NARA YAN BHONDOO PIMPUTKAR & ANOTHER LAXMAN PURSHOTTAM PIMlltJTKAR · & ORS. October 30, 1973 [H. R. KHANNA, V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARICAIUA; 11.} Gujarat Patel Watans Abolition Ac&,. 1961 (Gµjarat Act 48 of 1961). 1. 4- fl.
Aboiltioll nf 'oa1r-l watnns'-RiJ?ht nf watandar to execute deCree for possession of land, if affected. On the question whether, the right to execute a decree for the possession of watan land which has been obtained by the watandar came to an end, becal.18e of the abolition 'by the Gujarat Patel Watans Abolition Act, 1961, of patel watans and the cxtinguishment of all incidents appertaining to them under :ii. 4 of the Act,
HELD : ( 1) There is nothing in the language of s. 4 which renders such decrees for possession to be inexecutable. Had the legislature intend9d. that such decrees should become inexecutable, tlie legislature would have indicated such intention by incorporating some provision to that effect. f121Bl
(2) The words 1'any decree or order of a Court'' in the opening clause of the section do not indicate that the decree or order of court could not be executed with effect from the appointed day. The opening clause of the section only indicates that irrespective of any usage or custom and irrespective of any settlement, grant, agreement, sanad or decree or order of a. court or the existing watan law. which might have defined and dtclared the incidents appertaining to patC'l watans, the results contemplated by the various clauses of the section would follow and nothing contained in such settlement etc. would prevent the operation of that section.
[122E-123A] (3) The fact that pate! watans have been abolished and incidents appertain· ing to them hav"' been extinl'n!ished does not lead to the conclusion that the right of the erstwhile watandar to the possession of the watan lands also comes to an end. Section 4(iv' expressly provides that the resumption of watan land consequent upon the abolition of patel watans would be subject to the provi.~ sions of sections 6, 7 and 10. According to s. 6, the watan land, subject to the conditions mentioned in that section, shall_ be regranted to the watandar. He
shall be deemed to be occupant of the said land, and he would be entitled to continue in possession if be complies with the provisions of that section. 'That is, so far as the quondam watandars are concerned, they are entitled to be in possession of the watan Jands, though not in their capacity as watandars but by -virtue of the operation of s. 6 of the Act. If the respondent would be entitled to be in russession of the land under s. 6, the right to execute the decree for poosession of land cannot be denied to him. [121C-122]
( 4) If the respondent is entitled to execute the decree for possession of the Jand obtained against the app~llants the question whether the appellants, if allowed to remain in possession, could have applied for rcgrant to them_ under ' 10 is not relevant
[122C-E] Civ1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1573(N) of tn~ Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 3rd February, 1971 of the Gujarat High Court at Ahmedabad in Sec-Ond Appeal No. 639 of 1968.
V. S. Desai, P. C. Bhartari and A. G. Meneses, for the appellants. D. V. Patel, P. H. Parekh and Sunanda Bhandare, for respondent ~1. S. K. Dholakia. and M. N. Shroff, for respondent No. 2.
D. N. Mishra, for respondents Nos. 3a to 3d. NARAYAN v. LAXMAN (Khanna, J.) The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KHANNA, J.-Whether the decree for the possession of the land in dispute awarded in favour of LaXIUan Purshottam Pimputkar respon- de11t No. 1 (hereinafter described as the respqndentJ has become inexecutable after fhe ooming into force of the Gujarat Patel Watans Abolition Act, 1961 (Gujarat Act 48 of 1961) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is the short question which arises for determination in this appeal brought by special leave against the judgment of the Gujarat High Court.
c The appellants and the respondent belong to one family. The reapondent represents the seniormost branch of the family. The family was granted Patilki Watan in a number of villages, including Solsumbha, in district Thana. The watan land situated in Solsumbha is the subject matter of the present dispute. Under the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874 the person who actually performs the duty of a hereditary office for the time being is called an officiator.
