Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
46. The said lease deed is executed between the parties viz. KIADB and the Company with such terms and conditions as mentioned under Clauses 5 (a) and (b) which are extracted PEERAPPAHANMANTHAHARIJAN (D) BYLRS. v. STATE531 OF KARNATAKA[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] hereunder: "5(a) The premium indicated in clause I of this agreement represents the tentative cost of land. In the event of lessor incurring the payment of amounts to the land owners over and above the awards made by the acquiring authority by B virtue of awards passed by the competent court of law or in view of the provisions of the Land Acquisition (amendment) Act. 1984 in respect of demised premises or any part thereof the same shall be met by the lessee within one month from the date of receipt of communication C signed by the Executive or any other officer authorized by the lessor. Further, in the event of lessor incurring the payment amounts to the land owners for the Malkies and structures existing on the demised premises, the same shall be met by the lessor within one month from the date D of receipt of communic;:ation signed by the Executive Member or any other officer authorised by the lessor. b) As soon as it may be convenient the lessor will fix the price of the demised premises at which it will be sold to E the lessee and communicate it to the lessee and decision of the lessor in this regard will be final and binding, on, the lessee. The lessee shall pay the balance of the value of the property, if any after adjusting the premium and the total amount of rent paid by the lessee and earnest money F deposit within one month from the date of receipt of communication signed by the lessor or any other officer authorised in this behalf by the lessor. On the other hand, if any sum is determined as payable by the lessor to the lessee after the adjustment as aforesaid, such sum shall G be refunded to the lessee before the date of execution of the sale deed." (Emphasis laid by this court)
47. On a careful examination of the aforesaid clauses of the lease agreement executed between the parties in respect of the land of the appellants, it becomes manifestly clear that the said agreement is executed by the KIADB in favour of the Company after allotment of land was made in favour of the Company as provided under Regulation 10 (a) and (c) of the KIADB Regulations respectively by following the procedure of inviting applications and submission of the applications by the interested parties along with the required deposits towards . the cost of the land. Further, Clauses 5 (a) and (b) of the lease C agreement referred to supra, would clearly state that the premium indicated in Clause (1) of the lease agreement represents the tentative cost of the land and in the event of the lessor incurring payment of amounts to the land owners over and above the awards made by the acquiring authority by virtue of the award passed by the competent court of law or in view of the provisions of the L.A. Act in respect of demised premises or any part thereof, the same shall be met by the lessee within one month from the date of receipt of the E communication signed by the Executive Member or any other officer authorised by the lessor. Clause 5(b) also makes similar provision to that effect between the lessor and the lessee.
48. From a careful reading of the aforesaid clauses of the lease agreement along with the provision Section 32(2) of the KIAD Act and Regulation Nos. 4, 7, 10 (b), (c) and (d) of the KIADB Regulations, it is clear that the Company is only the lessee by way of allotment of the land as the same has been allotted by the KIADB in its favour and has executed the lease G deed in its favour in respect of the allotted land.
49. In view of the aforesaid documents, namely, the notifications issued under Section 28(1) and 28(4) of the KIAD Act by the State Government, it can be safely concluded by us H that the acquisition of the land involved in these proceedings is for the purpose of industrial development by the KIADB in PEERAPPAHANMANTHAHARIJAN (D) BYLRS. v. STATE533 OF KARNATAKA[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] the Sedam Taluk. Therefore, the beneficiary of the acquired A land is only the KIADB but not the Company as claimed by it. A reading of Section 28 (5) of the KIAD Act makes it clear that the land which is acquired by the State Government statutorily vests absolutely with it After following the procedure provided under Sections 28 (6) and (7) of the KIAD Act, the state government takes possession of the acquired land from the owners/person/persons who are in possession of the land and traQsfers the same in favour of the KIADB for its development and disposal of the same in accordance with Regulation 1 O(a) of the KIADB Regulations, referred to supra.
