Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
30. As we have already noted in reaching this conclusion, light can be drawn from legal maxims. Legal maxims are referred to in Bharat Kale, Japani Sahoo and Vanka Radhamanohari (Smt.). The object of the criminal law is to D punish perpetrators of crime. This is in tune with the well known legal maxim 'nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi', which means that a crime never dies. At the same time, it is also the policy of law to assist the vigilant and not the sleepy. This is expressed in the Latin maxim 'vigilantibus et non E dormientibus, jura subveniunt'. Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. which provides limitation period for certain types of offences for which lesser sentence is provided draws support from this maxim. But, even certain offences such as Section 384 or 465 of the IPC, which have lesser punishment may have serious F social consequences. Provision is, therefore, made for condonation of delay. Treating date of filing of complaint or date of initiation of proceedings as the relevant date for computing limitation under Section 468 of the Code is supported by the legal maxim 'actus curiae neminem gravabit'which means that G the act of court shall prejudice no man. It bears repetition to state that the court's inaction in taking cognizance i.e. court's inaction in applying mind to the suspected offence should not be allowed to cause prejudice to a diligent complainant. Chapter XXXVI thus presents the interplay of these three legal H maxims. Provisions of this Chapter, however, are not SARAH MATHEXV v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 727 DIR. – DR. K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.] interpreted solely on the basis of these maxims. They only serve as guiding principles.
31. It is submitted that the settled principles of statutory construction require that the expression 'cognizance' occurring in Chapter XXXVI should be given its legal sense. It is further submitted that if an expression acquires a special connotation in law, dictionary or general meaning ceases to be helpful in interpreting such a word. Reliance is also placed on the heading of Chapter XXXVI providing for "Limitation for taking cognizance of certain offences". Reliance is placed on c observations of the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Sa1Wan Singh, where in the context of limitation on prosecution it is observed that it is of utmost importance that any prosecution, whether by the State or by the private complainant, must abide by the letter of law. Relying on Raghunath Rai Bareja, it is urged that the first principle of interpretation of the statute in every system is the literal rule of interpretation. Purposive interpretation can only be resorted to when the plain words of statute are ambiguous. It is submitted that there is no ambiguity here and, therefore, literal interpretation must be resorted to.
32. There can be no dispute about the rules of interpretation cited by the counsel. It is true that there is no ambiguity in the relevant provisions. But, it must be borne in mind that the word 'cognizance' has not been defined in the Cr.P.C. This Court had to therefore interpret this word. We have adverted to that interpretation. In fact, we have proceeded to answer this reference on the basis of that interpretation and keeping in mind that special connotation acquired by the word 'cognizance'. Once that interpretation is accepted, Chapter XXXVI along with the heading has to be understood in that light. The rule of purposive construction can be applied in such a situation. A purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative purpose by following the literal meaning of the enactment where that meaning is in accordance A with the legislative purpose or by applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the legislative purpose (See: Francis Bennion on Statutory Interpretation). After noticing this definition given by Francis Bennion in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Laxmi Narain B Dhut:'0, this Court noted that more often than not, literal interpretation of a statute or a provision of a statute results in absurdity. Therefore, while interpreting statutory provisions, the courts should keep in mind the objectives or purpose for which statute has been enacted. In light of this observation, we are C of the opinion that if in the instant case literal interpretation appears to be in any way in conflict with the legislative intent or is leading to absurdity, purposive interpretation will have to be adopted.
33. In New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia and another etc. 41 while dealing with eviction proceedings initiated under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 this Court was concerned with interpretation of Sections 4 and 5 thereof. This Court was E of the view that literal meaning thereof would place undue burden on the noticee and would lead to conclusion that the landlord i.e. the State would not be required to adduce any evidence at all. This Court observed that such a construction would lead to an anomalous situation. In the context of fairness F in State action this Court observed that with a view to reading the provisions of the said Act, in a proper and effective manner, literal interpretation which may give rise to an anomaly or absurdity will have to be avoided. This Court further observed that so as to enable a superior court to interpret a statute in a G reasonable manner, the court must place itself in the chair of a reasonable legislator. So done, the rules of purposive construction will have to be resorted to which would require the 40. c2001) 3 sec 100. H 41. c2ooa) 3 sec 279. SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 729 DIR. – DR. K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.] construction of the statute in such a manner so as to see that it's object is fulfilled.
