J96J r.. S. Bansal v. Dtlhi Administrolion March 21 he would have otherwise spt'nt in obtaining a succes- sion certificate, and (ii) getting the money belonging to his father as his heir.
Even otherwise he secured a non-economic advantage as he got himself relieved of the trouble of getting the certificate of proof to the satisfaction of the rationing authority and the Post
:Master General of his credential to receive the money. He was, therefore, guilty of making the false documents both dishonestly and fraudulently. The High Court is right in coming to the conclusion
which it did. Jn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismii8ed . PHILIP .JOHN PLASKET THOMAS r. COMMISSIONER OF INC0:\1E TAX CALCUTT A (S. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR and
:\L HIDAY.ATC:LLAH .JJ.) Income Tax-Tran..~Jer of share.,. l1!f '' man to a 11Jomau before marriay1:-l11conie /roni those $lvrre~'i not tu l1e inc.ludetl in that of her h11•lm111l-11!ea11ing of 1cifc and /11,.l,a11d-h1terpre. tatim• of •latute-lnlention of &.gislarure-lncli<m lncom e-tax Act, [.922 (11 of ]!122), 8S. /(j (3) (q) (iii), Jr,(.1) (I,), Jfj (1) (o). The appellant who was engaged to one Mrs. Knight,
transferred 750 shares to her on December JO, 1947. On December Jj, 1947, the Conipany tran~ferrerl those shares in her name in its book.. On December !fl, 1947, the marriage was !'o)cmnised.
The Income~tax Officer included the incon1c of Mrs. Thomas from tho•e •hares in the income of her husband. The appeal of the assessee-husband was dismi,.ed by the Appellate A!Sistant Commi'9ion.r who lielcl that the 2 S.C.R.
prov1S1ons of s. 16 (3) (b) and s. 16 (3) (a) (iii) applied. Appeals having failed, the Appellate Tribunal referred to the High Court the question whether the provisions of s. 16 (3) (a) (iii) would apply or those of s. JG (I) (c). The
view of the High Court was that the provisions of s. 16 (3) (a) (iii) would apply and not of s. 16 (I) (c). The appellant crune to this Court after obtaining a certihcate of fitness.
Held that the provisions of s. 16 (3) (a) (iii) did not apply to the present case. From whatever point of view the transfer of the shares be con!lidered, whether as a consideration for a promise to marry or a gift subject to the subsequent condi· tion of marriage, the transfer took effect immediately and was not postponed to the date of marriage. On the date of transfer, the appellant and Mrs. Knight were not husband and wife and hence there was no transfer, directly and indirectly, by the husband to his wife. All income of the wife from all assets is not includible in the income of her husband. The income from only those assests of the wife can be included in that of her husband which were transferred to her by her husband after they became husband and wife.
The statute must be construecl in a manner which carries out the intention of the legislature. The intentlon of the legislature must be primarily gathered from the words of the statute itself. If the words
are unambiguous or plain, they will indicate the intention with which the statute was passed and the object to be obtained by it. There is nothing ins. 16 (3) which indicates that the words •wife' or 'husband' must not be taken in their primary sense which is clearly indicative of a marital relationship. The words •wife and husband' should be given their true natural meaning.
They do not include prospective husband and prospective wife. Bhogilal Laherchand v. Oommi.<sioner of Income. tax, [1954] 25 I. T. R. 523, Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sodra Devi (19.57], 32 I. T. R. 615, In Re Smalley, Smalley v. Scotton, [1929] 2 Ch. 112, Doe v. Hiscocks, (1839) 5 M. &, W. 369, Lard Vestey's Executors & Vestey v. Oommissio,.er oj Inland Reveune (1949), 31 T. C. 1 and OommiPSioner of Inland Revenue v. Gaunt, (1941), 24 T. C. 69, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 352-355 of 1962. Appeals from the judgment and order dated February 28, 1961, of the Calcutta High Court in Income Tax Reference No. 49 of 1956.
