the benefit of s. 10 (2) (xi). In our opinion, s. 10(2)(xi) was inapplicable to the facts of this case. In the result the appeal must fail and it is dismissed. The assessee company shall pay the costs
of the respondent. Appeal dismissed. 0. K. GHOSH AND ANOTHER v. E. X. JOSEPH (B. P. SINHA., c. J., P. B. GAJllNDRA.GADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAB GUPTA andJ. C. SHAH, JJ.) Service8 Rule8-ABBOciation of non-Gazetted civil •/,aff-
Wilktlrawal of recwnition by Government-Proceeding• agai118t Secretary for refUBal to dis•ociate-Participation in preparation for Btrike-Comlitutional Validity of Rules-Central Civil
S.rviwi (Conduct) Rules, 1965, rr. 4(A), 4(B)-Comtitution of India, Art. 19. The respondent, a Central Government servant, who was the Secretary of the Civil Accounts Association- of non-
Gazcttcd Staff, was departmentally proceeded against under rr. 4(A) and 4(.B) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955, for participating in demonstrations in preparation of a general strike of Central Government employees and for refusing to dissociate from the Association after the Government had withdrawn its recognition of it.
He impugned the validity of the said rules on the ground that they infringed his fonda- mental rights under Art. 19 of the Constitution. The High Court held that r. 4(A) was wholly valid but quashed the
proceeding under r. 4(.B) which it held to be invalid. Ruic 4(A) provided that no Government servant shall participate in any demonstration or resort to any form of strike in connection with any matter pertaining to his conditions of service and r. 4(B) provided that no Government servant shall join or
continue to be a member of any services Association whicb the A.V. Thomas Iii Oo., Lttl. v. Commissimur •f (naomt·lax, (Bon1aJor1) K,,,1to Hidayatullah, J, J96Z 0. K. Ghosh v. E. X. Joseph
Government did not recognise or in respect of which recognition had been refused or withdrawn by it. Held, that in view of the decision of this Court that r 4(A) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955, in so far as it prohibited any form of demonstration was violative of the Government servants' fundamental rights under Art. 19(1) (a) and (b), the High Court was in error in holding that the rule was wholly valid.
Ka.meshwar Parsad v. The State of Bihar, [1962] supp. 3 S.C.R. 369, referred to. Participation in demonstration organised for a strike and taking active part in preparation for it cannot, either in law or fact, mean. participation in the strike. The respondent could not, therefore, be said to have taken part in a strike as such and the proceeding against him under s. 4( A) being based on that part of it which was invalid must also be inval;d,
It was clear that r. 4(B) of the said Rules imposed res- triction on the undoubted right of the Government Servants under Art. 19 which were neither reasonable nor in the interest of public order under Art. 19(4). The rules clearly showed that in the granting or withdrawin~' of recognition, the Govern- ment might be actuated by considerations other than those of efficiency or ,discipline amongst the services or public order. The restriction imposed by r.4 (B), therefore, infringed Art. 19(1) (c) and must be held to be invalid.
The Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, A.LR. 1960 S,C,. 633 and Rex v. Basudev, [1949] F.C.R. 657, referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals
Nos. 378 and 379 of 1962. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 18, 1961 of the Bombay High Court in Miscellaneous 'petition No. 255 of 1960. C. K. Dapht,ary, Solicifm-General of India,
B. R. L. Iyengar and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellants in C. A. No. 378/62 and respondents in C. A. No. 379/62. A. S. R. Chari, M. K. Rarnamurthi, D. P. Singh, and 8. C. Agarwala, for the respondent in
C. A. No. 378/62 and Appellant in C. A. No. 379/62. 1962. October 30. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENpRAGADKAR, J.–The respondent E.X. Joseph is in the service of the Government of India
in the Audit and accounts Department at Bombay. He was she Secretary of the Civil Accounts Associa- tion which consists of non·gazetted staff of the Accountant-General's Office. The said Association was
affiliated to the All India Non-Gazetted Audit and Accounts Association. The latter Association had been recognized by .the Governmeut of India in December, 1956. In May, 1959, the Government
withdrew recognition of the said Association. In spite of the withdrawal of the recognition of the said Association, the respondent continued to be its Secretary General and refused to dissociate himself
from the activities of the said Association, though called upon to do so. As a result of his activities, on or about June 3, 1960, he was served with a charge-sheet for having deliberately committed
breach of Rule 4(b) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955 (hereinafter called the Rules). Appellant No. 1 0. K. Ghosh, Accountant-General, Maharashtra, who held the enquiry, found
the respondent guilty of the charges levelled against him. Accordingly, a notice to show cause why he should not be removed from service was served on the respondent. On July 25, 1960, appellant No. 1 served
a memo on the respondent intimating to him that it was proposed to hold an enquiry against him for having deliberately contravened the provisions of Rule 4( A) of the Rules in so far as he participated
actively in various demonstrations organised in connection with the strike cf Central Government employees and had taken active part in the prepara- tions made for the said strike.
