Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
17. The legal position is, thus, fairly well ~ettled that imprisonment for life is a sentence for the remainder of the life of the offender unless of course the remaining sentence is commuted or remitted by the competent authority. That being so, the provisions of Section 31 under Cr.P.C. must be so interpreted as to be consistent with the basic tenet that a life sentence requires the prisoner to spend the rest of his life in prison. Any direction that requires the offender to undergo imprisonment for life twice over would be anomalous and irrational for it will disregard the fact that humans like all other living beings have but one life to live. So understood Section 31 (I) would permit consecutive running of sentences only if such sentences do not happen to be life sentences. That is, in our opinion, the only way one can avoid an obvious impossibility of a prisoner serving two consecutive I ife sentences. c c
18. A somewhat similar question fell for consideration before a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Ranjit SinRh vs. U11io11 Terri101y of Chandigarh, ( 1991) 4 SCC 304. The prisoner was in that case convicted for murder and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment. He was released on parole while undergoing the life sentence when he committed a second offence of murder for which also he was convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. In an appeal filed against the second conviction and sentence, this Court by an order dated 30'h September, 1983 directed that the imprisonment for life awarded to him should not run concurrently with his earlier sentence of life imprisonment. The Court directed that in the event of remission or commutation of the earlier sentence awarded to the prisoner, the second imprisonment for life awarded for the second murder committed by him shall commence. Aggrieved by the said direction which made the second life sentence awarded to him consecutive, the prisoner filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution primarily on the ground that this Court's order dated 301h September, 1983 was contrary to Section 427 (2) of the Cr.P.C., according to which any person already undergoing sentence of imprisonment for life if sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence so awarded to him shall run concurrently with such previous sentence.
Relying upon God~e ~·and Maru Rams cases (supra), this Court held that imprisonment for life is a sentence for remainder of the life of the offender. There was, therefore, no question of a subsequent sentence of imprisonment for life running consecutively as per the general rule contained in sub-section (I) of Section 427. This Court observed: "8.xxxxxxxxx As rightly contended by Shri Garg, and not disputed by Shri La/it, the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life being understood to mean as a sentence to serve the remainder of life in prison unless commuted or remitted by the appropriate authority and a person having only one life span, the sentence on a subsequent conviction of imprisonme111 for a term or imprisonment for life can only be superimposed to the earlier life sentence and certainly not added to it since extending the life span of the offender or for that matter anyone is beyond human might. It is this obvious situation which is stated in sub-section (2) of Section 427 since the general rule enunciated in sub-section {l) thereof is that without the court's direction the subsequent sentence will not run concurrently but consecutively. The only situation in which no direction of the court is needed to make the subsequent sentence run concurrently with the previous sentence is provided for in sub-section (2) which has been enacted to avoid any possible controversy based on sub-section (1) if there be no express direction of the court to that effect. Sub-section (2) is in the nature of an exception to the general rule enacted irrsub- section (1) of Section 427 that a sentence on subsequent conviction commences on expiry of the first sentence unless the court directs it to run concurrently. The meaning and purpose of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 427 and the object of enacting sub-section (2) is, therefore, clear. "
19. Having said that, this Court declared that once the subsequent imprisonment for life awarded to the prisoner is superimposed over the earlier life sentence, the grant of any remission or commutation qua the earlier sentence of life imprisonment will not ipso facto benefit the prisoner qua the subsequent sentence of life imprisonment. Such subsequent sentence would continue and shall remain unaffected by the remission or commutation of the earlier sentence. This Court said: "xxxxxxxxx In other words, the operation of the superimposed subsequent sentence of life imprisonment shall not be wiped out merely because in respect of· the corresponding earlier sentence of life imprisonment any remission or commutation has been granted by the appropriate authority. The consequence is that the petitioner would not get any practical benefit of any remission or commutation in respect of his earlier sentence because of the superimposed.subsequent life sentence unless the same corresponding benefit in respect of the subsequent sentence is also granted to the petitioner. It is in this manner that the direction is given for the two sentences of life imprisonment not to run concurrently. " c c
20. Ranjit Singh '.I· case (supra) was no doubt dealing with a fact situation different from the one with which we are dealing in the present case, inasmuch as Ranjit Singh s case (supra) was covered by Section 427 of the Cr.P.C. as the prisoner in that case was already undergoing a sentence of life imprisonment when he committed a second offence of murder that led to his conviction and award of a second sentence of life imprisonment. In the cases at hand, the appellants were not convicts undergoing life sentence at the time of commission of multiple murders by them. Their cases, therefore, fall more appropriately under Section 31 of the Code which deals with conviction of several offences at one trial. Section 31 (I) deals with and empowers the Court to award, subject to the provisions of Section 71 of the !PC, several punishments prescribed for such offences and mandates that such punishments when consisting of imprisonment shall commence one after the expiration of the other in such order as the Court may direct unless the Court directs such punishments shall run concurrently.