190!J Philip Joh• PlAJklt I'homas CammisJioner of Iruome·lax, Calcutt• Philip Jclm PltJJirll 11ront'.J5 v. CommiJrioner nf lncom1-ta."<, Ca!C11fla DaJ J. Sachin Chaudhu.ry, D. X. B. N. Ghosh, for the appellant.
ilfokh.c~jee and /{. N. Rajagop11la Sastri and R . • I\'. Sachthey, for the rcspo11<lent. HJG3. March 22. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S. K. DAS J.·-These are four appeals on
certificates granted by the High Court of Calcutta under s. 66·A (2) of the Indian lncome·tax Act, HJ22. The appeals are from the decision of the Hight Court dated February 28, 1961 in Income·
tax Reference No. 49 of I !l56. \\' e may first state the relevant facts. One P. J. P. Thomas is the appellant before us. He was the assessec before the taxing authorities. He held
7.50 'A' shares in J. Thnmas & Co., Ltd., of 8 .l\·1ission Row, Calcutta. The assessee entered into an engagement to marry one ::\frs. Judith Knight, stated to be a divorcee, and the engagement was
announced in certain newspapers on September 3, I !l4 7. On Decem her IO, 194 7 the assessee and Mrs. Knight presented to the Company an application to transfer the said 700 'A' sliares to Mrs. Judith
Knight. A transfer deed of that date stated : "I, Philip John Plasket Thomas of 8, Mission Row, Calcutta, in consideration of my forthcoming marriage with .Judith Knight of 35, Ridgeway, Kingsbury, London (herein·
after called the said transferee) do hereby transfer to the said transferee the 750 'A· shares numbered l · 750 standing in my name in the hooks of .J. Thomas & Co., Ltd., to hold to the said transferee …………………… .
Executors, administrators and assigns, subject to the several conditions on which I hold the same at the time of the execution thereof. And I, the said transferee, do hereby agree to
2 S.C.R. take the said shares subject to the same conditions." On December 15, 1947 the Company transferred the shares to Mrs. Judith Knight and registered her as the owner of the shares. On December 18, 1947
the marriage was solemnised. On January 26, 1948 the fact of marriage was communicated to the Company and the name of the shareholder was chauged in the books of the company to Mrs.
Judith Thomas. It is undisputed that during the rdevant periods the shares stood registered in the name of the assessee's wife and when the income in question arose to her she was the wife of the assessee.
The four accounting years with which the assessments were concerned were those ending respectively on April 30, 1948, April 30, 1949, April 30, 1950 and April 30, 195 l. The four assessment years were
1949-1950, 1950-1951, 1951-1952 and 1952-1953. It appears that for the years 1949-1950 and 1950-1951 assessments of PJ. P. Thomas which had by then been already completed were reopened under s. 34 of the
Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 and the dividends of Rs. 97,091/- and Rs. 78,272/- as grossed up and paid to Mrs.Judith Thomas during the accounting years ending April 30, 1948 and April 30, 1949
were re-assessed in the hands of P. J. P. Thomas. For the assessment years 1951·1952 and 1952-1953, the dividends paid by the company to Mrs. Judith Thomas during the accounting periods
ending April 30, 1950 and April 30, 1951 were held by the I ncome·tax Officer to be includible in the total income of P. J. P. Thomas under s. 16 (3) (b) of the Act and accordingly orders were passed includ-
ing the sums of . Rs. 1,00,000/· and Rs. 16,385/- being the grossed up dividends for the two years respectively in the total income of P.J. P. Thomas. Against the said assessment orders the assessee
preferred appeals to the Appellate Assistant Com- missioner. By a common order dated May 11, l!J55 ·/963 Philip John PllU"-t Thomas v. Commissioner of Income-tax, r.aiculta Dat J.
