Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
59. Thereafter, in paragraph 33 in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra), this Court considered and rejected the contention of the appellants therein for deciding the disqualification petition itself and observed that the facts in the said case are not similar to the facts in the case of Rajendra Singh Rana (supra). This Court also observed that the life of the Legislative Assembly in the said case would come to an end only in March 2022. It, therefore, granted relief to the extent of directing the Speaker of the Manipur Legislative Assembly to decide the disqualification petitions pending before him within a period of four weeks from the date on which that judgment was intimated to him. It also reserved a remedy to the parties to approach the Court in the event the decision was not taken within a period of four weeks.
60. Having considered the position of law as has been laid down by this Court in various judgments, we will now consider the issue that falls for consideration before us.
61. Noticing the evil of political defections, the Parliament had found it appropriate to amend the Constitution by the Constitution (Fifty- Second Amendment) Act, 1985 so as to provide for the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Bill, 1984 reads thus: “Statement of Objects and Reasons The evil of political defections has been a matter of national concern. If it is not combated, it is likely to undermine the very foundations of our democracy and the principles which sustain it. With this object, an assurance was given in the Address by the President to Parliament that the Government intended to introduce in the current session of Parliament an anti-defection Bill. This Bill is meant for outlawing defection and fulfilling the above assurance.”
62. By the said amendment, certain changes were made to Articles 101, 102, 190 and 191. Most importantly, the Tenth Schedule which provided for disqualification on the ground of defection, came to be added by the said Amendment Act. [2025] 7 S.C.R. Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
63. It will be relevant to note that, when the Bill came up for discussion before both the Houses of Parliament, the question as to “whether the adjudication of disqualification petitions should be left to the discretion of the Speaker/Chairman or to some other authority” was also extensively debated.
64. It will be relevant to refer to the speech of Shri A.K. Sen, the then Law Minister, delivered on 30th January 1985 before the Lok Sabha, which reads thus: “Shri A.K. Sen – …… Once it goes outside the control of the House, it will take years and years for the court to come to a decision, because there will be appeals and further appeals and the matter will be forgotten, like the Anti-Defection Bills of the past. Therefore, if we mean business, we must give authority to decide this serious matter to the Speaker or the chairman of the House concerned, who has been elected by the majority vote of the Hose concerned. With these words, I recommend to the House the unanimous acceptance of this Bill.”
65. It can thus be seen that the reason for entrusting this important task to the Speaker/Chairman was that, once such a disqualification petition goes outside the control of the House, it might take years and years for the courts to come to a decision due to appeals and further appeals ultimately leading to the matter being forgotten.
66. It will be relevant to refer to the speech of the then Member of Parliament Shri Rajesh Pilot, made during the same Lok Sabha debate, which reads thus: “Shri Rajesh Pilot – …….. I would also like to make a submission that when we go through this legislation and analyse it, there is a lurking fear that the Speaker may have been given authoritarian powers. The Speaker or the Chairman is elected through due process and he belongs to a party. He is elected on the ticket of a particular party and when he seeks re-election, he has to look to that party again. A legislation should be brought in the Parliament that in future nobody would contest against the Speaker and once his non-political character has been recognized, he will have to sever 1918 all connections with his political party so that nobody may contest election against him. Then he will contest election as an independent candidate and return as an independent candidate to this House. Otherwise, if such privileges are not given to the Speaker and he is under pressure from the ruling party, it is feared that the rights of the Opposition may be adversely affected.”
67. The then learned Member of Parliament expressed his fear that the Speaker may have been given authoritarian powers. He expressed that the Speaker/Chairman belongs to a particular party and is elected through due process. He also expressed his fear that, such a Speaker/Chairman has to be supported by that particular party when he seeks re-election. He, therefore, suggested enacting a legislation providing for re-election of the Speaker/Chairman without contest. He expressed that it was necessary that the Speaker/Chairman severs all connections with his political party so that nobody would contest elections against him and that he contests the election as an independent candidate and return as an independent candidate to the House. The learned Member of Parliament expressed that if such privileges were not given to the Speaker and if he was under pressure from the ruling party, the rights of the members of the Opposition may be adversely affected.
