Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
11. The off ence of dacoity falls within Chapter XVII of the IPC which relates to Off ences Against Property. Section 390 explains what is “robbery”. It explains, when theft is robbery and when extortion is robbery. Section 390 along with illustrations reads thus:- “Section 390. Robbery.—In all robbery there is either theft or extortion. When theft is robbery.—Theft is “robbery” if, in order to the committing of the theft, or in committing the theft, or in carrying away or attempting to carry away property obtained by the theft, the off ender, for that end voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death or of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint. When extortion is robbery.—Extortion is “robbery” if the off ender, at the time of committing the extortion, is in the presence of the person put in fear, and commits the extortion by putting that person in fear of instant death, of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. AND ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.] restraint to that person or to some other person, and, by so putting in fear, induces the person so put in fear then and there to deliver up the thing extorted. Explanation.—The off ender is said to be present if he is suffi ciently near to put the other person in fear of instant death, of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint. Illustrations (a) A holds Z down, and fraudulently takes Z’s money and jewels from Z’s clothes, without Z’s consent. Here A has committed theft, and, in order to the committing of that theft, has voluntarily caused wrongful restraint to Z. A has therefore committed robbery. (b) A meets Z on the high road, shows a pistol, and demands Z’s purse. Z, in consequence, surrenders his purse. Here A has extorted the purse from Z by putting him in fear of instant hurt, and being at the time of committing the extortion in his presence. A has therefore committed robbery. (c) A meets Z and Z’s child on the high road. A takes the child, and threatens to fi ling it down a precipice, unless Z delivers his purse. Z, in consequence, delivers his purse. Here A has extorted the purse from Z, by causing Z to be in fear of instant hurt to the child who is there present. A has therefore committed robbery on Z. (d) A obtains property from Z by saying “Your child is in the hands of my gang, and will be put to death unless you send us ten thousand rupees”. This is extortion, and punishable as such: but it is not robbery, unless Z is put in fear of the instant death of his child.”
12. Section 391 of the IPC defi nes “dacoity”. Section 391 reads thus:- “Section 391. Dacoity. — When fi ve or more persons conjointly commit or attempt to commit a robbery, or where the whole number of persons conjointly committing or attempting to commit a robbery, and persons present and aiding such commission or attempt, amount to fi ve or more, every person so committing, attempting or aiding, is said to commit “dacoity”.”
13. Section 395 provides for punishment for the off ence of dacoity. Section 395 reads thus:- “Section 395. Punishment for dacoity. — Whoever commits dacoity shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fi ne.”
14. Theft amounts to ‘robbery’ if, in order to the committing of the theft, or in committing the theft, or in carrying away or attempting to carry away property obtained by the theft, the off ender for that end, voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death or of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint. Before theft can amount to ‘robbery’, the off ender must have voluntarily caused or attempted to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death or of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint. The second necessary ingredient is that this must be in order to the committing of the theft, or in committing the theft, or in carrying away or attempting to carry away property obtained by the theft. The third necessary ingredient is that the off ender must voluntarily cause or attempt to cause to any person hurt etc., for that end, that is, in order to the committing of the theft or for the purpose of committing theft or for carrying away or attempting to carry away property obtained by the theft. It is not suffi cient that in the transaction of committing theft, hurt, etc., had been caused. If hurt, etc., is caused at the time of the commission of the theft but for an object other than the one referred to in Section 390, IPC, theft would not amount to robbery. It is also not suffi cient that hurt had been caused in the course of the same transaction as commission of the theft.
15. The three ingredients mentioned in Section 390, IPC, must always be satisfi ed before theft can amount to robbery, and this has been explained in Bishambhar Nath v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1941 Oudh 476, in the following words:- “The words “for that end” in sec.390 clearly mean that the hurt caused by the off ender must be with the express object of facilitating MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. AND ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.] the committing of the theft, or must be caused while the off ender is committing the theft or is carrying away or is attempting to carry away the property obtained by theft. It does not mean that the assault or the hurt must be caused in the same transaction or in the same circumstances.”
