Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
47. While the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act specifically mentions commission of rapes against SC & ST women as a form of atrocity committed against the SC & ST communities, it does not specifically articulate the distinct disadvantage women of these communities face on account of casteism, patriarchy and poverty at the same time. Shreya Atrey notes that while the anti-caste movements began in early 1900s and saw active participation of SC & ST women, their oppression was imagined only on the basis of caste rather than patriarchy43. On the other hand, the mainstream feminist movement also failed to take into consideration the specific forms of oppression that SC & ST women face not only at the hands of upper caste men but also upper caste women. To reframe the words of the Combahee River Collective Statement, a classic text in US anti-racist feminism – the SC & ST women struggled together with SC & ST men against casteism, while they also struggled with men about sexism.44 Adrija Dey in her work has specifically highlighted that class, caste, geography and religion play a pivotal role in how gender violence is perceived and how punishments are meted out in the criminal justice system.45 How pervasive sexual violence is against women from SC & ST community is emphatically stated by V. Geetha in extract her book titled ‘Undoing Impunity’: “As for sexual violence, Dalit women activists understood it to be part of a continuum of violence that Dalit women experienced: in a life-world where food, water, clean living spaces are routinely denied to Dalit women, where their labour was exploited, and no protection available in their places of work, where to be in bondage to a landlord or petty trader was commonplace, and at all times 43 SHREYA ATREY, INTERSECTIONAL DISCRIMINATION, Oxford University Press) 2019, p. 69. 44 Combahee River Collective, The Combahee River Collective Statement, in HOME GIRLS: A BLACK FEMINIST ANTHOLOGY, Barbara Smith ed., (New York: Kitchen Table/ Women of Color Press, 1983; reprint, New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press 2000) 267. The original quote read, “We struggle together with Black men against racism, while we also struggle with Black men about sexism.” 45 A. Dey. ‘Others’ Within the ‘Others’: An Intersectional Analysis of Gender Violence in India, Gender Issues 36, 357–373 (2019). PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.] they are viewed as sexually available, and humiliated in their bodily being, sexual violence emerged as not an exceptional act of violence, but the most concentrated expression of a fundamental animus against Dalits”46
48. The above discussion highlights the social and economic context in which sexual violence against women from SC & ST communities occurs. This contextualized legal analysis has to be adopted by the Court which is sensitive to the nature of evidence that is likely to be produced in a case where various marginalities intersect. In the present case, a distinct individualized experience for PW2 is created on account of her gender, caste and disability due to her association with wider groups that face a societal disadvantage. C.4 Section 3(2)(v) of SC & ST Act
49. Section 3(2)(v) of the SC and ST Act as it stood at the material time read as follows: “3. Whoever not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe … (v) commits any offence under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more against a person or property on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member, shall be punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine;”
50. Under Section 3(2)(v), an enhanced punishment of imprisonment for life with fine is provided where (i) The offence is committed by a person who is not a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe; (ii) The offence arises under the Penal Code and is against a person or property and is punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more; and (iii) The offence is committed “on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe” or such property belongs to such a person. 46 V. Geetha, UNDOING IMPUNITY: SPEECH AFTER SEXUAL VIOLENCE, (Zubaan, 2016), Chapter 11. The key words are “on the ground that such person is a member of a SC or ST”. The expression “on the ground” means “for the reason” or “on the basis of”. The above provision (as it stood at the material time prior to its amendment, which will be noticed later) is an example of a statute recognizing only a single axis model of oppression. As we have discussed above, such single axis models require a person to prove a discrete experience of oppression suffered on account of a given social characteristic. However, when oppression operates in an intersectional fashion, it becomes difficult to identify, in a disjunctive fashion, which ground was the basis of oppression because often multiple grounds operate in tandem. Larrisa Behrendt, an aboriginal legal scholar from Australia, has poignantly stated the difficulty experienced by women facing sexual assault, who are marginalised on different counts, to identify the source of their oppression: “When an Aboriginal woman is the victim of a sexual assault, how, as a black woman, does she know whether it is because she is hated as a woman and is perceived as inferior or if she is hated because she is Aboriginal, considered inferior and promiscuous by nature?”47
51. Being cognizant of the limitation of Section3(2)(v) – as it stood earlier – in dealing with matters of intersectionality, we are however bound to apply the standard that has been laid down in the law. The expression “on the ground” was considered in a two-judge Bench judgment of this Court in Dinesh Alias Buddha v. State of Rajasthan48, where the Court speaking through Justice Arijit Pasayat held: “15. Sine qua non for application of Section 3(2)(v) is that an offence must have been committed against a person on the ground that such person is a member of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. In the instant case no evidence has been led to establish this requirement. It is not case of the prosecution that the rape was committed on the victim since she was a member of Scheduled Caste.”
52. The Court held that in the absence of evidence to that effect, the offence under Section 3(2)(v) would not stand established. This 47 Larissa Behrendt, Aboriginal Women and the White Lies of the Feminist Movement: Implications for Aboriginal Women in Rights Discourse, 1 Australian Feminist Law Journal 1, (1993), p. 35. 48 (2006) 3 SCC 771. PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.] principle was subsequently followed in a two judge Bench judgment of this Court in Ramdas and Others v. State of Maharashtra49 where it was held that merely because a woman belongs to the SC & ST community, the provisions of the SC & ST Act would not be attracted in a case of sexual assault. This Court observed that there was no evidence to prove the commission of offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC & ST Act.
53. The contours of the terms “on the ground of” have been explicated by this Court in the following cases. In Ashrafi v. State of Uttar Pradesh50, a two judge Bench of this Court held that conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC & ST Act cannot be sustained because the prosecution could not prove that the rape was committed only on the ground that the woman belonged to the SC & ST community. This Court speaking through Justice R Banumathi held: “9.The evidence and materials on record do not show that the Appellant had committed rape on the victim on the ground that she belonged to Scheduled Caste. Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act can be pressed into service only if it is proved that the rape has been committed on the ground that PW-3 Phoola Devi belonged to Scheduled Caste community. In the absence of evidence proving intention of the Appellant in committing the offence upon PW-3-Phoola Devi only because she belongs to Scheduled Caste community, the conviction of the Appellant Under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act cannot be sustained.” (emphasis added)
54. In another judgment of this Court in Khuman Singh v. State of MP51, Justice R Banumathi speaking for this Court held : “As held by the Supreme Court, the offence must be such so as to attract the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. The offence must have been committed against the person on the ground that such person is a member of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. In the present case, the fact that the deceased was belonging to “Khangar”-Scheduled Caste is not disputed. There is no 49 (2007) 2 SCC 170. 50 (2018) 1 SCC 742 (“Ashrafi’’). 51 Criminal Appeal 1283 of 2019 decided on 27 August 2019 (“Khuman Singh’’). evidence to show that the offence was committed only on the ground that the victim was a member of the Scheduled Caste and therefore, the conviction of the appellant-accused under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is not sustainable.” (emphasis supplied)
55. In the above two extracts, this Court has interpreted Section 3(2)(v) to mean that the offence should have been committed “only on the ground that the victim was a member of the Scheduled Caste.” The correctness of this exposition. Is debatable. The statutory provision does not utilize the expression “only on the ground”. Reading the expression “only” would be to add a restriction which is not found in the statute. The statute undoubtedly uses the words “on the ground’ but the juxtaposition of “the” before “ground” does not invariably mean that the offence ought to have been committed only on that ground. To read the provision in that manner will dilute a statutory provision which is meant to safeguard the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes against acts of violence which pose a threat to their dignity. As we have emphasized before in the judgment, an intersectional lens enables us to view oppression as a sum of disadvantage resulting from multiple marginalized identities. To deny the protection of Section 3 (2) (v) on the premise that the crime was not committed against an SC & ST person solely on the ground of their caste identity is to deny how social inequalities function in a cumulative fashion. It is to render the experiences of the most marginalized invisible. It is to grant impunity to perpetrators who on account of their privileged social status feel entitled to commit atrocities against socially and economically vulnerable communities. This is not to say that there is no requirement to establish a causal link between the harm suffered and the ground, but it is to recognize that how a person was treated or impacted was a result of interaction of multiple grounds or identities. A true reading of Section 3(2)(v) would entail that conviction under this provision can be sustained as long as caste identity is one of the grounds for the occurrence of the offence. In the view which we ultimately take, a reference of these decisions to a larger bench in this case is unnecessary. We keep that open and the debate alive for a later date and case.
56. If the evidence in this case was sufficient to establish the commission of the offence on the ground that PW2 was a member of a Scheduled Caste, a fresh look at the judgments in Ashrafi (supra) and PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.] Khuman Singh (supra) would have been warranted. However, a close look at the evidence would demonstrate that the prosecution has not led evidence to prove the ingredients of section 3(2)(v). Unfortunately, there has been a serious gap in the evidence on that count. In the present case, PW11 who was the Investigating Officer deposed: “PW 1 and PW2 did not state before me that since she belongs to Schedule Caste the accused committed the offence. Part 1 C.D does not disclose in specific that the accused was handed over to the Circle. ‘Inspector of police. Witness adds by the time he reached the scene of offence the Sub Inspector and Circle inspector of police were present and the witnesses present there handed over to the accused to them in turn he instructed them to take the accused to Mahanandi Police Station. It is not true to suggest that my statement that the accused was handed over to Sub Inspector of police or Circle Inspector of police is false as accused was not present at the scene of offence.”
57. The Sessions Judge noticed the deposition of PW11. However, the Sessions Judge noted that Exhibit P-1 disclosed that PW 2 belongs to a Scheduled Caste. The Sessions Judge also observed in paragraph 39 of the judgment that PW1, who is the mother of PW2 is an “illiterate village rustic woman” and merely because she did not mention in the report or statement to the police that the accused committed the offence on the ground that PW2 belonged to the Scheduled Caste is not fatal to the case of the prosecution under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC & ST Act. The Sessions Judge has also made observations in that regard in paragraph 40 of the judgment which has been extracted earlier where he stated that the accused would not have dared to commit the crime if PW2 belonged to an upper caste community particularly in a village atmosphere. In appeal, the submission that the ingredients of the offence under Section 3(2)(v) were not established was specifically urged before the High Court. The submission was dismissed with the observation that “even otherwise still the offence under Section 376(1) of the Penal Code is made out”. Both the Sessions Judge as well as the High Court have failed to notice the crucial ingredient of Section 3(2)(v) (as it stood at the material time prior to its substitution by Act 1 of 2016)52 52 Section 3(2)(v) of the SC & ST Act, prior to its amendment, read: “(2) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, (v) commits any offence under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more against a person or property on the ground that such person is a
58. The issue as to whether the offence was committed against a personon the ground that such person is a member of a SC or ST or such property belongs to such member is to be established by the prosecution on the basis of the evidence at the trial. We agree with the Sessions Judge that the prosecution’s case would not fail merely because PW1 did not mention in her statement to the police that the offence was committed against her daughter because she was a Scheduled Caste woman. However, there is no separate evidence led by the prosecution to show that the accused committed the offence on the basis of the caste identity of PW2. While it would be reasonable to presume that the accused knew the caste of PW2 since village communities are tightly knit and the accused was also an acquaintance of PW2’s family, the knowledge by itself cannot be said to be the basis of the commission of offence, having regard to the language of Section 3(2)(v) as it stood at the time when the offence in the present case was committed. As we have discussed above, due to the intersectional nature of oppression PW2 faces, it becomes difficult to establish what led to the commission of offence – whether it was her caste, gender or disability. This highlights the limitation of a provision where causation of a wrongful act arises from a single ground or what we refer to as the single axis model.
59. It is pertinent to mention that Section 3(2)(v) was amended by the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015, which came into effect on 26 January 2016. The words “on the ground of” under Section 3(2) (v) have been substituted with “knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe”. This has decreased the threshold of proving that a crime was committed on the basis of the caste identity to a threshold where mere knowledge is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Section 8 which deals with presumptions as to offences was also amended to include clause (c) to provide that if the accused was acquainted with the victim or his family, the court shall presume that the accused was aware member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member shall be punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine” The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015, w.e.f 26 January 2016, amended Section 3(2)(v) and currently states: “(2) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, (v) commits any offence under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more against a person or property [knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member] shall be punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine”. PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.] of the caste or tribal identity of the victim unless proved otherwise. The amended Section 8 reads as follows: “8. Presumption as to offences. – In a prosecution for an offence under this Chapter, if it is proved that (a) the accused rendered [any financial assistance in relation to the offences committed by a person accused of], or reasonably suspected of, committing, an offence under this Chapter, the Special Court shall presume, unless the contrary is proved, that such person had abetted the offence; (b) a group of persons committed an offence under this Chapter and if it is proved that the offence committed was a sequel to any existing dispute regarding land or any other matter, it shall be presumed that the offence was committed in furtherance of the common intention or in prosecution of the common object. [(c) the accused was having personal knowledge of the victim or his family, the Court shall presume that the accused was aware of the caste or tribal identity of the victim, unless the contrary is proved.]”