The power to award suitable sentences for several offences committed by the offenders is not and cannot be disputed. The order in which such sentences shall run can also be stipulated by the Court awarding such sentences. So also the Court is competent in its discre~ion to direct that punishment awarded shall run concurrently not consecutively. The question, however, is whether the provision admits of more than one life sentences running consecutively. That question can be answered on a logical basis only if one accepts the truism that humans have one life and the sentence of life imprisonment once awarded would require the prisoner to spend the remainder of his life in jail unless the sentence is commuted or remitted by the competent authority. That, in our opinion, happens to be the logic behind Section 427 (2) of the Cr.P.C. mandating that if a prisoner already undergoing life sentence is sentenced to another imprisonment for life for a subsequent offence committed by him, the two sentences so awarded shall run concurrently and not consecutively.
Section 427 (2) in that way carves out an exception to the -general rule recognised in Section 427 (I) that sentences awarded upon conviction for a subsequent offence shall run consecutively. The Parliament, it manifests from the provisions of Section 427 (2), was fully cognizant of the anomaly that would arise if a prisoner condemned to undergo life imprisonment is directed to do so twice over. It has, therefore, carved out an exception to the general rule to clearly recognise that in the case of life sentences for two distinct offences separately tried and held proved the sentences cannot be directed to run consecutively. The provisions of Section 427 (2) apart, in Ranjit Singh s case (supra), this Court has in terms held that since life sentence implies imprisonment for the remainder of the life of the convict, consecutive life sentences cannot be awarded as humans have only one life.
That logic, in our view, must extend to Section 31 of the Cr.P.C. also no matter Section 31 does nqt in terms make a provision analogous to Section 427 (2) of the Code. The provision must, in our opinion, be so interpreted as to prevent any anomaly or irrationality. So interpreted Section 3 1 ( 1) must mean that sentences awarded by the Court for several offences committed by the prisoner shall run consecutively (unless the Court directs otherwise) except where such sentences include imprisonment for life which can and must run concurrently. We are also inclined to hold that if more than one life sentences are awarded to the prisoner, the same would get super imposed over each other. This will imply that in case the prisoner is granted the benefit of any remission or commutation qua one such sentence, the benefit of such remission would not ipso facto extend to the other.
21. We may now turn to the conflict noticed in the reference order between the decisions of this Court in Cherian and Duryodhan s cases (supra) on the one hand and Kamalanatha and SanaullahKhan s cases (supra) on the other.
22. In 0.M Cherian~· case (supra) the prisoner was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for offences punishable under Sections 498 A and 306 of the IPC. The Courts below had in that case awarded to the convicts imprisonment for two years under Section 498 A of the IPC and seven years under Section 306 ofJPC and directed the same to run consecutively. Aggrieved by the said direction, the prisoners appealed to this Court to contend that the sentences awarded to them ought to run concurrently and not consecutively. The appeal was referred to a larger bench of Three Judges of this Court in the light of the decision in Mohd. Akhtar Hussain @ Ibrahim Ahmed Bhatti vs. Assistant Collector of Customs (Prevention), Ahmedabad and Anr. (1988) 4 SCC 183. Before the larger bench, the prisoners relied upon Mohd Akhtar Hussain s case (supra) and Mano} @ Panu vs. State of Haryana (2014) 2 sec 153 to contend that since the prisoners were found guilty of more than two offences committed in the course of one incident, such sentences ought to run concurrently.