68. It will also be relevant to refer to the speech made by one of the Members Shri Priya Ranjan Das Munshi, wherein he expressed his apprehension that the petition before the Speaker could face undue delay, which reads thus: “Shri Priya Ranjan Das Munshi : ……Now, in regard to a dispute regarding a member, the matter will be referred to the Presiding Officer, but no time limit has been fixed. I would request in the next session the time limit should be fixed within which the Speaker has to announce his decision. If he keeps it pending for three to four months, it should not be allowed.”
69. The learned Member had expressed that no time limit had been fixed for the Presiding Officer to decide the issue. He suggested that a time-limit should be fixed, within which the Speaker must announce his decision. He also expressed that the Speaker/Chairman should not be allowed to keep the matter pending for three to four months. [2025] 7 S.C.R. Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
70. It will be relevant to refer to another extract from the speeches of Shri A.K. Sen, the then Law Minister delivered during the same debate, which reads thus: “Shri A.K. Sen : …..The other questions are about the Speaker’s authority. It was our clear intention from the very beginning that we are not going to allow this matter to be dilly-dallied and tossed about in the courts of law or in the Election Commission’s office. I had myself appeared in the Courts along with late Kanhaiya Lal Mishra Ji for winning our symbol. Babuji is there. He was the President of our party then. We used to go very regularly and Shri Siddhartha Shankar Ray was assisting me at that time. But the time we won back our symbol, it became worthless, because we had already won the election not on a pair of bullocks, but on a cow and a calf. Therefore, that type of delay should not be tolerated any more. We want a quick decision. If this Bill is to be effective, and if defection is to be outlawed effectively, then we must choose a forum which will decide the matter fearlessly and expeditiously. This is the only forum that is possible. With these words I commend the Motion for consideration.”
71. It can therefore be seen that the only purpose of entrusting the work of adjudicating the disqualification petitions to the Speaker/ Chairman was to avoid dilly-dallying in the courts of law or the Election Commission’s office. The then Law Minister, who was himself an eminent lawyer, referred to a matter in which he had appeared before the courts seeking restoration of his party’s rights to use a party symbol. However, by the time his party’s right was restored by the courts, his party had already won the election on another symbol. The then Law Minister expressed that such a type of delay should not be tolerated and that they wanted a quick decision.
72. It can also be seen that the Parliament decided to entrust the important question of adjudication of disqualification petitions, on account of defection, to the Speaker/Chairman expecting him to decide them fearlessly and expeditiously. As can be seen from the speeches of the then Law Minister and other Members, Parliament was conscious of the potential long delays that could arise if the petitions were left to be decided through court proceedings. To avoid such potential 1920 delays, that would defeat the purpose of the Tenth Schedule, the Parliament therefore intended to have a forum which facilitated the quick disposal of the disqualification proceedings.
73. With the experience of over 30 years of working of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, the question that we will have to ask ourselves is as to whether the trust which the Parliament entrusted in the high office of the Speaker or the Chairman of avoiding delays in deciding the issue with regard to disqualification has been adhered to by the incumbents in the high office of Speaker and the Chairman or not?
74. We need not answer this question, since the facts of the various cases we have referred to hereinabove themselves provide the answer.
75. Now, let us consider the submissions made on behalf of the rival parties.
76. It has been argued on behalf of the respondents that in view of the Reference made to a Bench of learned five Judges in the case of S.A. Sampath Kumar (supra), the question as to whether this Court can issue a direction to the Speaker to decide the disqualification proceedings in a time-bound manner should not be decided in the present proceedings. It has also been argued on behalf of the respondents that this Court cannot pass any order which would be in the nature of Quia Timet action.