60. The Parliament Standing Committee Report on Atrocities Against Women and Children has observed that, “high acquittal rate motivates and boosts the confidence of dominant and powerful communities for continued perpetration” and recommends inclusion of provisions of SC & ST Act while registering cases of gendered violence against women from SC & ST communities53. However, as we have noted, one of the ways in which offences against SC & ST women fall through the cracks is due to the evidentiary burden that becomes almost impossible to meet in cases of intersectional oppression. This is especially the case when courts tend to read the requirement of “on the ground” under Section 3(2)(v) as “only on the ground of”. The current regime under the SC & ST Act, post the amendment, has facilitated the conduct of an intersectional analysis under the Act by replacing the causation requirement under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act with a knowledge requirement making the regime sensitive to the kind of evidence that is likely to be generated in cases such as these. 53 Parliament Standing Committee Report on Atrocities Against Women and Children, 15 March 2021, 107 available at https://rajyasabha.nic.in/rsnew/Committee_site/ Committee_File/ReportFile/15/143/230_2021_3_14.pdf.
61. However, since Section 3(2) (v) was amended and Clause (c) of Section 8 was inserted by Act 1 of 2016 with effect from 26 January 2016 these amendments would not be applicable to the case at hand. The offence in the present case has taken place before the amendment, on 31 March 2011. Therefore, we hold that the evidence in the present case does not establish that the offence in the present case was committed on the ground that such person is a member of a SC or ST. The conviction under Section 3(2)(v) would consequently have to be set aside. C.5 Punishment under Section 376 of the IPC
62. Mr Harinder Mohan Singh, learned Counsel has submitted that as a sequel to the setting aside of the conviction under Section 3(2)(v), the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for life for the offence under section 376 needs to be modified. In this context, learned Counsel relied upon the provisions of Section 376(1).
63. Now Section 376(1), as it stood at the material time prior to its substitution by Act 13 of 2013, was substituted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1983 (Act 43 of 1983) with effect from 25 December 1983. Section 376(1) as substituted by the amendment read as follows : “376. Punishment to rape: (1) Whoever, except in the cases provided for by sub-section (2), commits rape shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may be for life or for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine unless the woman raped is his own wife and is not under twelve years of age, in which case, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both: Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven years.” Essentially, the submission which has been urged on behalf of the appellant is that under Section 376(1) as it then stood, Parliament had made provisions for: (i) A minimum sentence of seven years; (ii) The imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven years for adequate and special reasons to be recorded by the Court; PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.] (iii) A term of imprisonment extending to ten years; and (iv) A term of imprisonment for life. In the context of (iii) and (iv) above, the words used in Section 376(1) were “but which may be for life or for a term which may extend to ten years”.
64. On behalf of the appellant it has been urged that in the present case the Sessions Judge proceeded to impose a term of imprisonment for life on the basis that an offence under Section 3(2)(v) was established. If it is held that the offence under Section 3(2)(v) has not been established, the Sessions Judge, it was urged, erred in taking the view that the court was not inclined to exercise its discretion “to give lesser punishment to the accused”. In other words, it was submitted that the Sessions Judge proceeded on the basis that a sentence of imprisonment for life was the norm and there was a discretion to award a lesser punishment, which is erroneous.
65. In evaluating the submission, it is necessary to note that the Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of an offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC and ST Act and, independent of that, also of an offence punishable under Section 376(1) of the Penal Code. In considering the sentence to be imposed in respect of the two distinct offences, the Sessions Judge held that: (i) A sentence of imprisonment for life should be imposed for the offence under Section 376(1); and (ii) A sentence of imprisonment for life would have to be imposed for the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC and ST Act.
66. For the reasons which we have indicated earlier we have come to the conclusion that the ingredients of the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC and ST Act were not established. The issue which survives for consideration is as to whether the punishment of imprisonment for life in respect of the offence under Section 376(1) should have been imposed.