This Court upon a review of the case law on the subject held that Section 3 I of the Cr.P.C. vested the c c court with the power to order in its discretion thatthe sentences awarded shall run concurrently in case of conviction of two or more offences. This Court declared that it was difficult to lay down a straightjacket rule for the exercise of such discretion by the courts. Whether a sentence should run concurrently or consecutively wou Id depend upon the nature of the offence and the facts and circumstances of the case. All that could be said was that the discretion has to be exercised along judicial lines and not mechanically. Having said that, the Court observed that if two life sentences are imposed on a convict the court has to direct the same to run concurrently. That is because sentence of imprisonment for life means imprisonment till the normal life of a convict.
23. As noticed above, Cherian s case (supra) did not involve awarding of two or more life sentences to the prisoner. It was a case of two term sentences being awarded for two different offences committed in the course of -the same transaction and tried together at one trial. Even so, this Court held that life sentences cannot be made to run consecutively plainly because a single life sentence ensures that the remainder of the life of the prisoner is spent by him in jail. Such being the case, the question of a second such sentence being undergone consecutively did not arise.
24. In Duryodhan Routs case (supra) the prisoner was convicted for offences punishable under Sections 302, 376 (2)(t) and 201 of the IPC and sentenced to death for the offence of murder and rigorous imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section 376(2)(t). Imprisonment for a period of one year was additionally awarded under Section 201 of !PC with a direction that the sentences would run consecutively. In appeal, the High Court altered the sentence of death to imprisonment for life while leaving the remaining sentences untouched. The petitioner then approached this Court to argue that the sentences ought to run concurrently and not consecutively as directed by the Courts below. Relying upon the decision of this Court in Gopal Vinayaks case (supra) and several other subsequent decisions on the subject this Court held that the sentence of imprisonment for life means imprisonment for the remainder of the life of the prisoner.
The Court further held that Section 31 of the Cr.P.C. would not permit consecutive running of life sentence and the term sentence since the aggregate punishment of the petitioner would go beyond the outer limit of 14 years stipulated in the proviso to Section 31(2) of the Cr.P.C. The Court observed: "Section 31 of Cr.P.C. relates to sentence in cases of conviction of several offences at one trial. Proviso to Sub-Section (2) to Section 31 lays down the embargo whether the aggregate punishment of prisoner is for a period of longer than 14 years. Jn view of the fact that life imprisonment means imprisonment for full and complete span of life, the question of consec·utive sentences in case of conviction for several offences at one trial does not arise. Therefore, in case a person is sentenced of conviction of several offences, includii1g one that of life imprisonment, the proviso to Section 31 (2) shall come into play and no consecutive sentence can be imposed. "
25. While we have no doubt about the correctness of the proposition that two life sentences cannot be directed to run consecutively, we do not think that the reason for saying so lies in the proviso to Section 31 (2). Section 31 (2) of the Cr.P.C. deals with situations where the Court awarding consecutive sentences is not competent to award the aggregate of the punishment for the several offences for which the prisoner is being sentenced upon conviction. A careful reading of sub-Section (2) would show that the same is concerned only with situations where the Courts awarding the sentence and directing the same to run consecutively is riot competent to award the aggregate of the punishment upon conviction for a single offence. The proviso further stipulates that in cases falling under sub-section (2), the sentence shall in no case go beyond 14 years and the aggregate punishment shall not exceed twice the amount of punishment which the Court is competent to award. Now in cases tried by the Sessions Court, there is no limitation as to the Court's power to award any punishment sanctioned by law including the capital punishment. Sub-section (2) will, therefore, have no application to a case tried by the Sessions Court nor would Sub-section (2) step in to forbid a direction for consecutive running of sentences awardable by the Court of Session.
26. To the extent Dwyodhan Rout case (supra) relies upon proviso to Sub-section (2) to support the conclusion that a direction for consecutive running of sentences is impermissible, it does not state the law correctly, even when the conclusion that life imprisonment means for the full span of one's life and consecutive life sentences cannot be awarded is c c [2016) 5 S.C.R. otherwise sound and acceptable.