Philip John Ploslur Thom'lS v. CtmtmissiOfltr of Ineomt·t 1x, Catrotta J)as J. 484 SUPREME (£0URT REPORTS [1964) VOL. the Appellate Assistant Commissioner con- firmed the orders of the Income-tax Officer holding
that not only the provisions of s. 16 (3) (b) but also the provisions of s. 16 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act applied in these cases. Against the order of the Appe- llate Assistant Commissioner th" assessee preferred
four appeals to the Appellate Tribunal and con· tended (1) that he transferred the shares to Mrs. Judith Knight when she was not his wife, (2) that the transfer of shares was absolute at the time when
it was made and no condition was attached to the transfer, and (3) that the transfer was for adequate consideration. On these grounds the assessee con· tended that the piovisions of s. 16 (3) of the Act
were not attracted to the cases in question. The Appellate Tribunal by a consolidated order dated April 4, 1956 disagreed with the view of the Income· tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner
that the provisious of s. 16 (3) (b) applied, but it held that the cases fell within s. 16 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act, because the transfer became effective only after the marriage. It further held that the transfer could
also be construed as a revokable transfer within the meaning of s. 16 (1) (c) of the Act. Therefore the Appellate Tribunal dismissed the four appeals. The asscssee then made four applications for
referring two questions of law arising out of the Tribunal's order to the J:ligh Court. These questions were: 1. In the fac:s and circumstances of these cases, whe1her the dividends paid by J.
Thomas & Co. Ltd., to Mrs. Judith Thomas, grossed up to the sums of Rs. !17,091 I·, Rs. 78,272/ -, Rs. 1,00,000/· and Rs. IU,385/- respectively for the four years in question could be included in
the income of Mr. P.J.P. Thomas and be taxed in his hands under the provision" of 2 S.C.R. 11ection 16 (3) (a) (iii) of the Indian I963 Income-tax Act? Philip John P/o,,\et 2. In the facts and circumstances of these
cases, whether the dividends referred to above could be included in the total income of Mr. P. ]. P. Thomas under the provisions of sec. 16 (1) (c) of the Indian Income-tax Act ? The Tribunal accepted these applications and
referred the aforesaid two questions to the High Court. By it, decision dated February 28, 1961 the High Court answered the first question against the assessee and the second question in his favour.
The assessec then moved the High Court for a certi- ficate of fitness under s. 66-A (2) of the Act and having obtained such certificate has perferred the present appeals to this court. The appeals relate
only to the correctness or otherwise of the answer given by the High Court to the first question. As the Department has filed no appeal as to the answer givrn by the High Court to the second ques-
tion, it is unnecessary for us to consider the correct· ness or otherwise of that answer. The answer to the first question depends on the determination of two points: (1) what on its pro·
per interpretation is the true scope and effect of s. 16 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act, and (2) whether the transfer made by the assessee in favour of Mrs. Knight took effect only from the date of the marriage
between the assessee and Mrs. Knight. A third point as to adequate consideration for the transfer was also gone into by the High Court, but in the view which we have taken of the first two points
involved in the question it is unnecessary to decide the point of adequate consideration. Before we proceed to a consideration of the question, it is necessary to set out the relevant
Thomas v. Commissiorttr of lncome-tai.:, Calcutta Das J. PhiJit lllm Plosk.t Tir•"'4J Commi.ui~tr nf ln:41'11-la, c.Jctdto Dos J. provisions of law. reads: Section 16 so far as it is relevant
"HJ. Exemptions and cxclitsions in determin- ing the total income- ( l) xx (2) xx xx xx xx xx (3) In computing the total income of any individual for the purpose of assessment, there shall be included-
'a) so much of the income of a wife or minor child of such individual as arises directly or indirectly- (i) from the membership of the wife in a firm of which her husband is a partner;
(ii) from the admission of the minor to the benefits of partnership in a firm of which such individi:al is a partner ; (iii) from assets transferred direct- ly or indirectly to the wife
bv the husband otherwise than for adequate considera- – tion or in connection with an agreement to Ii ve apart; or (iv) from assets transferred (b) xx directly or indirectly to the
minor child, not being a married daughter, by such individual (otherwise than for adequate consideration); xx xx xx xx". 2 S.C.R. Sub-s. (3) of s. 16 of the Act was introduced in 1937.