Purshottam, father of the respondent, was the officiator till 1921 when, be<:ause of a dis- qualification incurre'd by him, a deptlty was appointed in place of Purshottam. After the death of Purshottam in 1940, fhe respondent
became the officiator. The branch of the appellants claimed to be in possession of the watan land in dispute and some other lands under a partition. effected in 1914. In 1944 the respondent moved the
government for resumption of the watan land in dispute which was in possession Of the branch of the appellants. Pra}er was also made by the respondent that he might be delivered possession of the land. The government after some enquiry resumed that land by order dated October 9, 1946 and directed that possession of the same be restored to fhe respondent.
The. appellants thereafter moved the government for reconsideration of that order. The govermnent on May 2, 1947 modified its previous order. by directing that the appellants could con- tinue to retain the possession of the land in dispute subject to payment of rent as might be fixed by the government from time to time. The respondent thereupon instituted suit for a declaration that. the order of the government dated May 2, 1947 and an ancillary order dated Y!arch I, 19.49 were null, void and inoperative. Prayer was also made that fhe appellants should remove all obstructions and hindrances from the land in dispute and should hand over the possession of the · same to the respondent.
It was further prayed that the appellants should render account of the income of the land to the respondent. The suit was resisted by the appellants on the ground that the impugned ordcr1 were administrative orders and no suit could lie for setting
them aside. The suits were also stated to be barred by limitation. The trial court decreed the suit in favour of the respondent. On appeal fhe District Judge set aside the dOi:re~ in favour of the res- pondent. The decision of the District Judge was affirmed on secobd appeal by the High Court. The respondent then came up in appeal to this Court by special leave. This Court as per its iudgment dated DcceRlber 13, 1962, reported in, (1964) I S.C.R. 200, accepted the appeal of the respondent 'and set aside the jud~ents of the IIlgh Court arid the District. Judge and restored that of the trial court where- by decr.ee for possession of .the. land in dispute had been awarded in favour of the respondent against the appellants.
i,- . [ 1974] 2 s.c.R. In the meanwhile in 1960 the State of Bombay was bifurcated and the land in dispute which was earlier part of Bombay State became part of the State of Gujarat.
On April 1, 1963 the Act came into force. On July 19, 1966 the respondent filed an application to execute the decree for possession of the land which had been awarded in his favour.
Objection was then taken by the appellants that the decree awarded in favour of the respondent had become inexecutablc because of the coming into fQrce of the Act. This objection found favour with the ex.ecuting court which consequently dismissed the
execution apl'lication. Appeal filed by the respondent against the order of the executing court was dismissed by the District Judge Bulsar. The respondent thereafter filed second appeal before the Gujarat Hi&h Court. The High Court came to the conclusion that the respondent was entitled to execute the decree for possession of the land obtained by him against the appellants. Appeal of the respondent was accord· ingly allowed.
The appellants have thereafter come up in appeal to this Court by special leave. The question which arises for determination, as stated earlier, is whether the decree for possession of the land in dispute which was awarded in favour of the respondent has become incxccutable becau•e of the coming into force of the Act. It would, therefore, be neceesary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act.
Section 2 contain! the definitions. According to section 2(7), "hereditary patelship" means every village office of a revenue or police pate! held hereditarily under the existing watan law .for the performance of duties connected with the administration or collection of the public re~enue of a village or with the village police or with the settlement of boundaries or other matters of civil admini~tration of a village
and includes such office even where the services originally appertaining to it have ceaud to be demanded. Section 2 ( 11) defines ''pate! watan" to mean a watan held under the existing watan law for the performance of duties appertaining to the hereditary patelship whether any commutation settlement in respect of such pate! watan has or has not been effected. "UnaQthorised holder" has been defined in section 2(14) to mean a person in possession of a watan land without any right or under a lease, mortgage, sale, gift or any other kind of transfer thereof, which is null and void under the existing watan law.
"Watan", according to section 2(15), means watan property, if any, .together with the hereditary office and the rights and privileges attached to it. Section 2 (16) defines "watandar" to mean a person having here- ditary interest in a pate! watan under the existing watan law and includes a matadar and a representative watandar.