77. No doubt that the Bench of learned two-Judges of this Court in the case of S.A. Sampath Kumar (supra) has referred the question with regard to the issuance of directions to the Speaker, to the Bench of learned five-Judges. However, in a subsequent case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra), a Bench of learned three-Judges of this Court found that when the Reference Order came to be passed in the case of S.A. Sampath Kumar (supra), the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Rajendra Singh Rana (supra) was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench of this Court. It will also be relevant to note that R.F. Nariman, J., who had authored the judgment in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra) was also a Member of the Bench which passed the Reference Order in the case of S.A. Sampath Kumar (supra).
78. Needless to state that in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra), this Court, after referring to various earlier judgments of this Court, has directed the Speaker of the Manipur Assembly to [2025] 7 S.C.R. Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc. decide the disqualification petitions within a period of three months from date of order.
79. In our considered view, the issue is no more res-integra.
80. The Constitution Bench in the case of Kihoto Hollohan (supra), while considering the challenge to the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule, has held that the power of the Speaker/Chairman to decide disqualification petitions under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution is pre-eminently of a judicial complexion. In the majority judgment, M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. (as His Lordship then was) held that the proceedings of disqualification were, in fact, not before the House, but only before the Speaker as a specially designated authority. The decision under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution was not the decision of the House, nor was it subject to the approval by the House. The decision operated independently of the House. It was therefore held that the decision of the Speaker/Chairman exercising power under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution does not enjoy immunity from judicial scrutiny under Articles 122 and 212 of the Constitution.
81. No doubt that the Constitution Bench in the case of Kihoto Hollohan (supra) observed that the scope of judicial review under Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution in respect of an order passed by the Speaker/Chairman under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution would be confined to jurisdictional errors only i.e., infirmities based on violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non-compliance with rules of natural justice and perversity. This Court also observed that judicial review would not be available at a stage prior to the making of a decision by the Speaker/Chairman and a Quia Timet action would not be permissible. Further, it was observed that an interference would not be permissible at an interlocutory stage of the proceedings. However, this Court made an exception in respect of cases where disqualification or suspension was imposed during the pendency of the proceedings and such disqualification or suspension was likely to have grave, immediate and irreversible repercussions and consequences. A heavy reliance is sought to be placed on the aforesaid observations by the Respondents.
82. It can be seen from the judgment of the Constitution Bench in the case of Kihoto Hollohan (supra) that what was contemplated by not permitting a Quia Timet action was to prevent the passing of 1922 an order which would have the effect of protracting, interfering or delaying the proceedings pending before the Speaker/Chairman. At that point of time, the Constitution Bench was not expected to anticipate that, in the future, situations may arise where the high constitutional functionaries, like the Speaker/Chairman, would keep the proceedings pending for years together and permit them to die a natural death at the end of the tenure of the members facing such disqualification proceedings. However, such situations have subsequently come before this Court in various cases.
83. A glaring example was the case of Rajendra Singh Rana (supra) which came before the Constitution Bench of this Court. We have already narrated the facts of the said case. In the said case, though the proceedings of disqualification and the split were pending since 4th September 2003 and 6th September 2003 respectively, the Speaker chose not to decide the disqualification petition relating to the original 13 MLAs but decided the question of split under Paragraph 3 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. Meanwhile, the petition regarding the disqualification of the original 13 MLAs was kept pending. The pendency of the writ petition before the Allahabad High Court was taken as one of the grounds by the Speaker for not deciding the proceedings pending before him. Subsequently, the matter was heard by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court. In the Full Bench, the writ petition was dismissed by the learned Chief Justice, while the other two learned Judges of the Bench took a view that the Speaker was in error in not deciding the petition seeking disqualification of the original 13 MLAs first, and instead, directly deciding the application for recognition of a split made by the 37 MLAs, which included the original 13 MLAs. Finally, the matter reached this Court. The Constitution Bench of this Court ultimately held that the Speaker had committed an error that goes to the root of the matter or an error that was so fundamental, that even under a limited judicial review, the order of the Speaker had to be interfered with.
