Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
9. Learned senior counsel for the appellants further contended that so far as Maya Devi-appellant No. 1 herein is D · concerned, she was not staying at Rohtak at the relevant time and she was a teacher in Municipal School at Delhi which is apparent from the statement of Smt. Rajbala (DW-3), Head Mistress, Nagar Nigam Prathmik Balika Vidyalaya, Ladpur, Delhi as also from the investigation and the case of the E prosecution. Even, Karamvir-husband of the deceased was not preserit in the house when Kavita committed the act of . suicide .. He finally contended that there is nothing on record to show that any demand for dowry was made and she meted out cruelty or harassment soon before her death. Learned senior counsel further contended that even forthe purpose of Section 498A the evidence is lacking.
10. On the other hand, learned senior counsel for the respondent-State submitted that there is no dispute that Kavita G died on 26.09.1996 in her matrimonial home otherwise than under normal circumstances due to poisoning. Admittedly, there were persistent demands put up by the accused right from the solemnization of the marriage which continued till the H [2015) 11 S.C.R. date of the death of the deceased. He further contended that "the accused had been maltreating, harassing and subjecting her to cruelty for the fulfillment of their demands for additional dowry. It was next contended that in the present case, besides Kavita, the; accused had also humiliated Pankaj (PW-4) – B brother of the deceased. When PW-4 visited the house of the accused with some ceremonial articles on the day of 'sakrant', the accused expressed displeasure upon the articles brought by him. He further contended that the claim that the deceased was suffering from moderate depressing episode and was C having suicidal tendencies prior to her death which had come true on 26.09.1996 is hardly of any consequence. A series of transac~ions of maltreatment and cruelty which commenced just 20-25 days after the solemnization of the marriage of the deceased with appellant No. 2 herein and culminated on the date of the death of the deceased would go a long way to show that she was harassed, maltreated and was subjected to cruelty soon before her death for and in connection with the demands for dowry. It was further submitted that the deceased E was so much depressed as a result of cruelty/harassment meted out to her at the hands of the appellants that she developed the suicidal tendencies. He further.submitted that the accused had created such a vicious and charged atmosphere in the matrimonial home that Kavita (since F deceased) started picking up the ideas of committing suicide.
11. Learned senior counsel for the respondent-State ·vehemently contended that all the accused except appellant No. 1 were living in a house and the claim of the appellants G that there is no point of involvement of Maya Devi in the whole incident is wholly irrelevant as she too was a frequent visitor to Rohtak as admitted by her in the statement made under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short 'the Code') and there is sufficient evidence on record to show H that as and when the demands were put up by the accused to the complainant party, Maya Devi always accompanied her A son.
12. Learned senior counsel for the respondent-State finally contended that the trial Court rightly convicted and sentenced the appellants under Section 304B and 498A of B the IPC and the High Court upheld the same with some modification in the sentence. The appellants deserve a deterrent punishment in the present case. Discussion:
13. Before considering the prosecution case as well as the defence pleaded, it is desirable to extract the relevant provisions of Section 304B which relates to dowry death: c "3048. Dowry death.-(1) Where the death of a D woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in E connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called 'dowry death', and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.-For the purpose of this sub-section, 'dowry' shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28of1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than G seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life." The above provision was inserted by Act 43 of 1986 and came into force with ·effect from 19.11.1986. There is no H (2015] 11 S.C.R. A dispute about the applicability of the above provision since the marriage and the death occurred in the year 1994 and 1996 respectively.
14. In order to convict an accused for the offence punishable under Section 3048 IPC, the following essentials must be satisfied: (1) the death of a woman must have been caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances; (it) such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage; (iit) soon before her death, the woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relatives of her husband; (iv) such cruelty or harassment must be for, or in connection with, demand for dowry. When the above ingredients are established by reliable and acceptable evidence, such death shall be called dowry death and such husband or his relatives shall be deemed to have caused her death. If the above mentioned ingredients F are attracted in view of the special provision, the court shall presume and it shall record such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved by the accused. However, it is open to the accused to adduce such evidence for disproving such conclusive presumption as the burden is unmistakably on him G to do so and he can discharge such burden by getting an answer through cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses or by adducing evidence on the defence side.
