S.C.R. could have been reached. But in the absence of such a finding, we are unable to see any ground on which the order of the Tribunal could be upset in a reference under section 66 ( 1). Vvhen once it is found that there
was no proper determination of the profits as required under Rule 2(a)-and that was indeed conceded-and there was no justification for it such as the High Court thought there was, the only order that could properly
be made was to remand the case for further enquiry and fresh disposal in accordance with law. That was the order which was passed by the Tribunal, and that, in our opinion, was right.
This appeal will accordingly be allowed, and the second question referred by the Tribunal answered in the negative. The result of this will be that the Income-tax Officer will proceed to enquire into
the profits of the appellant Company for the years in question in accordance with the requirements of Rule 2. Under the circumstances, we direct that the parties do bear their respective costs both here and in the High
Court. Appeal allowed. NAVINCHANDRA MAFATLAL THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY CITY. [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., s. R. DAS, GHULAM HASAN, BHAGWATI and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.] Indian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922) s.
12-B-Government of India Act, 1935 (26 Geo. 5 CH. 2) Seventh Schedule, List I, Item 54-Tax on capital gains, if ultra vires-Capital gains, if income -Legislative practice-Interpretation
of words-Words used in Constitution Act. Section 12-B of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (inserted by Act XXII of 1947) which imposed tax on 'Capital gains' is not ultra vires the Government of India Act, 1935. The term 'Capital General Family
Pension Fund v. The Commissionr of Income-tax, West Bengal Vmkatarama 4vyar J. November 1. z954 Navinchandra Mafatlal v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City. [1955] gains co1nes well \Vithin the 1neaning of the word 'income' used in item No. 54 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Govern1nent of India .. A.ct, 1935.
It is incorrect to say that income cannot signify 'Capital gains' and it is equally an incorrect approach to hold that there is a legislative practice which recognises a clear line of
demarcation bet\veen income and capital. \Vhat is relied on here as a legisla- tive practice is nothing but the judicial interpretation given to the \Vord 'incon1e' as used in the income-tax and fiscal statutes. Such
interpretation does not necessarily cut do\vn the ordinary natural meaning of the word 'inco1ne' as used in item No. 54 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935. Cardinal rule of interpretation is that the words should be read in their ordinary natural and grammatical 1neaning.. But the words in a constitutional enact1ne11t conferring legislative powers should however
be construed most liberally an<l in their widest an1plitude. Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shatv Wallace & Co. (L.R. 59 I.A. 206); Ryal/ v. Hoare and Ryal/ v. Honeywill (1923) 8 T.C. 521; Californian
Copper Syndicate (Li1nited and Reduced) v. Ha"is (1904) 5 T.C. 159; Wallace Brothers & Co. Ltd." v. Commissioner of Income-tax [L.R. 75 I.A. 86: (1948) F.C.R. 1: 16 I.T.R. 240]; Croft v. Dunphy L.R. 1933 A.C. 156; Kamakshya Narain Singh v.
Commissioner of Income-tax [L.R. 70 I.A. 180: (1943) 11 I.T.R. 513] ; In re The Central Provinces and Bei·ar Act No. XIV of 1938 ( 1939) F.C.R. 18; United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum (1940) F.C.R. 110; State of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara (1951) S.C.R. 682; Eisner
v. Macomber (252). U.S. 189: 64 L. Ed. 521); Merchant's Loan Trust Co. v. Smietanka (2'.\5 U.S. 509: 65 L. Ed. 751) ; United States v. Stewart (311 U.S. 60: 85 L. Ed. 40) and Resch v. Federal Commissioner of Ta_xation
(66 C.L:.R. 198), referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 194 of 1952. Appeal from the Judgment and Order, dated· the 7th day- of Septe_mber, 1951, of .the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Income-tax Referenq.: No. 46 or 1950. S. Mitra (R. f. Kolah and I. N. Shroff, with him) for the appellant. M. C. Setalvad, ·Attorney-General for India (G. ,\[,
foshi, with him) for the respondent. 1954. November 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAs J. . .. S.C.R. DAs J.-This appeal is directed against the judg- ment pronounced on the 7th
September, 1951, by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay on a reference made at die instance of the appellant under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. By an assessment· order
dated the 31st March, 1948, the appellant was assessed by the Income-tax Officer, Bombay, for the assessment year 1947-1948 on a total income of Rs. 19,66,782 including a sum of Rs. 9,38,011
representing capital gains assessed in the hands of the appellant under section 12-B of the Act. The said amount of capital gains was earned by the appellant in the following circumstances.