16. In Karuppa Gounden v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1918 Madras 821, which followed two Calcutta cases of Otaruddi Manjhi v. Kafi luddi Manjhi, (1900-01) 5 C.W.N. 372, and King Emperor v. Mathura Thakur, (1901-02) 6 C.W.N. 72, it has been observed at page 824 as follows:- “Now it is our duty to give eff ect to the words “for that end”. It would have been open to the legislature to have used other words which would not raise the diffi culty that arises here. The Public Prosecutor has been forced to argue that “for that end” must be read as meaning ‘in those circumstances’. In my opinion we cannot do that in construing a section in the Penal Code. Undoubtedly, words ‘in those circumstances’ would widen the application of the section and we are not permitted to do that. The matter has been considered in two judgments of the Calcutta High Court one of which is reported as Otaruddi Manjhi v. Kafi luddi Manjhi (1900-01) 5 C.W.N. 372. Their Lordships put the question in this way: “It seems to us that the whole question turns upon the words “for that end”. Was any hurt or fear of instant hurt, that was caused in the present case, caused for the end of the commission of the theft? We think not. It seems to us that whatever violence was used for the purpose of dispossessing the persons who were already in possession of the premises in question and had no relation to the commission of theft, although theft was committed at the same time.” (Emphasis supplied)
17. Ordinarily, if violence or hurt is caused at the time of theft, it would be reasonable to infer that violence or hurt was caused for facilitating the commission of the theft or for facilitating the carrying away of the property stolen or for facilitating the attempt to do so. But there may be something in the evidence to indicate that hurt or violence was caused not for this purpose but for a diff erent purpose. We are of the view that prosecution has blindfoldedly and without understanding the true purport of the off ence of “dacoity” registered the FIR for the off ence punishable under Section 395 of the IPC and proceeded to even prepare charge sheet for the off ence of dacoity.
18. Even if we believe or accept the entire case put up by the fi rst informant, none of the ingredients to constitute the off ence of dacoity are disclosed. Let us once again recapitulate the case of the fi rst informant. The incident is alleged to have occurred at the house of the appellant No. 2. It is the fi rst informant and his brother who are said to have visited one fi ne day the house of the appellant No. 2. At that point of time, the other co-accused are also shown to be present. There is no good or plausible explanation coming from the fi rst informant as to why he was carrying Rs. 2 Lakh in his pocket. The entire case put up by the fi rst informant appears to be fabricated. Let us assume for the time being that the fi rst informant was in fact carrying Rs. 2 Lakh in his pocket and at the time of alleged incident, the amount was forcibly taken away by the accused persons, whether this taking away of Rs. 2 Lakh from the pocket of the fi rst informant would fall within the ambit of the words “for that end” occurring in Section 390 of the IPC. The answer is an emphatic “No”. Even according to the fi rst informant, the dispute was one relating to the agricultural land. The fi rst informant says that he is the lawful owner of the land in question, whereas, according to him, the accused persons are wrongly claiming to be the lawful owners of the land. With a view to settle this dispute, the fi rst informant and his brother are said to have visited the house of the appellant No. 2 on their own free will and volition. It is only after reaching the house of the appellant No. 2 that the entire incident is alleged to have occurred. We should be mindful of the fact that we are dealing with provisions of a criminal statute, like the IPC. The provisions of any criminal statute are to be construed and interpreted strictly.
19. The general rule governing the interpretation of penal statute is that it must be strictly construed. Strict interpretation in the words of Crawford connotes:- “If a statute is to be strictly construed, nothing should be included within its scope that does not come clearly within the meaning of the language used. Its language must be given exact and technical meaning with no MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. AND ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.] extension on account of implications or equitable considerations; or has been aptly asserted, its operation must be confi ned to cases coming clearly within the letter of the statute as well as within its spirit and reason. Or stated perhaps more concisely, it is close and conservative adherence to the literal or textual interpretation.”
