3 S.C.R. In the result the appeals are allowed, with costs throughout. one set in Civil Appeals Nos. 389 and 390 of 1960 and one in Appeals Nos. 391 and 392 of 1960, and one hearing fee.
Appeal allowed. PADMA VITHOBA CHAKKAYYA (K. C. DAS T. L. v. MOHD. MULTAN! GUPTA., J. R. MunnoLKAR and VENKATA.RAMA AIYA.R, JJ.) Adverse Possession-V svfructuary mortgagee obtaining
invalid sale with consent of mortgagor-Mortgagor a minor- Na ure of possession of mortgagee if altered. In I 961 R executed a usufructuary mortgage of the suit lands in favour of M. Later, in 1923 he executed a sale deed of the same lands in favour of Rajanna, uncle of the appel· !ant. The appellant and Rajanna formed a joint Hindu
family. As there was difficulty in obtaining possession by Rajanna, he R and M entered into an arrangement under which the sale deed was cancelled by making endorsements on the back of it and the lands were sold by R ti} M. Rajanna died in 1930 as a minor, and in 19H the appellant brought a suit aga.inst M for possession of the lands ori the ground that the cancellation of sale deed of 1923 was ineffective as it was not registered and that accordingly the sale deed in favour of M passed no title to him. M pleaded adverse possession on
account of the invalid sale in his favour. The suit for posses- sion was dismissed on the ground that the appellant had filed the suit more than three years after attaining majority.
Held, that though the suit for possession was time barred the appellant could maintain a suit for redemption if M had not prescribed title by adverse possession. M who had entered into possession as a mortgagee could acquire title by prescrip- tion if there was a change in the character of his possession -I
under an agreement with the owner. The endorsement of cancellation on the sale 'deed taken along with the sale deed Wao1ri1 Raymon· ti: Co.,. (India) Poi. I.Id. A.i)ar J. .196t M<1y4.
Pairna Vilhoba Chakt'!'ya v. Mo/!&. Multani in favour of M were admissible to show the character of posses::iion of M. This arrangement would clearly show that the possession of .M was adverse provided Rajanna was not
a minor and was capable of giving his consent. Though, in certain circumstances there could be adverse possession against a minor, possession lawful at the inception could not become adverse under an arrangement with a minor.
A minor was in law, incapable of givii1g consent, and there being no consent, there could be no change in the character of possession which could only be by consent and not by unilateral action.
Kanda Sami Pillai v. Chinnabba (1920) l.L.R. 44 Mad. 253 and Varatha Pillai v. Jee•arat/inammal (1918) LR. 46 l.A. 285. relied on. Sitharama Raju v. Subba Raju, (1921) I.L.R,. 45 Mad,
361, referred to. CrvIL APPELLATE JurusDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 620 of Hl60. Appeal by special leave from the judizement and decree dated February 11, 1954, of the former Hvderabad High Court in Second Appeal Suit No.
476/4 of 1954 Fasli. G()]lal Singh and R. 8. Narula, for the appellant. A. Ranganatham Chetty, A, V. Rangam, A, Vedavali and P. C. Agarwnla, for respondent No. 1. 1962. May 4. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by VENKATARAll!IA AIYAR, J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the High Court of Hyderabad whereby it affirmed the judg- ment of the Court of the Additional District Judge
of Adilabad dismissing the suit of the appellant. The facts are that there was a joint family consist- ing of one Chakkayya and his younger brother Rajanna. Chakkayya died in year 1923 leaving
8 S.C.R. .231 behind the appellant his son who it is said was at that time a minor a few months old. On December 21, 192:3, Rama Rao second defendant, sold the lands which are the subject-matter of the suit to
Rajanna. It appears that as there was some difficulty in Rajanna getting possession of the pro- perties which were stated to have been usufruct- uarily mortgaged to the first defendant, the
transaction of sale was cancelled and th"e same was endorsed on the sale deed. Thereafter the second defendant executed a fresh sale deed in favour of the first defendant and the latter
has ever since continued in possess{on. The iJ-ppellant filed the present suit on February 14, Hl4:J,. for recovery of possession of these pro- perties from the first defendant on allegation that.