27. In Kamalanantha VS. Stale of Tamil Nadu, (2005) 5 sec I 94, the prisoners were convicted amongst others for offences under Sections 376, 302, 354 of the IPC and sentenced to under rigorous imprisonment for life foroffences under Sections 376 and 302 and various terms of imprisonment for other offences with the direction that the sentences awarded shall run consecutively. One of the issues that was raised in support of the appeal was that the Courts below were not justified in awarding consecutive life sentences. That contention was rejected by a two-Judge Bench of this Cou1i in the following words: "The contention of Mr. Jethmalani that the term "imprisonment" enjoined in Section 31 Crl'C does not include imprisonment for life is unacceptable. The term "imprisonment" is not defined under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 31 of the Code falls under Chapter 111 of the Code which deals with power of courts. Section 28 of the Code empowers the High Court to pass any sentence authorised by law. Similarly, the Sessions Judge and Additional Sessions .Judge may pass any sentence authorised by law, except the sentence of death which shall be subject lo confirmation by the High Court. In our opinion the term ""i111prison111e11t" would include the .\·entence of imprisonment for I ife. "
28. The above view runs contrmy to the ratio ofthis Court's decision in Cherian s case (supra) and Duryodhan Rout~· case (supra). That apart the view taken in Kamalanantha s case has not noticed the basic premise that a life sentence once awarded would imply that a prisoner shall spend the remainder of his Ii fc in prison. Once that happens there is no question of his undergoing another life sentence. To the extent the decision in Ka111ala11a11tha s case takes the view that the Court can for each offence award suitable punishment which may include multiple sentences of imprisonment for life for multiple offences punishable with death, there is and can be no quarrel with the stated proposition. The Court can and indeed ought to exercise its powers of awarding the sentence sanctioned by law which may include a life sentence. But if the decision in Kamalanantha purports to hold that sentence of imprisonment for life can also be directed to run consecutively, the same does not appear to be sound for the reasons we have already indicated earlier. We need to remember that award of multiple sentences of imprisonment for Ii fe so that such sentences are super imposed over one another is entirely different from directing such sentence to run consecutively.
29. Sanaullah Khan vs. State of Bihar, (2013) 3 SCC52 simply follows the view taken in Kamalanantha 's case and, therefore, does not add any new dimension to call for any further deliberation on the subject.
30. We are not unmindful of the fact that this Court has in several other cases directed sentences of imprisonment for life to run consecutively having regard to the gruesome and brutal nature of the offence committed by the prisoner. For instance, this Court has in Ravindra Trimbak Chouthmal vs. State of Maharashtra ( 1996) 4 SCC 148, while commuting death sentence penalty to one of imprisonment for life directed that the sentence of seven years rigorous imprisonment under Section 207 IPC shall start running after life imprisonment has run its due course. So also in Ronny vs. State of Maharashtra ( 1998) 3 SCC 625 this Court has wlille altering the death sentence to that of imprisonment for life directed that while the sentence for all other offences shall run concurrently, the sentence under Section 376 (2)(g) shall run consecutively after running of sentences for other offences. To the extent these decisions may be understood to hold that life sentence can also run conse~utively do not lay down the correct law and shall stand overruled.
31. In conclusion our answer to the question is in the negative. We hold that while multiple sentences for imprisonment for I ife can be awarded for multiple murders or other offences punishable with imprisonment for life, the life sentences so awarded cannot be directed to run consecutively. Such sentences would, however, be super imposed over each other so that any remission or commutation granted by the competent authority in one does not ipso facto result in remission of the sentence awarded to the prisoner for the other.
32. We may, while parting, deal with yet another dimension of this case argued before us namely whether the Court can direct life sentence and term sentences to run consecutively. That aspect was argued keeping in view the fact that the appellants have been sentenced to imprisonment for different terms apart from being awarded imprisonment for I ife. The c c Trial Court's direction affirmed by the High Court is thatthe said term sentences shall run consecutively. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that even this part of the direction is not legally sound, for once the prisoner is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, the term sentence awarded to him must run concurrently. We do not, however, think so. The power of the Court to direct the order in which sentences will run is unquestionable in view of the language employed in Section 31 of the Cr.P.C. The Court can, therefore, legitimately direct that the . prisoner shall first undergo the term sentence before the commencement of his life sentence. Such a direction shall be perfectly legitimate and in tune with Section 31. The converse however may not be true for ifthe Court directs the life sentence to start first it would necessarily imply that the tem1 sentence would run concurrently. That is because once the prisoner spends his life in jail, there is no question of his undergoing any further sentence. Whether or not the direction of the Court below calls for any modification or alteration is a matter with which we are not concerned. The Regular Bench hearing the appeals would be free to deal with that aspect of the matter having regard to what we have said in the foregoing paragraphs.
33. The reference is accordingly answered. Devika Gujral Reference answered.