For the purpose of its application it is immaterial whether the partnership was formed before or after 1937 and whether the transfer was effected before or after that date. However, the
sub-section deals only with income arising after its introduction. It clearly aims at foiling an individual's attempt to avoid or reduce the incidence of tax by transfering his assets to his wife or minor child, or
admitting his wife as a partner or admitting his minor child to the benefits of partnership, in a firm in which such individual is a partner. It creates an arti- ficial income and must be strictly construed [see Bhogi-
lal Laherchand v. Commissioner of Income-tax (')]. Clauses (a) (i) and (a) (ii) of the sub-section provide that in computing the total income of an individual there should be included the income arising directly
or indirectly to his wife from her share as a partner or to his minor child from the admission to the benefits of partnership, in a firm of which such individual is a partner. We are not directly concerned with els.
(a) (i) and (a) (ii). We are concerned with cl. (a) (iii). Under that clause the income arising from assets transferred by an individual to his wife has to be included in the transferor's total income.
There are two exceptions to this rule, viz., (I) where the transfer is for adequate consideration, or (2) where it is in connection with an agreement to live apart. The second exception has no bearing on the cases
before us. The first and principal point which has been urged before us on behalf of the appellant is this. It is pointed out that at the time the transfer of shares was made by the a:!sessee to Mrs. Judith
Knight the latter was not the wife of the former and therefore cl. (a) (iii) which talks of"assets transferred directly or indirectly to the wife by the husband" has no application, apart altogether from any ques-
tion of adequate consideration. This argument on (I) [1954) 25 I.T,R. 523. Philip Johrt Plasket 1 homar v. Commissioner of ln&ome·tax, Calcutta Das J. Philip l•hn Plask<t T,,,,,..,
Cctnmissiontr of lncome~t•x. Cdcutt• 4b8 behalf of the appellant was advanced before the High Court also. The High Court sought to meet it in the following way. Mukharji J. who gave the
leading judgment said that in order to determine whether a particular case came under cl. (a) (iii) or not, the relevant point of time was the time of compu- tation of the total income of the individual for the
purpose of assessment and the section did not limit any particular time as to when the transfer of assets should take place. He then observed: "It appears to me that as the addition of the
wife's income to the husband's income under this sub.section is made, the relevant time of the relationship between husband and wife which has to be considered by the taxing authorities is the time of computing of the total
income of the individual for the purpose of asses~ment. That is how I read the opening words of section 16 (3) of the Act : 'In computing the total income of any individual for the purpose of assessment'."
Bose J. expressed a slightly different view. He said that the material consideration under s. HI (3) (a) (iii) was whether the transferee was actually the wife of the assessee during the relevant accounting
period when the income from the assets transferred tu her accrued. In effect both thr. learned Judges held that for the application of cl. (a) (iii) it was not necessary that the relationship of husband and wife
must subsist at the time when the transfer of the assets is made; according to Mukharji J. the crucial date to determine the relationship is the date when the taxing authorities are computing the total income
of the husband and according to Bose J. the crucial time is the time when the income accrues to the wife. It must also be stated in fairness to Mukharji J. that he did not accept the view that the words
'husband' and 'wife' in cl. (a) (iii) included prospec- tive husband and prospective wife. He accepted the 2 S.C.R. view that the words 'husband' and 'wife' must mean legal husband and legal wife. Even so he expressed
the view that on a true construction of s. 16 (3) (a) (iii) the time when the relationship has to be construed is the time when the computation of the total income of the husband is made.
Learned counsel for the appellant has vecy strongly contended before us that the view expressed by the learned Judges of the High Court as to the proper interpretation of cl. (a) (iii) is not correct.