50. In the instant case, a perusal of the provisions of the lease agreement executed between the parties referred to supra and Regulation 10 clauses (a), (c), (d) and (e) of the KIADB Regulations make it abundantly clear that the Company D is only the allottee-lessee of the acquired land and as per Clauses 5(a) and (b) of the lease agreement referred to supra, the premium indicated in the lease agreement in respect of the allotted land in its favour represents the tentative cost of the land. It has been further specified in the lease agreement E that in the event ofthe lessor incurring the payment of amounts to the land owners over and above the awards made by the acquiring authority by virtue of awards passed by the competent court of law in view of the provisions of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 in respect of demised premises or any part thereof, the same shall be met by the lessee within one month from the date of receipt of communication signed by the Executive Member or any other officer authorized by the lessor. In view of the above conditions G of the lease agreement, neitherthe KIADB nor the Company can contend that the acquisition of the land involved in these proceedings is in favour of the lessee Company. Therefore, the Company.is neither a beneficiary nor an interested person as claimed by them in terms of Section 2(11) of the KIADAct H (2015] 9 S.C.R. or under Section 3 (b) of the L.A. Act as per which, "person interested" includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under the KIAD Act and that a person shall be deemed to be interested in the land if he is interested in an easement B affecting the land. It is necessary to examine Section 3(b) read with Section 9 of the L.A. Act, which deals with notice to persons interested and Section 11, which deals with enquiry and award to be passed by the Deputy Commissioner/ Land Acquisition Officer. c
51. A careful reading of the aforesaid provisions of the L.A. Act, KIAD Act and the KIADB Regulations would clearly go to show that the Company is neither a beneficiary, nor an interested person in the land as on the date of acquisition of D the land, as the land was acquired by the state government in favour of KIADB who is the beneficiary and it has allotted in favour of the Company after the acquired land was transferred in its favour by the State Government and executed the lease agreement referred to supra.
52. The strong submissions made by learned senior counsel on behalf of the respondents Dr A.M.Singhvi and Mr. Basava Prabhu Patil, in interpreting the aforesaid provisions of Sections 3(b), 9, 11 and 20(b) read with Section 54 of the L.A. Act are totally misplaced and misconceived for the reason that the Company cannot be considered as "person interested" to claim interest in the compensation to be made to the owners on account of the acquisition of the land of the appellants/ owners and other landowners.
53. Further strong reliance has been placed by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the Company upon Section 3(f) (viii) of the L.A. Act, as amended by the Karnataka legislature by Act No.17 of 61 to show that the Company-is an 'interested H person' in the proceedings of determination bf the market value PEERAPPA HANMANTHA HARIJAN (D) BY LRS. v. STATE535 OF KARNATAKA[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] of the acquired land and passing of an award. Section 3 (f) A (vii~ includes the provision of land for acquisition in favour of a company- a) where the land is needed for the construction of some work, and such work is likely to prove substantially useful to the public; orb) where the land is needed by a building co- operative society or corporation for the construction of houses. The said contention of the learned senior counsel is wholly misconceived as the said provision has no application to the fact situation.
54. The acquisition of land under the provisions of the L.A. Act in favour of a Company the mandatory procedure as provided under part VII of the L.A. Act and Rules must be adhered to, that is not the case in the acquisition of land involved in these proceedings as the acquisition of land is under the provisions of KIAD Act and therefore the reliance D placed upon the provision of Section 3(f)(viii) of the Karnataka L.A. Amended Act of 17 /1961 is not applicable to the facts of the case on hand and therefore, the said provision cannot be made applicable to the case on hand.
55. The definition of "public purpose" under the L.A. Act cannot be imported to the acquisition of land by the State Government for the industrial development under the provision of KIAD Act as the words 'Development', 'Industrial Area' and 'Industrial Estate' have been clearly defined under sub- Sections(5), (6) and (7) of Section 2 of the KIAD Act which reads thus:- "(5)Development with its grammatical variations means the carrying out of levelling, digging, building, engineer- ing, quarrying or other operations in, on, over or under land, or the making of any material change in any building or land, and includes re-development; and 'to develop' shall be construed a~cordingly; (6)1ndustrial area means any area declared to be an in- dustrial area by the State Government by notification which is to be developed and where industries are to be ac- commodated; and industrial infrastructure facilities and amenities are to be provided and includes an industrial estate; c (?)Industrial estate means any site selected by the State Government where factories and other buildings are built for use by any industries or class of industries.