The assessee had a half share m certain immovable properties situate in Bombay which were sold by the assessee and his co- owners during the relevant accounting year which was the calendar year ending on the 31st
December, 1946, to a private limited company known as Mafatlal Gagalbhai & Company Ltd. The profits on the sale of the said properties amounted to Rs. 18,76,023 and the appellant's half share
therein came to the sum of Rs. 9,38,0ll which was included m the assessment under section 12-B. In April, 1948, the appellant appealed from the said order to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner contend-
ing that section 12-B of the Act authorising the levy of tax on capital gams was ultra vires the Central Legislature. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner by his order dated the 5th
April, 1949, dismissed the appeal. A L.irther appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was dismissed by its order dated the 30th June 1950. Being aggrieved by the · order of the Appellate Tri-
bunal the app~llant applied to it under section 66(1) of the Act for raising certain questions of law. The AJ?pellate Tribunal agreeing that certain questions of law did arise om of its order drew up a statement of
the case which was agreed to by the parties and rtferred to the High Court the following questions :- ( 1) Whether the imposition of a tax under the l1ead "capital gains" by the Central Legislature
was ultra vires ? 15-88 S. C. India/59 N avitU;handra Mafatlal v. The CommissiMwr of !n&Dme-tox, BMnbay Ci!Y. DatJ. N avinchandra Mqfailal v. The Commissiontr of ln&orne-tax, &mbayCi!J'.
Das]. [1955] (2) Whether the imposition was in any way invalid on the ground that it was done by amending the Indian Income-tax Act ? After hearing the reference the High Court following
its judgment in Income-tax Reference No. 18 of 1950, Sir /. N. Duggan and Lady Jeena /. Duggan v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City, answered the first question in the negative and expressed the
opinion that it was not necessary to answer the second question. In that reference the two learned Judges gave the same answer to the first question but on different grounds as elaborated in their
respective judgments. The principal question that was discussed before the High Court, as before us, was whether section 12-B which authorised the imposition of a tax on capital gains was invalid being ultra vires the Central
Legis- lature. Section 12-B was inserted in the Act by the Indian Income-tax and Excess Profits Tax (Amend- ment) Act, 1947 (XXII of 1947) which was a Central Act. Under section 100 of the
Government of India Act, 1935, the Central Legislature was empowered to make laws with respect to matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule to that Act. The only entries in List I on which reliance
could be placed to uphold the impugned Act were entries 54 and 55 which were as follows : "54. Taxes on income other than agricultural income. 55. Taxes on the capital value of the assets, exclu-
sive of agricultural land, of individuals and companies, and taxes on the capital of companies." Chagla C. J. held that the enactment of Act XXII of 1947 which inserted section 12-B was well within
the scope of the legislative powers of the Central Legislature as it fell within entry 55 and was valid either as a whole or, in any case, to the extent that it applied to individuals and companies. Although it was
unnecessary for the learned Chief Justice to decide whether the Act could be supported as a valid piece of legislation falling within the scope of entry 54 yet in deference to the arguments advanced before the
Court .• ' S.C.R.. the learned Chief Justice expressed the view that it could not be so supported. Tendolkar J., on the other hand, held that Act XXII of 1947 was wholly intra vires the
Central Legislature as it fell within entry 54 and in this view of the matter he did not consider it necessary to discuss whether the legislation was covered by entry 55 in List I of the Seventh Schedule.
In our opinion the view taken by Tendolkar J. with respect to entry 54 is corn~ct and well-founded. In the course of a lucid argument advanced with his usual ability and skill Mr.
Kolah submitted that entry 54 which deals with "taxes on income" does not embrace within its scope tax on capital gains. "Income'', according to him, does not signify capital gains either according to its natural import or common
usage or according to judicial interpretation of relevant 'legislation both in England and in India. He submitted that the learned Chief Justice was entirely right in the view that there was a clear line of demarcation that
had always been observed by English lawyers and English jurists between income an<l capital, that the English legislative practice had always recognised this difference and that as the word ha<l come to acquire a
certain meaning and a certain connotation by reason of such legislative practice in England, the British Parliament which enacted the Government of India Act, 1935, must be regarded as having understood and
used that word "income" in entry 54 in that sense. Our attention has not, however, been drawn to any enactment other than fiscal statutes like the Finance Act and the Income-tax Act where the word "income"
has been used and, therefore, it is not possible to say that the critical word had acquired any particular meaning by reason of any legislative practice. Reference has been made to several cases where the word "income"
has been construed by the Court. What is, therefore, described as legislative practice is nothing but judicial interpretations of the word "income" as appear- ing in the fiscal statutes mentioned above.
A perusal .of the those cases, however, will reveal at once that those decisions were concerned with ascertaining the meaning of that word in the context of the Income-tax Navinchandra
Mefatlal v. The Commissioner of lncome-tQJ<, Bombay City. Das]. NavinchanJra Mqfat/al v. The Commissiontr ofl~tax, Bombt!J Ci!J. Das]. [1955] legislation. Thus the observation of their Lordships of
the Privy Council in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shat11 Wallace & Co. ('), laid down the connotation of the word "income" as used "in this Act." The passage in the judgment of Rowlatt J. in Ryal! v. Hoare and
Ryal! v. Honeyt11ill (2), quoted by the learned Chief Justice in his judgment and strongly relied on by Mr. Kolah, refers to profits or gains "as used in these Acts." In Californian Copper Syndicate (Limited and Reduced) v.
Harris ('), Lord Justice Clerk refers to the enhanced price realised on sale of certain things over the cost price thereof as not being profits "in the sense of Schedule D of the Income Tax Act of 1842."
These guarded observations quite clearly indicate that they relate to the term "income" or "profit" as used in the Income-tax Act. There is no warrant for saying that these observations cut down the natural meaning of the
ordinary English word "income" in any way. The truth of the tn;itter is that while Income-tax legislation adopts an inclusive definition of the word "income" the scheme of such legislation is to bring to charge only
such income as falls under certain specified heads (e.g., the 5 Schedules of the English Act of 1918 and our section 6 read with the following sections) and as arises or accrues or is received or is deemed to arise or accrue
or to be received as mentioned in the statute. The Courts have striven to ascertain the meaning of the word "income" in the context of this scheme. There is no reason to suppose that the interpretation
placed by the Courts on the word in question was intended to be exhaustive of the connotation of rhe word "income" outside the particular statute. If we hold, as we are asked to do, that the meaning of the
word "income" has become rigidly crystallised by reason of the judicial interpretation of that word appearing in the Income- tax Act then logically no enlargement of the scope of the
Income-tax Act, by amendment or otherwise, will be permissible in future. A conclusion so extravagant and astounding can scarcely be contemplated or (1) (1932) L. R. 59 I. A. 206 at page 2r2.