84. This Court took into consideration the glaring facts in the case. It found that the term of the Assembly was coming to an end and an expeditious decision by the Court was warranted for the protection of the constitutional scheme and constitutional values. This Court further found that the very fact that the original 13 MLAs had given a letter to the Hon’ble Governor requesting him to call upon the Leader of [2025] 7 S.C.R. Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc. Opposition to form the Government was a ground sufficient enough to incur disqualification under Paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. This Court therefore took an unprecedented step of holding those 13 MLAs as disqualified.
85. The view taken by another Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Subhash Desai (supra) is consistent with the decisions of the earlier Constitution Bench.
86. This Court, in the case of Subhash Desai (supra), held that the Speaker of the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly was the appropriate constitutional authority to decide the question of disqualification under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. It was held that there were no extraordinary circumstances in the said case that warranted the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court to adjudicate disqualification petitions in the first instance. This Court therefore held that the Speaker must decide disqualification petitions within a reasonable period. It is to be noted that though the Constitution Bench in the case of Subhash Desai (supra) had noticed the judgment of three learned Judges in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra), it did not disapprove the view taken in the said case. On the contrary, it observed that the Speaker should act fairly, independently, and impartially while adjudicating the disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution.
87. We have also extensively referred to the judgment of learned three Judges in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra). This Court, after referring to the earlier judgments, found that what was meant by passing an order in Quia Timet action in the case of Kihoto Hollohan (supra) was passing an order injuncting the Speaker from making a decision in the disqualification petitions pending before him. It held that it did not, in any manner, interdict judicial review in aid of the Speaker arriving at a prompt decision as to disqualification under the provisions of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. It was observed that the Speaker, in acting as a Tribunal was bound to decide the disqualification petitions within a reasonable period.
88. In the present case, the Appellants in the lead matter namely Padi Kaushik Reddy and Kuna Pandu Vivekanand filed separate disqualification petitions before the Telangana State Legislative Assembly on 18th March 2024, 2nd April 2024 and 8th April 2024. 1924
89. Since the petitions for disqualification filed by the Appellants/ Petitioners were kept pending before the Speaker, writ petitions were filed before the High Court.
90. The learned Single Judge, vide judgment and order dated 9th September 2024, had only asked the Speaker for fixing a schedule of hearing (filing of pleadings, documents, personal hearing etc.) within a period of four weeks. The learned Single Judge further clarified that, if nothing was heard within four weeks, then the matter would be reopened suo motu. Being aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, the Secretary of the Telangana Legislative Assembly preferred three separate appeals. Vide impugned judgment and final order dated 22nd November 2024, however, the learned Division Bench of the High Court reversed the order of the learned Single Judge.
91. When the matter was firstly listed on 31st January 2025 before this Court, taking into consideration that the learned Division Bench of the High Court had directed the disqualification proceedings to be decided within a “reasonable period”, we had asked Shri Rohatgi, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents to take instructions from the Speaker as to within how much time would the disqualification proceedings be decided by him. Thereafter, when the matter was listed on 10th February 2025, Shri Rohatgi submitted that he was not in a position to make any statement in that regard. Thereafter, upon the matter being mentioned on 20th February 2025, it was directed to be kept for hearing on 4th March 2025. On the said date, after we had heard Shri Sundaram and Shri Naidu, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants/Petitioners at some length, a hyper technical objection was raised by Dr. Singhvi and Shri Rohatgi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondents that no “formal notice” was issued in these matters and therefore the respondents could not file any reply. Though we found the objection to be totally hyper technical, in order to avoid any complications at a subsequent point of time, where a ground could be raised by the respondents claiming that the petitions were decided without following the principles of natural justice, we issued a formal notice to the respondents returnable on 25th March 2025. It is to be noted that the Speaker had issued notices to the MLAs pertaining to the lead matter only on 16th January 2025 i.e., on the next day after the lead matter was filed before this Court on 15th January 2025. Similarly, notices were issued to the remaining MLAs pertaining to the connected writ petition on 4th February 2025 [2025] 7 S.C.R. Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc. i.e., on the next day after the connected matters were heard for the first time by this Court on 3rd February 2025.