On August 8, 1960, the respondent filed a writ petition on the original side of the Bombay 0. K. Ghosh v. E. X. Joseph Gajmdragadkar, J. O, K. Ghosh v. E. X. Jo,,ph Gajendragadkor, J.
High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and prayed that a writ of certiorari should be issued to quash the charge-sheets issued against him by appe- llant No. 1 in respect of the alleged contravention
of Rules 4 (B) and 4 (A) and a writ of prohibition should be issued prohibiting appellant No. 1 from proceeding further with the departmental proceedir1gs against the respondent. In his petition, the respon-
dent asked for other incidental reliefs. The main ground on which the respondent challenged the validity of the departmental proceed- ings initiated against him was that Rules 4(A} and
4(B) were void in so far as they contravened the fundament11l rights guaranteed to the respondent under Art.19(1) (a), (b}, (c) and (g). This contention was resisted by appellant No. 1 and appellant No. 2,
the Union of India, who had been impleaded as respondents to the said petition. It was ur~ed on their behalf that the impugned Rules were vahd and so, the claim for a writ of certiorari or writ of prohibi-
tion was not justified. The writ petition was heard by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. On January 18, 1961, the High Court rejected the petition in so far as the respondent had claimed writs in
regard to the enquiry for breach of Rule 4(A}; the Court held that the said Rule was valid and so, the departmental proceedings initiated against the respon- dent in respect of the breach of the said Rule could
not be successfully impeached. In respect of the proceedings under Rule 4(B), however, the High Court held that the said Rule was invalid and so, the departmental proceedings in respect of the breach
of the said Rule have been quashed. It is against this decision that the appellants, the A.G. and the Union of India, have come to this Court by Appeal No. 378/1962; whereas E. X. Joseph the respondent,
has preferred Appeal No. 379/1962. Both the appeals have been brought to this Court by special leave. 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT .REPORTS The appellants contend that the High Court was in error in holding that. Rule 4(B) was invalid,
whereas t.he respondent urges that Rule 4(.A) was invalid and the decision of the High Court to the contrary-is .errQneous in law. Before dealing- with the contentions of the: parties, it is necessary to set
out the two impugned Rules. These Rules form part of a body of Ruies framed in 195_5· under Art. 309, of the Constitution. Rule 4-A provides that no Government servant shall participate in any demonstration or resort to
any form of strike in connection with any matter pertaining to his condition of service, whereas Rule 4-B lays down that no 'Government servant shall join or. continue to be a member of ariy Service Assoda-
tion of Government servants : (a) which has not, within a period of six . months from its formation, obtained the recognition 0£ the Government under the Rules prescribed in that behalf, or (b) recognition
in respect of which has been refused or withdrawn by the Government under the said Rules. The case against the respondent is that he has contravened both these Rules. 'The question ab,qut the validity of Rule 4-A
has been the subject-matter of a recent decision of this Court in Kameshwar Prasad v.. The State of Bihar '('). At the hearing of the said appeal, the appellants and the respondent had intervened and
were heard by the Court. In that case, this Court has held that Rule 4-A in the form in which it nqw stands prohibiting any form of demonstration is violative of the Government servants' rights under
Art. 19(1)(a) & (b) and should, therefore, be struck down. In striking down the Rule in this limited way, this Court made it clear that in so far as the said Rule prohibits a strike, it cannot be struck down
for the reason that there is no -fundamental righ,t to resort to a strike. In other words; if tl;te Rt:!~ was (1) [1~~2] SUP?•, s.c.R.. ~b'S. I96Z O. r;:, Ghosh E. X. J01ph Gaj1ntlra1aJk•r. J,
1'62 – 0. /f. Glursh E. X.J.,ih 794 SNPREME COURT REPORTS[l963] SUPP. invoked against a Government servant 011 the ground that he had resorted to any form of strike specified by Rule 4-A, the Government servant would not be
able to ccmtend that the Rule was invalid in that behalf. In view of this decision, we must hold that the High Court was in error in coming to the con- clusion that Rule 4-A was valid as a whole.
That takes us to the question about the validity of Rule 4-B. The High Court has held that the impugn.ed Rule contravenes the fundamental right guaranteed to the respondent by Art.