On a plain reading of sub-s. (3) of s. 16 it seems clear to us that at the time when the income accrues, it must be the income of the wife of that individual whose total income is to be computed for the purpose
of assessment: this seems to follow clearly from cl. (a) of sub·s. (3). Therefore, in a sense it is right to say that the relationship of husband and wife must subsist at the time of the accrual of the income :
otherwise the income will not be the income of the wife, for the word 'wife' predicates a marital relationship. The matter does not however end there. When we go to sub:cl. (iii) we find that only
so much of the income of the wife as arises directly or indirectly from assets transferred directly or in- directly to the wife by the husband shall be included in the total income of the husband.
Therefore, sub- cl. (iii) predicates a further condition, the condition being that the income must be from such assets as have been transferred directly or indirectly to the wife by the husband. This condition must be fulfil-
led before sub-cl. (iii) is attracted to a case. It is clear that all income of the wife from all her assets is not includible in the income of the husband. Thus on a proper reading of s. 16 (3) (al (iii) it seems
clear enough that the relationship of husband and wife must also subsist when the transfer of assets is made in order to fulfil the condition that the transfer is "directly or indirectly to the wife by the hus-
band", Phili.b John Plaskd Thom11S v. Commissi011er 1 IncJT111·tax, Calcutta Das lo Philip Jolrn Plos/ut T"""4s Commissionn ef /nc01Jtt·t&:1e Catcuita Du J. Learned counsel for the respondent has con-
tended before us that the transfer mentioned in s. 16 (3) {a) (iii) need not necessarily be post-nuptial and he has argued that the main object of the provision is the principle of aggregation, that is, the inclusion
of the income of the wife m the income of the hus- band, because of the influence which the husband exercises over the wife. He has also pointed out that sub-cl. (i) which refers to the membership of the
wife in a firm of which her husband is a partner is indicative of the object of the provision because it does not talk of any assets being brought into the firm by the wife. He has further argued that in
sub-cl. (iii) the word 'wife' is merely descriptive and means the woman referred to in cl. (a), and the word 'husband' has reference merely to the individual whose total income is to be computed for the purpose
of assessment. In support of this argument he has relied on the expression "such individual" occurring in sub-s. (3) (a). We are unable to accept these arguments as correct. It is indeed true that all the
four sub-clauses of cl. {a) must be harmoniously read as this court observed in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sodra Devi (1); but we see no disharmony between sub-cl. (i) and sub-cl. (iii) on the interpretation which
we are putting. Sub-cl. (i) talks only of the mem- bership of the wife in a firm of which her husband is a fartner ; it has no reference to assets at all. Sub-c . (iii) however talks of assests and qualifies the
word "assets" by the adjectival clause "transferred directly or indirectly to the wife by the husband". We fail to sec how any disharmony results from giving full effect to the adjectival clause in sub-cL
(iii). Nor do we see why the words 'husband' and 'wife' should be taken in the archaic sense contmded for by the learned counsel for the respon-dent. In re Smalley, Sm,alley v. Scotton ('),
a decision on which learned counsel for the respondent relies, the facts were these. A testator by his will gave all his property to "my wife E.A.S". The testator left a (I) [1957) 32 I.T.R. 615, 625,
(2) [1979) 2 Ch, 112. 2 S.C.R. SUPRE!\1E COURT REPORTS lawful wife M.A.S. and children by her and contri- buted to their support, but about five years before his death had contracted a bigamous marriage with a
widow E.A. M .. who lived with him and was known as E.A.S., and believed she was and was reputed to be his. wife. The will was produced by E.A.M. It was held that the will taken in connection with
the surrouding circumstances, indicated that the testator intended to benefit E.A M., she being in a s~condary sense and by repute his wife. The rules of construction which were followed in that case were
those laid down by Lord Abinger in Doe v. Hisooolcs (1). Lord Abinger said : "The object in all cases is to discover the inten- tion of the testator. The first and most obvious mode of doing this is to read his will as he has
written it, and collect his intention from his words. But as his words refer to facts and circumstances respecting his property and his family, and others whom he names or describes
in his will, it is evident that the meaning and application of his words cannot be ascertained, without evidence of all those facts and circu- mstances. To understand the meaning of any
writer, we must first be appraised of the persons and circumstances that are the subjects of his allusions or statements : x x x All the facts and circumstances, therefore, respecting persions or property, to
which the will relates, are undoubtedly legitimate, and often necessary evidence, to enable us to understand the meaning and application of his words." We are dealing here with a statute and the statute
must be construed in a' manner which carries out the intention of the legislature. The in tendon of the legislature must be gathered from the words of the statute itself. If the words are unambiguous or plain,
(I) (1839) 5 M. & W. ~61, 367. Philip John Plosket Thomas v. Commissioner of lncome·tax, Calcutta Du J. f'liiJip John Plad:tl Thomas v. ~mmiSJiontr of lneom~·ta.t ,Calci;tta Das J.