34. In this connection, we may also usefully refer to the following paragraph from Justice G.P. Singh's 'Principles of Statutory Interpretation' [13th edition – 2012]. "With the widening of the idea of context and importance being given to the rule that the statute has to be read as a whole in its context it is nowadays misleading to draw a rigid distinction between literal and purposive approaches. The difference between purposive and literal C constructions is in truth one of degree only. The real distinction lies in the balance to be struck in the particular case between literal meaning of the words on the one hand and the context and purpose of the measure in which they appear on the other. When there is a potential clash, the conventional English approach has been to give decisive weight to the literal meaning but this tradition is now weakening in favour of the purposive approach for the pendulum has swung towards purposive methods of constructions."
35. We must also bear in mind that we are construing rules of limitation. Our approach should, therefore, be in consonance with this Court's observation in Mela Ram that "it is well established that rules of /imitation pertain to domain of F adjectival law and that they operate only to bar the remedy but not to extinguish the right".
36. It is argued that legislative Casus Omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretation. It is submitted that to read Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. to mean that the period of limitation as period within which a complaint/charge-sheet is to be filed, would amount to adding words to Sections 467 and 468. It is further submitted that if the legislature has left a lacuna, it is not open to the Court to fill it on some presumed intention of the legislature. Reliance is placed on Shiv Shakti Co-operative A Housing Society, Bharat Aluminum, and several other judgments of this Court where doctrine of Casus Omissus is discussed. In our opinion, there is no scope for application of doctrine of Casus Omissus to this case. It is not possible to hold that the legislature has omitted to incorporate something B which this Court is trying to supply. The primary purpose of construction of the statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature and then give effect to that intention. After ascertaining the legislative intention as reflected in the 42nd Report of the Law Commission and the Report of the JPC, this C Court is only harmoniously construing the provisions of Chapter XX.XVI along with other relevant provisions of the Cr.P.C. to give effect to the legislative intent and to ensure that its interpretation does not lead to any absurdity. It is not possible to say that the legislature has kept a lacuna which we are trying o to fill up by judicial interpretative process so as to encroach upon the domain of the legislature. The authorities cited on doctrine of Casus Omissus are, therefore, not relevant for the present case.
37. We also concur with the observations in Japani Sahoo, where this Court has examined this issue in the context of Article 14 of the Constitution and opted for reasonable construction rather than literal construction. The relevant paragraph reads thus: "The matter can be looked at from different angle also. Once it is accepted (and there is no dispute about it) that it is not within the domain of the complainant or prosecuting agency to take cognizance of an offence or to issue process and the only thing the former can do is to file a complaint or initiate proceedings in accordance with law, if that action of initiation of proceedings has been taken within the period of /imitation, the complainant is not responsible for any delay on the part of the court or Magistrate in issuing process or taking cognizance of an offence. Now, if he is sought to be penalised because SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 731 DIR. – DR. K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.] of the omission, default or inaction on the part of the court A or Magistrate, the provision of law may have to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. It can possibly be urged that such a provision is totally arbitrary, irrational and unreasonable. It is settled law that a court of law would interpret a provision which would help sustaining the validity of law by applying the doctrine of reasonable construction rather than making it vulnerable and unconstitutional by adopting rule of litera /egis. Connecting the provision of limitation in Section 468 of the Code with issuing of process or taking of cognizance c by the court may make it unsustainable and ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution."
