Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
10. The conviction of the appellant rests significantly on alleged extra- judicial confessions made to her husband Nikku Ram (PW-1), Ward Member Krishan Lal (PW-3), Pradhan Bhagwanti Devi (PW-4), and Umrawati (PW-5).
11. It is settled law that extra-judicial confessions are generally considered weak evidence and should be corroborated by other, independent evidence. This Court in Sahadevan & Anr. vs. State of Tamil Nadu2 aptly summarized this principle in the following words: “12. …It is a case based upon circumstantial evidence. In case of circumstantial evidence, the onus lies upon the 2012 INSC 209 1470 prosecution to prove the complete chain of events which shall undoubtedly point towards the guilt of the accused. Furthermore, in case of circumstantial evidence, where the prosecution relies upon an extra-judicial confession, the court has to examine the same with a greater degree of care and caution. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. Wherever the Court, upon due appreciation of the entire prosecution evidence, intends to base a conviction on an extra-judicial confession, it must ensure that the same inspires confidence and is corroborated by other prosecution evidence. If, however, the extra- judicial confession suffers from material discrepancies or inherent improbabilities and does not appear to be cogent as per the prosecution version, it may be difficult for the court to base a conviction on such a confession. In such circumstances, the court would be fully justified in ruling such evidence out of consideration.”
12. This position of law has been followed in a plethora of judgments of this Court, including SK. Yusuf vs. State of West Bengal 3, Pancho vs. State of Haryana4 and Jagroop Singh vs. State of Punjab 5. Further, this Court in Chandrapal vs. State of Chhattisgarh (Earlier M.P.)6 had specifically held as follows: “11. …However, this court has consistently held that an extra judicial confession is a weak kind of evidence and unless it inspires confidence or is fully corroborated by some other evidence of clinching nature, ordinarily conviction for the offence of murder should not be made only on the evidence of extra judicial confession. …”
13. It is to be noted that during examination of the appellant under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19737, she had negated the extra-judicial confessions and in the said statement, she had provided 2011 INSC 415 2011 INSC 773 2012 INSC 296 2022 INSC 629 For short, ‘the Cr.PC’ [2025] 8 S.C.R. Neelam Kumari v. The State of Himachal Pradesh an alternative explanation. She stated that when she found her child unresponsive in the morning, she started crying. On hearing her cries, two women came and made enquiries. One of the women, namely Sita Devi, who was allegedly a non-interested witness to the extra- judicial confession, was never examined by the prosecution. While the prosecution is not required to examine every possible witness, it must ensure that those witnesses essential to substantiate the truth are produced before the Court. Failure to do so without adequate explanation, may cast doubt on the prosecution’s case as held by this Court in the case of Gaurav Maini vs. The State of Haryana8 that non-examination of a relevant witness at the trial persuades the Court to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution.
14. Beyond these alleged confessions, the case of the prosecution rests heavily on circumstantial evidence. In this regard, we find it pertinent to mention the five ‘golden principles’ for evaluating circumstantial evidence which originated in Hanumant vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh 9 and crystallized in Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra10 namely: (a) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established; (b) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (c) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (d) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (e) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 2024 INSC 488 1952 INSC 41 1984 INSC 121 1472
15. At the outset, we note that the appellant’s whereabouts during the most critical period are not conclusively established. Per her husband Nikku Ram (PW-1), on 8th December, 2006, the appellant came back to village Nand with him from village Katli. However, he further stated that he did not find the appellant and the child at their house in village Nand when he returned from Kainchi Mor at around 08:30 pm on the same day, and the appellant called him the following morning to enquire where he had spent the previous night i.e., per his statement, husband and wife did not encounter each other the night of 8th December, 2006. We also note that he has admitted before the Trial Court that the house in village Katli was double-storeyed, meaning the appellant could have been present there overnight without his knowledge. Dr. Sandesh Guleria (PW-2), residing in village Nand, also stated that he was asleep from 04:00 pm to 06:00 pm, and did not see the appellant post 06:00 pm.