56. Reliance has also been placed by the learned senior counsel upon Sections 3(b), 9 and 20(b) of the LA.Act, which provisions deal with service of notice to all persons interested in the possession of the acquired land except such (if any) of o them as have consented without protest to receive payment of compensation awarded for the purpose of holding an enquiry by the Special Deputy Commissioner for determination of compensation of the acquired land. None of the above provisions of the L.A. Act supports the case of either the KIADB E or the Company. Therefore, the contention urged on their behalf that the Company is an interested person in the acquired land for determination of compensation to be paid to the landowners for their acquired land is wholly untenable and therefore, the same cannot be accepted by this Court.
57. The reliance placed upon the provisions of Sections 50 (1) and (2) of the L.A. Act, also are not applicable to the case on hand for the reason that Section 50 of the L.A. Act applies to the acquisition of land in favour of a Company by G the State Government by following the mandatory procedure contemplated under Part VII of the L.A. Act and relevant Rules framed for that purpose. Therefore, the claim made by the Company that it has got every right to participate in the proceedings for determination and re-determination of the H market value of the acquired land and award of compensation PEERAPPA HANMANTHA HARIJAN (D) BY LRS. v. STATE537 OF KARNATAKA [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] passed by the Land Acquisition Officer or Deputy A Commissioner or before the Reference Court or the Appellate Court is wholly untenable in law and therefore, the submissions made on behalf of the Company cannot be accepted and the same is rejected.
58. Further, both the learned senior counsel on behalf of KIADB and the Company have placed reliance on various decisions rendered by this Court in support of their above respective legal submissions that the Company is an interested person and therefore it has got right to participate in the C proceedings before the Reference Court for determination of compensation before passing the award either by Land Acquisition Officer or Deputy Commissioner or the Reference Court at the instance of the owner or any other interested person. These include judgments rendered by this Court in the cases of U.PAwas Evam Vikas v. Gyan Devi,(1995) 2 SCC 326, Himalayan Tiles and Marble Pvt Ltd v. Francis Victor (1980) 3 sec 223, and P Narayanappa and anr v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (2006) 7 SCC 578 and other decisions which are not required to be mentioned in this judgment as they are all reiteration of the law laid down in the above cases. The reliance placed on the various decisions of this Court by both the learned senior counsel on behalf of the KIADB and the Company, is misplaced as none of the said judgments relied upon are applicable to the fact situation in the present case for the reason that those cases dealt with reference to the acquisition of land under the provisions of the L.A. Act, either in favour of the Company or Development Authorities, G whereas in the case on hand, the acquisition proceedings have been initiated under the KIAD Act for industrial development by the KIADB. Further the original acquisition record in respect of the acquired land involved in the proceedings by the learned standing counsel on behalf of the State of Karnataka as per our directions issued vide our orders dated 17.11.2014 and 24.3.2015, do not disclose the fact that the acquisition of lands covered in the acquisition notifications are in favour of the Company. Thus, the acquisition of land in favour of the KIADB B is abundantly clear from the preliminary and final notifications issued by the state government and thereafter following the procedure under sub-Sections (6) and (7) of Section (28) of the KIAD Act, it took possession of the acquired land from the owners who were in possession of the same and was C transferred in favour of the KIADB for its disposal for the purpose for which lands were acquired as provided under Section 32(2) of the KIAD Act read with the Regulations referred to supra framed by the KIADB under Section 41 (2) (b) of the KIAD Act. Therefore, the reliance placed upon the judgments of this Court by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the Company and the KIADB, are wholly inapplicable to the fact situation and do not support the case of the Company. In view of the foregoing reasons recorded by us on the basis of E the acquisition notifications issued by the State Government under the statutory provisions of the KIAD Act and therefore, we have to answer the point nos.1, 2 and 3 in favour of the landowners holding that the Company is neither the beneficiary nor interested person of the acquired land, hence, it has no right to participate in the Award proceedings for determination of the market value and award the compensation amount of the acquired land of the appellants. Hence, the Writ Petition filed by the Company questioning the correctness of the award · passed by the Reference Court which is affirmed by the High G Court is not at all maintainable in law. On this ground itself, the Writ Petition filed by the Company should have been rejected by the High Court instead it has allowed and remanded the case to the Reference Court for re-consideration of the claims after affording opportunity to the Company which order suffers H from error in law and therefore the same is liable to be set PEERAPPA HANMANTHA HARIJAN (D) BY LRS. v. STATE 539 OF KARNATAKA[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.) aside.
59. Further, the learned Judge of the High Court has erroneously held that the allottee Company is a beneficiary of the acquired land of the 9ppellants, which finding of the learned Judge is not correct both on facts and in law. The findings and reasons recorded by the High Court in the impugned judgment in allowing the Writ Petition and quashing the award of the Reference Court and remanding it back to the Reference Court and allowing the Company to participate in the proceedings for re-determination of compensation for the acquired land is C wholly impermissible in law and the same are in contravention of the provisions of the KIAD Act, L.A. Act, the KIADB Regulations and the lease agreement, which has been executed by the KIADB in favour of the Company and therefore, the impugned judgment and order is liable to be set aside by D allowing the appeals of the owners.
60. Further, the learned single Judge of the High Court has further committed an error in law in not appreciating Section 54 of the L.A. Act, which provision provides the right E to appeal to the land owners, or state government and beneficiaries of the acquired land but not to the Company which is the lessee. When the company does not have the right to file an appeal against the award it also has no right to file a writ petition. The KIADB has filed the belated appeal after F disposal of the appeal filed by the appellants by the High Court and against which award· it has filed the present appeal questioning the correctness of the same and prayed for enhancement of compensation and the said appeal is being disposed of by this common judgment after adverting to the G rival legal contentions urged on behalf of the parties. The High Court has rightly dismissed the belated appeal filed by the KIADB.
61. Therefore, the appeal filed by KIADB questioning the H [2015) 9 S.C.R. A order of remand passed in the Writ Petition and Review Petition is liable to be set aside.The appeal has been filed by the KIADB as it is aggrieved of the findings and certain observation recorded against them by the High Court and it has got reasonable apprehension that the Reference Court B may not appreciate the facts and evidence that may be produced before it. For the reasons stated above, the appeal filed by the KIADB has no merit and they have become unnecessary hence, the same are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, we dismiss the same. c · Answer to Point Nos. 4 & 5 regarding enhancement of Compensation
62. Since the appeals arising out of S.L.P. Nos. 31624- D 31625 are allowed and the appeals arising out of S.L.P. Nos. 3482-3484 of 2015 filed by the State of Karnataka through Special Deputy Commissioner, Gulbarga, wherein it has sought to set aside certain findings in the impugned judgment and order dated 02.09.2014 passed in Review Petition No. 2537 E of2013filed in MFA No. 32157 of2012 and Writ Petition No. 100860 of 2013 passed by the learned Judge, are dismissed, we are required to consider the appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 19819 of 2013 filed by the appellants as they are aggrieved by the inadequate compensation awarded by the Reference F Court, which has been upheld by the High Court.