19 (1) (c). The respondent along with other Central Govern- ment servants is entitled to form Associations or Unions and in so far as this right is prejudicially controlled and adversely affected by the impugned
Rule, the said Ruic is invalid. The learned Solicitor- General contends that in deciding the question about the validity of the Rule, we will have to take into account the provision of clause (4) in Art. 19. This
clause provides that Art. 19(1) (c) will not affect the oper2tion of any existing law in so far as it imposes, in the interests of public order or morality, reason- able restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred
by the said sub·clause. The argument is that the impugned Rule does nothing more than imposing a reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right which is alleged to have been contravened and, there-
fore, the provision of the rule is saved by clause (4). This argument raises the problem of construc- tion of clause (4). Can it be said that the Rule im- poses a rcawnablc re·striction in the interests of public
order ~ There can be no doubt that Government servants can be subjected to rules which are intended tCl maintain discipline amongst their ranks and to lead to an efficient discharge of their duties.
Discip- line amongst Government employees and their efficiency may, in a sense, be said to be related to public order. But in considering·the scope of clause (4), it has to be borne in mind that tho:: rule must he
r 1 S.C.R. f in the interests of pub] ic order and must amount to a reasonable restriction. The words "public order" occur even in clause (2), which refers, inter alia, tp security of the 'State and public order.
There-can be nQ doubt that the said words must have the same meaning in both ciauses (2) and (4). So far as clause (2) is concerned, security of the State having been expressly and specifically provided for, public order
cannot include the security of State.. though in its widest sepse it may be capable of including the said concep_t. Therefore, in clause (2), public order is virtually synonymous with public peace, safety and
tranquility. The denotation of the said wo,rds cannot be any wider in clause ( 4). That is one consideration which it is necessary to bear in mind. When clause (4) .refers to the restriction imposed in the interests of public order, it is necessary to enquire as to what is
the effect of the words "in the inter!'sts of". This clause again cannot be_ interpreted to mean that even if the connection between the restriction and the public order is remot,, and indirect, the restriction can
be said to be in the interests of public order. A res- triction can be said to be in the interes1s of public order only if th~ connection between the restriction and the public order
is proximate and direct. Indirect or far-fetched or unreal connection between the restriction and public order would not fall within the purview of the expression "in the interests of
pub.lie order." This interpretation is strengthened by the other requirement of clause (4) that, by itself, the restriction ought to be reasonable. It would be difficult to hold that a
~cstriction which does not directly relate to public or<lcF can be said to be reasonable on the ground that its connection with public order is -remote or far-fetched. That is an-
other consideration which is relevant. Therefore, reading the twd requirements of clause (-J-), it follows that the impugned restriction can be said to satisfv the test of clause (4-) only if its connection with public. order is shown 'to be rationally proximate and direct.
0. K Ghosh v. E. /{. Josph Gajtniragadtar, J O. K. Ghosh v. E. X. Josph Gajendragadkar, J, That is the view taken by this Court in The Superin- tendent Central, Prison, Fatehgarh v. Dr. Ram
Manohar Lohia, ('). In the words of Patanjali Sastri .J., in Rex v. Basudev,(') "the connection contemplated between the restriction and public order must be real and proximate, not far-fetched or problematical."
It is in the light of this legal position that the validity of the impugned rule must be determined. It is not disputed that the fundamental rights guaranteed by Art. 19 can be claimed by Govern-
ment servants. Art. 33 which confers power on the parliament to modify the rights in their application to the Armed Forces, clearly brings out the fact that all citizens, including Government servants, are en-
titled to claim the rights guaranteed by Art. 19. Thus, the validity of the impugned rule has to be judged on the basis that the respondent and his co-employees are entitled to form Associations or Unions. It is
clear that Rule 4-B imposes a restriction on this right. It virtually compels a Government servant to with- draw his membership of the Service Association of Government Servants as soon as recognition accorded
to the said Association is withdrawn or if, after the Association is formed, no recognition is accorded to it within six months. In other words, the right to form an Association is conditioned bv the existence
of the recognition of the said Association by the Government. If the Association obtains the recog- nition and continues to enjoy it, Government servants can become members of the said Association ; if the
Association does not secure recognition from the Government or recognition granted to it is withdrawn, Government servants must cease to be the members of the said Association. That is the plain effect of
the impugned rule. Can this restriction be said to be in the interests of public order and can it be said ·to be a reasonable restriction ? In our opinion, the only answer to these questions would be in the
negative. It is difficult to see any direct or proximate (1) A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 633. [1949] s.c.,. 657,661. 1 s.c.R. or reasocii.l:lle connection between the recognition by the Government of the Association and the discipline
amongst, and the efficiency of,_ the ,members of the said Association. Similariy, it is difficult to see any connection betw~en recognition and putJlic order. – . – A reference to Rule 5· of the Recognition of
Service Association Rules recently made in 1959 would clearly show "that there is no necessary connec- tion between recognition or its withdrawal and public order. Rule 5· enumerates different conditions by
clauses (a) to (1) which every Service Association must comply with; and Rule 7 provides that if a Service Association recognised under the said Rules has failed to comply with the conditions set out in Rule – 4, 5, or 6, its n;cognition may be withdrawn.