the first defendant wa.s in management of the properties belonging to the joint family of Chak- kayya and Rajanna and himself, that the sale deed in favour of Rajanna dated December 21, 1923,
vested title to the suit properties in the joint family, that the first defendant had entered on the management of these I roperties also as manager on behalf of the joint family, that Hajanna died in
1U30 as a minor, that the first defendant was dis- charged from the management in 1933, that he had not surrendered possessiou of the suit properties to t.he family, but was setting up a title to them in
himself on the basis of a sale deed executed by the second defendant subsequent to the sale deed dated December 21, 192;~ in favour of Rajanna, but that the said sale deed could confer no title on him, as
the second defendant had sold the lands pre- viously to Rajanna, and had no title which he could thereafter convey. It was further alleged that the plaintiff became a major some time in June 1940
and that the suit for possession was within thn e years of his attaining majority a.nd not barred by -limitation. The first defondant contested the suit. :e;e pleaded that he was merdy a jawa.n or servant
J961 Parlma JI ilh,b" Chakkoy_i• · v. Mohd. Mullani 196t Padma Vithoba Ohakkayya Ha!rd. Mu.ltani Aiyar J. in the service of the family, that he ~as not in management of the joint family properties, that the
suit lands had been uoufructu>irily mortgaged to him in 1916 for Rs. 800 f · long before they were sold to Rajano<i. in 1923, that the sale in favour of Rajanna had been cancelled with his consent he having been
paid back the ~onsideration, that it was thereafter that the second defendant sold the properties to him, and that he had therefore acquired a good title to them, and that further as he had been in
possession of the properties thereafter for over the statutory period in assertion of a title as owner, he had acquired title to them by prescription and that the suit was. barred by limitation. He denied that
Rajanna was a minor at the relevant dates as stated in the plain. On these pleadings the District Munsiff framed the following issues : – Fl Whether according to the suit (plaint), the suit lands have been sold by
defendant No. 2 in favour of Padma Rajanna through registered sale deed dated 17th Bahman 1:>34-F (corresponding to 21st Dec. 1923)? (2) Whether as stated by the plaintiff in his suit, the family of the plaintiff and
. Padma. Rajanna waH joint ? And whether on account of the death of the said Rajauna, the plaintiff is entitled to the suit lands ? (3) Whether the defendltnt No. 2 has executed the sale deed dated 3 Farwardi 1334-F
(corresponding to 4th February 1925-AD) and what is its legal effect on the sale deed dated 17th Bahman 1334-F. (corre'sponding to 21st December 1923) ? (4) Whether at the time of the execu:
tion of the sale deed dated 3rd Farward1 1334-F (21. 12. 1923) the.plaintiff was minor? And whether' this suit is within limitation ? a s.c.R. (5) To what relief are the pa1ties entit-
led to? The learned District Munsiff, Nirmal, who tried the suit held that as the endorsement of thti cancellation of the sale deed in favour of Rajanna was unregistered, no title pasr,ed to the second
defendant by reason of that endorsement and that accordingly the sale by him in favour of the first defendant conferred no title on him and further that the suit had been instituted within three years
of the plaintiff's attaining majority and that it was in time and so he decreed the suit. Against this Judgment and decree there was an appeal by the respondents to the Additional District Court of
Adilabad, which held that the plaintiff had not est· ablished that he had attained majority with.in three years of the suit and on the finding the ~ppeal was allowed. The appellant took the matter in second
appeal to the High Court of Hyderabad which agreeing with the District Judge, held that the suit was instituted more than three years after the plaintiff had attained majority and dismissed the
appeal. It is against this Judgment that the present appeal by special leave has been filed. The first contention that is urged on behalf of the appellant is that the finding that the plaintiff had
attained majority more than three years prior to the suit was erroneous. But there a.re concurrent findings on what is a question of fact, and we see no sufficient reason to differ from them.