92. It could thus be seen that the Speaker did not even find it necessary to issue notices in the petitions filed by the present petitioners for a period of more than seven months and only after the proceedings were filed before this Court, did the Speaker find it necessary to issue notice.
93. The question, therefore, that we ask ourselves is as to whether the Speaker has acted in an expeditious manner, when expedition was one of the main reasons, why the Parliament had entrusted the important task of adjudicating disqualification petitions to the Speaker/Chairman. Non-issuance of any notice for a period of more than seven months and issuing notice only after either the proceedings were filed before this Court, or after this Court had heard the matter for the first time cannot by any stretch be envisaged as acting in an expeditious manner.
94. Though, we do not possess any advisory jurisdiction, it is for the Parliament to consider whether the mechanism of entrusting the Speaker/Chairman the important task of deciding the issue of disqualification on the ground of defection, is serving the purpose of effectively combating political defections or not? If the very foundation of our democracy and the principles that sustain it are to be safeguarded, it will have to be examined whether the present mechanism is sufficient or not. However, at the cost of repetition, we observe that it is for the Parliament to take a call on that.
95. In light of the facts of the present case, however, a failure to issue any direction to the Speaker, in our view, would frustrate the very purpose for which the Tenth Schedule has been brought in the Constitution. If we do not issue any direction, it will amount to permitting the Speaker to repeat the widely criticized situation of “operation successful, patient died”.
96. In any event, we find that there was absolutely no occasion for the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the High Court to have interfered with the well-reasoned order of the learned Single Judge, as learned Single Judge had only asked the Speaker to fix a schedule of hearing (filing of pleadings, documents, personal hearing etc.) within a period of four weeks. The learned Single Judge had not even issued any direction to decide the disqualification proceedings within 1926 a time-bound period. We, therefore, find that the Division Bench of the High Court has erred in interfering with the order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court.
97. We further find that as a matter of fact, there was no occasion for the Secretary, Telangana Legislative Assembly to have challenged the order passed by the learned Single Judge inasmuch as nothing adverse could be found in the said order.
98. Next, it was sought to be urged on behalf of the appellants that taking into consideration the glaring facts in the present case, we ourselves should decide the question with regard to the disqualification as was done by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Rajendra Singh Rana (supra).
99. In that respect, it is pertinent to note that all the judgments of the Constitution Bench, right from Kihoto Hollohan (supra) to Subhash Desai (supra), consistently hold that the Speaker is the authority who should decide the issue with regard to disqualification at the first instance. We are, therefore, not inclined to accede to the said request. We, however, find it appropriate to direct the Speaker to decide the petitions pending before it within a stipulated period.
100. We may clarify that we are inclined to do so in view of the specific finding of the Constitution Bench of this Court in the cases of Kihoto Hollohan (supra) and Subhash Desai (supra), that the Speaker, while acting as an adjudicating authority in Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, acts as a Tribunal amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. While doing so, we are also reminded of the finding of the Constitution Bench that the Speaker/Chairman, while acting as an adjudicating authority under Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution does not enjoy the constitutional immunity as available either under Article 122 or 212 of the Constitution.
101. We are therefore inclined to allow the present appeals/petition.
102. In the result, we pass the following order: (i) The present appeals/petition are allowed; (ii) The impugned judgment and final order dated 22nd November 2024 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is quashed and set aside; [2025] 7 S.C.R. Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc. (iii) We direct the Speaker to conclude the disqualification proceedings pending against the 10 MLAs pertaining to the present appeals/petition as expeditiously as possible and in any case, within a period of three months from the date of this judgment; and (iv) We further direct that the Speaker would not permit any of the MLAs who are sought to be disqualified to protract the proceedings. In the event, any of such MLAs attempt to protract the proceedings, the Speaker would draw an adverse inference against such of the MLAs.
103. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
104. In the facts and circumstances, no order as to costs. Result of the case: Appeals allowed. †Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan