PANCHAYAT VARGA SHARMAJIVI SAMUDAIK SAHAKARI KHEDUT COOP. SOCIETY LTD. AND ORS. v. HARIBHAI MEVABHAI AND ORS. JULY 19, 1996 [K. RAMASWAMY AND Q.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.] Gram Panchayat Act, 1961: Section 96(2)-Proviso and 96(4). Wasteland-Resumption of-Notice to villagers-Society consisting of C labourers and Scheduled caste persons-Request to gram panchayat for as- signment of wasteland for the pwpose of cultivating and augmentation of econo111ic c111powennent of n1e111bers of Society-{]nani111ous Resolution passed by Gram Panchayat requesting the Collector to resume land and assign it to the Society-Collector resianing the land and assigning the san1e to the Society–Challenge to resumption order on the ground that District D Collector did not issue any notice. lo the villagers before resumption of lan~Held issuance of a notice to the villagers is not wa1r"anted by the sche111e of Section 96( 4 )-In passing the Resolution as a repre>·entative body the elected members represented the interest of Gram Panchayat effecting the constitutional goal-Consequently there lVGS no obligation to issue notice to E the villagers.
Constitution of India, 1950: A1ticles 14, 21, 39(6), 46. Socio Economic justice-Stale-Duty to protect interests of scheduled castes–Econon1ic e1n1Jowennent of the poor. Madhu Kislnvar & 01~. v. State of Bihar & Ors., JT (1996) 4 SC 379; Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. &Anr. v. U11i01i of India & Ors. Etc., JT [1996] 4 SCC 555; Consumer Education & Research Centre & Ors. v. Union of India & 01~., [1995] 3 SCC 42 and Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar v. Vishwanalh Pandu Barde and Anr., JT (1995) 3 SC 563, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 9888 of 1996. From the Judgment and Order dated 24.1.94 of the Gujarat High Court in L.P.A. No. 33/94 in S.C. Application No. 6051 of 1986. R.P. Bhatt, Ms. N. Singh, Mrs. H. Wahi for the Appellants. Yashank A<lhyaru for J.M. Nanavati, Associates.
The following Order of the Court was delivered : Leave granted. Though notice was served on the respondents – the first and the fourth respondent), the 1st respondent is not appearing either in person or through counsel; equally, 4th respondent through counsel. We have heard the counsel for the appellant as well as for the Stale. The undisputed facts are that the appellant-Society consists of labourers and Scheduled Caste person belonging lo the village Khardosan in Decsa Taluka of Banaskantha District of Gujarat State. The appellant- .society had requested the Gran1 Panchayat lo recommend t.o the Di.strict Collector for assignment of 300 acres of gaucher land (waste land) vested in the Ci-r<.nn Panchayat for the purpose of cultivation and augmentation of D economic empowerment of the members of the appellant-Society. The Gran1 Panchayat had unanimously i;esolvcd and requested the Collector to resume the land and assign it to the appellant. The District Collector in response thereto had resumed the land and assigned lhe same to the appellant. Calling the order of the District Collector in question a Review E Petition was filed before the Government by the first respondent. The Government by order dated August 20, 1986 set aside the order on the ground that District Collector did not issue any notice to the villagers before its resumption. When the writ petition came to be filed, while upholding that the waste land was required lo be resumed by the Collector for public purpose of assignment to the rural labourers belonging to backward classes and Scheduled Caslcs, the High Court directed the Collector to give notice lo the villagers and to consider their objections and to pass order afresh thereafter. On appeal, by the impugned order dated January 24, 1994 in Appeal No. 33/94, the Division Bench confirmed the same. Thus this appeal by special leave.
