Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
21. Reliance has also been placed on a decision of this Court in Dr. Mahachandra Prasad Singh v. Chairman, Bihar Legislative Council & Ors. (2004) 8 SCC 747 in which this Court has observed that delegated legislations are subject to certain fundamental factors. The delegatee is not intended to travel wider than the object of the legislature. A delegatee cannot extend the scope or general operation of the enactment but power is strictly ancillary. This Court has laid down thus: "13. It may be noted that under Paragraph 8, the Chairman or the Speaker of a House is empowered to make rules for giving effect to the provisions of the Tenth Schedule. The rules being delegated legislation are subject to certain fundamental factors. Underlying the concept of delegated legislation is the basic principle that the legislature delegates because it cannot directly exert its H c will in every detail. All it can in practice do is to lay dowi:t the outline. This means that the intention of the legislature, as indicated in the outline (that is the enabling Act), must be the prime guide to the meaning of delegated legislation and the extent of the power to make it. The true extent of the power governs the legal meaning of the delegated legislation. The delegate is not intended to travel wider than the object of the legislature. The delegate's function is to serve and promote that object, while at all times remaining true to it. That is the rule of primary intention. Power delegated by an enactment does not enable the authority by regiilations to extend the scope or general operation of the enactment but is strictly ancillary. It will authorise the provision of subsidiary means of carrying into effect what is enacted in the statute itself and will cover what is incidental to the execution of its specific provision. But such a power will not support attempts to widen the ptirposes of the Act, to add new and different means of carrying them out or to depart from or vary its ends. (See Section 59 in chapter "Delegated Legislation" in Francis Bennion 's Statutory Interpretation, 3rd Edn.) The aforesaid principle will apply with greater rigour where rules have been framed in exercise of power conferred by a constitutional provision. No rules can be framed which have the effect of either enlarging or restricting the content and amplitude of the relevant constitutional provisions. Similarly, · the rules should be interpreted consistent with the aforesaid principle." In our opinion Rule 5 of the Rules being a r~medial provision is ancillary. It is open to provide for an additional speedier remedy so as to carry out the objective of the Act.
22. Reliance has also been placed on a decision of this Court in B.K. Srinivasan & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. ( 1987) I SCC 618 in which this Court considered the question that subordinate legislation, in order to take effect, must be published or promulgated in some suitable manner. Where the parent statute prescribes the mode of publication or promulgation that mode must be followed. Mode of publication of subordinate legislation should be reasonable, which is necessary, only then it will take effect. The question was entirely different. Even otherwise procedure for recovery of land revenue is quite reasonable. POWER MACHINES INDIA LIMITED v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
23. Reliance has been placed o·n Academy of Nutrition A Improvement & Ors. v. Union of India etc. (2011) 8 SCC 274 in which this Court has laid down thus : "66. Statutes delegating the power to make rules follow a standard pattern. The relevant section would first contain a provision granting the power to make rules to the delegate in general terms, by using the words "to carry out the provisions of this Act" or "to carry out the purposes of this Act". This is usually followed by another sub-section enumerating the matters/areas in regard to which specific power is delegated by using the words "in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoi11g power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters''. Interpreting such provisions, this Court in a number of decisions has held that where power is conferred to make subordinate legislation in general terms, the subsequent particularization of the matters/topics has to be construed as merely illustrative and not limiting the scope of the general power. Consequently, even if D the specific enumerated topics in Section 23(1-A) may not empower the Central Government to make the impugned rule (Rule 44-1), making of the rule can be justified with reference to the general power conferred on the Central Government under Section 23(1), provided the rule does not travel beyond the scope of the Act. "But even a general power to make rules or regulations for carrying out or giving effect to the Act, is strictly ancillary in nature and cannot enable the authority on whom the power is conferred to extend the scope of general operation of the A.ct. Therefore, such a power 'will not support attempts to widen the purposes of the Act, to add new and different means to carrying them out, to depart from or vary its terms'." Considering the question of power of food authority under section 7(iv) to ban a food article in interest of public vis-a-vis power of the Central Government under section 23 to make rule, it was held that the Central Government cannot exercise power under section 23 to ban use of non-iodised salt for human consumption. Thus, provision of Rule 44- 1 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 was held to be ultra vires. Rule 44-1 was wholly outside the scope oftheAct. Itwas held not to be a rule made or required to be made to carry out. the provisions of H the Act having regard to its object and the scheme whereas the position in the instant case is juxtaposed. Hence the d!!cision is of no help to the appellants.
