c PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ANR. MAY 7, 1996 [M.M. PUNCHHI AND K.S. PARIPOORNAN, JJ.] SeTVice Law: Tennination of service-Ground for-Summary trial of employee for offence under S. 294 !PC-Employee pleaded guilty-Sentenced to fine of Rs. 2!>-Copy of summary register neither disclosed substance of allegations nor the words in which plea of guilt was entere~Policy decision of State Govern- ment laid down tests for detennination of moral turpitude-Held : Mere conviction Jlnder S.294 per se does not anzount to n1oral turpitude without satisfying the tests laid down in the policy decision-Provision need to be D made that punishment of fine up to a certain limit, say up to Rs. 2,000 or so, 011 summary/ordinary conviction shall not be treated as conviction at all for any purpose, especially for entry into and retention in Govemntent ser- vice-Courts should be sensitive to changing moral standards of society-Penal Code 1860, S. 294-Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, S. 264. Criminal Law :
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 : Section 264. Summary Triaf–Accused pleading guilty-Held: Magistrate not obliged to write a judgment containing a brief statement of reasons, but he must record the substance of the evidence-When substance of a/legations is not put to the accused, his entering any kind of plea is no plea legally. Penal Code, 1860 :
Section 294-lngredients-Explained. Words and Phrases: "Moral turpitude''–!lfeaning of-In the context of Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 294. The appellant was appointed in a Class IV post on ad hoc basis. H While in senice, the appellant came to be convicted in a summary trial for PAWANKUMAR v.STATE
an offence under Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code, I 860 for which he A was ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 20, which line he paid there and then. \Vhen steps \Vere afoot to regularise his services, papers \\'ere moved to the office of the Superintendent of Police to verily about the character and antecedents of the appellant. The ollice of the Superintendent of Police reported back the factum of conviction of the appellant under Section 294 B lPC, but otherwise verified that the appellant was of a good character. The services of the appellant were terrninated as no longer required. The appellant challenged the aforesaid order of termination before the civil court, which decided the case against the appellant. Tiie appellate court and the High Court in second appeal affirmed the same. Hence this appeal. c Allowing the appeal, this Court
HELD: 1.1. "Moral turpitude" is an expression, which is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connection sho\\'ing depravity. The State Govern- ·D n1ent while considering the question of rehabiHtation of ex-convicts took a policy decision that ex-con-Viets who were convicted for oll'ences involving n1oral turpitude should not, however be taken in Government service. Significantly Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is not found enlisted in the list of offences constituting moral turpitude. [398-E-F] 1.2. The copy of the summary register neither discloses the substance of the allegations put to the appellant, nor the words in which the plea of guilt was entered. It is of no significance that the appellant treats himself a convict as he had pleaded guilty. Assuming that the conviction is not open to challenge at the present juncture, one cannot but deprecate the action of the respondents in having proceeded to adversely certify the character and antecedents of the appellant on the basis of the conviction per se, opining to have involved moral turpitude, without satist)ring the tests laid down in the policy decision of the Government. All the three courts below, even when invited to judge the matter in the said perspective, G went on to hold that the acl/s involved in conviction uncier ~ection 294 IPC per se established moral turpitude. Tliey should have been sensitive to the . changing perspectives and concepts of morality_ to appreciate the effect of Section 294 IPC on today's society and its standards, and its changing view of obscenity. [399-F-H, 400-A-BJ