The contention strongly urged by Mr. Gopal Singh in support of the appeal is that the first defendant had been put in management of all the properties belonging to the plaintiff's family
and that having entered into the possession of the suit lands as mana.ger on behalf of the family, it was not open to him to set up a. title by adverse pcssession, unless he first surrendered possession of
Pad"la Vil hob a Ghakkayya, v. Mohd. Mu/tani A!Jlar J, Podma Vithob~ Ch11k.ka.J.-,a v •. Mohd; Alultuni the properties. On this point the learned Judges of the High Court held that there was no satis-
factory proof-that the. first defendant had been in management of the properties as agent of the plaintiff and his family. The contention of the appellant is that there is a large body of evidence
in support of the allegations in the plaint that the fint defendant \\as not a mere servant but mana· get· of the properties, that he had not. gone into the box and denied them and that under
the circumstances it must be held that he entered into possession of the properties as manager and it was not competent for him to set up a claim by adverse possession. The respondent argms that he was merely a
jawan in the service of the family of appellant and that he had nothing to do with the management of the properties and that as there was no evidence worth the name in support of the allegations in the
·plaint, there was no need for him to enter into the box and give evidence that he was not in manage· ment of the lands. If the fact of this appeal turned on a determination of this question, we should, on
the materials before us, feel considerable difficulty . in agreeing with the decision of the learned Judges, The failure of the first defendant to go into the box would have been sufficient to shift the burden of
proving that he was not the manager on to him, Vide Murugesam Pillai v. ManickavasakaPandara(l) and Guruswami Nadar v. Gopalaswami Odayar (2). · .But then it is pointed out by the respondent
that the suit lands had come into his possession under a usufructuary mortagage executed by the second defendant in 1916, that there was no allega· tion that this mortagage was obtained by him while
he was the manager of the family properties or on (I) [1917) L.R. 441.A. 98. (2) [1919] !.L.R. 42 Mad. 629. 3 S.C.R. 23~ behalf of the family, and that when once his posses- sion has been traced to the usufructuary m Jrtg1ge
of 1916, th3re could b3 no que'ltion thereafter of his havin<1 entered into possession of the properties as manag~r on behalf of the family. Before us the appellant did not dispute the truth of the usufructu-
ary mortgage in favour of the first respondent nor did he contend that in taking that mortgage the first defendant acted on behalf of the family. Such a contention would be· untenable as at that time
Chakkayya the father of the plaintiff and the manager of the joint family was alive. That being so the question whether the first defendant is precluded as manager from acquiring title by
adverse . possession does not arise for decision because he entered into possession of the properties in his own right as usufructuary mortgagee, On the finding reached above that the first
defendant entered into possession of the properties e.s usufructuaty mortgagee in 1916, the question is what are the rights of the appellant .. On the basis of the sale deed by the second defendant in favour
of Rajanna he would be entitled to redeem the mortgage. But the present suit is not one for redemption of the mortgage but for ejectment, and that by itself would be & ground for dismissal of
the suit. But in view of the fact that this litigation had long been pending, we consider it desirable to decide the rights of the parties on the footing that it is a suit to redeem the usufructuary mortgage,
without driving the parties to a separate action. We have now to consider the defence of the first defendant to the suit, treating it as one for redemp- tion. Now the contention of Mr. Ranganathan
Chatty for the respondent is that he had been in possession of the properties as owner ever since 1923, when the second defendant sold them to him, that he had thereby acquired a prescriptive title
to them, and that the right of the appellant to Patlm 1 V ilhiJ'14 <.'hakkaJYil. v. Mohd. Mulliini 1962 – Padmtl Vithoba, Ckalfkayy~ v. Mohd. Multani redeem was thereby extinguished. It is not disputed
that when a person gets into possessiou of proper-J ties as mortgagee, he cannot by any unilateral act declaration of his prescribe for a title by ad verse possession against the mortgagor, because in law
his possession is that of the mortgagor. But what is contended is that if the mortgagor and mortgagee subsequently enter into a transaJtion under which the mortgagee ii to hold the properties thereafter
not as a mortgagee but as owner that would be sufficient to start ad verse possession against the, mortgagor if the transaction is for any reason inoperative under the law. This contention, in our
opinion, is well founded. Though there was at one time a body of judicial opinion that when a person enters into possession as a mortgagee he cannot under any circumstances acquire a title by prescrip·
tion against the owner, the Jaw is now fairly well settled that he can do so where there is a change in the character of his possession under an agreement with the owner, vide Kanda Sami Pillai v.