(2) (1923) 8 T. C. 521 at page 525. (3) (1904) 5 T. C. 159 at page 165. t S.C.R. countenanced. We are satisfied that the cases relied on by Mr. Kolah and referred to in the judgment of the
learned Chief Justice do not, as we read them, establish the broad proposition that the ordinary English word "income" has acquired a particular! y restricted meaning. The case of Wallace
Brothers & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of lncome-tax(1), was not concerned with ascertaining the meaning of the word "incomt" at all. The problem there was whether the foreign income of
an English company which was a partner in a firm carrying on business in Bombay and whose Indian income was greater than its foreign income could be treated as a resident within the meaning of section 4-A.
It was in that context said in that case that in determining the scope and meaning of the legislative power regard was to be had to what was ordinarily treated as embraced within that topic in the legislative
practice of the United Kingdom. The problem there was not to ascertain the meaning of the word "income" so much as to ascertain the extent of the application of the Act to the foreign income. That case, clearly,
does not establish that the word "income" had acquired any special or narrow meaning. The same remarks apply to the case of Croft v. Dunphy{"), referred to by Lord Uthwatt in delivering the judgment of the Privy
Council in Wallace Brothers case (supra). In Kamakshya Narain Singh v. Commissioner of lncome-tax(3), Lord Wright observed :- "Income, it is true, is a word difficult and perhaps impossible to define in any precise general formula.
It is a word of the broadest connotation." After making the above observation his Lordship referred to the observations of Sir George Lowndes in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal v. Shaw Wallace &
Co. (supra), where an attempt was made to indicate the connotation of the word "income" as used "in this Act." It is, therefore, clear that none of the authorities relied on by Mr. Kol.ah establish what may be called a
legislative practice indicating the connotation of the (1) (1948) L. R. 75 I. A. 86; [1948] F. C.R. 1; 16 I. T. R. 240. (2) L. R. [1933] A. C. 156. {3) (1943) L. R. 70 I. A. 180; [1943] u I. T. R. 513.
N avin&handra Mtifatlal v. The CommissioMr of Income-taJt, Bom6a,y City. DasJ. .N cwinchandra Mqfatla( v. Tht Commissionct of lncome–tax, Bombay Cit)'. Das J. S1)PREME COURT REPORTS
[19551 term "income'', apart from the Income-tax statute. In our view, it will be wrong to interpret the word "income" in entry 54 in the light of any supposed English legislative practice as contended for by Mr. Kolah. It
is interesting to note that in the English Income Tax Act of 1945 (8 and 9 Geo. VI, C. 32, sections 37 and 38) capital gains have been included as taxable income. It should be remembered that
the question before us relates to the correct interpretation of a wore\ appearing in a Constitution Act which, as has been said, must not be construed in any narrow and pedantic sense.
Gwyer C.J. in In re The Central Provinces and Berar Act No. XIV of 1938('), observed at pages 36-37 that the rules which apply to the interpretation of other statutes apply equally to the interpretation of
a constitutional enactment subject to this reservation that their application is of necessity conditioned by the subject-matter of the enactment itsclft It should be remembered that the problem before us is to construe
a word appearing in entry 54 which is a head of legislative power. As pointed out by Gwyer C.J. in The United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum(2) at page 134 none of the items in the Lists is to be read in a narrow
or restricted sense and that each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be compre- hended in it. It is, therefore, clear-and it is acknowledged by Chief Justice Chagla-that in construing an entry
in a List conferring legislative powers the widest possible construction according to their ordinary meaning mnst be put upon the words used therein. Reference to legislative practice may be admissible for
cutting down the meaning of a word in order to reconcile two conflicting provisions in two legislative Lists as was done in The C. P. and Berar Act case (supra), or to enlarge their ordinary meaning as in The
State of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara (3). The cardinal rule of interpretation, however, is that words should be read in their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning subject
