2 S.C.R. strictly cumtrued. This Court again in 1'he State of Uttar Pmde.sh v. Maham.med 8ayeed (1), applied the strict rule of comtruction of a surety bond in that case. In the present case a strict construction
of the bond leads to the only conclusion that a demand of the Court on the judgment· debtor and a default made by him were necessary conditions for the enforcement of the bond against the appellant.
In the result, we set aside the order of the High Court and dismiss the application for execution filed by the first n~spondent against the appellant. But we do not think that this is fit case for award-
ing costs to the appellant. She has failed to raise this objection specifically in her objections or to place before the learned District Judge the present con tent ion. In the circumstances we direct each
party to bear his or her own costs throughout. MEE:'olGL\S TEA ESTATE v. ITS WORKMEN (P. B. GA.JENDRAGADKAR, M. HIDAYATULJ,AH and J.C. SHAH JJ.) lnd11strla! T>iBpufe-Requireme-nts of vrdifl inquiry-
/lri'.ncip/f'.~ nf natuta! jtt~lice-Practice, of Suprerne ('nurt nnt In Pnfr r irifu fridenre to .find facts for itsefj-(1ase of no f.vid1,nrr. In Jan:,ary, I ()j6, there was an incident in which a group of workrnen assaulted the Manager and tv,;o Assistant Managers of the appellant company.
All the three offi,·ers were wound- ed. Sornr: w• 1rk1nr.n IA'< re suspended, :ind cbargt'·Sheets wen>: served on them, c!'iar~ii,g them with participation in the riot. After an inquiry the VIOrkmen wert" disrnissed. 'rhe inquiry was hr.ld liy the M;1nager and one of the 1\ssistant Managers. During the inquiry, no witness was
~xarnine<l and no stat(' .. ment marle by any witnt ss was tendered in evidence. (IJ (1957] S. C.R. 770. Kam ala nvJi v. Takhatmal S"hba Rao }. I .bruarY 22, M1en1l1.r Te.1. Est•t1
v. Its WBrkmen llidayatul/ah J. The dispute was first referred to the Labour Court and then to the Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal. The Tribunal set aside the inquiry held by the appellant company and asked the company to prove the allegations against each workman
d' nova before it. The company examined five witnesses. The Tribunal held that orders for dismissal of 15 workmen were justified but it ordered the remaining workmen to be reinstated. The company came to this Court hy special leave.
n,zd, that the view of the Tribunal was correct that the inquiry made by the company was not in accordance with the principles of n•tural justice. The inquiry consisted of putting questions to each workman in turn.
~o witness \Vas examined in support of the charge before the workman was questioned. It is an elementary principle that a person who is required to answer a charge must not only know the accusation Lut also the testifuony by which the accusation ·is supported. He must be given a clear chance to hear the evidence in support of the charge and to put such relevant questions by way of c10'5·exa- mination as he desires.
He must also be given a chan'::e to rebut the evidence led against him. As regards two workmen, this Court held that the Tribu- n:il was justified in not acceptiug the findings which p1 oceeded almost on no evidence.
As regards one workman, this Court held that as the Tribunal had the opportunity of hearing and seeing the two Assistant Managers, this Court would be slow to reach a conclusion different from that of the Tribunal. More- over, in such cases, it is not the practice of this Court to enter into evidence with a view to finding facts for itself.
CrvrL APPELLATl<>]URISDIOTION: Civil Appeal No. 359 of 1962. Appeal by special leave from the Award dated April 3, 1961 of the t:leventh Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, in Case No. VIII-303 of 1 !Jt>O.
B. Sen, S. G. JYJazumdar, D. N. Mulcheijee for B. N. Ghosh, for the appellant . . .Janardhrin 8hnrmn, for the respondents. Hl63. February 22. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
HrnA YATULLAH J.–·By this appeal filed with the special leave of this Court, by the Meenglas Te<1 2 S.C.R. Estate against its Workmen, the Company seeks to challenge an award dated April 3, 1961, pronounced
by the Seventh Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal. The order of reference was made by the Government of West Bengal as far back as October 29, 1957, in respect of the di~missal of 44 workmen. The issue
which was referred was as follows :- "Whether the dismissal of the workmen men- tioned in the attached list is justified ? What relief by way of reinstatement and/or compen- sation are they entitled to?"
From November 5, 1957, to August 17, 1960, this referJnce remained pending before the First Labour Court. It was then transferred to the Seventh Industrial Tribunal and the letter made the
impugned award on April 3, 1961. By the time the award was made two of the workmen (Nos. 12 and 37) had died and four had been re-emplo) ed (Nos. 31, 33, 34 and ,35). One of the workmen
(No. 22) was not found to be a workman at all. The Tribunal held that the orders of dis- missal of fourteen workmen were justified though retrospective effect could not be given to the orders.
