Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
9. Since the consent decree dated 24.11.1980 had been held by the First Appellate Court to be not collusive, the High Court in our opinion rightly refused to interfere with that findings 8 of fact.
10. It was then urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that there was violation of the Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908.
11. In this connection, it may be noted that Section 17(2)(vi) c of the Registration Act states that "nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section(1) of Section 17 applies to: "any decree or order of a Court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject- matter of the suit or proceeding." 'l' (emphasis supplied)
12. In our opinion the exception mentioned in Section 17(2)(vi) means that if a suit is filed by the plaintiff in respect E of property A, then a decree in that suit in respect of immovable property 8 (which was not the subject-matter of the suit at all) will require registration. This is the view taken by this Court in K. Raghunandan & Ors. vs. Ali Hussain Sabir & Ors. 2008(9) Scale 215.
13. However, a different view was taken by this Court in Jc Bhoop Singh vs. Ram Singh Major 1995(5) SCC 709 in which it is stated that : " …… We would think that the exception engrafted is meant to cover that decree or order of a court, including a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise, which declares the pre-existing right and does not by itself create new right, title or interest in praesenti in immovable property of the value of Rs.100 or upwards …………….. " (emphasis supplied) PHOOL PATii AND ANR. v. RAM SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. & ANR. [MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.]
14. In our opinion there seems to be inconsistency between the decisions of this Court in Bhoop Singh's case (supra) and K. Raghunandan's case (supra) in so far as the interpretation to the exception in clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act is concerned. Prima facie it seems to us that the decision in Bhoop Singh's case (supra) does not lay down the correct law since Section 17(2)(vi) on its plain reading has nothing to do with any pre existing right. All that seems to have been stated therein is that if a decree is passed regarding some immovable property which is not a subject-matter of the suit then it will require registration. As already explained above, c if a suit is filed in respect of property A but the decree is in respect of immovable property B, then the decree so far as it relates to immovable property B will require registration. This seems to be the plain meaning of clause (vi) of Section 17(2) "I of the Registration Act.
15. It is a well settled principle of interpretation that the Court cannot add words to the statute or change its language, particularly when on a plain reading the meaning seems to be clear. Since there is no mention of any pre- existing right in the exception in clause (vi) we have found it difficult to accept the · views in Bhoop Singh's case (supra).
16. It seems that there is inconsistency in the decisions of this Court in Bhoop Singh's case (sup,ra) and K. Raghunandan's case (supra), and since we are finding it difficult to agree with the decision of this Court in Bhoop Singh's case (supra), the matter should be considered by a larger Bench of this Court.
17. Let the papers be laid before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for constituting a larger Bench for interpreting the exception in clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act. D.G. Matter referred to larger Bench.