Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
14. Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of Patna High Court (corresponding to clause 15 of Letters Patent of Calcutta High Court) was considered by this Court in Central Mine Planning and Design Institute Ltd v. Union of India, [200 I] 2 SCC 588. In that case, the award of an Industrial Tribunal directing reinstatement and payment of partial backwages was challenged in a writ petition before the High Court of Patna. The workman claimed interim relief under section 17-B of the Industrial Dispt•tes Act, 1947. The learned Single Judge directed the employer to pay full wages to the workman during the pendency of the writ petition. That was challenged in a Letters Patent Appeal. The Division Bench held that the Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable as the order directing payment under section 17-B of the I.D. Act was not a 'judgment'. Reversing the said decision, this Court held that an interlocutory order passed in a writ proceeding directing payment under section I 7B of Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7 was a final determination affecting the vital and valuable rights and obligations of parties and, therefore, would fall under the category of 'intermediary or interlocutory judgment' against which a Letters Patent Appeal would lie. The following observations are relevant : "It is now well settled that the definition of "judgment" in section 2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure has no application to Letters Patent ……………………… , it follows that to determine the question whether an interlocutory order passed by one Judge of a High Court falls within the meaning of 'judgment' for purposes of Letters …. MIDNAPORE PEOPLE' CO-OP. BANK LTD. v. C. NANDA [RA VEENDRAN, J.] I 003 Patent the test is : Whether the order is a final determination affecting vital and valuable rights and obligations of the parties concerned, This has to be ascertained on the facts of each case."
15. The above principle was reiterated in Mithailal Dalsangar Singh v. Annabai Devram Kini, [2003] 10 SCC 691 andSubal Paulv. Malina Paul, [2003] 10 SCC 361. In the latter case, this Court held : "While determining the question as regards clause 15 of the Letters . Patent, the court is required to see as to whether the order sought to be appealed against is a judgment within the meaning thereof or not. Once it is held that irrespective of the nature of the order, meaning thereby whether interlocutory or final, a judgment has been rendered, clause 15 of the Letters Patent would be attracted . … Clause 15 of the Letters Patent confers a right of appeal on a litigant against any judgment passed under any Act unless the same is expressly excluded. Clause 15 may be subject to an Act but when it is not so subject to the special provision the power and jurisdiction of the High Court under clause 15 to entertain any appeal from a judgment would be effective." c
16. Interim orders/interlocutory orders passed during the pendency of E a case, fall under one or the other of the following categories : (i) Orders which finally decide a question or issue in controversy in the main case. (ii) Orders which finally decide an issue which materially and directly affects the final decision in the main case. (iii) Orders which fi~ally decide a collateral issue or question which is not the subject matter of the main case. (iv) Routine orders which are passed to facilitate the progress of the case till its culmination in the final judgment. (v) Orders which may cause some inconvenience or some prejudice to a party, but which do not finally determine the rights and c obligations of the parties. The tenn 'judgment' occurring in clause 15 of the Letters Patent will take into its fold not only the judgments as defined in section 2(9) CPC and orders enumerated in Order 43 Rule I of CPC, but also other orders which, though may not finally and conclusively detennine the rights of parties with regard to all or any matters in controversy, may have finality in regard to some collateral matter, which will affect the vital and valuable rights and obligations of the parties. Interlocutory orders which fall under categories (i) to (iii) above, are, therefore, 'judgments' for the purpose of filing appeals under the Letters Patent. On the other hand, orders falling under categories. (iv) and ( v) are not 'judgments' for purpose of filing appeals provided under the Letters Patent.
17. The next question is whether the appeal was not maintainable because, it was filed by the Chainnan and the Secretary-in-Charge of the Bank eo nomine, and not by the "Bank" itself. The order dated 20.11.1998 against which the appeal was filed, was passed by the learned single Judge in the course of contempt proceedings. The Chainnan and the Secretary-in- Charge were parties to such proceedings having been impleaded eo nomine as respondents I and 4 respectively. The 'Bank' as such was not a party to the contempt proceedings. The lear!Jed single Judge proceeded on the basis that the Chainnan and the Secretary-in-Charge represented the 'Bank' by referring to them as 'Respondent Bank' and directing them to reinstate the complainant (first respondent herein) and to pay all salary arrears to him. If the Chainnan and Secretary-in-Charge were considered as representing the Bank for issuing such directions, certainly they could file an appeal against such directions. The directions were issued to them and they were the persons aggrieved.