15. Section 1138 of the Evidence Act, 1872 speaks H about presumption as to dowry death which reads as under: "113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.-When the A question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such 8 person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.-Fo"r the purposes of this section, 'dowry death' shall have the same meaning as in Section 3048 of the Indian Penal Code (45of1860)." As stated earlier, the prosecution under Section 3048 IPC cannot escape from the burden of proof that the harassment or cruelty was related to the demand for dowry and such was caused "soon before her death". In view of the D Explanation to the said section, the word "dowry" has to be understood as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act; 1961 which reads.as under: "2. Definition of 'dowry' .-In this Act, 'dowry' meam; E any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly- ( a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b).by the parent of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage \Jr to any other person, at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties. but does not include G dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies."
16. To attract the provisions of Section 3048. one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be H A established is that "soon before her death" she was subjected to cruelty or harassment "for, or in connection with the demand for dowry". The expression "soon before her death" used in Section 3048 IPC and Section 1138 of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. In fact, learned senior B counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that there is no proximity for the alleged demand of dowry and harassment. With regard to the said claim, we .shall advert to while considering the evidence led in by the prosecution. Though the language used is "soon before her death", no definite C period has been enacted and the expression "soon before her death" has not been defined in both the enactments. Accordingly, the determination of the period which can come within the term "soon before her death" is to be determined by the courts, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. However, the said expression would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. In other words, there must be existence of a proximate and live link E between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and t~e death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence. . F
17. The aforesaid provisions were considered by this Court in Bansi La/vs. StateofHaryana (2011) 11SCC359 wherein it was held that while considering the case under Section 3048 cruelty has to be proved during the close . G proximity of the time of death and it should be continuous and such continuous harassment, physical or mental, by the accused should make life of the deceased miserable which may force her to commit suicide. This Court further held that ' where the cruelty has been proved during the close proximity H of the time of death then the provisions of Section 1138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 providing for presumption that the A accused is responsible for dowry death, have to be pressed in service. In paras 19 and 20 of the judgment, this Court has further held as follows:- "19. It may be mentioned herein that the legislature in its wisdom has used the word "shall" thus, making a mandatory application on the part of the court to presume that death had been committed by the person who had subjected her to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand of dowry. It is unlike the provisions of Section c 113-Aofthe Evidence Act where a discretion has been conferred upon the court wherein it had been provided that court may presume abetment of suicide by a married woman. Therefore, in view of the above, onus lies on the accused to rebut the presumption and in case of Section o 113-B relatable to Section 304-B IPC, the onus to prove shifts exclusively and heavily on the accused. The only requirements are that death of a woman has been caused by means other than any natural circumstances; that death has been caused or occurred within 7 years of her marriage; and such woman had been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband in connection with any demand of dowry.
20. Therefore, in case the essential ingredients of such odeath have been established by the prosecution, it is the duty of the court to raise a presumption that the accused has caused the dowry death. It may also be pertinent to mention herein that the expression "soon before her · death" has not been defined in either of the statutes. G Therefore, in each case, the Court has to analyse ttie facts and circumstances leading to the death of the victim and decide if there is any proximate connection between the demand of dowry and act ()f cruelty or harassment and the death." (2015] 11 S.C.R. 18. This Court, in Mustafa Shahada/ Shaikh vs State ofMaharasl1tra (2012) 11SCC397 held as under:- "9. In order to convict an accused for the offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC, the following essentials must be satisfied: c (1) the death of a woman must have been caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances; (it) such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage; (iit) soon before her death, the woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relatives of her husband; (iv) such cruelty or harassment must be for, or in connection with, demand for dowry.
When the above ingredients are established by reliable and acceptable evidence, such death shall be called dowry death and such husband or his relatives shall be deemed to have caused her death. If the abovementioned ingredients are attracted in view of the special provision, the court shall presume and it shall record such fact as proved unless and until it is dispro~ed by the accused. However, it is ooen to the accused to adduce such evidence for disproving such compulsory presumption as the burden is unmistakably on him to do so and he can discharge such burden by getting an answer through cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses or by adducing evidence on the defence side. 11. To attract the provisions of Section 304-B, bne of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that "soon before her death" she was A subjected to cruelty or harassment "for, or in connection with the demand for dowry".