3Y4 1.3. The attention of the Parliament is drawn to step iu and perceive the large many cases which per law and public policy are tried summarily, involving thousands and thousands of people throughout the country appearing before summary courts and paying small amounts of tine, more often than not, as a measure of plea·bargaining. Foremost among them being tratlic, municipal and other petty offences under the India Penal Code, mostly committed by the young and/or inexperienced. The cruel result of a conviction of that kind and a tine of payment of a paltry sum on plt'a·bargaining is the end of the career, future or present, as the case may be, of that young and/or inexperienced person, putting a blast to his c
life and his dreams. Life is too precious to be staked over a petty incident like this. Irnmediatc reniedial n1easures are, therefore, necessary in raising the toleration lhnits with regard to petty otl'ences especially \\'hen tried su1nn1arily. Provision need be n1ade that punishn1ent of fine up to a certain lin1it, say up to Rs. 2,000 or so, on a sun1mary/ordinary conviction shall not be treated as conviction at all for any purpose and all the n1ore for D entry into and retention in govern1nent service. This can brook no delay, whatsoever. [ 400-C-F]
2.1. Jn order to secure a conviction the provision of section 294 IPC requires two particulars to be proved by the prosecution, i.e. (i) the offender has done any obscene act in any public place or has sung, recited or uttered any obscene songs or \\'ords in or near any public place; and (ii) has so caused annoyance to others. If the act complained of is not obscene, or is not clone in any public place, or the song recited or uttered is not obscene, or is not sung, recited or uttered in or near any public place, or that it causes nu annoyance to others, the oll'ence is not cu1n1nitted. (397-C-D] 2.2. Section 264 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 enjoins upon the Magistrate that he shall (i) record the substance of the evidence; and (ii) a judgn1ent containing a hrief staten1ent of the rt:asons for the finding. Conversely put, vrhen the accused pleads guilty, G the i\-1agistrate n1ay not be obliged to write a judgn1ent containing a brief statement of the reasons, but the Magistrate is not absolved of the obligation to record the substance of the evidence. When the substance of the allegations is not put to the accused, his entering any kind of plea is no plea legally, due to the non-observance of such procedural require- ment of utmost importance. (397-F-G]
PAWANKUMAR v. STATE[PUNCHHI,J.] CIVIL APPELLATE .JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7796 of A 19?6. From tl1c Judgment and Order dated 31.10.94 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in R.S.A. No. 3756 of 1987.
Ms. Sangeeta Kumar for the Appellant. I.S. Goyal for Ms. Indu Malhotra for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PUNCHHI, J. Special leave granted. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the Punjab and Haryana High Court passed on October 31, 1994 in Regular Second Appeal No. 3756 of 1987. It has arisen on these facts : c
The appellant, Pawan Kumar on 19.4.78 was appointed in a class IV D post as a Field Worker, on ad hoc basis, in the office of the Chief Medical Officer, General Hospital, Bhiwani, Haryana. In his terms of appointment it was .made clear that the ad hoc appointment offered was till such time his charaCtcr and antecedents \Vere verified as satisfactory, \Vhen he would be considered for Iegular appointment. He was required to give a decla- ration in writing that he had not, on any previous occasion, been dismissed from service and had not been convicted by any court of law. This decla- ration, the appellant presumably furnished.
. While in service, the appellant on 4.6.1980 came to be convicted in a summary trial for offence under section 294 !PC by the Court of Shri F P.L. Kha,nduja, Chief .Judicial Magistrate, Bhiwani on his entering upon a plea of guilt, for which he was ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 20, which fine he paid there and then, whereaftcr it was deposited in the treasury by the Chief Judicial Magistrate the same day. The appellant's appointment how- ever, in the mea.ntime was kept renewed from time to time. When steps were afoot to regularise his services, papers were moved to the office of the Superintendent of Police to verify about the character and antecedents of the appellant. The office of the Superintendent of Police reported back the factum of conviction of the appellant under section 294 !PC, but otherwise ve;ified that the appellant was of a good H character. Thereafter the opinion of the District Attorney, Bhiwani was sought.
