Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
11. Incidentally, be it noted that the decision in Budha's case (supra) was on interpretation of Rajasthan Zamindari and Biswedari Abolition Act, 1959 whereas Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 came up for consideration in Meharbansingh 's case. The later decision of this Court in Budha's case (supra) however has not noticed the judgment of this Court in D Meharban Singh 's case (supra) and by reason of the observation of this Court in paragraph 15 of the judgment in Budha 's case, it can not but be said that the decision in the later judgment was 012 the peculiar facts of the case. It is further to be noted that Meharban Singh 's case came to be decided as early as 1970 and has been followed for last three decades in the State of Madhya Pradesh and innumerable number of matters have been dealt with on E the basis thereof and in the event, a different view is expressed today, so far as this specific legislation is concerned, it would unsettle the situation in the State of Madhya Pradesh and it is on this score also that reliance on the doctrine of 'stare decisis' may be apposite. While it is true that the doctrine has no statutory sanction and the same is based on a Rule of convenience F and expediency and as also on 'Public Policy' but in our view, the doctrine should and ought always to be strictly adhered to by the courts of law to sub-serve the ends of justice.
12. This Court in Muktul v. Mst. Manbhari & Ors., [1959] SCR 1099, explained the scope of the doctrine of stare decisis with reference to Halsbury's G Laws of England and Corpus Juris Secundum in the manner following:- "The principles of 'Stare Decisis' is thus stated in Halsbury's Laws of England : "Apart from any question as to the Courts being of co-ordinate jurisdiction, a decisio9_which has been followed for a long period of MISHRI LAL v. DHIRENDRA NATH [BANERJEE, J.] time, and has been acted upon by persons in the fonnation of contracts A . or in the disposition of their property, or in the general conduct of affairs, or in legal procedure or in other ways, will generally be followed by courts of higher authority than the court establishing the rule, even though the court before whom the matter arises afterwards might not have given the same decision had the question come before it originally. But the. supreme appellate Court will not shrink from B overruling a decision, or series of decisions, which establish a doctrine plainly outside the statute and outside the common law, when no title and no contract will be shaken, no persons can complain, and no general course of dealing be altered by the remedy of a mistake". The same doctrine is thus explained in Corpus Juris Secundum:- "Under the stare decisis rule, a principle of law which has become settled by a series of decisions generally is binding on the courts and should be followed in similar cases. This rule is based on expediency c and public policy, and, although generally it should be strictly adhered D to by the courts, it is not universally applicable."
13. Be it noted however that Corpus Juris Secundum, adds a rider that "previous decisions should not be followed to the extent that griev_ous wrong may result; and, accordingly, the courts ordinarily will not adhere to a rule or principle established by previous decisions which they are convinced is E erroneous. The rule of stare decisis is not so imperative or inflexible as to preclude a departure therefrom in any case, but its application must be detennined in each case by the discretion of the court, and previous decisions should not be followed to the extent that error may be perpetuated and grievous wrong may result."
14. The statement though deserves serious consideration in the event of a definite finding as to the perpetration of a grave wrong but that by itself does not denude the time tested doctrine of stare decisis its efficacy. Taking recourse to the doctrine would be an imperative necessity to avoid uncertainty and confusion. The basic feature of law is its certainty and in the event of G there being uncertainty as regards the state of law – the society would be in utter confusion resultant effect of which would bring about a situation of chaos – a situation which ought always to be avoided.
15. In Raj Narain Pandey & Ors. v. Sant Prasad Tewari & Ors., [1973] 2 SCR 835, H.R. Khanna, J. (as he then was) observed at page 840 of the H [l 999) 2 S.C.R. A Report as follows :- c In the matter of the interpretation of a local statute, the view taken by the High Court over a number of years should normally be adhered to and not distuI'bed. Adifferent view would not only introduce and element of uncertainty and confusion, it would also have the effect of unsettling transactions·wliich might have been entered into on the faith of those decisions. The doctrine of stare decisis can be aptly invoked in such a situation. As 9bserved by Lord Ev~rshed M.R. in the case of Brownsea Haven Properties v. Poole Corpn., there is well established authority for the view that a decision of long standing on the basis of which many persons will in the course of time have arranged their affairs should not lightly be disturbed by a superior court not strictly bound itself by the decision."
16. Recently in Bishamber Dass Kohli v. Satya Bhalla, [1993] 1 SCC 566 J.S. Verma, J. (as he then was) observed in respect of a provision of the D East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 as follows :- "This is how this provision appears to have been understood at least ever since then and the people in the State have arranged their affairs on that basis. Apart from the fact that this view commands to us as the correct view, the desirability of continuing the settled view is also a reason in its favour."
