Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out ifthe facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of D the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients E constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.
12. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy', a three judge Bench of this Court had observed that at the stage of framing the charge, the Court has to apply its mind to the question whether or not there is any F ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. As framing of charge affects a person's liberty substantially, need for proper consideration of material warranting such order was emphasized.
13. Then again in State of Maharashtra and Ors. v. Som Nath The.pa and Ors2, a three judge Bench of this Court, after noting three G pairs of sections viz. (i) Sections 227 and 228 insofar as sessions trial is concerned; (ii) Sections 239 and 240 relatable to trial of warrant cases; (1977) 2 S.C.C. 699. 2. (1996) 4 S.C.C 659. [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R. A and (iii) Sections 245 (1) and (2) qua trial of summons cases, which dealt with the question of framing of charge or discharge, stated thus: "if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, ifthe court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of a charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage."
14. In a later decision in State ofM.P. v. Mohan/al Soni3, this Court, referring to several previous decisions held that the crystallized judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie D consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the ac~used. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused.
15. Having noted the broad guidelines to be kept in view while deciding whether or not a charge against the accused is to be framed, we may advert to the facts of the present case to decide whether on the basis of the material placed before the trial court, it can reasonably be held tl1at a case for fran1ing charges against the appellants under Sections F 498A and 406 I.P.C. exists. However, before undertaking this exercise it would be apposite to briefly note the essential ingredients of Sections 406 and 498A I.P.C.
16. According to Section 405 l.P.C., the offence of criminal breach of trust is committed when a person who is entrusted in any manner with G the property or \Vith any dominion over it, dishonestly misappropriates it or converts it to his own use, or dishonestly uses it, or disposes it of, in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which the trust is to be discharged, or of any lawful contract, express or implied, made by 3. (2000) 6 S.C.C. 338. t ONKARNATHMISHRA v. STATE[D.K.JAIN,J.] him touching such discharge, or wilfully suffers any other person so to A do. Thus in the commission of the offence of criminal breach of trust, two distinct parts are involved. The first consists of the creation of an obligation in relation to the property over which dominion or control is acquired by the accused. The second is a misappropriation or dealing with the property dishonestly and contrary to the terms of the obligation created. (See: The B Superintendent & remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. S.K. Roy')
17. The term "cruelty", which has been made punishable under Section 498A l.P.C. has been defined in the Explanation appended to the said Section, to mean: (i) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature C as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health whether mental or physical of the woman; or (ii) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or D any person related to her to meet such demand. Therefore, the consequences of"'cruelty", which are either likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury, danger to life, limb or health, whether mental or physical of the woman or the harassment of a woman, where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related E to her to meet any unlawful demand are required to be established in order to bring home an offence under Section 498A l.P.C.
18. In the present case, from a plain reading of the complaint filed by the complainant on 8.11.1994, extracted above, it is clear that the facts mentioned in the complaint, taken on their face value, do not make out a F prima facie case agaisst the appellants for having dishonestly misappropriated the Stridhan of the complainant, allegedly handed over to them, thereby committing criminal breach of trust punishable under Section 406 I.P.C. It is manifestly clear from the afore-extracted complaint as also the relevant portion of the charge-sheet that there is neither any G allegation of entrustment of any kind of property by the complainant to the appellants nor its misappropriation by them. Furthermore, it is also noted in the charge-sheet itself that the complainant had refused to take 4. (1974) 4 S.C.C. 230. [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R. A articles back when this offer was made to her by the Investigating Officer. Therefore, in our opinion, the very pre-requisite of entrustment of the property and its misappropriation by the appellants are lacking in the instant case. We have no hesitation in holding that the learned Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court erred in law in coming to the conclusion that a B case for framing of charge under Section 406 I.P.C. was made out.
19. As regards the applicability of Section 498A I.P.C., in the complaint dated 8.11.1994 there is not even a whisper of a wilful conduct of appellants No. 1 and 2 of harassment of the complainant at their hands with a view to coercing her to meet any unlawful demand by them so as C to attract the provisions of Section 498A read with Explanation thereto. The complaint refers to the talk the complainant purports to have had with her husband, appellant No. 3, who is alleged to have told her to come to Bijnore if she apologizes to his father; keeps him happy; obeys his sister and talks to her father (complainant's) to give her Rs. 50,000/- and V.C.R. D and brings these mticles to Bijnore. We are convinced that the allegation of misbehaviour on the part of appellant Nos. I and 2 and the demand of Rs. 50,000/- and V.C.R. by them made by the complainant in her subsequent statement, dated 4.4.1995, was an after thought and not bona fide. Section 498A l.P.C. was introduced with the avowed object to E combat the menace of dowry deaths and harassment to a woman at the hands of her husband or his relatives. Nevertheless, the provision should not be used as a device to achieve oblique motives. Having carefully glanced through the complaint, the F.l.R. and the charge-sheet, we find that charge under Section 498A l.P.C. is not brought home insofar as F appellant Nos. 1 and 2 are concerned.
20. Consequently, we allow the appeal partly; quash the charge framed against all the appellants under Section 406 I.P.C.; quash the charge framed against appellant Nos. I and 2 under Section 498A I.P.C. and dismiss the appeal of appellant No. 3 against framing of charge under G Section 498A I.P.C. Needless to add that the trial court shall now proceed with the trial untrammeled by any observation made by the Additional Sessions Judge m1d upheld by the High Court in the impugned order or by us in this judgment. N.J. Appeal partly allowed.