He opined that the offence punishable under section 294 1 PC was not a serious offence \vhich could involve n1oral turpitude and the sentence of fine of Rs. 20 imposed on the appellant was not likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties and therefore there was no legal har for his retention in service. A reference \Vas also n1adc to the Legal Remembran- cer to the Government of Haryana, soliciting his opinion. This officer opined that it would not be desirable to appoint the appellant in go\'crn- mcnt service since he had been convicted under section 294 IPC, involving an offence of moral turpitude, as other\vise the very purpose of verification of character/antecedents would be frustrated. On the collection of such material, decision \Vas taken and the services of the appellant \Vere ter· minated vide order dated 30.9.J 984, as no longer required. Challenging this order the appellant went in suit for declaration before the Civil Court, describing the order terminating his services as against law, equity, good conscience, and violative of print:iples of natural justice, claiming that he continued lo be in service entitled to all benefits of service including salary etc. The State and the Chief Medical Officer resisted the suit. The only contentious issue which sprung up from the pleadings of the parties was :
"Whether the order dated 30.9.1984 about the termination of ser\'ice of the plaintiff is wrong, illegal and liable to be set aside as alleged ?" The trial court decided the said issue against the appellant. The lower appellate court on appeal affirmed the same. The High Court too in second appeal concurred with the decision of the courts below, basically on two grounds, namely, (i) that the conviction of the appellant under section 294 IPC revealed an act which per se constituted moral turpitude; and (ii) the order of termination of service, bare facedly, on its plain language was not stigmatic. All the same it was never disputed by the G defendants-respondents that since the character and antecedent verifica- tion had revealed the conviction of the appellant under Section 294 IPC, that was the reason why the services of the appellant were dispensed with and not regularised. Hence this appeal.
Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code reads as follows : PAWANKUMAR v. STATE[PUNCHHI,J.] "294. Obscene acts and songs – Whoever, to the annoyance of A others, (a) does any obscene act in any public place, or
(b) sings, recites or utters any obscene songs, ballad or words, in or near any public place, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extent to three months, or with fine, or with both.'·
In order to secure a conviction the provision requires two particulars to be proved by the prosecution, i.e. (i) the offender has done any obscene act in any public place or has sung, recited or uttered any obscene songs or words in or near any public place; and (ii) has so caused annoyance to others. If the act complained of is not obscene, or is not done in any public plac~, or the song recited or uttered is not obscene, or is not sung, recited or uttered in or near any public place, or that it causes no annoyance to others, the offence is not committed. The measure of sentence of three months imposable thereunder suggests that such offence is triable sum- marily under Section 260 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it being not an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding two years. When the accused does not plead guilty, Section 264 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enjoins upon the Magistrale that he shall (i) record the substance of the evidence; and (ii) a judgment containing a brief statement of the reasons for the finding. Conversely put, when the accused pleads guilty, the Magistrate may not be obliged lo write a judgment containing a brief statement of the reasons, but the Magistrate is not absolved of the obligation to record the substance of the evidence. Otherwise, it would be difficult to conceive as to what could the accused have pleaded to. His plea of guilt is an admission to whatever factual data c
the prosecution lays before the court about the commission of the offence. Pleading guilty by the accused lo the violation of a provision of law is no plea at all, as he would have to be confronted with the substance of the G allegation, in order to enter upon a plea, one way or the other. When the substance of the allegations is not put to the accused, his entering any kind of plea is no plea legally, due to the non observance of such procedural requirement of utmost importance.
There is a sequator lo it. Section 375 of the Code of Criminal H c Procedure provides that when the accused pleads guilty and has been convicted on such pica, there shall be no appeal, except to the extent or legality of the sentence. Section 376 of the Code of Criminal Procedure further goes to provide that where a case has been tried summarily by a Magistrate empowered to act under section 260 Cr. P.C. and passes a sentence of line only not exceeding Lwo hundred rupees, no appeal shall lie.
The totality of the situation thus is that since the appellant was tried summarily under Section 260 and has been sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 20 on his entering the plea of guilt, he could nol have filed an appeal against the same. Procedural barbs thus coil the appellant, causing reper- cussions not only to his service career but in being branded for ever as "unfit'
1 for govern1ncnt service. This is the rancour and the sting \Vhich hurts the appellant most, not the payment of fine of the paltry sum of rupees twenty, but the consequences which have visited him, due to the acl/s covered under section 294 !PC leading lo the conviction per se being treated as involving moral turpitude.
11Moral turpitude'' is an expression \Vhich is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connection shO\ving depravity. The government of Haryana while considering the question of rehabilitation of ex-convicts took a policy decision on February 2, 1973 (Annexure E in the Paper Book), accepting the recommendations of the Government of India, that ex-convicts who were convicted for offences involving moral turpitude should not however be taken in government service. A list of offences which were considered involving moral turpitude was prepared for infor- mation and guidance in that connection. Significantly Section 294 IPC is not found enlisted in the list of offences constituting moral turpitude. Later, on further consideration, the government of Haryana on 17/26th March, 1975 explained the policy decision of February 2, 1973 and decided to modify the earlier decision by streamlining determination of moral tur- G pitude as follows :
" …….. The following terms should ordinarily be applied in judging whether a certain offence involves moral turpitude or not : (1) whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could shock the moral conscience of society in general.