The expression "soon before her death" used in Section 304-B IPC and Section 113- B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity · test. In fact, the learned counsel appearing for the B appellant submitted that there is no proximity for the alleged demand of dowry and harassment. With regard to the said claim, we shall advert to the same while considering the evidence led in by the prosecution. Though the language used is "soon before her death", C no·definite period has been enacted and the expression "soon before her death" has not been defined in both the · · enactments. Accordingly, the determination of the period which can come within the term "soon before her death" 0 is to be determined by the courts, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. However, the said expression would normally imply that the ·interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question.
In other words, there must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry.demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence. These principles have been reiterated in Kaliyaperumal v. State of TN. and Yashoda v. State of MP" 19.ln the case of Ramesh Vithal Patil vs. State of G Karnataka (2014) 11SCC516 this Court held as follows:- "20. Moreover, admittedly the deceased committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage. Section 113-A of the Evidence Act is, therefore, clearly attracted to this case. Presumption contemplated therein must spring in action. This provision was introduced by the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983 to resolve the diffic;:ulty of proof where married women are forced to commit suicide but incriminating evidence is difficult to get as it is usually available within the four walls of the matrimonial home …..
" 20. With these principles in mind, let us analyse the evidence led in by the prosecution. The marriage of C Kavita@Kusum (since deceased) was solemnized with Karamvir on 17.07.1994. Kavita died on 26.09.1996 after ·consuming some poisonous substance at her matrimonjal home. The father of the deceased lodged a complaint against the accused persons that he had given dowry on the eve of D marriage beyond his means but after 20-25 days of marriage, Karamvir-appellant No. 2 herein, Maya Devi-appellant No.1 herein and brothers Dharamveer and Paramveer and sister Sonika, started harassing his daughter for more money When Kavita visited her father's house, she nan ated the entire tale E of woes to her parents and brother. When the complainant enquired about the matter, the appellants informed the complainant that the appellant No. 2 is in need of money and they also have to perform the marriage of Sonika. A sum of Rs. 20,000/- was paid to appellant No. 2 so that the daughter of the complainant is not harassed. It was further stated that the complainant receiv~d a letter of his daughter regarding continuous demand for dowry and sufferings meted out to her. The complainant paid a further sum of Rs. 25,000/- for the G purchase of refrigerator and gold chain to the appellant No. 2. Kavita was sent with her husband on the assurance that the accused family would not harass her in future. Even on the day of 'sakrant', when the brother of the deceased visited her matrimonial home, the accused threatened them that the H household articles of Kavita will be thrown out. A further demand of Rs. 30,000/- was made to meet the kitchen expenses by A the appellants. Since that demand was not fulfilled, the deceased was left with her father at Delhi. Subsequently, the complainant requested to compromise the matter and tendered his apology in writing. In June 1996, the deceased was brought to home by the accused persons. After some B days, when the complainant visited her matrimonial home at Rohtak, he was informed that situation has not changed and whenever she brings money, the peace returns for 10-20 days otherwise she is beaten mercilessly by the accused persons. On 26.09.1996, the complainant got the information about the C death of his daughter. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions and the accused were found guilty under Section 3048 and 498A of the IPC. There is ample evidence thatthe deceased was harassed, maltreated and was s,ubjected to D cruelty, for and in connection with the demands for dowry by the accused. Admittedly, appellant No. 2 was present in his office on 26.09.1996 located at M.D. University Campus at Rohtak but he did not attend to his wife at the relevant time. The assertion made by learned senior counsel for the appellants E that the deceased was suffering from moderate depressing episode and was having suicidal tendencies prior to her death is of no consequence. Dr. V.P. Mehla (DW-2) was apprised by the deceased about the harassment and the maltreatment by her in-laws a month prior to her death when she was taken to the aforesaid doctor for the alleged treatment. According to DW-2, the deceased was so much depressed as a result of the act of cruelty meted out to her at the hands of the appellants that she developed suicidal tendencies. The testimony of DW- 2 shows that the accused had created such a charged G environment in her matrimonial home that she developed suicidal tendencies. Except appellant No. 1 herein, all were living in the house at Rohtak.