One of tlie conditions imposed by Rule 5(1) is tha! commu- nications addressed by the Service Association or by any office bearer on its behalf to the Government or a Government authority shall not contain any disres-
pectful or improper language. Similarly, Rule 5(g) provides that the previous permission of the Govern- ment shall be taken before tlie Service Association seeks affiliation with 'any other Union, Service Associ-
ation or Federation; and Rule 5 (h) prohibits the Service Associatioi:i from starting or publishing any perfodical, magazine or bulletin without the previous approval of th.e Governmerit. It is not easy to see
any rational, dir_ect or proximate connection between the observance of these conditions and public order. Therefore, even without examining the validity of all the conditions laid down by rule 4, 5 or 6, it is not
difficult to hole\ that the granting or withdrawing or recognition may 6e based on considerations some of which have .no connection whatever either with the efficiency or discipline amongst the Services or with
public order, 'rt might perhaps have been a different matter ff the recognition or its witqdrawal had been based on grouqds whi,cq have a direc_t, proximate and rational connection with public order. That, however
o. K, Ghosh v. E. X. Josph CafendragadJ.ar, J. 0. K. Ghosh v. /!.', X. Josph cannot be said about each one of the conditions pres- cribed by rule 4; 5 or 6. Therefore, it is quite possi-
ble that recognition may be refused or withdrawn on grounds which are wholly unconnected with public order and it is in such a set-up that the right to form Associations guaranteed by Art. lO(l)(c) is made sub-
ject to the rigorous restriction that the Association in question must secure and continue to enjoy recogni- tion from the Government. We are, therefore, satisfied that the restriction thus imposed would make
the guaranteed right under Art. 19(l)(c) ineffective and even illusory. That is why we see no reason to differ from the conclusion of the High Court that the impugned Rule 4-B is invalid. In the result, appeal
No. 378/1962 fails and is dismissed. In regard to appeal No. 379/1962, though we have partly reversed the conclusion of the High Court in respect . of the validity of the whole of Rule 4-A, it appears that· the departmental
proceedings initiat.ed against the respondent in respect of the alleged breach of rule 4-A have to be quashed, because the alleged contravention of the said Rule on which the said proceedings are based is contravention
of that part of Rule 4-A which has been held to be invalid by this Court. The material charge a~ainst the respondent in that behalf is that he had delibera- tely contravened the provisions of Rule 4-A in so far
as he has participated actively in the various demons- trations organised in connection with the strike of Central Government employc~s and took part in the preparations made for the said strike. It will be
noticed that the result of the decision of this Court in Kameshwar Prasad' s(') case is that in so far as the rule prohibits any form of demonstration, it is invalid. It is not invalid in so far as it may prohibit partici-
pation in strikes. . ~he chai:ge against. the respondent is not that he participated m any strike ; the charge is that he participated in the various demonstra- tions ; alld that is a charge based upon that part of
(I) [1962] Supp. s s.c.R. 869. 1 S.C.R. the rule which prohibits demonstrations altogether. It is true that the demonstrations in which he is alleged to have participated active! y were organised
in connection with the strike ; but that does not mean either in fact or in law that he participated in the strike itself. Similarly, the charge that he took active part in the preparations made for the said
strike, also does not mean in fact or in law that he participated in the strike. If he joined demonstrations organised in connection with the strikes, or if he took part in the preparations for the strike, it cannot be
said that he took part in the strike as such, and so, the charge cannot be reasonably construed to mean that his conduct amounted to a contravention of the rule which prohibits strikes. Therefore, though Rule
4-A is partly, and not wholly, invalid as held by this Court in the case of Kameshwar Prasad('), the parti- cular charge against the respondent being on the basis of that part of the rule which is invalid, it must
follow that the departmental proceedings based on that charge are also invalid. That is why appeal No. 379/1962 must be allowed and 1he departmental proceedings instituted against the respondent for the
alleged contravention by him of rules 4-A and 4-B must be quashed. There would be no order as to costs. A,,peal 378/62 dismissed. Appeal 379/62 cill<YWed. (I) (1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 369.
1%2 O. K. Gwh E. X. Jos;n