-.,,'.j 'l .. ''I i ·~ . j c ORIENT PAPER MILLS LTD. v. UNION OF INDIA May 3, 1968 [J. M. SHELAT AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.] Quasi-Judicial Power-exercise of-necessity for deciding matters
independently of dir.ections given by others. Appeals and Revisions- 1nanner in which quasi-judicial power to be exercised. Upto February, 1961 certain "printing and-writing paper" and "pack- ing and wrapping paper" produced by the appellant Company were sub- ject to exercise duty 'at the rate of 22 nP. per kilogram though the former was chargeable under Item 17(3) and the latter under Item 17(4) of the First Scheduie to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The Finance Act of 1961 raised the1 excise duty payable under Item 17(4) to 35 nP. per kilogram with effect from March 1, 1968 and though for some months the Excise Officer continued to levy duty on certain "machine glazed paper" popularly known as "M.G. Poster paper" under Item 17(3) i.e. by regarding it as "printing and writing paper", subsequently the excise autho- rities began to treat this paper as "packing and wrapping paper" and insisted on the appellant paying duty thereon under Item 17 ( 4). The
appellant paid the duty at the rate claimed under protest and thereafter appfod for refund of the excess on the ground that the duty on that paper should have been levied under Item 17(3). The Assistant Collectdr rejected the claim.
An appeal to the Cullector and a revision to the Central Government were also rejected. It was clear from the order of the Collector as well as from the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Government that the appeal and the revision were, rejected on the ground that the question was covered by a di'rection issued by the Central Board of Revenue to tho effect that the paper in question was to be treated a& "packing and wrapping paper".
On appeal, to this Court HELD :The direction given by the Board was invalid and had vitiated the proceedings before the Collector as well as the Government. The appeals must therefore be allowed and the orders of the Central Govern~ ment as \vell as the Collector set aside, and the proceedings- remitted to the Collector for deciding the question whether "M.G. Poster paper'' should be as·sessed as "printing and writing paper" or "packing or wrap~ ping paper" afresh. [253 A-CJ
The question whether "M.G. Poster paper" is "printing and writing paper" or "packing and wrapping paper" is essentially a question of fact. That had to be docided by the authorities under the Act.
The power exercised by the Collector and the Central Government was a quasi-judi~ cial power- that could not be controlled by the directions issued by the Board. No authority however high placed can control the decision of a judicial or a quasi-judicial authority.
There is no provision in the Act empowering the Board to issue directions to the as5""….ssing authorities or the appellate authorities in the matter of deciding disputes between the persons who a're called upon to pay duty and the department. Although the assessing authorities as well as the appellate authorities are judges in their own cause, when they are called upon to decide disputes arising under the Act they must act independently and impartially. They cannot [1969] I S.C.R.
h~ said to act independently if their judgm~nt is controlled by the dircc- uons given by others. [249 R-C, F-HJ Aluniiniu1n C:orporation of India Ltd. v. Union of India, C.1\. 635 of 1964, decided on September 22, 1965; Malzatlayal PremclziJ11tlra v. Com- 1nercia/ Tax Of]ict·r, c:a/cuua, l 19~9} S.('.R. 551 anJ B. Rajagopal Naidu v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, [1964), S.C.R. I; referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos 659 to
664 of 1965. Appeals by special !caw from the judgment and order dated October 5, 1963 of the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi in Central Excise Revision.\ Applications Nos. 720 to 725 of 1963.
S. Ray. R. K. Chaudhury, A. N. Parikh and /J. P. Mahesh- ivari, for the appellant. Seiyed Mohammad and S. P .. l\'ayyar, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered hy
Hegde, J. These appeals by special leave arise from the orders made hy the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi on October 5. 1963. in Central Excise Revision Applications !\as. 720 to 725 of 1963. Herein a common question or law arises for decision and that is whether '"M.G. Poster paper" manufactured by
the appellant- co1npany is a "printing and \\'riling paper" chargeable under item 17 ( 3) of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (No. I of 1944), hereinafter referred to as the Act or whether it is "packing and wrappinj! paper" chargeable
under item 17 ( 4) of the aforementioned Schedule. The appellant is a public limited company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913. and an "existing company" within the meaning of the Indian Companies Act, 1956.
It is carrying on business, imer alia, of manufacturing and sale of various kinds of paper at its factory at Birjrajnagar in the district of Sambalpur in the State of Orissa. In particular, it manufac-
tures "packing and wrapping paper", "printing and writing paper" and "machine glazed paper", popularly known as "M.G. Poster paper". Upto February 28, 1961, the date on which the Finance
Bill of that year was introduced in Parliament, "prirrtiog and writing paper" and "packing and wrappini! paper" were subject to excise duty at the rate of 22 nP per kilogram. though the former was chargeable under item 17 (3) and the ia'tter under item 17 ( 4) of the First Schedule to the Act.