63. The Reference Court vide its judgment and order dated 29.09.2012 enhanced the compensation from Rs 1,700/- per acre to Rs. 1,37,000/- per acre. The Reference Court relied G on the judgment and order of the Karnataka High Court dated 27.02.2005 in MFA No. 3796 of 2005 and Cross Objection No. 213 of 2005, which pertains to the same village, where the lands of the owners were acquired for establishment of industries under notification in the year 1988. The High Court H in the said case questioned the correctness of determination_ PEERAPPA HANMANTHA HAR I JAN (D) BY LRS. v. STATE 541 OF KARNATAKA [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] of market value by the Reference Court at Rs. 5.7/- per sq. ft. in Cross Objection No. 213 of 2005 filed by the respondent- landowner in the said appeal. In arriving at the market value of the land under acquisition, the said compensation was made on the basis of the average of the va~ious rates covered under various sale-deeds under different sites, carved out from the B lands in survey numbers which lands are adjacent to the land covered in the said MFA and Cross Objection, located at different places and sold on different dates, which had been taken at Rs.6.33 per sq.ft. The same had been escalated by 10% on the ground that the date of preliminary notification in C that case was issued on 03.11.1988. The said sites under the said sale-deeds referred to above were sold two to three years earlier. The High Court held that taking the average of the prices of different sites situated at different places and sold at different 0 points of time is not permissible in law. The High Court took the value of the plot as would be the most beneficial to the claimant which was Rs.7.5/- per sq. ft for land carved out of Sy. No. 389 and at Rs. 13/- per sq. ft for the land carved out of Sy. No, 414/2. The High Court enhanced the compensation E accordingly, after deduction of 10% towards escalation charges. The Reference Court in the present case after taking the aforesaid criteria of developmental charges, de-escalation charges and waiting period charges, awarded the compensation at Rs 7.5/-persq.ft. in relation to the land of the appellants in the present case. The compensation was fixed at Rs.7.5 x 43,560 sq.ft. which came to Rs.3,26,700/- after giving the necessary deduction towards developmental G charges was made at the rate of 25% and 5% towards waiting period and expenses for conversion i.e. 30%, which came to Rs.98,000/- deducte·d from Rs.3,26,700/-. This was determined as the market value of the land as on the date of the preliminary notification dated 03.11.1988 as in the MFA H No. 3796 of2005 and Cross Objection No. 213 of2005. Since in the instant case, the notification was issued on 18.06.1981, de-escalation charges were deducted at the rate of 5% for 8 years, and an award of Rs.1,37,000/- per acre was arrived at in the present case by the Reference Court as compared to B Rs.2,50,000/- per acre as demanded by the appellants, which was upheld by the High Court.
64. The correctness of the same has been challenged by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellants C contending that the methodology adopted by the High Court in determining the market value of the land covered in the MFA 3796 of 2005 and Cross Objection No. 213 of 2005 by deducting charges including developmental charges, waiting period charges, de-escalation and conversion expenses is D arbitrary and unreasonable. The same could not have been adopted by the High Court.
65. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, the learned Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the respondent State placed reliance E on the decision of this Court in the case of Chandrashekar' and Ors. v. Land Acquisition Officer and Another7, and contends that the deduction to be made from the value of the acquired land to be kept aside for providing developmental infrastructures like roads, parks etc and second component F under the head of "development" should not exceed upper benchmark of 67%. It was further contended that the deductions towards the de-escalation and waiting charges can be made at appropriate rates but all the deductions put together should not exceed upper benchmark of 75%. In the G Chandrashekarcase referred to supra, the High Court had allowed 55% under the heading of development, 10% under de-escalation and 5% under waiting period which works out cumulatively to 70%. This Court had held that it did not call for 1 (2012i 1 sec 390 PEERAPPAHANMANTHAHARIJAN (D) BYLRS. v. STATE543 OF KARNATAKA[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] any interference which is well within the upper benchmark of A 75%.
66. It is further contended by the learned Solicitor General that the lands acquired by way of notification Sy. No. 389 were acquired in 1988, which could not be compared to the land in s the instant case, which had been acquired by way of notification seven years earlier in 1981. It is further contended by him that the lands covered in this case are situated at 4 kms away from the land in Sy. No. 414/2, by relying on the village map. Hence, it is contended by the learned Solicitor General that the same C could not have been taken by the Reference Court as the criteria to re-determine the market value of the land of the appellants in the award passed in respect of the land covered in the notification of 1988. Therefore, it is submitted that the enhancement of compensation sought by the appellants is D without any basis, hence they are not entitled for the same and prayed for the dismissal of the appeal.