to this rider that in (') ['939] F. C.R. ,s. (3) ['95'] S. C.R. 682. \2) ['940] F. C.R. no. _._ i …, …. S.C.R. construing words in a constitutional enactment con- ferring legislative power
the most liberal construction should be put upon the words so that the same may have effect in their widest amplitude. What, then, is the ordinary, natural and grammati- cal meaning
of the word "income"? According to the dictionary it means "a thing that comes in". (See Oxford Dictionary, Vol. V, page 162; Stroud, Vol. II, pages 14-16). In the United States of America and in
Australia both of which also are English speaking countries the word "income" is understood in a wide sense so as to include a capital gain. Reference may be made to Eisner v. Macomber( 1 ), Merchants' Loan &
Trust Co. v. Smietunka (2), and United States v. Stewart{3), and Resch v. Federal Commissio11er of Taxation (4). Jn each of these cases very wide meaning was ascribed to the word "income" as its
natural meaning. The relevant observations of learned Judges deciding those cases which have been quoted in the judgment of Tendolkar J. quite clearly indicate that such wide meaning was put upon the word "income" not because
of any particular legislative practice either in the United States or in the Commonwealth of Australia but because such was the normal concept and connota- tion of the ordinary English
word "income." Its natural meaning ef9.braces any profit or gain which is actually received. This is in consonance with the observations of Lord Wright to which reference has already been made. Mr. Kolah concedes that the word
"income" is understood in the United States and Australia in the wide sense contended for· by the learned Attorney"General but he maintains that the law in England is different and, therefore, entry 54
which occurs in a Parliamentary statute should be construed according to the law of England. We are again brought back to the same argument as to the word having acquired a restricted meaning
by reason of what has been called the legislative practice (1) \1920) 252 U. S. 189; 64 L. Ed. 521. (2) (1925) 255 U.S. 509; 65 L. Ed. 751. ).. • (3) (1940) 311 U.S. 60; 85 L. Fd. 40.
(4) (1942) 66 C. L. R. 1g8. Navincnandm Mafatlal v. The Commissioner of /nfX1tn4-tait, Bomb'!)' Ci1'. Das]. ·—– — [1955) in England ~an argument which· we have already ·discarded. The argument founded on an assumed
]tl avinchandt'a legislative practice being thus out of the way, there can Mafatla_l v. be no difficulty in applying its natural and grammatical Th• Commission~ meaning to the ordinary English word "income." As ofl•come-taz. · already observed, the word should be given it widest Bombay c.1y. connotation in ·view of the fact that it occurs in a n.,;.
Iegislativ"e head conferring legislative power. For reasons stated above we are of opinion that Act XXII of 1947 which amended the Indian Income-tax , I I954. October I8.· . Act by enlarging the definition of the term income in
section 2(6-0) and introducing a new head of income in section 6 and inserting the new section 12-B is int·ra vires the powers of the Central Legislature acting under entry 54 in List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Govern~
merit of India Act, 1935. In this view of the matter it is unnecessary for. us to consider or express any opinion as to the meaning, scope and ambit of entry 55 in that List. ·The appeal is accordingly dismis8ed with costs.
Appeal dismissed. · THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, HAPUR, AND THREE OTHERS v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND T\VO OTHERS. [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., s. R. DAS, GHULA~I HASAN, BHAGWATI and JAGANNADHADAS JJ.]
Uttar Pradesh Food-grains (Futures and Options Prohibition) Order, 1951-Uttar Pradesh Food-grains (Futures and Options Prohibition) Order, 1945-Restrictfons on dealings in pulses other thangram,….:.1,. both orders-Order o/'1951 partlu declared ultra vires by Supreme Court-Not so s. 9 thereof which repealrd Order of -1945-Whether Order of 1945 still fo force-Proper procedure for ' clarification of the matter • .
Uttar Pradesh Food-grains (Futures and Options Prohibition) Order, 1951, made it illegal and a punishable offence for any · person to enter into any fntures in pulses other than gram, or to pa.y or receive or to agree to pay or receive a.ny margin rel.a.ting to such futures. Bys. 9 of that Order the Order of 1945·conlaining . similar provisions was repealed. An application qnd~r Art. S2 of