Section 2(17) defines "watan land" to mean the land forming part of the watan property. According to section 2(18). "watan property" means the moveable or immovable property held, acquired or assigned under the existing watan law for providing remuneration for the performance of the duty appertaining to a hereditary patelship and includes a right under tbe existing watan law to levy customary fees or perquisites in ' money or in kind, whether at fixed times or other\\ifse and also includes cash pavments in addition to the original watan property made volun- tarilv bv the State Government and subject periodically to modification or withdrawal.
• A c c NARAYAN v. LAXMAN (Khanna, J.) Section 3 gives powers to the Collector to decide variollS ques.tious arising under the Act, including the question · whether . anY land is watan land and whether a person is watandar or authoriSCd holder or unauthorised holder. Right is also given to a person aggrieved by the order of the Collector to file appeal to the State Government Section 4 has material bearing and reads as under :
"4. Notwithstanding any usage or custom or anything. contained in any settlement, grant, agreement, sanad, or any decree or order of a court or the existing W11taii law, with effect o• and from the appointed day,- ·
_ (i) all pate! waians shall be Biid are hereby abolished; (ii) all Incidents (including the right to hold office and watan 11.1:operty, the right to levy customary fees or perquis1ties in money or in kind. and the liability to
render service) appertaini~ to the said watans shall be and are hereby extingwshed; (iii) no office of pate! shall be hereditary; and (iv) subject to the provisions of sections ~. 7 and 10 all watan land shall be and is hereby hlll!Dled and shall
be subject to the payment of land revenue. under the provisions of the Code and the rule~ made thereunder as if it were an unalienated land : .Provided that such resumption shall not affect the vali·
dity of any a!i~ation. of such watan land marle in accord- ance with the provisions of the existing watan law or of the rights o~ an alienee thereof or any person claiming under .or through him."
Section S deals with resumption of watan land which is not a grant of soil and is held subject to a total or partial exemption from pay- ment of land revenue thereof. We are in the present case not con· cerned with such watan land. According to section 6, watan land to which the provisions of section S do not apply shall, in cases not falling under• section 7 or section 10 be. regranted to the watandar · of the watan to which it appertained on payment by or on behalf ~ the watandar to the. State Government of the occupancy price equal to six tilllC8 the amount of the fUll assessment of such land within· the prescribed period and in the prescribed mariner and the. wa.tandar shall be deemed to :be occupant· within the meaning of the Code in respect of such land and shall primarily be liable to pay land .revenue to the Stam Government in accordance with the provisions. of tile Code and 1he rules made thereunder; and all the provisions of the Code and the said rules relating to unalicnated land shall subject to the provisions of this Act, apply t9 the said land.
Section 7 deals with the regrant of watan land to . authorised holders. Accordins; to the section, any watan land other than land to wl)i,~h the provisions of section S apply held by an aullloriled holder sha!1 be regranted to him on payment by him or on bi& behalf ( 1974] 2 S.C.ll·
to the State Government of the occupany price mentioned in section 6 and subject to the like conditions and consequences and all the pro- visions of section 6 shall apply mutatis mutandis in relation to the regrant
of the land under this ·section to the authorised bower as if were the watandar. Section 10 provides !hat where any watan land is in possession of an unauthorised holder, he shall be summarily evicted therefrom by the Collector in accordance with the provisions of the Code : Provided that if the State Government is of opinion that in view of the investment made by such holder in the development of the land or in the non-agricultural use of the land or otherwise, his eviction will cause undue hardship to him, it may direct the Collector to regrant the land to such holder on payment of such amount and subject to such terms a'nd conditions as the State Government may determine and the Collector shall regrant the land accordingly. It is further provided in the section that watan land unless regranted under the section shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code applicable to disposal of unoccupied unalienated land.
Section 22 contains the saving clause and reads as under : "22. Nothing contained in this Act shall affect (i) any obligation or liability already incurred under an incident of a pate! watan before the appointed day,
or (ii) any proceeding or remedy in respect of such obliga- tion or liability, and any such proceedin_g may be continued or any' such remedy may be enforced as if c this Act had not been passed."
