Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
19. Before we venture to discuss the applicability of Section 7 of the Act whioh·deals with disability of one of several persons, we have to bestow our attention to the Articles which are appliaable to the facts of the case.
20. In the case on hand, there cannot be any dispute about the fact that after the death of the 2nd defendant's husband automatically the znd defendant becomes a natural guardian to her children. On this, the finding of the lower appellate court, that as she was not the guardian appointed on the day to alienate the Suit schedule property therefore Article 109 of the Act applies which gives 12 years limitation from the day the al ienee lakes possession of the property and the alienation made by the father of ancestral property of the Hindus who are governed by Mitakshara law, and that the Suit is well within limitation, cannot be sustained.
21. Even the High Court has proceeded on the same notion that Article 60 of the Act applies where the ward files a Suit after attaining majority, for setting aside transfer of property made by his guardian when he was minor.
22. The High Court has furtherobserved that under Article I 09 of the Act, a long rope is given to file the Suit to the plaintiff than a Suit NARAYAN v. BABASAHEB & ORS. [N. V. RAMANA, J.] filed by the plaintiff under Article 60 of the Act and the case of the plaintiff strictly falls under Article 109 of the Act.
23. A bare reading of Section 8(1) of the 1956 Act indicates that it empowers the natural guardian to do all the acts which are necessary or reasonable or proper for the benefit of the minor. Section 8(2)(a) of the 1956 Act prescribes that either the purchaser or the seller should obtain the permission of the District Court to transfer the property by sale.
24. Hence, the present transaction on the face of it is in contravention of the mandatory provisions laid down by the 1956 Act.
25. When once a tra1isaction takes place in the name of the minor which is in contravention of the 1956Act and which is not done for legal necessity, such transaction is voidable and unless such a transaction is sought to be impeached or set aside, the question of recovery of possession of that property does not arise. c
26. A close analysis of the language of Article 60 would indicate that it applies to Suits by a minor who has attained majority and further by his legal representatives when he dies after attaining majority or from the death of the minor. The broad spectrum of the nature of the Suit is for setting aside the transfer of immovable property made by the guardian and consequently, a Suit for possession by avoiding the transfer by the . E guardian in violation of Section 8(2) of the 1956 Act. In essence, it is nothing more than se.eking to set aside the' transfer and grant consequential relief of possession.
27. There cannot be ariy doubt that a Suit by quondam minor to set aside the alienation of his property by his guardian is governed by Article 60. To impeach 'the transfer of immovable property by the Guardian, the minor must file the Suit within the prescribed period of three years after attaining majority.
28. The Limitation Act neither confers a right nor an obligation to file a Suit, ifno such right exists under the substantive law. It only provides a period oflimitation for filing the Suit.
29. Hence, we are of the considered opinion that a quondam minor plaintiff challenging the transfer of an immovable property made by his guardian in contravention of Section 8( I )(2) of the 1956 Act and who seeks possession of property can file the Suit only within the limitation .H c prescribed under Article 60 of the Act and Articles I 09, 110 or 113 of the Act are not applicable to the facts of the case.
30. The High Court as ;-;ell as the Trial Court erred in applying Article I 09 of the Act, where Article I 09 of the Act clearly speaks about alienation made by father governed by M itakshara law and further Courts below proceeded in discussing about the long rope given under Article .109 of the Act and comparatively lesser time specified under Article 60 of the Act. It is well settled principle of interpretation that inconvenience and hardship to a person will not be the decisive factors while interpreting the provision. When bare reading of the provision makes it very clear and unequivocally gives a meaning it was to be interpreted in the same sense as the Latin maxim says "'dulo lex sed lex"'. which means the law is hard but it is law and there cannot be any departure from the words of the law. 3 I. Hence, in view of our above discussion, the limitation to file the present Suit is governed by Article 60 of the Act and the limitation is 3 years from the date of attaining majority. When once we arrive at a conclusion that Article 60 of the Act applies and the limitation is 3 years, the crucial question is when there are several plaintiffs, what is the reckoning date of limitation? A reading of Section 7 makes it clear that when one of several persons who are jointly entitled to institute a Suit or make an application for the execution of the decree and a discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person, time will run against all of them but when no such discharge can be given, time will not run against all of them until one of them becomes capable of giving discharge. 32. In the case on hand, the l st plaintiff was 20 years old, the 2nd defendant was still a minor and the plaintiffs 3, 4 and 5, who are married daughters, were aged 29, 27 and 25 respectively, on the date of institution of the Suit in the year 1989. As per Explanation 2 of Section 7, the manager ofa Hindu undivided family governed by Mithaks.hara law shall be deemed to be capable of giving a discharge without concurrence of other members of family only ifhe is in management of the joint family property. In this case, plaintiffs 3 to 5 though majors as on the date of institution of Suit will not fall under Explanation 2 of Section 7 of the Limitation Act as they are not the manager or Karla of the joint family. The first plaintiff was 20 years old as on the date of institution of the Suit and there is no evidence forthcoming to arrive at a different conclusion with regard to the age of the I st plaintiff. In that view of the matter, the NARAYAN v. BABASAHEB & ORS. (N. V. RAMANA, J.] Suit is instituted well within three years of limitation from the date of attaining majority as envisaged under Article 60 of the Act. 33. Hence, in view of the above discussion, as the appeal is devoid of merits, we deem it appropriate to dismiss the appeal and accordingly the appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs. Nidhi Jain Appeal dismissed.