16. The medical evidence suggests a significant gap between the alleged time of strangulation and the medical examination, with approximately two hours passing before death and eight hours before examination. This extended timeline introduces considerable uncertainty about when and how the fatal injuries occurred. In other words, during this time gap, numerous events could have transpired, and various individuals other than the appellant could have had access to the child. In our view, this intervening period weakens the prosecution’s ability to establish an unbroken chain of events leading inexorably to the conclusion of the appellant’s guilt.
17. The recovery and treatment of the alleged murder weapon is similarly troubling. It is the case of the prosecution that a green dupatta used to murder the child (Ex.P2) was recovered from the appellant during the interrogation in the presence of Krishan Lal (PW-3) and Bhagwanti Devi (PW-4). It was noted by the Trial Court that it is a commonly available dupatta, and that the appellant has strenuously denied producing the same by her in her judicial statement under Section 313 of the Cr.PC.
18. Furthermore, the dupatta was never shown to Dr. Sunita Sood (PW-10) who conducted the postmortem examination. This creates a fundamental disconnect in the chain of evidence. It seems obvious that the doctor who determined the cause of death must be given the opportunity to assess whether the alleged murder weapon was consistent with the injuries observed on the deceased child. [2025] 8 S.C.R. Neelam Kumari v. The State of Himachal Pradesh
19. On the point of the alleged weapon, we also note that while the forensic examination reportedly found blood stains and human skin tissues on the dupatta, there is no evidence establishing that these materials belonged to the deceased child himself. Therefore, their presence on the dupatta cannot be conclusively linked to the offence. Common items of clothing may contain various biological materials from everyday use, and without specific identification, such evidence remains ambiguous at best. The finding that the cause of death “could be due to throttling” is also tentative.
20. We also find it pertinent to point out that if the appellant had indeed killed her child, her subsequent conduct is difficult to reconcile with guilt. Rather than attempting to conceal the crime or flee, she proceeded to village Nand to seek medical assistance for the child. Specifically, she took the child to their tenant, Dr. Sandesh Guleria (PW-2). Logically, such behaviour is more consistent with innocence than guilt. At the very least, represents a significant inconsistency in the prosecution’s narrative. It is difficult to reconcile that the appellant was cold-blooded enough to strangle her own child but urgently sought medical help for that child shortly thereafter.
21. This Court has repeatedly affirmed that the strength of the motive plays a crucial role in establishing the credibility of the prosecution’s case. While a weak or absent motive alone may not be sufficient to acquit an accused if other circumstances form a complete chain pointing unerringly to guilt, it significantly weighs in favour of the accused and creates a reasonable doubt. In this regard, we reproduce a pertinent extract from this Court’s recent decision in Anwar Ali & Anr. vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh11: “9. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the accused that in the present case the prosecution has failed to establish and prove the motive and therefore the accused deserves acquittal is concerned, it is true that the absence of proving the motive cannot be a ground to reject the prosecution case. It is also true and as held by this Court in the case of Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar 1995 Supp (1) SCC 80 that if motive is proved that would supply a link in the chain of circumstantial evidence but 2020 INSC 563 1474 the absence thereof cannot be a ground to reject the prosecution case. However, at the same time, as observed by this Court in the case of Babu (supra)12, absence of motive in a case depending on circumstantial evidence is a factor that weighs in favour of the accused. …”
22. The prosecution has failed to establish any convincing motive for the appellant to commit the murder of her own child. The suggestion that the appellant killed her child because her husband visited village Katli for the last rites of his recently deceased father defies logic, given that she herself visited village Katli along with him and their child on 8th December, 2006. Moreover, such an extreme act runs completely contrary to the natural instinct of a mother of an infant child.
23. Based on the above analysis, we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The alleged extra-judicial confessions suffer from serious infirmities and cannot be relied upon. The circumstantial evidence, too, does not form a complete chain conclusively pointing towards the guilt of the appellant.
24. In light of these findings, the Appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC is set aside and the appellant is acquitted of the offence alleged against her. Since the appellant was already on bail, she be discharged from her bail bonds. Result of the case: Appeal allowed. †Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey Babu v. State of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC 189