67. It is further contended by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the KIADB that on the basis of the sale statistics, the sale deeds produced in this appeal along with counter statements after collecting the same from the Sub~Registrar's office in relation to the lands which are sold nearby to the acquired land should be applied for the purpose of re- determination of the market value of the acquired land. It is contended that if the said sale-deeds are taken into consideration, the appellants are not even entitled to the compensation of Rs.1,37,000/- awarded by the Reference Court, which award is affirmed in the MFA filed by the appellant landowners. Therefore, he prayed for dismissal of the appeal G of the landowners seeking for enhancement.
68. The learned senior counsel Mr. Mohan Parasaran, appearing on behalf of the respondent KIADB in the connected appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos.3482-3484 of 2015 has H vehemently requested this Court, if this Court is of the view to re-determine/enhance the compensation, then it may confine it to the owners of the land involved in this case only for the reason that the said benefit cannot be extended to other land owners as a vast extent of land has been acquired by the state B government in the 1981 notification along with the land of the owners herein for the purpose of industrial development by the KIADB and will have serious financial implications on the part of the allottee if the benefit is extended to all land owners whose lands were acquired vide 1981 notification. c
69. This Court at the time of issuing notice in the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (c) No. 19819 of 2013 has indicated to the respondents that the owners are entitled for enhancement of compensation and directed the Registry of this Court to D secure the original LAC record from the Reference Court. We have heard the learned counsel on behalf of the parties at length and perused the records made available for our perusal.
70. The statutory notifications of acquisition of land would E clearly go to show that the land of the appellants was acquired way back in the year 1981 for the purpose of establishment of industries The land of the appellants has non-agricultural potentiality, which fact is proved from the notifications published by the State Government under Sections 28( 1) and ( 4) of the KIAD Act, as the State Governme_nt specifically mentioned therein that the acquisition of the land of the appellants is for the industrial development and establishment of industries which is for non agricultural and commercial purpose.
71. Further, the land which has been covered under notification in 1988 is also adjacent to the residential sites which were formed. The land owners in that case produced the sale deeds of the year 1986 and 1988 respectively, which was 2 years and 2 months earlier respectively to the notification H issued in the year 1988 and some of which were two to three PEERAPPAHANMANTHAHARIJAN (D) BYLRS. v. STATE545 OF KARNATAKA[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] years earlier. Taking the said relevant facts into consideration, the High Court of Karnataka re-determined the compensation at Rs. 7.5/- per sq. ft of land bearing Sy. No. 389 covered in award passed in MFA No. 3796 of 2005 and Cross Objection No. 213 of 2005 after giving deduction towards the developmental charges, de-escalation and conversion charges. The same method should be applied in the case on hand.
72. Further, the High Court ought to have taken into consideration the relevant fact that though, the final notification C for the land covered in MFA No. 3796 of 2005 and Cross Objection No. 213 of 2005 was in the year 1988, it was for the industrial development and the said land was also leased in favour of the allottee Company by the KIADB to be used for the industrial development. The land along with the other lands D covered in 1981 notification was also acquired by the State Government for the purpose of the industrial development and allotted to the Company for the development of the industrial estate. Therefore, apart from the fact that there was a gap of 7 years in which the lands of the appellants were notified for E acquisition to the land covered in MFA No. 3796 of 2005 and Cross Objection No. 213 of 2005, it is an admitted fact that there is similarity in the nature of the land and the purpose for which they were acquired.