1-1 The question that arises for consideration is : whether notice to the villagers in mandatory under Section 96( 4) of the Gram Panchayat Act. 1961 (for short, the 'Act') ? Section 96 reads as under :
"96. Government may vest certain lands in Panchayats – (1) for lhe purpose of this Act, the State Government may subject lo such Pt\NC11A YATVARGASHARMAJ!VJ S.S. KHElJLTTCO.OP SUCY. LTD.1·. HAIUBHAI MEVABHAl c~Jndilions and restrictions as it n1ay think fit to irnpo~c, vest in a A Pancln1.yat open sites \Vastc, vacant or grazing lands or public roads, streets, bridges, ditches, dikes and fences, \Vellsi river-beds tanks, strean1s, lakes, nallas, canals, \Vatcr-courses, trees or any other property in the gram or nagar, as the case rnay by, vesting in the (Jovernment.
(2) Sub.iecL lo any conditions anJ restrictions imposed by the State Government imposed by the Slate Government under sub-section (1) and wilh the previous sanction of the Collector, a panchayal may discontinue or stop up any such public roaJ or street vested in it by the State Government, but \vhich is no longer required as public roaJ or streel and may lease or sell any such land therefore used for the purposes of such public road or street.
Provided that one months before it is decided to stop up or discontinue such public road or street, the Sarpanch or Chair1nan c as the case may be, shall, by notice signed by him and affoed in lhe parl of the puiJiic road or street v.'hich is proposed to discon- tinue or stop up, and published in such other manner as is prescribed, inforn1 the residents of the gram or nagar as the case may be~ of the said proposal and consider any objections in \Vriting made thereto; the notice shall indicate the alternative route, if any, E which it is proposed to provide or which may already be in existence.
(3) Whenever any public road or street or any part thereof has been so discontinued or stopped up, reasonable compensation shall be paid lo every person who was entitled to use such road or street or part thereof, other\vise then as a mere member of the public, as a means of access lo or from his property and had suffered dam<lge fron1 such discontinuance or stopping up, and the provisions in the Bombay Highways Act, 1955, (Born. LV of 1955) in relation to the a,ssess1nent, apportionn1ent, and payn1ent of G compensation shall, mulatis mutandis apply thereto as they apply in relation to the closure of a highway under section 52 of that Act. ( 4) Where any open site or \Vaste, vacant or grazing land vesting in Government has been vested by Govcrnn1ent in a pancl1ayat wheiher before or after the commencement of this Act, then it H shall be lawful for the Stale Government to resume al any time such site or land, if it is required by il for any public purpose. Provided that in case of any improvement of such site or land made by the Panchayat or any other person, the panchayat or person, as the case may be, shall be entitled to compensation equal lo the value of such improvement and such value shall be deter- mined in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894."
The land belonging to the Government was vested in the Gram C Panchayat for one of the purposes enumerated in Section 96, which en- visages resumption of land for any public purpose. When the land was no longer needed for a public road or a street, the Sarpaneh or the Chairman, as the ease may be, was enjoined under proviso to sub-section (2) to cause a notice signed by him affixed in any part of the public road or a street which was proposed to be discontinued or stopped and to give due notice to the villagers in the prescribed manner or indicating an alternative route, if available or if it has fallen to disuse. After considering the objections, if any, the Gram Panchayat is required to pass a resolution in writing for the discontinuation or disuse of the public road or a street.
Relying thereon, it is contended for the State that notice under sub-section ( 4) is also implicit when an open site or waste, vacant or grazing land vests in the Government but in the management of the panchayat is sought to be resumed; notice to the villagers or the affected persons is necessary before resumption by the Collector. Since such notice was not F given, the resumption of land by the Collector is bad in law. We find no force in the contention.
It is fairly conceded by the learned counsel for the State that by operation of Article 46 read with Article 39(b) of the Constitution the material resources of the State should be so distributed as to subservc the common good. Article 46 enjoins that the State shall promote with special care the economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, in particular, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. Consequentially, Preamble of the Constitution assures socio economic justice to every citizen to provide dignity of person.
PANCl IA YATVAROA SHARMAJIV! S.S. KHEDlJl'CO.OPSOCY. LTD.•~ HARIBHAI MEVABHAl 779 In Madhu Kishwar & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., JT (1996) 4 SC A 379 it was held that agricultural land is the foundation of a sense of security and freedom from fear. Assured possession is a lasting road for develop- ment, intellectual, cultural and moral and also for peace and harmony. Agriculture is the only source of livelihood for the tribes and rural poor to provide them social justice and status.
Jn Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. &Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. Etc., JT (1996) 4 SC 555 a Bench of three Judges to which we were members had held that "Social justice is the· comprehensive form to remove social imbalances by law harmonising the rival claims or the interests of different groups and/or sections in .the social structure or indi\iduals by means of C which alone it would be possible to build up a welfare State. The ideal of economic justice is to make equality of status meaningful and the life worth living at its best removing inequality of opportunity and of status – social, economic and political. Right to cultivation of agricultural land was held to be a socio- economic justice to an agriculturist as fundamental right. A Bench of three Judges of this Court in Consumer Education & Research Ce11tre & Ors. v. Union of India & On·., [1995] 3 SCC 42 held social justice is the arch of the Constitution to ensure life to everyone to be me;rningful and livable with human dignity. Jurisprudence is the eye of law giving an insight into the environment of which it is the expression. It relates the law to the spirit of the time and makes it richer. Law is the ultimate aim of every civilised society, as a key system in a given era, to meet the needs and demands of its time. Justice, according to law, com- prehends social urge and commitment. Justice, liberty, equality and frater- nity are supreme constitutional values to establish that egalitarian social, economic and political democracy. Social justice, equality and dignity of person are cornerstones of social democracy. Social justice consists of diverse principles essential for the orderly growth and development of personality of every citizen. Justice is the generic term and social justice is its facet, a dynamic device to mitigate the sufferings of the disadvantaged G and to eliminate handicaps so as to elevate them to the level of equality to live life with dignity of person. Social justice is not a simple or single idea of a society but is an essential part of complex social change to relieve the poor etc. from handicaps, penury, to ward them off from distress and to make their lives livable for greater good of the society at large. Social justice, there[ore, gives substantial degree of social, economic and political H !..'.quality, \vhich is the constitullonal right of every citizen. In para 1.9, it \Vas further elaborated that social justice is one of the disciplines of justice which relates to the society. What is due cannot be ascertained by an absolute s1andard which keeps changing depending upon the time, place and circumstances. The constitutional concern of social justice, as an elastic continuous process, is to i-ransform an<l accord justice to all sections uf the society by providing facilities and opportunities to remove handicaps and llisabilities with which the poor etc. are languishing. It aims to secure dignity of their person. It is the duty of the State to accord justice to all members of the society in all facets of human activity. The concept of social justice embeds equality to flavour and enlivens practical content of life. C Social justice and equality are complementary to each other so that both should maintain their vitality. Rule of law, therefore, is a potent instrument of social justice to bring about equality in result. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights envisions that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and each should act towards one another D in a spirit of brotherhood.
In that case the question was : whether right to social security is a fundamental right of workman? To make the life of the workman worth living with health, right to health was held to be a fun- damental right and it is the duty of the State and the employer to provide facilities and opportunities for ensuring sustained good health and leisure to the workman as a facet of right to life under Article 21. Social democracy means a way of life which recognises liberty, equality and fraternity as principles of life. They are the trinity. One cannot diverse one from the other. Without equality, liberty would produce supremacy of the few over the many. Equality without liberty would denude F the individual of his initiative to improve excellence. Without fraternity, liberty and equality would not nurture as their natural habitat. Social and economic justice is a constitutional right enshrined for the protection of the society.
The right to socio-economic justice in the trinity, the Preamble, Fundamental Rights and Directives is to make the quality of life of the disadvantaged people meaningful. Equal protection in Article 14, there- G fore, requires affirmative action by the State to those unequals by providing facilities and opportunities.