Mr. Desai on behalf of the appellants has contended before us that in view of the provisions contained in section 4 of the Act, the decree for the possession of the lanct in dispute awarded in favour of the respondent has become inexecutable. It is submitted that as the decree wus awarded in favour of the respondent in his capacity as a watandar and as pate! waitans have been abolished, the respondent cannot obtain the possession of the land to which he was entitled as ''· watandar. This stand has been controverted by Mr. Patel on behalf of the res- pondent and he submits that there is nothing in the
language of section 4 which renders the . .decree for tlic possession of the land in dispute. inexecutable. In any case, according I<> Mr. Patel, the t.ight of the respondent to execute the decree and the liability of the appel- lants to hand over possession of the land lo the respondent under the decree have been kept intact by section 22 of the Act.
The provisions. <;If. section 4 of the Act have been reproduced above and it is manifest therefrom that with effect from the appointed day, viz, April 1, 1963 all pate! watans are abolished and all incidents appert'lining to the said watans are extinguished. It is furth•·r pro- vided that as fron! the appoin((>d day no office of pate! shall be here- ditary and that subject to the provisions of section 6, 7 and 10 all watan lands are resumed and would be subject to the payment of land revenue.
The question with which we are concerned is whether the NARAYAN v. LAXMAN (Khanna, J.) right to execute the decree for the possession of watam land which – has boen obtained by the watandar against other persons comea. to an end bee"ause of the abolition of pate! watans .and the extinguish- ment of all incidents appertaining to the said watans.
The a111wer to this question, in our opinion, should be in the negative. Thero is nothing in the language of section 4 which renders such decrees for possession to be inexecutable.
Had the legislature intended that the ll decrees for possession of the watan lands which bad been obtained by the watandars against third persons should 6ecome inexecutable, the legislature would have indicate4 such an inlention by incorporating some pr.ovision to that effect.
In the absence of any such provisioR, ii is not permissible to read a prohibition in section 4 of the Act on !he execution of a decree for possession of the '.1-atan land obtained in favour of the watandar.
c The fact that pate! watans have been abolished lind incidents appertaining to the watans have been extinguished does not lead to the conclusion that the right of the erstwhile watandar to !he posses- sion of the watan lands also comes to an end.
Indeed, clause (iv) of section 4 of the Act expressly provides that the resumption of watan land consequent upon the abolition of pate) watans and the extinguishment of incidents appertaining to the said watans would be . subject to the provisions of sections 6, 7 and 10. According to sec- tion 6, the watan land, subject to the conditions mentioned in that section, shall be regranted to the watandar of the watan and he shill be deemed to be occupant of the said land.
The watandar would be entitled to continue to be in possession of the watan lands, if he complies with the provisions of that section despite the abolition of pate! watans and the extinguishment of incidents appertaining to the said watans.
The object of the Act as would appear from its pre- amble was to abolish pate! watans because its hereditary character smacked of some kind of feudalism. At the same time, the legisla-
ture made it clear that it was not intended to deprive the watandar of the possession of the land if he complied 'II ith the conditions laid down in section 6 of the Act. It, therefore, cannot be said that there was a severance of all connections between the watandar and. the watan hnd because of the abolition of pate! watans and the extinguish· ment of incidents aooer!,inirui: to such watans.
A residual ri2ht was still there in the erstwhile watandar and that included the right to retain possession of watan land if the conditions mentioned in section 6 were complied with.