they will indicate the intention with which the statute was passed and the object to be obtained by it. There is nothing in sub-s. (3) of s. 16 which would indicate that the word 'wife' or the word 'husband' must not
be taken in their primary sense which i3 clearly indicatve of a marital relationship. !\or arc we satisfied that the object of the legislature is just the principle of aggregation. We have said earlier that
sub-s. (3) of s. Hi clearly aims at foiling an indivi- dual's attempt to avoid or reduce the incidence of tax by transferring his assets to the wife or minor child or admitting his wife as a partner or admitting
his minor child to the benefits of partnership, in a firm in which such individual is a partner. This object does not require that the word 'wife' or the word 'husband' should be interpreted in an archaic
or secondary sense. Learned counsel for the respondent has drawn our attention to certain English decisions, particu- larly the decision of the House of Lords in Lord Vestey's Bxecutors und Vestey v.
Commissim~rs of Inland Revenue ('). One of the questions which was considered in that decision was whether for the purpose of either s. 18 of the Fi'lance Art, J 936 (in England} ors. 38 of the Finance Act, 1938 (in Eng-
land) "wife" included a "widow." Their Lordships had to consider the earlier decision of the Court of Appeal in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Gaunt ('), which held that the one word included the
other. Their Lordships ultimately held, over-ruling tne decision in Gaunt' s case ('), that the word "wife" did not include a "widow." The English decisions proceeded on the footing that in England
it is a principle of Income Tax law, embodied in rule 16 of the General Rules, that for Income Tax .iurposes husband and wife living together arc one. tol"J Morton said : "I think that the treatment of husband and
wife by the Legislature for Income Tax (I) (1949) SI T. C. I (2) (19fl) 2+ T.C. 69. 2 S.C.R. purposes rests on the view that any income enjoyed by one spouse is a benefit to the other
spouse. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the Sections now under consideration a benefit to the wife of the settlor is treated as being a benefit to the settlor, but it seems to me un·
likely that this principle is being extended by these Sections to the widow of the settlor." Now, it is quite clear to us that the treatment of husband and wife in the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922
does not rest on the view that any income enjoyed by one spou~e is a benefit to the other spouse ; for sub-s. (3) of s. 16 makes it quite clear that all income enjoyed by the wife is not to be included in the income
of the husband and only such of the wife's income as comes within the sub-section is to be included in the income of the husband. We therefore think that the English decisions are not in point and there are no
reasons why the word 'wife' or the word 'husband' should not be given its true natural meaning. This brings us to the second question, namely, whether the transfer of shares made by the assessee
in favour of Mrs. Judith Knight on December 10, 194 7 was to take effect only from the date of their marriage. It is admitted that on December 10, 1947 the assessee and Mrs. Knight were not married. It
is also admitted that they were engaged to be married and the engagement was announced on September 3, 194 7. The transfer deed which we have earlier quoted contained no words of postponement. On
the contrary, it contained words which indicated that the transfer took effect immediately. Learned counsel for the respondent has rightly pointed out that the expression in the transfer deed "in conside-
ration of my forthcomin~ marriage" can have very little meaning as a real consideration, because on September 3, 1947 the parties had mutually promised to marry each other; therefore the promise to marry
/963 Philip lnhn Pl:Jsket Thomas c,,mmi5tio11n ·if Jn.:omt·la."<, Calc•1tto Das J, Philip Johri Pla1ktl llwmas v. CimmiJSio111r of fnrum1-tJx, Cairutfa Dns }. had been made earlier th•m December 10, 1947.