Gandhiji, the Father of the Nation, on the eve of independence had stated that "independence did not mean freedom from British Rule by ]-J breaking the bonds of slavery but it meant more than that. It meant justice . PANCHA YATVARGASHARMAJJVI S.S. KHEDUTCO.OP SOCY. LTD. v. HARJBHAl MEVABHAl to all citizens of India, irrespective of religion, caste, creed or language, each getting his legitimate due".
It was held in Dabnia's case (supra) thal social and economic justice to the agriculturists is the fundamental right. It was further held that social justice forms the basis of stability in socie1y. Econon1ic justice means the abolition of those economic conditions which ultimately result in the ine- quality of economic values among men. It means to establish a democratic way of life built upon socio-economic structure of the society to make the rule of law dynamic.
In Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar v. Vishwanath Pandu Barde & Anr., JT (1995) 3 SC 563 it was held that welfare is actually a from of liberty inasmuch as it liberates men from social conditions which narrow their choices and brighten their self-development. In paragraph 17, it was held that "providing adequate means of livelihood for all the citizens and dis- . tribution of the material resources of the community for common welfare, enable the poor, the Dalits and tribes, to fulfil the basic needs to bring about a fundamental change in the Indian structure. Therefore, the State should see the socio-economic democracy taken strong roots and become a way of life. The State, therefore, is enjoined to provide adequate means of livelihood to the poor, weaker sections of the Society, the Dalits and tribes and to distribute material resources of the Community to them for common welfare etc. The socio-economic justice was held to be fundamen- tal right of the poor. Economic empowerment was, therefore, held tn be basic human right and the fundamental right as a part of right to live \vith equality of status and of dignity.
c Economic empowerment of the poor, in particular the Schedukd Castes and Scheduled Tribes, as is enjoined under Article 46, is a constitu- tional objective as basic human and fundamental right to enable the labourer, Scheduled Castes and Tribes to raise their economic empower- ment. When the appellant-Society had requested for assignment of the G waste land vested in the Gram Panchayat, the Gram Panchayat undoub- tedly passed a unanimous resolution requesting the Collector to resume the land for assignment to the appellant-society. Since, the Gram Panchayat as a representative body passed the resolution, it would be obvious that the elected members represent the interest of the Gram Panchayat for effecting the constitutional goal. When the Gram Panchayat H in turn passed the resolution for the Said purpose, there \Va~ not obligation to i:.sue notice to th~ villagers. 'J'hat apart: the schc111~ of Section 96 is cl~ar.
The legislature is cognizant of the fact \Vhen public ro(:l<l or street i:>: sought to be discontinued or closed, public is likely to be effected, Sarpanch or Chairman acting on behalf of Gram Panchayal etc. is enjoined by the B proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 96 to issue notice to them. It specifi- cally enjoins the Sarpanch or the Chairman, as the case 1nay he, lo cause a notice to be issued in the prescribed manner, before passing a resolution so that the affected users would have an opportunity lo put in their objections for consideration by the Gram Panchayat. But when the waste land or open site or vacant land or grazing land vested in the State was C sought to be resumed from the Gram Panchayat by the Collector for another laudable public purpose, then silence of issc1ancc of notice is eloquent. Requirement of hearing the villagers is not insisted. The legisla- ture did not intend issuance of notice to villagers.
It is contended for the State that in a case where the Gram Panchayat sought to pass a resolution D requesting the Collector to resume the land in the possession and enjoy- ment of a person and when the resumption affects such a person, the issuance of prior notice to such affected person should be implicit. We need not .go into that question since that question does not arise in this case. Under these circun1stances, the vie\\' of the Government, learned single ,ludge and the Division Bench of the High Cou!l for issuance of a E notice to the villagers is dearly not warranted by the scheme of Section 96(4) of the Act.
The appeal is accordingly allowed. The orders of the High Court and the Goverrunent stand set aside and that of the District Coliector stands restored. No. costs. T.N.A. Appeal allowed.