Section 7 of the Act contains provisions for re<n"ant of watan lands to authorised holders. while section 10 nro-. vides for eviction of unauthorised ·holders. Provision is also made
for regrant of the land by the State Government to unauthorised holders if the Government forms the opinion that his eviction would cause undue liardship to 'him. It would follow from a combined reading of sections 4, 6. 7 and I 0 of the Act th't a watandar on the abolition of pa tel watans and extinguishment of the incidents appertaining to the watans does not ~utomatically lose his right to possession of the watan lands. The same IS' true of an authorised holder,
fheir right to retain possession of [ 1974] 2 s.c.a. watan land as long as they comply with the prescribed conditions is statutorily recognised. The position of a watandar and an authorised
holder is in marked contrast to that of an unauthorised holder who can be summarily evicted from the watan lands by the Collector under section 10 of the Act. So far as quondam watandars are concerned,
they are entitled to be in possession of the watan lands not in their .capacity as watandars but by virtue of the operation of section 6 of the Act. Likewise, the authorised holders are entitled to be in possession by virlue of section 7 of the Act. If the respondent is cntilled to be in :possession of the land in dispute under section 6 of the Act, the ri¥ht to execute the decree for possession of the land can plainly be not denied to him on account of the provisions of the Act.
According to Mr. Desai, if the appellants are not dispossessed from the land in dispute in execution of the decree obtained by the respondent against them, the appellants can approach the State
Government for regrant of the land in dispute to thc:n b~cause their eviction would cause undue hardship to them. .It is, in our opinion, not necessary for the purpose of the present case to go into the ques- tion whether the appellants can claim regrant of the land under sec- tion l 0 of the Act because this question does not materially affect the right of the respondent to execute the decree for possession of the '.and in disp,ute obtained by him against the appellants.
If the respon- dent is entitled to execute the decree for possession of the land ob- tained against the appellants, in that event the question whether the appellants, if allowed to remain in possession, could have applied for regrant of the land to them, is hardly of any relevance.
Reference has been made by Mr. Desai to the words "any decree or order of a court" in the opening clause of section 4 of the Act. It is urged that those words indicate that the decree or order of a court can also be not executed with effect from the appointed day. This
contention, in our opinion, is not well-founded. What is contem- plated by the opening clause of section 4 of the Act is that not- withstanding any usage or custom or anything contained in any settle· ment, grant, agreement, sanad, or any. decree or order of a court or the existing law with effect from the appointed day, the results men- tioned in the various clauses of that section would follow. The words "any decree or order of a court'' are preceded by the words "anything contained in any settlement, grant, agreement, sanad". It is a well "Cstablished rule in construotion of statutes that general terms following ·particular ones apply only to such persons dr things as are ~;ustkm generis with those comprehended in the language of the Legislature. In other wot<ls, the general expression is to be read as comprehend- ing only things of the same kind as that designated bv the preceding particular expressions, unless there is something to show that a wider sense was intended. (see p. 297 of Maxwell on the Interpretation of ·statutes.
Twelfth Edition). In our opinion, the openin~ clause of section 4 indicates that irrespective of any usage or custom and irrespective of any settlement, grant, a)!)'eement, sanad, or decree or order of a court or the existing watan law, which might have defined and declared the incidents appertaining to 1>atel watans. the result~ ""ontemplated by the various clauses of section 4 would follow and c
c NARAYAN v. LAXMAN (Khanna, J.) nothing contained in the settlement, grant, agreement, sanad, or decree or order of the court or the existing watan law would prevent the operation of that section.
In View of what has been held above, it is, in our opinion, not necessary to deal with the alternative argument of Mr. Patel that the execution proceeding)! taken by the respondent to recover possession of the land were also protected by section 22 of the Act.
Reference has been made by Mr. Desai to a Full Bench decision of Nagpur High Court in the case of Chhote Khan v. Mohammad Obedulla Khan('). It was held by the majority in that cue that
after the coming into force of the M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, M.ahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 the pre-emption decrees obtained by landlords are no longer executable becaUBe the persons seeking to enforce. them have lost their proprietary interest. The aforesaid case cannot be of any help to the appellants beeause it has been conceded bv Mr. Desai that there were no provisions in the above ~ntioned Madhya Pradesh Act corresponding to seclions 6, 7 and 10 of the Act with which we are concerned. It is also consequently not necessary to express any opinion about the correct· ness <)f the view taken by the majority in the above mentioned Full Bench decision.
There is, in our opinion, no merit in this appeal which is accord- ·ingly dismissed with costs. V.P.S. <l) A.I.R. 1953 Nag. 361.