67. On a plain reading of Section 376(1), as it stood after its insertion with effect from 25 December 1983 by Act 43 of 1983, it is evident that a sentence of imprisonment for life is one of the sentences contemplated by the provision. The Criminal Law Amendment Act 1983 was introduced with the aim of bringing widespread amendments to the laws of rape in the country, making it difficult for the offenders to escape conviction. The stated object and purpose of the Act was: “There have been pressing demands inside and outside Parliament for the amendment of the law relating to rape so that it becomes more difficult for the offenders to escape conviction and severe penalties are imposed on those convicted. […] 2. […] The changes proposed in the Bill have been formulated principally on the basis of the following considerations:- (3) minimum punishments for rape should be prescribed;” Pursuant to the above-mentioned objective, Section 376(1) provided that except for cases covered by sub-Section (2), a person committing rape shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years. However, the proviso stipulated that the court may for ‘adequate and special reasons’ to be mentioned in the judgment impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven years. The minimum sentence of seven years could, in other words, be reduced to a lesser term only for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the judgment. This Court has time and again noted that adequate and special reasons depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. These special and adequate reasons are an exception to the rule and must be used sparingly and interpreted strictly as held by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bala54. Section 376(1) however also stipulated that the term of imprisonment “may be for life or for a term of ten years”.
68. Subsequently, in 2013, post the Nirbhaya case, the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2013 was brought into force which amended Section 376(1). The Parliament sought to take a tougher stand on crime against women and limited the discretion of the judiciary regarding imposition of sentences for offences involving rape by providing a minimum punishment of seven years and a maximum punishment of life imprisonment, without any exceptions for reduction of sentence. In 2018, Section 376 has been further amended by the Criminal Law Amendment 54 (2005) 8 SCC 1. PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.] Act 2018 (Act 22 of 2018) by which the minimum punishment has been enhanced to ten years, with the maximum punishment remaining the same.
69. Having detailed the amendments in Section 376 by the Parliament, we are cognizant that we must apply the law as it was at the time of occurrence of the crime. The range of punishment within which we must exercise our judicial discretion is the imposition of a minimum punishment of 7 years (or less on existence of adequate and special reasons), or 10 years or imprisonment for life. In determining the appropriate sentence, this Court has consistently laid down that we must of necessity be guided by all the relevant facts and circumstances including (i) The nature and gravity of the crime; (ii) The circumstances surrounding the commission of the sexual assault; (iii) The position of the person on whom the sexual assault is committed; (iv) The role of the accused in relation to the person violated; and (v) The possibility of the rehabilitation of the offender. The above factors are relevant for the determination of the quantum of punishment as held in Ravji v. State of Rajasthan55, State of Karnataka v. Krishnappa56,and State of Punjab v. Prem Sagar57 among others.
70. In addition to these factors, we must also be alive to the intersectional identity of PW2 and the underlying societal factors within which the offence was committed. PW2 is a woman who is blind since birth and is a member of a Scheduled Caste. These intersectional identities placed her in a uniquely disadvantageous position. The Chhattisgarh Pradesh High Court in Tekan v. State of Madhya Pradesh (Now Chhattisgarh)58 dealt with the conviction of a person accused of raping 55 (1996) 2 SCC 175. 56 (2000) 4 SCC 75. 57 (2008) 7 SCC 550. 58 2014 Cri LJ 1409. Physical disability has been considered as an aggravating factor in sentencing by other High Courts as well. See, for e.g.,Rabindrayan Das v. State, 1992 Cri LJ 269, Orissa High Court. a blind woman on multiple occasions, on the promise of marriage. The High Court was acutely aware of the misuse of the woman’s disability by the accused and sentenced him to 7 years of rigorous imprisonment. The conviction and sentence were later upheld by this Court59. This Court also dealt with the question of compensation to be paid to the prosecutrix and the physical disadvantage accruing to her on account of her disability. In doing so, Justice M Y Eqbal, speaking for the two-judge bench, noted: “15. Coming to the present case in hand, victim being physically disadvantaged, she was already in a socially disadvantaged position which was exploited maliciously by the accused for his own ill intentions to commit fraud upon her and rape her in the garb of promised marriage which has put the victim in a doubly disadvantaged situation and after the waiting of many years it has worsened. It would not be possible for the victim to approach the National Commission for Women and follow up for relief and rehabilitation. Accordingly, the victim, who has already suffered a lot since the day of the crime till now, needs a special rehabilitation scheme.” (emphasis supplied)