73. Keeping in mind that the land in question has got non-agricultural potentiality, a 25% deduction towards development charges and 5% deduction towards waiting period for every year and expenses for conversion by the Reference Court is definitely on the higher side. Hence, the G same is required to be rejected, as it is erroneous and suffers from error in law. Further, the reliance placed by the learned Solicitor General on Chandrashekars case referred to supra is misplaced, as the case has no relevance to the facts of the H case on hand. The total amount of charges deducted in that case were to the tune of 55%. In the instant case, a 30% deduction was made towards development and waiting charges. As per the survey conducted by the state government, it is an undisputed factthat mineral is available in the land and B the Company is extracting the same to be used as raw material for the manufacture of cement in its factory. Therefore, though the land in the present case is a short distance away from the lands covered in MFA No. 3796 of 2005 and Cross Objection C No. 213 of 2005, both have been acquired for the purpose of industrial development and sought to be used for the same purpose by the Company. The land of the appellants herein along with other lands that was acquired vide notification in 1981 have been allotted in favour of the Company for the purpose of extracting the mineral of limestone which is the raw material used for the purpose of manufacturing the cement used for the commercial purpose. Therefore, the land of the appellants is acquired forthe non-agricultural potentiality and the same is used for commercial purpose. Therefore, E determining deductions towards de-escalation at 5% per year for 7 years and 10% towards waiting and other incidental charges would justify the re-determination of the market value of the land of the appellants. There is no need to deduct the developmental charges as has been done by the Reference F Court and Appellate Court in respect of the land covered under MFA No. 3796 of 2005 and Cross Objection No. 213 of 2005 upon which strong reliance has been placed by the learned senior counsel for the appellants, for the reason that there is no development activiti.es involved in respect of the land G involved in these appeals, as the same is being used by the Company for extraction of minerals from the land, which are used as a raw material for the purpose of manufacturing cement and also for development of infrastructure of its factory. Therefore, the enhancement of compensation at Rs.1,92,000/ H – per acre as per the calculation below would be just and PEERAPPA HANMANTHA HARIJAN (0) BY LRS. v. STATE547 OF KARNATAKA[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] reasonable. CALCULATION i. Persqft = Rs.7.5/- ii. Peracre=Rs.7.5X43,560squarefeet= Rs.3,26,700/- per acre. iii. Incidental and other charges@ 10%= Rs.32, 6701- iv. After the above deduction= Rs.2,94,030/- v. De-escalation charges= 5% for 7 years (5% x 7x 2,94,030/- = Rs.1,02,910/- per acre( rounded off) vi. Compensation= Rs. 2,94,030/-(-) Rs. 1,02,910/ Rs.1,91,120/-· vii. Final Compensation= Rs.1,92,000/- (rounded off) c 7 4. It would be relevant to state here that compensation of market value has to be determined notwithstanding the fact that the date of the notification issued under Section 28( 1) of F the KIAD Act has not been taken into consideration, but the criteria for determination of market value of the land put to uses to which it is reasonably capable of being put to in the ·future shall be considered by the Court, as was held by the Privy Council in the case of Raja Vyricher/a Narayana G Gajapatiraju v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Vizagapatam8, wherein the law on the subject has been succinctly I.aid down as under: •Al R 1939 Privy Council 98 c [2015) 9 S.C.R. 'The compensation must be determined therefore by reference to the price which a willing vendor might reasonably expect to obtain from a willing purchaser. The disinclination of the vendor to part with his land and the urgent necessity of the purchaser to buy must alike be disregarded. Neither must be considered as acting under compulsion. This is implied in the common saying that the value of the land is not to be estimated at its value to the purchaser. But this does not mean that the fact that some particular purchaser might desire the land more than others is to be disregarded. The wish of a particular purchaser, though nothis compulsion, may always be taken into consideration for what it is worth. But the question of what it may be worth, that is to say, to what extent it should affect the compensation to be awarded is one that will be dealt with later in this judgment. It may also be observed in passing that it is often said that it is the value of the land to the vendor that has to be estimated. This, however, is not in strictness accurate. The land, for instance, may have for the vendor a sentimental value far in excess of its "market value". But the compensation must not be increased by reason of any such consideration. The vendor