The Finance Act of 1961 raised the excise duty payable under item 17 ( 4) to 35 nP per kilogram with effect from March 1, 1961. From March 1, 1961. c c ORIENT PAPER MILLS V. UNION (Hegde, J.)
to August 1, 1961, the excise officers levied duty on "M.G. Poster paper" under item 17 (3) i.e. at the rate of 22 nP per kilogram. In other words, during that period the excise autho-
rities treated "M. G. Poster paper" as "printing and writing paper". Subsequently, the excise authorities began to treat this paper as "packing and wrapping paper" and insisted on the appellant pay- ing duty thereon under item 17 ( 4). The appellant paid duty at that rate under protest and thereafter applied to the Assistant Collector for refund on the ground that the duty on that paper should have been levied under item 17 ( 3) and consequently the duty collected was in excess of that le viable under law.
The Assistant Collector rejected that claim. Consequently, the appel- lant went up in appeal to the Collector of Central Excise, who rejected its appeal. Then the matter was •taken up in revision to
the Government of India. The Government declined to interfere with the orders of the Collector. The orders made by the Collector in the various appeals and those made by the Government in the revisional applications are similar in all the cases.
Therefore it would be sufficient if we refer only to those made in one of the cases, viz., in C.A. 659 of 1965. The contention of the appellant before the Assistant Collector, the Collector as well as the Central Government was that "M.G. Poster paper" is a, "printing and writing paper"
and it was considered as such, by the Indian Tariff Board, in the Tariff Commission Report published in 1959 and in the specifications published by the Indian Standards Institution.
Further it was dealt as "printing and writing paper" in the annual rate contracts entered into between the appellant and the Government of India for supply of papers and paper-boards to the Government. This contention does not appear to have been examined either by the Collector or by the Central Government.
The Collector re- jected the appeals of the appellant with these observations :- "The crucial point in appeal is whether the paper declared as 'M.G. Poster paper' should be assessed as
'packing and wrapping paper, other sorts' under tariff item No. 17 ( 4) or as 'printing and writing paper, other sorts' under tariff item 17(3). The Central Board of Revenue have already made
it clear that all types of poster paper of whatever colour including white should not be treated as 'printing and writing paper' but as 'packing and wrapping paper'. As such, the Poster paper has not been wrongly
assessed. [1969] J S.CR. I have carefully gone through the available records of the case. Considering all the facts and circum- s·tanccs, I do not find any reason to interfere with the
order passed by the A.C. appealed against His order is therefore confirmed." It is seen from his order that the only ground on which the Col- lector rejected the appeals of the appcliant was that the question was covered by the direction issued by the Central
Board of Revenue-hereinafter referred to as the Board. During the pendency of !he revision applications filed before the Central Government, the Collector, in response to the notice served on him. filed his objections in writing.
In those objections he pleaded primarily two grounds in opposition to the appellant\ claim. They are: (i) that on chemical examination it was found that "M.G. Poster paper .. was "packing and wrapping paper" and (ii) ·the direction issued by the Board was binding on him. As
per its order of October 5, 1963, the Government rejected the revision applications in question with these observations :- "The Government of India have carefully consider- ed all the points raised hy the petitioners, but they regret that they do not find any justification for interfering
with the order in appeal. The Revision Applica!ion is accordingly rejected." The order in question is by no means a speaking order; it is not possible to spell out from that order the reasons that persuade<) the Government to reject the revision applications.
The bcs1 that can be said in favour of the Government is that it thought that the direction issued by -the Board referred to earlier was decisive of the mauer. That was what was stated in the counter- affidavit filed on behalf of the Governmem of India
in these appeals. The only other reason that could have influenced the decision of the Government was the statement of the Collector tha~ on chemical examination it was found that
"M.G. Poster paper" was "packing and wrapping paper". If the Government had taken into consideration any other facts in deciding the revi- sion applications they had clearly contravened the principles of natural justice as the appellant had not been given any opportu- nity to rebut those facts.
Now it is conceded that "M.G. Poster paper" wa< never che- mically examined and the Collector's statemem to the co~trary was incorrect. It is not possible to detern1me whether the meor-
rect statement made by the Collector had or had not influenced the Government. It mav be mentioned at this stage that the appellant had specifically. complained to the Government ~hat it had not been supplied with the copy of any report rclatmg
to c ORIENT PAPER MILLS V. UNION (Hegde, J.) chemical examination of "M.G. Poster paper", nor was it given any opportunity to contest 1he correctness of the facts mentioned in that report.
Undoubtedly during the hearing of the revision applications the appellant was not informed •that the statement made by the Collector regarding the alleged chemical examination was incorrect, and that statement would not be taken into consi- deration in deciding the revision-applications.