71. Similarly, we are also aware of the disadvantage faced by women (and persons generally) belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. As explained above, it is difficult and, in our opinion, artificial to delineate the many different identities of an individual which overlap to place them in a disadvantaged position of power and create the circumstances for heinous offences such as rape to occur. At this point, it would be relevant to note that a series of decisions of this Court rendered by three-judge benches60 and two-judge benches61, have stated that “socio-economic status, religion, race, caste or creed of the accused or the victim are irrelevant considerations in sentencing policy”. However, it is necessary to understand the context in which this finding was made. In all of these cases, the Court was dealing with the plea of mitigation of sentence awarded by the High Courts or the 59 (2016) 4 SCC 461. 60 State of Karnataka v. Krishnappa (2000) 4 SCC 75; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Basodi (2009) 12 SCC 318. 61 State of Karnataka v. Raju (2007) 11 SCC 490; State of Rajasthan v. Vinod Kumar, (2012) 6 SCC 770; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Santosh Kumar (2006) 6 SCC 1. PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.] lower courts on the ground of existence of ‘adequate and special reasons’ on account of the accused being a member of the scheduled caste/ tribe; belonging to a rural background; or being illiterate. It is on this count that the Court rejected such a plea given the heinous nature of the crime of rape and the gravity of the criminal act. In our opinion, these judgments do not bar us from taking a holistic view of the various intersectional identities which form a vital part of the facts and circumstances of the act and speak to the nature of the crime.
72. In the present case, several circumstances bearing on the sentence must be borne in mind. First, PW2, who was subjected to a sexual assault was blind since birth. Second, the appellant was known to the brothers of PW2, including PW3. The appellant used to visit the house in which PW2 resided with her parents and brothers. Bereft of eye-sight, PW2 was able to identify the appellant by his voice with which she was familiar. Third, shortly before entering the home of PW2, the appellant enquired of PW1 where her sons were, when he was told that they were not at home. PW1 proceeded with her chores at a public water tap. Taking advantage of the absence of the members of the family from the family home, the appellant entered the house and subjected PW2 to a sexual assault. PW1 has deposed that when she entered the house together with PW3, PW4 and PW5 she found PW2 in a nude condition on the ground bleeding from the injuries sustained on her genitals. The nature and circumstances in which the offence has been committed would leave no manner of doubt that the appellant had taken advantage of the position of the PW2 who was blind since birth. He entered the house, familiar as he was with members of the family, in their absence and subjected PW2 to a sexual assault. PW2 belongs to a Scheduled Caste. The prosecution has not led evidence to prove that the offence, as we have noticed, was committed on the ground that she belongs to a Scheduled caste within the meaning of section 3(2)(v) of the SC and ST Act. This is a distinct issue. But the fact that PW2 belonged to a Scheduled Caste is not a factor which is extraneous to the sentencing process for an offence under Section 376. It is in that context, that we must read the observations of the Sessions Judge with a robust common sense perception of ground realities. The appellant was 27 years old, a mature individual who was working as a coolie together with the brothers of PW2 for a couple of years. The nature and gravity of the offence in the present case is serious in itself and it is compounded by the position of PW2 who was a visually disabled woman. A heinous offence has been committed on a woman belonging to Scheduled Caste. The imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be faulted. D Conclusion and Summary of Findings
73. For the above reasons we have come to the conclusion that the conviction under Section 376(1) and the sentence imposed by the Sessions Judge must be affirmed. In the circumstances we order as follows: (i) The conviction of the appellant for an offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC and ST Act and the sentence imposed in respect of the offence is set aside and the appeal allowed to that extent; and (ii) The conviction of the appellant for an offence punishable under Section 376(1) of the Penal Code and the sentence of imprisonment for life is upheld. The fine of Rs 1,000/- and default imprisonment of six months imposed by the Sessions Judge and affirmed by the High Court shall also stand confirmed.
74. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
75. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. Nidhi Jain Appeal disposed of. PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]