17. More recently in Gangeshwar Limitedv. State ofU.P. & Ors., [1995] 6 SCC 84, this Court observed :- . "We would have appreciated this attractive argument had there not been two decisions of the Allahabad High Court in the way, which are to the contrary. These are – State of U.P. v. Har Bi/as Goel and Jai Ram Singh v. State of U. P. The understanding of section 6 of the Ceiling Act by the High Court reflected in these two decisions, when none has been placed before us to the contrary, would require upholding on the principle of stare decisis, for if we go to reinterpret the provision contrarily, it would upset the settled positi0n in the State insofar as this area of law is concerned."
18. Paripoornan, J. in a similar vein in Kattite Valappil Pathumma & Ors. v. Taluk land Board & Ors., [1997] 4 SCC 114 observed:- "We are further of the view, that even if another view is possible, …. — ……. – MISHR! LAL v. DHIRENDRA NATH [BANERJEE, J.] we are not inclined to take a different view at this distance of time. A Interpretation of the law is not a mere mental exercise. Things which have been adjudged long ago should be allowed to rest in peace. A decision rendered long ago can be overruled only if this Court comes to the conclusion that it is manifestly wrong or unfair and not merely on the ground that another interpretation is possible and the court B may arrive at a different conclusion. We should remember that the law laid down by the High Court in the above decision has not been doubted so far. The Act in ,question is a State enactment. These are weighty considerations. to hold that even if a different view is possible, if it will have the effect of upsetting or reopening past and closed transactions or unsettling titles all over the State, this Court should C be loathe to take a different view. On this ground as well, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment under appeal."
19. In this context reference may also be made to two English decisions: (a) In Admiralty Comrs. v. Va/verda, (Owners) (1938 Appeal Cases 173 at 194) wherein the House of Lords observed that even long-established conveyancing D practice, although not as authoritative as a judicial decision, will cause the House of Lords to hesitate before declaring it wrong and (b) In Button v. Director of Public Prosecution, Swain v. Director of Public Prosecutions, (1966) AC 591 House of Lords observed:- "In Corpus Juris Secundum, a contemporary statement of American E Law the stare decisis rule has been stated to be a principle of law which has become settled by a series of decisions generally is binding on the courts and should be followed in similar cases. It has been stated that this rule is based on exp~diency and public policy and should be strictly adhered to by the courts. Under this rule courts are F bound to follow the common law as it has been judicially declared in previously adjudicated cases and rules of substantive law should be reasonably interpreted and administered. This rule has to preserve the harmony and stability of the law and to make as steadfast as po~sible judicially declared principles affecting the rights of property, it being G indispensable to the due administration of justice, especially by a court of last resort, that a question once deliberately examined and decided should be considered as settled and closed to further argument. It is a salutary rule, entitled to great weight and ordinarily should be strictly adhered to by the courts. The courts are slow to interfere with the principle announced by the decision, and it may be upheld even H [1999] 2 S.~.R. though they would decide otherwise were the question a new on~, or equitable considerations might suggest a different result and although it has been erroneously applied in a particular case. The rule represents an element of continuity in Jaw and is rooted in the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable expectations, but it is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision however recent and questionable when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder and verified by experience.
20. The law as settled by this court in Meharbansingh 's case (supra) C has stood the test of time and if at this juncture a contra opinion is expressed, it will open·up a series of conflicts and consequent litigation and thereby disturbing settled position of Jaw in the State of Madhya Pradesh. This Court's decision on the Rajasthan legislation has been decided in the peculiar facts of the matter in issue therein. There is neither any co-relation nor any identity of subject, between the two enactments and as a matter of fact the D legislations speak differently. As such, we are not able to record our concurrence with the submission of Mr. Jain that the law needs to be· enunciated more fully by reason of a different view as expressed by this Court in Budha 's case. Budha 's case (supra) as noticed above, has been decided on its own merits and has no applicability in the contextual facts. The doctrine E of stare decisis therefore, prompt us to reject the contention of Shri Jain. In that view of the matter and since the High Court has proceeded on the basis of Meharbansingh's case , we do feel it convenient to record that the High Court has decided the issue in its proper perspective and we see no reason to express any different view at this point of time. p
21. The appeal', therefore, fails and is dismissed with no order as to _costs. S.V.K.1. Appeal dismissed.