The Company was ordered to re-instate the .remain- ing workmen and to pay them compensation in some cases (but not all) amounting to three months' wages. In the present appeal the Company seeks to challenge
the award regarding 13 of those workmen who have been ordered to be reinstated. Of these workmen the cases of three fall to be considered separately and those of the remaining ten can be considered
together. We shall now give the facts from which the reference arose. The appellant Meenglas Tea Estate in Jalpai- guri District of West Bengal is owned by Duncan Brothers Ltd. The workers belong to the Zilla
Chabagan Workers' Union, Malbazar, D~trict Meenglas Tei Fslat1 v. Its Workmen Hidayatul/ah J, /963 M1tntlos Tta E1l''lt v. Its WerA:mtn .Jalpaiguri. On January 18, l!J;i6, there was an
ugly incident in which a group of workmen assaulted the Manager, Mr . .\1arshall and his two Assistant Managers Mr. Nichols and .\fr. Dhawan. This happeued one morning in a section of the tea gardens
where about two hundred workmen had surrounded .\Ir. Nichols and were making a violent demonstra- tion. First .\Ir. Dhawan and soon after .\1r. Marshall arrived on the scene and the workmen surrounded
them also. In the assault that followed these three officers were wounded-Mr. Marshall seriously. criminal case was started ag::inst some of the rioters hut we are not concerned with
it. The Company also started proceedings against some workmen. It first issued a notice of suspension which was to take effect from February (i, I !J56, and then served charge-sheets on a large number of workmen charg-
ing them with participation in the riot. The Work- men replied denying their complicity. The Company then held enquiries and 01<lered the dismissal of a number of workmen with effect from January IS,
J fl56. A sample order of di~missal is exhibited as · anncxurc F in the case. In the enquiry before the Tribunal the Union admitted the incident though it said that it was caused by provocation on the
part of the Management. The Cnion, however, denied that any of the workmen who were charged was concerned in the affray pointing out that none of these workmen was prosecuted by the police.
The enquiry was held by .\fr. .\farshall and !\fr. Nichols and the record of the proceedings is marked Exhibits l i and series. That record was produced before us by the appcllan• for our perusal.
It was admitted before us that there was no further record of evidence for the Company as none was recorded. Exhibit 11 and 18 serie~ are the answers of the workmen to the charges against them and
such replies as they gave to questions put !fl thr.m in cross-examination. 2 S.C.R. The Tribunal held that the enquiry was vitiated because it was not held in accordance with the principles of natural justice. It is contended
that this conclusion was erroneous. But we have no doubt about its correctness. The enquiry consisted of putting questions to each workman in turn. No witness was examined in support
of the charge before the workman was que~tioned. 'It is an ele- mentary principle that a person who is required to answer a charge must know not only the accusation but also the testimony by which the accusation is
supported. He must be given a fair chance to hear the evidence in surport of the charge and to put such relevant questions by way of cross-examination as he desires. Then he must be given a chance to rebut
the evidence led against him. This is the barest requirement of an enquiry of this character and this requirement must be substantially fulfilled before the result of the enquiry can be accepted.
A departure from this requirement in effect throws the burden upon the person charged to repel the charge without first making it out against him. In the present case neither was any witness examined nor was any state-
ment made by any witness tendered in evidence. The enquiry, such as it was, was made by Mr. Mar- shall or Mr. Nichols who were not only in the position of judges but also of prosecutors and wit-
nesses. There was no opportunity to the persons charged to cross-examine them and indeed they drew upon their own knowledge of the incident and instead cross-examined the persons charged.
This was such a travesty of the principles of natural justice that the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the findings and asking the Company to prove the allega- tion against each workman dr, novo before it.
In the enquiry which the Tribunal held the Company examined five witnesses including Mr. Marshall, Mr. Nichols and Mr. Dhawan, who were the eye-witnesses. In view of the fact that the
l11e1nglas Tea E#alt v. Its Workme:ri Hiday1tullah J. Afttnt Jss 71• F:slaJt v. Its •VorAmta Hiiayatu/lah J. . … ~ enquiry was being made into an incident which took place four and a half years ago the Tribun<1l in
assessing the evidence held that it wou Id not accept that any workman was incriminated unless at least two witnesses deposed against him. Some of the workmen got the benefit of this approach and it is
now contended that the Tribunal was in error in insisting upon corroboration before accepting the evidence of a single witness. Reference in this connection is made to s. 13.( of the Indian Evidence
Act (I of 1872) which lays down that no particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact. It is not a question of an rrror in applying the Evidence Act. It is rather a
question of proceeding with caution in a case where admittedly many persons were involved and the inci- dent itself took place a very long time ago. The Tribunal acted with ca11tion and did not act upon
uncorroborated testimony. It is possible, that the evi- dence against somr of the persons to whom the bene- fit has gone, might be cogent enough for accrptance, but the question is not one of believing a single
witness in respect of any particular workman but of treating all workmen alike and following a method which was likely to eliminate reasonably chances of faulty observation or incorrect recollec.tion.