This leaves us with the question of the directions issued by the Board. The question whether "M.G. Poster paper" is "print- ing and writing paper" or "packing and wrapping paper" is
essentially a question of fact. That had to be decided by the authorities under the Act. It was not denied before us that the Collector and the Central Government while deciding the appeals and the revision applications respectively functioned
as quasi judicial authorities. So far as the nll!ture of power exercised by the Central Government under s. 36 of the Act (revisional powers) is concerned, the matter is concluded by the decision of this Court in Aluminium Corporation of India Ltd. v. Union of India(').
Therein this Court held that the said power is a quasi judicial power. There is hardly any doubt that the power exercis- ed by the appellate authority, i.e. the Collector, under s. 35 is also a quasi judil;:ial power.
He is designated as an appellate authority; before him there was a /is between the appellant which had paid the duty and the Revenue; and his order is subject 10 revision by the Central Government.
Therefore, it is obvious that the power exercised by him is a quasi judicial power. Dr. Syed Mohammed, appearing for the respondent, did not contend-and we think rightly-that the power exercised by the Collector was not a quasi judicial power.
If the power exercised by the Collector was a quasi judicial power-as we hold it to be-that power cannot be controlled by the directions issued by the Board. No authority however high placed can control the decision of a judicial or a quasi judicial authority.
That is the essence of our judicial system. There is no provision in the Act empowering the Board to issue directions ·to the assessing authorities or the appellate authorities in the matter of deciding disputes between the persons who are called upon to pay duty and the department.
It is true that the assessing autho- rities as well as the appellate authorities are judges in their own cause; yet when they are called upon to decide disputes arising under the Act they must act independently and impartially. They cannot be said to act independen1ly if their judgment is controlled by the directions given by others. Then it is a misnomer to call their orders as their judgments; they would essentially be the judgments of the authority that gave the directions and which authority had given those judgments without hearing the aggrieved (I) C.A. 635 of 1964, decided on September 22, 1965.
[1969] t S.C.R. party. The only provision under which the Board can issue directions is r. 233 of the Rules framed under the Act. That rule says that the Board and the Collectors may issue written instruc- tions providing for any supplemental matters arising out ot these Rules.
Under this rule the only instruction that the Board can issue is that relating to administrative matters; otherwise that rule will have to be considered as ultra vires s. 35 of the Act. In Mahadayal Premchandra
v. Commercial Tax Officer, Calcutta( 1 ), this Court held that the Commercial Ofiicer while assessing certain transactions should not have solicited instruc· tions from the Assistant Commissioner, nor should he have acted on the basis. of those instructions.
It was further held that the instructions given by the Assistant Commissioner had vitiated the entire proceedings as "the procedure adopted was, to say the least, unfair and was calculated to undermine !he confidence of the pub- lic in the impartial and fair administration
of the sales tax department." In B. Rajagopal Naidu v. State Transport Appellate Tribu- nal('), this Court was called upon to consider the validity of Madras Government Order No. 1298 dated April 28, 1956 issued under s. 43-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, whercunder cer- tain directions were given to the Transport Authorities
in the · discharge of their quasi iudicial functions. The G.O. in question was struck down hy this Court. In the course of the judgment. Gaiendragadkar C:.J., speaking for the Court, observed thus :- "In reaching this conclusion, we have been influenc-
ed by certain other considerations which are both relevant and material. In interpreting s. 43-A, we think, it would be le~itimatc to assume that the legis- lature intended to respect the basic and elementary
postula1c of the rule of law, that in exercising their authority and in discharging their quasi judicial func· tion, the tribunals constituted under the Act must be left absolute!\' free to deal with the matter according to their best judgment.
It is of the essence of fair and objective administration of law that the decision of the Judae or the Tribunal mt1'1 be absolutely unfettered by any "extraneous guidance by the execu.tive or adl!1inist.ra- tive wing of the State.
If the exercise of d1scrctton conferred on a quasi judicial tribunal is controll~d by any such direction, that forges fetters on the exercise of quasi judicial authority. and the presence ?f such fetters would make the exercise of such authonty completely
inconsistent with the well-accepted notion of judic.ial process. Tt is true that law can regulate the exercise (!) [19591 S.C.R. 551. 12) fJQf4) 7 S.C.R. I. c c ORIENT PAPER MILLS v. UNION (Hegde, J.)