PAWANKUMAR v.STATE[PUNCHHI,J.] (2) whether the motive which led to the act was a base one. (3) whether on account of the act having been committed the perpetrator could be considered to be of a depraved character or a person who was to be looked down upon by the society.
Decision in each case will, however, depend on the circumstan- ces of the case and the competent authority has to exercise its discretion while taking a decision in accordance with the above mentioned principles. A list of offences which involve moral tur- pitude is enclosed for your information and guidance. This list, however, cannot be said to be exhaustive and there might be C offence which are not included in it but which in certain situations and circun1stances n1ay involve moral turpitu<lc.
Section 294 !PC still remains out of the list. Thus the conviction of the appellant under section 294 !PC on its own would not involve moral turpit11de depriving him the opportunity to serve the State unless the facts D and circumstances, \vhich led to the conviction, met the requirements of the policy decision above-quoted.
We had required of the respondents to produce before us the copy of the judgment whereby the appellant was convicted for the offence. As was expected only a copy of the institution/summary register maintained by the court of the Chief Judicial tvJ"agistrate, Bhiwani was placed before us showing that the appellant on 4.6.1980 was imposed a fine of Rs. 20. A copy of the treasury challan supporting that the fine paid was deposited by the Chief Judicial Magistrate the same day has also been produced. The copy of the summary register neither discloses the substance of the allega- tions put to the appellant, nor the words in which the plea of guilt was entered. It is of no significance that the appellant Lreats hin1self a convict as he had pleaded guilty. Ex facie it only shows that the entry concerns F.l.R No. 231/3.6.1980 under Section 294 !PC. Therefrom it is difficult to discern the steps taken in the summary trial proceedings and what had the appellant pleaded to as guilly, whether to the allegations in the FIR or to the provision of the !PC or any other particular ? Mere payment of fine of Rs. 20 does not go to show that the conviction was validly and legally recorded. Asst~ming that the conviction is not open to challenge at the present juncture, \Ve cannot but deprecate the action of the respondents in having proceeded to adversely certify the character and antecedents of the H Appellant on the basis of the conviction per se, opinion to have involved moral turpitude, without satisfying the tests laid dow!l in the policy decision of the government. We are rather unhappy to note that all the three courts below, even when invited to ,iudge the matter in the said perspective, went on to hold that the act/s involved in conviction under section 294 !PC per c
se established moral turpitude. They should have been sensitive to the changing perspecti.ves and concepts of morality to appreciate the effect of Section 294 IPC on today's society and its standards, and its changing views of obscenity. The matter unfortunately was dealt with casually at all levels. Before concluding this judgment we hereby draw attention of the Parliament to step in and perceive the large many cases which per law and public policy arc tried summarily, involving thousands and thousands of people throughout the country appearing before summary courts and paying small amounts of fine, n1ore often than not, as a measure of plea-bargaining. Foremost among them being traffic, municipal and other petty offences under the Indian Penal Code, moslly commiltcd by the young and/or the inexperienced. The cruel result of a conviction of that kind and a fine of payn1ent of a paltry ~um on plea-bargaining is the end of the career, future or present, as the case may be, of that young and/or inexperienced person, putting a blast to his life and his dreams. Life is too precious to be staked over a petty incident like this. Immediate remedial measures are therefore necessary in raising the toleration limits with regard lo petty offences especially when tried summarily. Provision need be made that punishment of line upto a certain limit, say upto Rs. 2000 or so, on a summary/ordinary conviction shall not be treated as conviction at all for any purpose and all the more for entry into and retention in government service. This can brook lJO delay, whatsoever.
As. a result of the above discussion, \Ve allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court as also that of the two courts below and decree the suit of the appellant as prayed for, \vilh costs. G v.s.s.
Appeal allowed.