Ghinnabba (1). Now the question is was there such an arrangement? The contention of the respondent is that the agreement between Rajanna and the two defendants under which Rajanna received back the
sale consideration and made an endorsement cancelling the R!lle followed, as part of the transac- tion, by the sale of the properties by the second defendant to the first defendant would be sufficient
to start ad verse possession. The endorsement of cancellation on the back y of the sale deed in favour of Rajanna dated December 21, 1923, has been held, as already stated, ·to be inadmissible in evidence as it is not register-
ed. The result of it is only that there was no retransfer of title by Rajanna to the second defen- dant, and the family would in consequence continue . to be the owner, und that is why the appellant is Y
(!) (1920) I.L.R. 44. Mad. 253. ~ S.C.R. entitled to redeem. But the endorsement, taken along with the sale deed by the second defendant in favour of the first defendant is admissible in
evidence to show the character of possession of the latter. Vide Varatha Pillai v. Jeevanathammal (1). And that was clearly adverse to the owners. The answer of the appellant to this contention is that
Raja.nna himself was a minor at the time when this arrangement is stated to have taken place and that in consequence no title by adverse possession can be founded on it. We agree that if
Rajanna was a minor when he entered into this arrangement that would not operate to alter the character of possession of the first defendant as mortgagee. The respondent contended that there
could be adverse poss~ssion against a minor in certain circumstances, !ind relied on the decision in Sitharama Raju v. Subba Raju(2 ), in support of this position. That is not questioned, but the point for
decision is whether possession lawful at the inception can become adverse under an arrangement entered into by a minor. Now a minor is in law incapable of giving consent, and there being no
consent, ·there could be no change in the character of possession, which can only be by consent, and not by any unilateral act. Therefore the crucial point for determination is whether at the time of
the cancellation of the sale deed dated December 21, 1923, Rajanna was minor or major. According to the respondent he was a major and there is evidence also on record in support of this contention.
According to the appellant Raja.nna was a minor at that time and he died a minor in 1930. On this disputed question of fa.ct there has been neither an issue framed nor evidence adduced.
Under the cir· cumstances we think it desirable that the matter should be remanded to the Court of District Munsiff for a. fresh inquiry on this questinn. The plaintiff should (I) [1918] L.R, 46 I.A. 285.
f2) ( 1921) J.L.R. 45 Mad. 361. Padma Vithoba Chakka'!;a v. Modh. Multan> i Padma ViJhobn Chakkayya v. Mohd. MulJani A(iiar J. dn remand be required to suitably aniend the plaint ..
so as to convert the suit into one fur redemption of the usufructuary mortgage of the year 1916. The first defendant will then file his written statement in answer thereto. An issue will be framed whether
Rajanna wa~ a major at the time when the sale deed was cancelk ·;. If it is held that he was a major then the pm;, ••sion of the first defendant thereafter would be adv-;rse and on the findings given by the
Courts below the suit will ·have to be dismissed as barred by limitation. But if it is held that Rajanna was then a minor, then there would be no question of adverse possession and the plaintiff wcmld be the
entitled to redeem the mortgage. The decree of the lower court is accordingly set aside and the matter remanded to the Court of the Distriot Munsi:ff for fresh disposal as stated above. Costs incurred
throughout in all the Courts will abide the result. Case remanded. "I f