was under Section 15 of the Act and it can be filed within five years from the date on which the cause for such compensation or relief first arose.

33. It was further submitted that right to appeal under Section 22 is not a vested right unless provided by statute. Exercise of Appellate Jurisdiction without the fulfillment of statutory mandate would be without jurisdiction. Section 22 of the Act provides for an appeal on the ground specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short ‘the CPC’). Under Section 100 of the CPC, an appeal can be filed only on the ground that the case involves a substantial question of law as may be framed by the Appellate Court. In the instant case, the appeal does not involve any substantial question of law hence it has to be dismissed in limine. He has taken us through various materials placed on record in order to substantiate that the direction passed and penalty imposed by the Tribunal upon to project proponents are sustainable. He prays for dismissal of the appeals.

34. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel of the parties and perused the materials placed on record. MANTRI TECHZONE PVT. LTD. v. FORWARD FOUNDATION [S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.]

35. Before considering the other contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, let us first consider the scope of enquiry in appeals filed under Section 22, which is as under: “22. Appeal to Supreme Court.- Any person aggrieved by any award, decision or order of the tribunal, may, file an appeal to the Supreme Court, within ninety days from the date of communication of the award, decision or order of the Tribunal, to him, on any one or more of the grounds specified in section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908): Provided that the Supreme Court may, entertain any appeal after the expiry of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficience cause from preferring the appeal.”

36. It is settled that there is no vested right of appeal unless the statute so provides. Further, if a statute provides for a condition subject to which the appropriate Appellate Court can exercise jurisdiction, the Court is under an obligation to satisfy itself whether the condition prescribed is fulfilled. Exercise of appellate jurisdiction without the fulfillment of statutory mandate would be without jurisdiction. Therefore, the right of appeal provided under Section 22 is to be read subject to the conditions provided therein.

37. Section 22 provides for an appeal to the Supreme Court on the grounds specified in Section 100 of the CPC. Under Section 100 CPC, an appeal can be filed only on the ground that the case involves a substantial question of law as may be framed by the Appellate Court. The scope of appeal under Section 22, therefore, is restricted to substantial question of law arising from the judgment of the Tribunal. The test to determine whether the question is substantial question of law or not was laid down by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons, Ltd. v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing, 1962 Supp. (3) SCR 549. This Court has laid down the test as under: “The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law.”

38. It is equally settled that merely because the remedy of appeal is provided against the decision of the Tribunal on a substantial question of law alone, that does not ipso facto permit the appellants to agitate their appeal to seek re-appreciation of the factual matrix of the entire matter. The appellants cannot seek to re-argue their entire case to seek wholesale re-appreciation of evidence and the factual matrix that has been considered by the Tribunal is ex facie impermissible under Section 22. There cannot be fresh appreciation or re-appreciation of facts and evidence in a statutory appeal under this provision. 39. The first question raised by the learned counsel is in relation to the maintainability of the application before the Tribunal. 40. The Tribunal has been established under a constitutional mandate provided in Schedule VII List I Entry 13 of the Constitution of India, to implement the decision taken at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. The Tribunal is a specialized judicial body for effective and expeditious disposal of cases relating to environmental protection and conservation of forests and other natural resources including enforcement of any legal right relating to environment. The right to healthy environment has been construed as a part of the right to life under Article 21 by way of judicial pronouncements. Therefore, the Tribunal has special jurisdiction for enforcement of environmental rights. 41. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is provided under Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Act. Section 14 provides the jurisdiction over all civil cases where a substantial question relating to environment (including enforcement of any legal right relating to environment) is involved. However, such question should arise out of implementation of the enactments specified in Schedule I. 42. The Tribunal has also jurisdiction under Section 15(1)(a) of the Act to provide relief and compensation to the victims of pollution and MANTRI TECHZONE PVT. LTD. v. FORWARD FOUNDATION [S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.] other environmental damage arising under the enactments specified in Schedule I. Further, under Section 15(1)(b) and 15(1)(c) the Tribunal can provide for restitution of property damaged and for restitution of the environment for such area or areas as the Tribunal may think fit. It is noteworthy that Section 15(1)(b) & (c) have not been made relatable to Schedule I enactments of the Act. Rightly so, this grants a glimpse into the wide range of powers that the Tribunal has been cloaked with respect to restoration of the environment. 43. Section 15(1)(c) of the Act is an entire island of power and jurisdiction read with Section 20 of the Act. The principles of sustainable development, precautionary principle and polluter pays, propounded by this Court by way of multiple judicial pronouncements, have now been embedded as a bedrock of environmental jurisprudence under the NGT Act. Therefore, wherever the environment and ecology are being compromised and jeopardized, the Tribunal can apply Section 20 for taking restorative measures in the interest of the environment. 44. The NGT Act being a beneficial legislation, the power bestowed upon the Tribunal would not be read narrowly. An interpretation which furthers the interests of environment must be given a broader reading. (See Kishsore Lal v. Chairman, Employees’ State Insurance Corpn. (2007) 4 SCC 579, para 17). The existence of the Tribunal without its broad restorative powers under Section 15(1)(c) read with Section 20 of the Act, would render it ineffective and toothless, and shall betray the legislative intent in setting up a specialized Tribunal specifically to address environmental concerns. The Tribunal, specially constituted with Judicial Members as well as with Experts in the field of environment, has a legal obligation to provide for preventive and restorative measures in the interest of the environment. 45. Section 15 of the Act provides power & jurisdiction, independent of Section 14 thereof. Further, Section 14(3) juxtaposed with Section 15(3) of the Act, are separate provisions for filing distinct applications before the Tribunal with distinct periods of limitation, thereby amply demonstrating that jurisdiction of the Tribunal flows from these Sections (i.e. Sections 14 and 15 of the Act) independently. The limitation provided in Section 14 is a period of 6 months from the date on which the cause of action first arose and whereas in Section 15 it is 5 years. Therefore, the legislative intent is clear to keep Section 14 and 15 as self contained jurisdictions. 46. Further, Section 18 of the Act recognizes the right to file applications each under Sections 14 as well as 15. Therefore, it cannot be argued that Section 14 provides jurisdiction to the Tribunal while Section 15 merely supplements the same with powers. As stated supra. the typical nature of the Tribunal, its breadth of powers as provided under the statutory provisions of the Act as well as the Scheduled enactments, cumulatively, leaves no manner of doubt that the only tenable interpretation to these provisions would be to read the provisions broadly in favour of cloaking the Tribunal with effective authority. An interpretation that is in favour of conferring jurisdiction should be preferred rather than one taking away jurisdiction. 47. Section 33 of the Act provides an overriding effect to the provisions of the Act over anything inconsistent contained in any other law or in any instrument having effect by virtue of law other than this Act. This gives the Tribunal overriding powers over anything inconsistent contained in the KIAD Act, Planning Act, Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 (“KMC Act”); and the Revised Master Plan of Bengaluru, 2015 (“RMP”). A Central legislation enacted under Entry 13 of List I Schedule VII of the Constitution of India will have the overriding effect over State legislations. The corollary is that the Tribunal while providing for restoration of environment in an area, can specify buffer zones around specific lakes & water bodies in contradiction with zoning regulations under these statutes or the RMP. 48. The second question raised by the appellants is that the petition is barred by time. According to appellants, environmental clearance was granted to the respondent No. 9 on 17.02.2012 for which notice was published in the leading newspaper on 12.03.2012 and 14.03.2012. Modified building plan was approved on 30.08.2012, which was followed up to 10.08.2014. Similar events had taken place in regard to the project of respondent No. 10 who had been granted environmental clearance on 30.09.2013. The application had to be filed within a period of six months from the date on which cause of action for such dispute has first arisen in terms of Section 14 of the NGT Act. Admittedly, the present application has been filed in March, 2014 and according to them, it is much beyond the prescribed period of limitation. Also, there is no application for condonation of delay accompanying the main application. Therefore, the Tribunal will not have jurisdiction to condone the delay. MANTRI TECHZONE PVT. LTD. v. FORWARD FOUNDATION [S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.] 49. The OA No. 222 of 2014 was not an application simpliciter under Section 14 of the Act. It was an application where a specific prayer has been made with reference to Lake Development Authority’s (“LDA”) Report dated 12.06.2013 and the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (“MoEF”) Monitoring Committee Report dated 14.08.2013 for restoration of ecologically sensitive land and for maintaining the sensitive in its natural condition so that the ecological balance of the area is not disturbed. It is clear from the documentary evidence supported by data, that the project proponents have committed breaches and the implementation of the project is bound to have serious adverse impact on the ecology, hydrology and the environment in the catchment area of Bellandur Lake. The environmental degradation as established from the documents would give rise to an independent cause of action. Therefore, this was a petition under Section 15 of the Act and thus it could be filed within 5 years from the date on which the cause for such compensation or relief first arose. 50. In fact, in the original application before the Tribunal there was no mention of the provision under which it was being filed. It is well settled principle of law that non-mention of or erroneous mention of the provision of law would not be of any relevance, if the Court had the requisite jurisdiction to pass an order. It would be a mere irregularity and would not vitiate the application or the judicial order of the Tribunal. 51. Shri R. Venkataramani, learned senior counsel, appearing for the appellant in CA No.5016 of 2016 has submitted that the constructions had not commenced before the grant of environment clearance. The inspection report dated 11.01.2012 of the Chairman of the KSPCB observes that “no construction” had commenced on the date of inspection. This report cannot be overlooked on the basis of some dumping of debris which could not be attributed to the appellant. He has pointed out the report of the Committee appointed by the Tribunal in the month of August 2015, wherein it was stated that “it started construction after obtaining clearance”. In this regard he has also taken us through various documents placed on record and submits that there is absolutely no justification in imposing monitoring penalty/compensation without assessment of impact. 52.. The Tribunal has pointed out on the basis of the Committee report of August 2015, that the appellant had encroached 3 acres 10 guntas of Bellandur Lake and a boundary wall has been raised around the said land. The Tribunal has also found that the project proponents have violated the Master Plan. They have not obtained the mandatory clearance from the Sensitive Zone Committee constituted by the Government of Karnataka. It is also clear from the materials on record that there are several other violations by the project proponents. The Tribunal has discussed all these issues from para 52 onwards. It is also clear from the materials on record that there is a definite possibility of environment, ecology, lakes, and wetland being adversely affected by these projects. That is why, the Tribunal has observed as under: “72. In light of the above scope of the project and records before the Tribunal and the defaults on the part of the Project Proponents, the cumulative adverse effects of the activities undertaken by the respondents before us can be summed up as under: 1) The construction of both the projects had started prior to the grant to Environmental Clearance. 2) The EIA Notification of 2006 requires that without grant of Environmental Clearance, no project can commence its activity. This restriction applies not only to operationalization of the project but even for the purposes of establishment. 3) Revenue Map images shows multiple Rajakaluves flowing through the project(s) in question. The images further show encroachment on Rajakaluves. 4) Digital images of the land available on Google satellite images showing encroachment on two major Rajakaluves. 5) Google Satellite images retrieved from Google archives clearly reflect two distinct features. Firstly, change in the wetland area between the period of 13th November, 2000 and 23rd November, 2010. Secondly, it reveals the excavation work carried out by Respondent Nos. 9 and 10 commenced prior to obtaining Environmental Clearance. 6) Restriction in regard to extraction of ground water was not strictly complied with as permission of Central Ground Water Authority was not obtained before construction. 7) The conditions with regard to the natural slopping pattern of the project site to remain unaltered and natural hydrology of the MANTRI TECHZONE PVT. LTD. v. FORWARD FOUNDATION [S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.] area to be maintained as it is, to ensure natural flow of storm water as well as in relation to Lakes and other water bodies within and/or at the vicinity of the project area to be protected and conserved: The inspection report by the MoEF clearly notes that condition nos. (xxxix) and (xl) in the Environmental Clearance of respondent no. 9 cannot be complied with as it will necessarily result in some alteration of the natural slopping pattern of the project site and the natural hydrology of the area. It noted that the project area is located in the catchment area of the Bellandur Lake and the project authorities have informed that they will take all precautionary measures to ensure that the lake will not be affected by project activities either during construction or operation phase.” 53. In paragraph 81, the Tribunal has observed as under: “81.…………Another very important aspect which cannot be overlooked by the Tribunal is with regard to the respondent nos. 9 & 10 carrying on their project activity fully knowing that they were incapable of or it was not possible for them to comply with condition no. xxxix and xl (or alike conditions) in the order granting the Environmental Clearance. This has even been noticed by the MoEF in its monitoring report dated 14th August, 2013. These respondents never applied for variation or amendment of these conditions and continued with their construction activities. This renders these respondents entirely liable for environmental and ecological damage and the restoration and restitution thereof.” 54. In our view, the findings arrived at by the Tribunal are not only based on the documents that were available on record but also on the pleadings that were made by the parties buttressed by the Committee’s report and the inspection note of the Expert Members. Therefore, the directions passed and the penalty imposed by the Tribunal on both project proponents are valid and sustainable and do not suffer from any perversity. 55. We are also of the view that it is impermissible for the appellants to seek a factual review through the methodology of re-appreciation of factual matrix by this Court under Section 22 of the NGT Act. 56. Shri R.Venkataramani, learned senior counsel has also raised a subsidiary issue relating to res judicata. According to him, respondent Nos. 12 and 13 filed Writ Petition Nos.3656-57/2013 seeking similar reliefs in a representative capacity. The issues raised therein are same as those canvassed in the application before the Tribunal. The reliefs sought for are essentially the same. Hence, the applications are barred by the principle of res judicata. 