·•251 of judicial powers. It may indicate by specific provi- sion on what matters the tnbunals constltuted by it should adjudicate. lt may by specific provisions lay down the principles which have to be followed by the
tribunals in dealing with the said matters. The scope of the jurisdiction of 1he tribunals constituted by statute can well be regulated by the statute and principles. tor cruidance of the said tribunals may also be prescribed
~ubject of course to the inevitable requirement that these provisions do not contravene the fundamental nghts guaranteed by the Constitution. But what law and ~e provisions of law may legitinlately do cannot be penrut-
ted to be done by administrative or executive orders. Tliis position is so well established 1hat we are reluc- tant to hold that in enacting s. 43-A the Madras Legis- lature intended to confer power on the State Govern-
merrt to invade the domain of the exercise of judicial power. In fact, if such had been the intention of the Madras Legislature and had been the true effect of the provisions of s. 43-A, s. 43-A itself would amount to
an unreasonable contravention of fundamerrtal rights of citizens and may have to be struck down as unconstitu- tional. That is why the Madras High Court in dealing with the validity of s. 43-A had expressly observed that
what s. 43-A purported to do was to clothe the Gov- errunent with authority to issue directions of an admi- nistrative character and nothing more. It is somewhat unfortunate that though judicial decisions have always
emphasised this aspect of the matter, occasion did not arise so long to consider the validity of the Govern- ment order which on the construction suggested by the respondent would clearly invade the domain of quasi
judicial administration." The rule laid down in the above decisions is fully applicable to the facts of this case. It is obvious as well as admitted that both the Collector and the Central Goverrunent proceded on the basis that the direction given by the Board was decisive of the matter.
The revision applications filed before the Government were heard and decided by one of the members of the Board. He appears to have proceeded on the basis that in view of the direc- tions given by the Board nothing more need be said as to the point in dispute. It is regrettable that when administra1ive offi- cers are entrusted with quasi judicial functions, often times they are unable to keep aside administrative considerations while di'- charging quasi-judicial functions. This Court as well as the High Courts have repeatedly tried to Jmpress upon them that their two functions are separate; while functioning as quasi judicial officers they should not allow their judgment to be influenced by admi- [1969] I S.C.R.
nistrative considerations or by the instructions or directions given by theiv superiors. In this case both the Collector as well "' the Central Government have ignored the line that demarcate' their administrative duties and their judicial functions.
Dr. Syed Mohammed did not try to justify the direction given by the Board nor did he contend that that direction has any force of law. On the other hand, his main contention was that the
grounds urged before this Court were not at all taken before the Collector and the Central Government and therefore the appel- lant should not be permitted to take those grounds in this Court. We do not think that Dr. Syed Mohanuncd is right in his conten- tion.
Before the Central Government the appellant had definitely contended that no copy of the report relating to chemical exami- nation of "M.G. Poster paper" had been given to the appellant and therefore the same could not have been taken into considera- tion.
At that stage the appellant could not have known that the statement of the Collector relating to chemical examination of "M. G. Poster paper" was incorrect. As regards the validity of
the direction given by the Board, it is clear from the notes of argument maintained by the member of the Boa.rd who heard the revision applications that that contention had been taken before him, though not in the form in which it was presented before this Court. . This what we get from the notes maintained by him :- "The matter (as to whether 'M.G. Poster paper' is
'printing and writing paper' or 'packing and wrapping paper') was re-examined in detail, in consultation with all the concerned authorities, viz., the Ministry of Com- merce and Industries, the Indian Standards Institution
and the Chief Chemist. 'rhe views of Collectors of Central Excise as well as those of Collectors were also invited. Ultimately it was re-affirmed vide the Board's Jetter :-lo. F. No. 21/36/61/CXIV dated November 6,
1961, that poster paper was correctly assessable as 'packing and wrapping paper' and should continue to be assessed as such. F.M.'s approval was also secured before confirming this position.
This therefore should settle the main issue regarding the classification of the poster paper." From these notes ii is clear that at any rate the correctness of the direction issued by the Board was put in issue during the hearing of the revision applications.
That apart, we. arc clearly. of !he opinion that even if the question of the lcgali1y of the dircc!1~>n issued by the Board had not been taken before the authonttcs under the Act, as ihat direction completely vitiates the p~ocecd ings and makes a mocke"". of the judicial process. we thmk we oaght to consider the legality of that dtrcchon.
For the reasons c c ORIENT PAPER MILLS V. UNION (Hegde, J.) already mentioned, we hold that •that direction was invalid and the same has vitiated the proceedings before the Collector as well as the Government.
Both the appellant as well as the Revenue invited us to decide the case on the basis of the material on record. Ordinarily this Court does not go into questions of fact. That is 1he duty of the authorities under the Act.
We see no exceptional circumstances in this case requiring us to deviate from 1he ordinary rule. For the reasons mentioned above, these appeals are allowed and the orders of the Central Government as well as that of the Collector are set aside, and •the proceedings remitted to the Collec- tor for deciding the question whether "M.G. Poster paper" should be assessed as "printing arid writing paper" or as "packing and wrapping paper" afresh.
The respondents shall pay the costs of the appellant in all these appeals; hearing fee one set. R.K.P.S. Appeals allowed. 12Sup. C. L/68-2