Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
3. The aforesaid shows that the rate of interest was increased from 6 per centum to 9 which would become 15 after expiry of the period mentioned in the proviso to the Amendment Act. The question for deter- mination is whether advantage of the increased in rate of interest would be available to the appellants. To decide this we have to keep in mind the D following dates: (i) Date of Collector's award : 10.6.1968; (ii) Date of taking over of possession: 24.6.1968 (iii) Date of Reference Court's award : 30.8.1972; (iv) Date of the decision of the High Court : 24.6.1974; and (v) Date of this Court's aforesaid judgments : 15.5.1992
4. The answer to the controversy lies mainly in finding out as to whether the appellants' case is covered by Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act which reads as below: "30(2) The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 of the principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of Section 15 G and Section 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also td;-and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982 H [the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People) and before the commence- ment of this Act." (Emphasis supplied).
5. As to what is the reach and extent of the aforesaid section came to be examined by the Constitution Bench in Raghubir Singh 's case. Para B 32 of that judgment is relevant for our purpose, according to which the expression "any such award" in the section referred to awards made by the coµector or Court between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984 (which is the date of commencement of the Amendment Act); or the appeal against such awards decided by the High Court and the Supreme Court, C whether the decisions are rendered before September 24, 1984 or after that date. In the present case the award of the Collector as well as of the Court being before April 30, 1982, on the ratio of Raghubir Singh's case benefit of amended section 28 is not available to the appellants. However, it deserves to be noted thctt Raghubir Singh's case dealt with the question of payment of solatium as enhanced by the Amendment Act. The real point D for consideration, therefore, is whether what was stated by Raghubir Singh's bench regarding solatium would apply to interest as well; and this is the point of difference between the two learned Judges who iteard the appeal earlier. May we state that the view taken by the Raghubir Singh's Bench has been endorsed by the Constitution Bench in KS. Paripooman E v. State of Kerala, JT (1994] 6 SC 182 (see paras 58, 59, 102, 106 and 107).
6. Shri Madhav Reddy, learned Sr. Advocate appearing for the appellants, has submitted that as appellants are not claiming enhanced interest retrospectively but from the · date of coming into force of the ~ending Act (September 24, 1984) what was stated in Raghubir Sing/Vs case has no application, we find no force in this submission inasmuch as enhanced interest as contemplated by section 18 of the Amending Act cannot be claimed even from the date of coming into force of the Amend- ing Act de hors what has been stated in sub-section (2) of Section 30. This is for the reason that the Amending Act has made available the enhanced G rate only to those cases mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 30. The Court has no power to enlarge the scope of this sub-section. That would be either "violence to the statute" as put by Punchhi, J ., or an act of legislation by us, which as a court we cannot undertake.
7. Let it, therefore, be seen whether, despite what was stated in ;—-· r M.F. HUSSAIN v. DY. COLLECTOR (HANSARIA, J.] Raglmbir Singh 's case qua solatium, enhanced interest can be claimed by A the appellants. This aspect is being examined by us because interest is not a part of the award and section 30(2) of the Amendment Act deals with awards. That interesc does not form of award would appear from a com- bined reading of Sections 11, 23 and 26 of the Act Section 11, which enjoins the Collector to make an award, requires him to specify: (i) the true area of the land; (ii) the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land; and (iii) the apportionment of the said compensation. Section 23 deals with the matters to be considered in determining the compensa- tion. Sub-section (1) requires six aspects to be taken note of which are subject matters of six clauses of that sub-section. Sub-section (2) of Section 23 has provided for payment collo-quially known as solatium. Section 26, which is on the subject of form of awards, states that every award shall specify the amount awarded under clause first of sub- section (1) of Section 23, and also the amounts, if any, awarded under each of the other clauses of the same sub-section. Sub- section (2) of this section states that every such award shall be deemed to be a decree.
8. The aforesaid clearly shows that the interest visualised by section 28 of the Act is not a part of the compensation, and so, not a part of award. This has also been the view expressed by a two-Judge bench of this Court, to which one of us (Kuldip Singh, J) was a party, in Shree Vijay Cotton & c Oils Mills Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 1 SCC 262. (See para 15). A E combined reading of aforesaid sections would show that solatium too is not a part of the award inasmuch as sub-section (1) of Section 26 specifically states that the award shaII specify the amount awarded under each of the clauses of sub-section (1) of Section 23, whereas solatium is dealt by sub-section (2) of Section 23.
9. The aforesaid being the position, we have to hold that what was stated in Raghubir Singh's case qua solatium shall apply to interest also. Enhanced interest is not demanded by a harmonious reading of relevant provisions, as opined by Kasliwal, J., because the "intention of the legisla- ture" about which the learned Judge spoke, really shows the contrary, G according to us, as the increase was sought to be confined (for reasons which need no examination) to the awards made between the dates noted above, whereas the present award is anterior to the starting point. We are, therefore, in agreement with the view taken by Punchhi, J. and state that the appellants are not entitled to enhanced rate of interest as contemplated H (1995) 2 S.C.R. A by section 18 of the Amendment Act.
10. It has also been submitted by Shri Madhava Reddy that higher rate of interest may be ordered to do equity between the parties. We are unable to concede, as, had present been a case of non-awarding of any interest, we would have done so, because, interest in such cases may B become payable on equity, for it is meant to make good ~he loss suffered by a person due to delayed payment. This view has been reiterated recently by this Court in Kalimpong Land & Building Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, IT (1994) 6 SC 102, in which payment of interest was ordered, even when acquisition was under Requisitioning and Acquisitioning of Immovable C Property Act, 1952, which statute has made no specific provision, unlike the Act at hand, for payment of interest. But equity has no role when the question relates to rate of interest. Whether the rate of interest should be .6% or 9% is not a matter which would require invocation of Court's equitable jurisdiction. The. same has to be governed by statutory provision. Had the rate of interest been too low, we could have perhaps on equity D granted some relief. But 6% has been the rate for a very long period insofar as the Act is concerned as the enhancement came only in 1984 whereas the Act is of 1894. So, we are not satisfied if equity demands granting of relief in question.
11. This is our answer to the point referred to this bench. The appeal .may now be placed for final disposal before an appropriate bench. B.K.M. Reference answered.