Appellant No. 1 herein was a frequent visitor to that house and she herself admitted this fact in her statement under Section 313 of the Code. Thus, it is very much clear that accused persons maltreated, harassed and subjected the deceased to cruelty, after the solemnization of her marriage with the appellant No. 2 herein, during her life time and soon before her death, for and in connection with the demands for dowry, who died at her matrimonial home within seven years of her marriage otherwise than in normal circumstances.
21. Section 3048 IPC does not categorise death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. This is because death C caused by burns can, in a given case, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental. Similarly, death caused by bodily injury can, in a given case, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental. Finally, any death occurring "otherwise than under normal circumstances" can, in a given case, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental. D Therefore, if all the other ingredients of Section 3048 IPC are fulfilled, any death (homicidal or suicidal or accidental) whether caused by burns or by bodily injury or occurring otherwise than under normal circumstances shall, as per the legislative mandate, be called a "dowry death" and the woman's husband E or his relative "shall be deemed to have caused her death". The section clearly specifies what constitutes the offence of dowry death and also identifies the single offender or multiple offenders who has or have caused the dowry death.
22. The key words under Section 1138 of the Evidence Act, 1872 are "shall presume" leaving no option with a court but to presume an accused brought before it of causing a dowry death guilty of the offence. However, the redeeming factor of this provision is that the presumption is rebuttable. Section G 1138 of the Act enables an accused to prove his innocence and places a reverse onus of proof on him or her. In the case on hand, accused persons failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased died a natural death. When Kavita H allegedly committed suicide, her husband-appellant No.2, though he was not present in the house, was present in his A office at M.D. University, Rohtak at the relevant time but he did not make any sincere effort to take her to the hospital which was very near to the place of the incident. Similarly, appellant No. 2 got the deceased exami_ned by DW-2 in order to create an impression that she was struggling with chronic depression but the truth floated upon the surface when the deceased reveals that the accused persons were maltreating her and she had started picking up the ideas of suicide. .Lastly, appellanf No. 2 falsely informed the court that having learnt about the death of his wife Kavita, he left for Delhi to inform C her family members.
In fact, the accused never went to Delhi and the complainant received a telephonic message from an unknown person regarding the death of his daughter. So far as Maya Devi-appellant No. 1 herein is concerned, there is no D denying the fact that she was working as a teacher in a government school and she was not present at the relevant time at the place of incident but it is very much clear from the ·evidence on record that both the accused persons had a dominating role in the entire episode and she had always E accompanied her son-appellant No. 2 herein to the house of the complainant (PW-3) for the dowry demands. The presumption under Section 1138 of the Act is rriandatory may be contrasted with Section 113A of the Act which was introduced contemporaneously. Section 113A of the Act, dealing with abetment of suicide, uses the expression "may presume". This being the position, a two-stage process is required to be followed in respect of an offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC: it is necessary to first ascertain whether the ingredients of the Section have been made out G against the accused; if the ingredients are made out, then the · accused is deemed to have caused the death of the woman but is entitled to rebut the statutory presumption of having caused a dowry death.
From the evidence on record, we are of the opinion that in the present case Kavita died an unnatural H (2015] 11 S.C.R.. death by committing suicide as she was subjected to cruelty/ harassment by her husband and in-laws in connection with the demand for dowry which started from the time of her marriage and continued till she committed suicide. Thus, the provisions of Sections 3048 and 498A of the IPC will be fully attracted. Conclusion:
23. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that Kavita@Kusum suffered death at her matrimonial C home, otherwise than under normal circumstances, within seven years of her marriage, and the case squarely falls within the ambit of dowry death. In the present case, from the evidence of the Doctor (OW-2), PW-3 and PW-4, we find that the harassment of the deceased was with a view to coerce o her to convince her parents to meet the demands for dowry.
24. All the above factors clearly established the legal requirements for an offence falling under Sections 3048 and 498A IPC with the aid of ~ection 1138 of the Evidence Act, 1872 against the appellants and the conviction and sentence imposed, therefore, do not call for interference. Hence, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal dismissed.