57. The Tribunal has answered this issue in paragraphs 47 to 51 of the order. There was no dispute in so far as filing of the writ petitions is concerned. However, the parties are not common nor the issues in application and the writ petitions are directly and substantially the same. After examination of the pleadings, the Tribunal has recorded a finding of fact that there is no commonality of a cause of action or likelihood of a conflict between the judgments. The prayers and the geneses of the respective proceedings are entirely distinct and different in their scope and relief. The issues before the Tribunal would essentially relate to environment ecology and its restoration while the proceedings before the High Court relate to entirely different issues with acquisition of land, its allotment and transfer to the third party. These issues in both the proceedings are neither substantial nor materially identical. 58. After elaborately considering this question, the Tribunal has concluded as under: “51.….For these reasons, we find no merit in this contention of respondent Nos. 9 and 10. The purpose of the doctrine of res judicata is to provide finality and conclusiveness to the judicial decisions as well as to avoid multiplicity of litigation. In the present case, the question of re-agitating the issues or agitating similar issues in two different proceedings does not arise. The ambit and scope of jurisdiction is clearly decipherable. The jurisdictions of the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka and this Tribunal are operating in distinct fields and have no commonality in so far as the issues which are raised directly and substantially in these petitions, as well as the reliefs that have been prayed for before the Hon’ble High Court and the Tribunal are concerned. There is no commonality in parties before the Tribunal and the High Court. The ‘cause of action’ in both proceedings is different and distinct. The matters substantially and materially in issue in one proceedings are not the same in the other proceeding. There is hardly any likelihood of conflicting judgments being pronounced by the Tribunal MANTRI TECHZONE PVT. LTD. v. FORWARD FOUNDATION [S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.] on the one hand and the High Court on the other. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the present applications are neither hit by the principles of res judicata nor constructive res judicata. We also hold that culmination of proceedings before the Tribunal into a final judgment would not offend the principle of ‘judicial propriety’, because of the Writ Petitions pending before the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka.” 59. We do not find any error in the aforesaid conclusion of the Tribunal. We are of the view that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the objections taken by the respondent Nos. 9 and 10 do not satisfy the basic ingredients to attract the application of res judicata or constructive res judicata. 60. The State of Karnataka is aggrieved by the following offending portion of the order dated 04.05.2016: “1. In view of our discussion in the main Judgment, we are of the considered view that the fixation of distance from water bodies (lakes and Rajkalewas) suffers from the inbuilt contradiction, legal infirmity and is without any scientific justification. The RMP – 2015 provides 50m from middle of the Rajkalewas as buffer zone in the case of primary Rajkalewas, 25m in the case of secondary Rajkulewas and 15m in the tertiary Rajkulewas in contradiction to the 30m in the case of lake which is certainly much bigger water body and its utility as a water body/wetland is well known certainly part of wet land. Thus, we direct that the distance in the case of Respondents Nos. 9 and 10 from Rajkulewas, Waterbodies and wetlands shall be maintained as below:- (i) In the case of Lakes, 75m from the periphery of water body to be maintained as green belt and buffer zone for all the existing water bodies i.e. lakes/wetlands. (ii) 50m from the edge of the primary Rajkulewas. (iii) 35m from the edges in the case of secondary Rajkulewas (iv) 25m from the edges in the case of tertiary Rajkulewas This buffer/green zone would be treated as no construction zone for all intent and purposes. This is absolutely essential for the purposes of sustainable development particularly keeping in mind the ecology and environment of the areas in question. All the offending constructions raised by Respondents Nos. 9 and 10 of any kind including boundary wall shall be demolished which falls within such areas. Wherever necessary dredging operations are required, the same should be carried out to restore the original capacity of the water spread area and/or wetlands. Not only the existing construction would be removed but also none of these Respondents – Project Proponent would be permitted to raise any construction in this zone. All authorities particularly Lake development Authority shall carry out this operation in respect of all the water bodies/ lakes of Bangalore.” 61. We have already noticed that Shri Poovayya has no objection to set aside the aforesaid impugned portion of the order in so far as the appellants in all the appeals except the appeals filed by respondent Nos.9 and 10. The aforesaid portion of the order contains not only general directions but also certain directions against respondent Nos. 9 and 10. Therefore, only that portion of the order which does not pertain to respondent Nos. 9 and 10 needs to be quashed. 62. In the light of the above discussion, we pass the following order: i) Civil Appeal No. 5016 of 2016 and Civil Appeal Nos. 8002-8003 of 2016 filed by the appellants/respondent nos. 9 and 10 are hereby dismissed. The impugned judgment and order in so far as appellants/respondent Nos. 9 and 10 are concerned is sustained. ii) All the other appeals are hereby allowed and the direction/ condition No. (1) in the order dated 4.5.2016 is hereby set aside except the direction issued against respondent Nos. 9 and 10. 63. There will be no order as to costs. Ankit Gyan Appeals disposed of. MANTRI TECHZONE PVT. LTD. v. FORWARD FOUNDATION [S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.]