Learned counsel for the respondent has arg,1ed before us that the transfer of shares was really a gift made to Mrs. Knight in contemplation of the forthcoming marriage and the gift was subject to a condition
subsequent, namely, that of marriage which if not performed would put an end to the gift. This does not however advance the case of the respondent in any way. A gift may be made subject to conditions,
either precedrnt or subsequent. A condition prece- dent is one to be performed before the gift takes eff~ct; a condition subsequent is one to be performed after the gift had taken effect, and if the condition is
unfulfilled that will put an end to the gift. But if the gift had already taken effect on December 10, 194 7 and lhe condition subsequent has been later fulfilled, then the gift is effective as from December IO. 1947
when the asscssee and Mrs. Knight were not husband and wife. That being the position. sub·cl. (iii) of s. 16 (:3) (a) will not be attracted to the case as the transfer of the shares was not made by the husband
to his wife. We were also addressed on th<: qul"stion as to the circumstances in which a gifr to an intended wife or husband may be recovered whe11 the marriage does not take place through the fault or either of
the two parties. We do not think that that question falls for decision in the present case. From what· ever point of view we look at the transfer of shares in the present case, whether it be in consideration of a
promise to marry or be a gift subject to 1bc subse· quent condition of marriage, the transfer takes effect immediately and is not postponed to the date of marrigc. If that be the true position, as we hold
it to be, then sub-cl. (iii) of s. lt.i (3) (a) is not attracted to these cases, apart altogether from any question as to whether there was adequate considera- tion for the transfer
within the meaning of that sub-clause. 2 S.C.R. For the reasons given above we allow the appeals and answer the question referred to the Hi!)h Court in favour of the assessee. The appellant will
be entitled to his costs in this court as also in the High Court ; there will be one hearing fee. Appeals allowed. MRS. CHANDNEE WIDYA VATI MADDEN v. DR. C. L. KATIAL & OTHERS (B. P. SINHA, C. J., J.C. SHAH and
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.) Specific performance'-Contract to sell house property- Implied t•rm-Poi11ts not raised in the High Court, if be allowed for the first time in this Court.
The plaintiffs-respondents entered into a contract of sale in respect of a house property belonging to the appellant. The deed of agreeuient provided that the vendor shall obtain the pt"rmh.sion of the Chief Commissioner to the transaction of sale within two months of the agreement and if the sairl
permission was not forthcoming within that time, it was open to the purchasers to extend the date or to treat the agreement as canceJlcd. As the necessary permission was not forthcom-
ing ~.vithin the stipulated time, the purchasers extended the time by another month. The appellant withdrew her applica- tion for the necessary permission. The defendant having failed to perform
her part of the contrart, the plaintiffs brought a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale or in the alt<rnative for damages. The trial court, althoug-h it found that the plaintiffs had been throughout ready ani willing, inderd anxiou-., to perform their part of the contract and that it was the defendant who had backed out of it, refused the main relief of specific performance of the contract on the ground that the agreement was inchoate, as the previous sanction of the Chief Com1nissioner to the proposed transfer had not been
obtained. The High Court came to the conclusion that there Pfii/ip lnlm Fla!kei Thomas v. Commiuionf!r of Income-tax, Ca'c111ta Das J. A1.arch 25