20. According to Sutherland, by the rule of strict construction it is not meant that the statute shall be stringently or narrowly construed but it means that everything shall be excluded from its operation which does not clearly come within the scope of the language used.
21. When it is said that all penal statutes are to be construed strictly, it only means that the Court must see that the thing charged is an off ence within the plain meaning of the words used and must not strain the words.
22. In the circumstances referred to above, we have reached the conclusion that Section 395 of the IPC is not applicable to the case on hand. SECTIONS 503, 504 AND 506 OF THE IPC
23. Chapter XXII of the IPC relates to Criminal Intimidation, Insult and Annoyance. Section 503 reads thus:- “Section 503. Criminal intimidation. — Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation.—A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section. Illustration A, for the purpose of inducing B to resist from prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B’s house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation.” Section 504 reads thus:- “Section 504. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace.— Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other off ence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fi ne, or with both.” Section 506 reads thus:- “Section 506. Punishment for criminal intimidation. — Whoever commits, the off ence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fi ne, or with both; If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.— And if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fi re, or to cause an off ence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fi ne, or with both.”
24. An off ence under Section 503 has following essentials:- 1) Threatening a person with any injury; (i) to his person, reputation or property; or (ii) to the person, or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested. 2) The threat must be with intent; (i) to cause alarm to that person; or (ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat; or (iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat. MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. AND ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
25. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other off ence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other off ence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to commit an off ence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the Section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any off ence having exercised self control or having been subjected to abject terror by the off ender. In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504, IPC, the court has to fi nd out what, in the ordinary circumstances, would be the eff ect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant.
26. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504, IPC if it does not have the necessary element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an off ence and the other element of the accused intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case and there cannot be a general proposition that no one commits an off ence under Section 504, IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant. In King Emperor v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai, (1902) 4 Bom LR 78, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court pointed out that:- “To constitute an off ence under Section 504, I.P.C. it is suffi cient if the insult is of a kind calculated to cause the other party to lose his temper and say or do something violent. Public peace can be broken by angry words as well as deeds.” (Emphasis supplied)
27. A bare perusal of Section 506 of the IPC makes it clear that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation. Before an off ence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be established that the accused had an intention to cause alarm to the complainant.
28. In the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly, considering the nature of the allegations levelled in the FIR, a prima facie case to constitute the off ence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC may probably could be said to have been disclosed but not under Section 504 of the IPC. The allegations with respect to the off ence punishable under Section 504 of the IPC can also be looked at from a diff erent perspective. In the FIR, all that the fi rst informant has stated is that abusive language was used by the accused persons. What exactly was uttered in the form of abuses is not stated in the FIR. One of the essential elements, as discussed above, constituting an off ence under Section 504 of the IPC is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult. Where that act is the use of the abusive words, it is necessary to know what those words were in order to decide whether the use of those words amounted to intentional insult. In the absence of these words, it is not possible to decide whether the ingredient of intentional insult is present.
29. However, as observed earlier, the entire case put up by the fi rst informant on the face of it appears to be concocted and fabricated. At this stage, we may refer to the parameters laid down by this Court for quashing of an FIR in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). The parameters are:- “(1) Where the allegations made in the fi rst information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any off ence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the fi rst information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. AND ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.] off ence, justifying an investigation by police offi cers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any off ence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable off ence but constitute only a non-cognizable off ence, no investigation is permitted by a police offi cer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is suffi cient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specifi c provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing effi cacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fi de and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” In our opinion, the present case falls within the parameters Nos. 1, 5 and 7 resply referred to above.
30. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged off ence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged off ence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.
31. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522, a two-Judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fi ne distinction between consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held:- “5. …Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. AND ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.] powers court would be justifi ed to quash any proceeding if it fi nds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no off ence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 : 1960 Cri LJ 1239, this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (AIR p. 869, para 6) (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the fi rst information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the off ence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short- circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death…..” (Emphasis supplied) DELAY IN LODGING THE FIR 32. The alleged incident is said to have occurred sometime in the year 2021. There is no reference to any date or time of the incident in the FIR. The allegations are too vague and general. Had it been the case of prompt registration of the FIR, probably the police might have been able to recover Rs. 2 Lakh from the possession of the accused persons alleged to have been forcibly taken away from the pocket of the fi rst informant. The FIR also talks about a document on which the fi rst informant and his brother were forced to put their signatures. We wonder, whether the investigating agency was in a position to collect or recover any such document from the accused persons containing their signatures in the course of the investigation, more particularly when the State says that the investigation is over and the charge sheet is also ready. In the absence of all this material, how is the State going to prove its case against the accused persons. The FIR in a criminal case is an extremely vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of corroborating the oral evidence adduced at the trial. The object of insisting upon lodging of the FIR to the police in respect of commission of an off ence is to obtain early information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, the names of the actual culprits and the part played by them as well as names of the eye witnesses present at the scene of occurrence. 33. In the aforesaid context, we may clarify that delay in the registration of the FIR, by itself, cannot be a ground for quashing of the FIR. However, delay with other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case rendering the entire case put up by the prosecution inherently improbable, may at times become a good ground to quash the FIR and consequential proceedings. If the FIR, like the one in the case on hand, is lodged after a period of more than one year without disclosing the date and time of the alleged incident and further without any plausible and convincing explanation for such delay, then how is the accused expected to defend himself in the trial. It is altogether diff erent to say that in a given case, in MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. AND ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.] the course of investigation the investigating agency may be able to ascertain the date and time of the incident, etc. The recovery of few incriminating articles may also at times lend credence to the allegations levelled in the FIR. However, in the absence of all such materials merely on the basis of vague and general allegations levelled in the FIR, the accused cannot be put to trial. 34. The learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State vehemently submitted that considering the gross criminal antecedents of the appellants before us, the criminal proceedings may not be quashed. The learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State in her written submissions has furnished details in regard to the antecedents of the appellants. A bare look at the chart may give an impression that the appellants are history sheeters and hardened criminals. However, when it comes to quashing of the FIR or criminal proceedings, the criminal antecedents of the accused cannot be the sole consideration to decline to quash the criminal proceedings. An accused has a legitimate right to say before the Court that howsoever bad his antecedents may be, still if the FIR fails to disclose commission of any off ence or his case falls within one of the parameters as laid down by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra), then the Court should not decline to quash the criminal case only on the ground that the accused is a history sheeter. Initiation of prosecution has adverse and harsh consequences for the persons named as accused. In Directorate of Revenue and another v. Mohammed Nisar Holia, (2008) 2 SCC 370, this Court explicitly recognises the right to not to be disturbed without suffi cient grounds as one of the underlying mandates of Article 21 of the Constitution. Thus, the requirement and need to balance the law enforcement power and protection of citizens from injustice and harassment must be maintained. It goes without saying that the State owes a duty to ensure that no crime goes unpunished but at the same time it also owes a duty to ensure that none of its subjects are unnecessarily harassed. 35. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the continuation of the criminal case arising from the FIR No. 224 of 2022 registered at Mirzapur Police Station, Saharanpur will be nothing but abuse of the process of the law. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we are inclined to accept the case put up on behalf of the appellants herein. 36. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is hereby set aside. The criminal proceedings arising from FIR No. 224 of 2022 dated 19.09.2022 registered at Police Station Mirzapur, Saharanpur, State of U.P. are hereby quashed. 37. It is needless to clarify that the observations made in this judgment are relevant only for the purpose of the FIR in question and the consequential criminal proceedings. None of the observations shall have any bearing on any of the pending criminal prosecutions or any other proceedings. Headnotes prepared by: Appeal allowed. Nidhi Jain MOHAMMAD WAJID AND ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. AND ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]