On the whole, it cannot be said that the Tribunal adopted an approach which made it impossible for the com- pany to prove its case. It followed a standard which in the circumstances was prudent.
We do not think that for this reason an interference is called for. Since no other point was argued the appeal of the Company in respect of the t~n workmen, who were alleged to be concerned in the occurrence of January
18, Hl'if>, must be dismissed. This brings us to the consideraticn of the three special cases. They concern Dasarath Barick (:-lo. 25), Lea Bichu (No. 2fl) and Nester Munda (J\o. ~i).
Dasarath Barick was said to h;tve lhreatencd the —–}-.. 2. S.C.R. loyal workers and to have prevented them from work on March 15, 1956. Lea Bichu was said to have forced tae chowkidar to hand over the keys of the
gate to him on the same day and to have locked the gate with a view to hampering the movement of workmen. The Tribunal held that the enquiry in both the cases was not a proper enquiry and the con·
clusion was not acceptable. Here, fl.gain no witness was examined in the enquiry to prove the two occurrences and even before the Tribunal there was no evidence against them except the uncorroborated
testimony of Mr. Marshall. No worker was examined to prove that he was threatened by Dasarath Barick or to show that it was Lea Bichu who had taken the keys from the chowkidar and
locked the gate. In view of these circumstances the Tribunal was justified in not accepting the findings which proceeded almost on no evidence. We agree with the Tribunal that no case was made out
before the Tribunal for the dismissal of Dasarath Barick and Lea Bichu. The last case is of Nester Munda who is the Secretary of the Union. It was alleged against him that on January 16, 1956, he had abused Mr. ·
Nichols and had demonstrated at the head of a hostile group of work>nen. Here, again, no proper enquiry was held and the conclusion reached at the enquiry by the Company was not acceptable.
The Tribunal, therefore, enquired into the case for itself. Mr. Nichols and Mr. Dhawan gave evidence which the Tribunal was not prepared to accept. It pointed out that their testimony conflicted on vital
points. Since the Tribunal had the opportunity of hearing and seeing Mr. Nichols and Mr. Dhawan we should be slow to reach a conclusion different from that of the Tribunal. In addition, in such cases,
it is not the practice of this Court to enter into evidence with a view to finding facts for itself. Following this well settled practice we see no reason Meenglas Tea E;tate v. Its fVorkmen
Hidayatullah- J .: M<1.ngtas Tta FJlt.tt v. lls H'orkmm Hi44yoM/ah J. /963 M•rrn 4 to interfere with the conculsion of the Trihunal. The result is that the appeal fails and is dis·
missed with costs. A ppP.<Jl dismiMrd. LAKKIREDDI CHIN:'>:A VEl\KATA REDDI v. LAKKIREDDI LAKSHMAl\fA (P. B. GA.JENDRAGADKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAR and j. C. SHAH jj.) Hindu Law~loinr family prop<rly-i'artirion-lligld of
niinor-,)l't'f',ranct of joint property-Su.it for ]Xlrlitinn by 111inor if can be con.Jini£ed a/kr hi8 dfath-Sej><r-TfJte or self·ar"luirc<l pro- perty, when impru.ed wilh rhe charact.r of joinl family prop<,.ty. Butchi Tirupati was a member of a Hindu co-parcenary
consisting of himself, his five l>rothcrs and his son P11Ila Reddy. After llutchi Tripati's death in 1947, Pulla Reddy, his sou and Lakshmaina, his wido,v, filed a st1it for partition and separate possession of their share in the properly of the joint family an<l a fourth share in certain property
devised under a \VilJ executed by \'en<'1ta Konda Reddy in July, 1910. l'ulla Reddy was then a minor and his in.other acted as his nex" friend. Pulla Reddy died during the pendency of the suit and his mother \Va~ shown ln the record as his legal representative for the suit.
The suit v:as contested on the gro11nd that it was highly µrejudicial to the interest of P11lla Redciy to hAV(' his share separatt!d from the joint f;unily '"-,tale. It WA-'i also denied that Pulla Reddy aoJd ht• mother had been driven away from the family house.
The trial court holrl th;ll part1t1on of the joint family property was for the benefit of the minor P11lla Reddy and tho High Court affirmed that view. Two questions raised before the Supreme Court were whether the suit for partition of jollii