18. The Division Bench, therefore, committed a serious and obvious error in holding that the appeal [MAT 4075/1998) was not maintainable G under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Though the order of the learned Single Judge dated 20.11.1998, by which several directions to the Bank with reference to first Respondent were issued, is not a final 'judgment', it is an 'interlocutory judgment' which finally decides several rights and obligations of the employee vis-a-vis the employer and therefore, appealable under H clause 15 of the Letters Patent. MIDNAPORE PEOPLE' CO-OP. BANK LTD. v. C. NANDA [RA VEENDRAN, J.] l 005 Re : Point No. (iii) :
19. As noticed above, by order dated 9.4.1997 in C.O. No.200008(W)/ 1995, the first inquiry proceedings were set aside and the Chairman of the Bank was directed to appoint an outsider, preferably an officer from the Co- operative Department, as the Enquiry Officer, with a further direction that such Enquiry Officer should conduct the enquiry de novo, and submit the report within four months (from the date of first sitting), and a direction to the first respondent to fully co-operate in the enquiry. The time stipulated for appointment of the Enquiry Officer was extended by two weeks on 19.12.1997. The new Enquiry Officer was appointed by the Registrar of Co- operative Societies, on 5.1.1998. The inquiry was not completed within four months and that led to the initiation of the contempt proceedings by the employee (first respondent). The Chairman of the Bank, the Enquiry Officer; the previous Enquiry Officer (H. K. Maiti, whose appointment was revoked on 3.10.1997) and the Secretary-in-Charge of the Bank were shown as contemnors/respondents I to 4. As H.K. Maiti was not a party to the writ petition, and as he did not conduct the enquiry, there was no question of his disobeying any order. After perusing the records, the court by order dated 20.11.1998 came to the conclusion that aprimafacie case was made out for issuing a show cause notice only against Sri S.K. Das (Enquiry Officer). This meant that no case was made out for issue of show cause notice to the Chairman and Secretary-in-Charge of the Bank. In fact, it was not the case of the first respondent that after the appointment of S.K. Das as Enquiry Officer, there was any disobedience by the Bank.
20. In the circumstances, the court ought to have proceeded to consider whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order dated 9.4.1997, on the part of S K Das and if so, punish him for contempt. As S.K. Das was ·nowhere in the picture when the order dated 9.4.1997 was passed in the writ petition, and as he was appointed as an independent Enquiry Officer only by an order dated 5.1.1988 and as there was a complaint about the non- cooperation by the first respondent, (delinquent employee), it is doubtful whether there was any case for even issuing a show cause notice to him. Be that as it may. We are not concerned with the issue of show cause notice to S.K. Das in this appeal. What is relevant to be noticed is that the learned Single Judge could not have made an order in the contempt proceedings, that c Sri S.K. Das had, by his conduct, disqualified himself to be the Enquiry Officer and that he shall cease to be the Enquiry Officer and that another Enquiry Officer shall be appointed. c
21. There was also no justification for the further direction by the learned Single Judge in the contempt proceedings, that too by an interlocutory order, that the complainant should immediately and forthwith be reinstated into the service of the Bank, and shall be deemed to be in the service of the Bank all through, that the employee shall not be prevented in any manner from discharging his duties and that he shall be paid all arrears of salary within four weeks, and that the suspension order shall be deemed to have been revoked. These were totally outside the scope of the proceedings for contempt and amounted to adjudication of rights and liabilities not in issue in the contempt proceedings. At all events, on the facts and circumstances, there was no disobedience, breach or neglect on the part of the Bank and its President and Secretary, to provoke the court to issue such directions, even assuming that such directions could be issued in the course of the contempt proceedings. Hence, directions (2) and (3) and the direction relating to revocation of suspension are liable to be set aside. Re : SLP (c) Nos. 13045-4612003
22. These SLPs. arise out of the order dated 3.9.2001 in MAT No. 1102/ 200 I filed by the Bank against the order dated 20.11.1998 in CPAN No. 2237/1997. As we have held that the appeal filed by the Chairman and Secretary on behalf of the Bank [MAT No. 4075/1998] against the said order was maintainable, these SLPs. have become infructuous. Conclusion :
23. During the pendency of this appeal, the Enquiry Officer has completed the enquiry and submitted his report dated 18.7.2002. No action has been taken thereon in view of the pendency of this civil appeal and the interim order dated 25.2.2002 which permitted only the completion of the G enquiry. In view of this decision, there will now be no impediment for the Bank to take further action based on such Inquiry Report.
24. In view of the above, we dispose of these matters as follows : (i) CA No. 1727/2002 is allowed. The order dated 26.2.2001 or the Calcutta High Court in MATNo.4075/1998 is set aside. Directions MIDNAPORE PEOPLE' CO-OP. BANK LTD. v. C. NANDA [RA VEENDRAN, J.] J 007 (2) and (3) as also the direction that "the suspension shall be immediately deemed to have been revoked" contained in the order dated 20.11.1998 of the learned Single Judge passed in CPAN No.2233/1997 (arising from C.O. No. 20008(W) of 1995) are deleted. (ii) SLP (C) Nos. 13045-46/2003 are dismissed as infructuous. (iii) The appellant-Bank is at liberty to take further action in pursuance of the Inquiry Report dated 18. 7 .2002, in accordance with law. (iv) Parties to bear their respective costs. S.K.S. C.A. No. 1727 /02 allowed and SLP(c) Nos. 13045-46/2003 dismissed as infructuous. c