38. So far 'heading' of the chapter is concerned, it is well settled that 'heading' or 'title' prefixed to sections or group of sections hav~ a limited role to play in the construction of D statutes. They may be taken as very broad and general indicators or the nature of the subject matter dealt with thereunder but they do not control the meaning of the sections if the meaning is otherwise ascertainable by reading the section in proper perspective along with other provisions. In Mis. Frick India Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors.42, this Court has observed as under: "It is well settled that the headings prefixed to sections or entries cannot control the plain words of the provisions; they cannot also be referred to for the purpose of construing the provision when the words used in the provision are clear and unambiguous; nor can they be used for cutting down the plain meaning of the words in the provision. Only, in the case of ambiguity or doubt the heading or sub-heading may be referred to as an aid in construing the provision but even in such a case it could not be used for cutting down the wide application of the clear words used in the provision." 42. (1990) 1 sec 400. Therefore, the submission that heading of Chapter XXXVI is an indicator that the date of taking cognizance is material must be rejected. 39. It is true that the penal statutes must be strictly construed. There are, however, cases where this Court has having regard to the nature of the crimes involved, refused to adopt any narrow and pedantic, literal and lexical construction of penal statutes. [See Muralidhar Meghraj Loya & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.43 and Kisan Trimbak Kothu/a & Ors. v. C State of Maharashtra44]. In this case, looking to the legislative intent, we have harmoniously construed the provisions of Chapter XXXVI so as to strike a balance between the right of the complainant and the right of the accused. Besides, we must bear in mind that Chapter XXXVI is part of the Cr.P.C., which is a procedural law and it is well settled that procedural laws must be liberally construed to serve as handmaid of justice and not as its mistress. [See Sardar Amarjeet Singh Katra, N. Ba/aji v. Virendra Singh & Ors.45 and Kai/ash]. 40. Having considered the questions which arise in this E reference in light of legislative intent, authoritative pronouncements of this Court and established legal principles, we are of the opinion that Krishna Pillai will have to be restricted to its own facts and it is not the authority for deciding the question as to what is the relevant date for the purpose of F computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C., primarily because in that case, this Court was dealing with Section 9 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 which is a special Act. It specifically stated that no court shall take cognizance of any offence under the said Act after the expiry G of one year from the date on which offence is alleged to have been committed. There is no reference either to Section 468 43. (1976) 3 sec 684. 44. (1977) 1 sec 300. H 45. c2004) a sec 312. SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 733 DIR. – DR. K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.] or Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. in that judgment. It does not refer to Sections 4 and 5 of the Cr.P.C. which carve out exceptions for Special Acts. This Court has not adverted to diverse aspects including the aspect that inaction on the part of the court in taking cognizance within limitation, though the complaint is filed within time may work great injustice on the complainant. Moreover, reliance placed on Antulay '1984' Case, in our opinion, was not apt. In Antulay '1984' Case, this Court was dealing inter a/ia with the contention that a private complaint is not maintainable in the court of Special Judge set-up under Section 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 ('the 1952 Act). It was urged that the object underlying the 1952 Act was to provide for a more speedy trial of offences of corruption by a public servant. It was argued that if it is assumed that a private complaint is maintainable then before taking cognizance, a Special Judge will have to examine the complainant and all the witnesses as per Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. He will have to postpone issue of process against the accused and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer and in cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 by police officers of designated rank for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. It was submitted that this would thwart the object of the 1952 Act which is to provide for a speedy trial. This contention was rejected by this Court holding that it is not a condition precedent to the issue of process that the court of necessity must hold the inquiry as envisaged by Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. or direct investigation as therein contemplated. That is matter of discretion of the court. Thus, the questions which arise in this reference were not involved in Antulay '1984' Case: Since there, this Court was not dealing with the question of bar of limitation reflected in Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. at all, in our opinion, the said judgment could not have been usefully referred to in Krishna Pillai while construing provisions of Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. For all these, we are unable to endorse the view taken in Krishna Pillai. 41. In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. We further hold that B Bharat Kale which is followed in Japani Sahoo lays down the correct law. Krishna Pillai will have to be restricted to its own facts and it is not the authority for deciding the question as to what is the relevant date for the purpose of computing the c period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. 42. The Reference is answered accordingly. The Registry may list the matters before the appropriate courts for disposal. R.P. Reference answered.