is to be treated as a vendor willing to sell at "the market price", to use the words of Section 23 of the Indian Act. It is perhaps desirable in this connection to say something about this expression "the market price". There is not in general any market for land in the sense in which one speaks of a market for shares or a market for sugar or any like commodity. The value of any such article at any particular time can readily be ascertained by the prices being obtained for similar articles in the market. In the ease of land, its value in general can also be measured by a consideration of the prices that have been obtained in the PEERAPPA HANMANTHA HARIJAN (D) BY LRS. v. STATE549 OF KARNATAKA[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] past for land of similar quality and in similar positions, and this is what must be meant in general by "the market value" in Section 23. But sometimes ii happens that the land to be valued possesses some unusual, and it may be, unique features as regards its position or its potentialities. In such a case the arbitrator in determining its value will have no market value to guide him, and he will have to ascertain as best he may from the materials before him, what a willing vendor might reasonably expect to obtain from a willing purchaser, for the land in that particular positio.n and with those particular potentialities. For it has been C established by numerous authorities that the land is not to be valued merely by reference to the use to which it is being put at the time at which its value has to be determined [that time under the Indian Act being the date 0 of the notification under Section 4 (1 )], but also by reference to the uses to which it is reasonably capable of being put in the future." (Emphasis laid by this Court) The above position of law laid down by the Privy Council has been reiterated by this Court in a catena of cases. In view of the same, we are of the considered view that the market value of the land covered in MFA No. 3796 of 2005 and Cross Objection No. 213 of 20.05 has to be applied to the land of the appellants in the present case for the reason that in both the notifications as the required land has been put to use for the industrial development by the KIADB, and the lands have been allotted to the Company for the purpose of extracting sand stone from the lands which is used as raw material for manufacture G of cement and for providing infrastructure of the Company. However, having regard to. the facts and circumstances of the present case, considering the fact that acquisition of the land was made in the year 1981, it would be just and proper to fix A the compensation as per the above referred calculation at Rs.1,92,000/- per acre, with all statutory benefits such as solatium at 30% as provided under Section 23 (2) and statutorily payable interest under Sections 23(1-A) and 28 of the L.A. Act, from the date of taking possession of the land till B the date of payment. The appellants are also entitled to costs throughout as provided under Section 27 of the L.A. Act. The Respondents are directed to pay the compensation to the appellants-landowners as directed above, within eight weeks from the date of the receipt of the copy of this judgment and C award after proper computation in the above terms. (I} (II) Accordingly, the appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos.31624-31625 of2014 for setting aside the judgment and order of remand passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 100860 of 2013 · (filed by the Company) and the Review Petition No. 2537 of 2013 (filed by KIADB) are allowed and set aside the same by allowing these ap- peals .. The appeals arising out of SLP (C} Nos.3482- 3484 of 2015 filed by the KIADB for setting aside the observations and findings recorded in the judgment and order of remand passed by the High Court at the instance of KIADB and the Company are dismissed as it is unnecessary in the light of the setting aside of the impugned judgment and order of remand to the Reference Court by this Court. (Ill) The appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 19819 of 2013 filed by the landowners for enhancement of compensation in respect of their acquired land is allowed as clearly mentioned in the PEERAPPA HANMANTHA HARi JAN (D) BY LRS. v. STATE 55 ~ OF KARNATAKA[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.] penultimate paragraph of this judgment i.e. en- hancement of the compensation amount from Rs.1,37,000/-to 1,92,000/- per acre along with solatium at the rate of 30% under Section 23 (2)and statutorily payable interest under Sections 23 (1-A), 28 of the LA Act upon the compensa- tion awarded in this appeal. The appellants are also entitled to the costs of the proceedings throughout as provided under Section 27 of L.A. Act. The memo of costs may be filed within three weeks to prepare the decree. c I.A. No. 2 for impleadment of Ultra Tech Cement Ltd. is dismissed as not main~ainable, however, they have been heard in the matter. Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeals disposed of.