24. Similarly reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in General Officer Commanding-in-Chief & Anr. v. Dr. Subhash Chandra Yadav & Anr. ( 1988) 2 SCC 351. Rules were framed enabling the transfer of one Cantonment Board's employee to another. It was held that service was not transferable as such Rule 5 was ultra vires of section 280(2)( c) of the Cantonments Act, 1924. On facts the case has no application. c
25. Reliance has also been placed on International Airports Authority of India v. K.D. Bali & Anr. ( 1988) 2 SCC 360 in which it has been laid down that when subordinate legislation is in conflict with the Parent Act then it must give way to the substantive statute. The principle has no application in the case of remedial statutory provisions as plurality of inconsistent remedies can always be provided and only one remedy has to be chosen. In Avinder Singh" & Ors. v. State oi Punjab & Ors. (1979) 1 SCC 137, it has been laid down that a delegate is not free to switch policy laid down by the Legislature. On the anvil of the aforesaid reasons, the decision is of no utility to the cause espoused.
26. Reliance has also been placed on Suraj Mall Mohta & Co. v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri & Anr. (1955) 1 SCR 448 in which it has been observed that if persons dealt with by the impugned Act are deprived of the substantial and valuable privileges which they would otherwise have if they were dealt with under the Indian Income-Tax Act, in that situation it is no defense to say that discriminatory procedure also advances the course of justice. The matter has to be judged from the point of view of the ordinary reasonable man and not from the point of view of the Government. The ordinary reasonable man would say, when the stakes are heavy and serious charge of evasion of income-tax are made against him, why one person similarly placed should have the advantage substantially of the procedure prescribed by the Indian Income Tax Act, G while another person similarly situated be deprived of it. The ratio of said decision has no application to the instant case, provision in question being remedial one and no substantial or valuable privilege is being deprived of by Rule 5. It is only procedural provision and intends to simplify the procedure of execution, once arbitral award is passed. POWER MACHINES INDIA LIMITED v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
27. Reliance has also been placed on Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd., Madurai etc. v. Sri A. V. Visvanatha Sastri & Anr. AIR 1955 SC 13 in which this Court has laid down thus: "3. The procedure prescribed by the Act for making the investigation under its provisions is of a summary and drastic nature. It constitutes a departure from the ordinary law of B procedure and in certain important aspects is detrimental to the persons subjected to it and as such is discriminatory. The substantial differences in the normal procedure of the Income Tax Act for catching escaped income and in the procedure prescribed by Act 30of1947, were fully discussed by this Court in Sura) Mal Mohta v. Sri A. V. Visvanatha Sastri AIR 1954 SC 545 and require no further discussion here." In said case, there was substantial difference in the normal procedure of the income-tax Act for catching escaped income and in the procedure prescribed by Act 30 ofTaxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947. The classification made was held to be impermissible without any rationale. Such is not the situation in the instant case. The procedural provision of recovery of arrears of land revenue cannot be said to be prejudicial to the appellants. Once adjudicatio,n of dues has been made it was expected of the appellant to honour it after lapse of time under Section 34 of Act of 1996.
28. The decision in Magan/al Chhagan/al (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors. (1974) 2 SCC 402 has also been referred to in which this Court has laid down thus : "14. To summarise: Where a statute providing for a more drastic procedure different from the ordinary procedure covers the whole field covered by the ordinary procedure, as in Anwar Sarkar s case and Sura) Mall Moh ta s case without any guidelines as to the class of cases in which either procedure is to be resorted to, the statute will be hit by Art.14. Even there, as mentioned in Sura) Mall Mohta s case (supra) a provision for appeal may cure the defect. Further, in such cases if from the preamble and surrounding circumstances, as well as the provisions of the statute themselves explained and amplified by affidavits, necessary guidelines could be inferred as in Saurashtra case (supra) and Jyoti Pershads case (supra) the statute will not be hit by Art.14. Then again where the statute itself covers only a class of cases as in Haldar s case (supra) and Bajoria s case (supra) the statute will not be bad. The fact that in such cases the executive will choose which cases are to be tried under the special procedure will not affect the validity of the statute. Therefore, the contention that the mere availability of two procedures will vitiate one of them, that is the special procedure, is not supported by reason or authority." In Maganlal Chhaganlal (supra), this Court considered the alternative procedure for eviction of unauthorized occupants on Government premises; one by suit and the other by summary procedure alleged to be more drastic and onerous under Chapter V-A of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 or the Bombay Government Premises . Act, 1955. The procedure for recovery ofland revenue envisaged under Rule 5 of the Rules could not be said to be discriminatory, it being quite reasonable procedure. It cannot be said to be harsh or drastic but is quite a reasonable procedure and it furthers the mandate of the Act. The difference between the procedure of execution of Rule 5 and that of CPC cannot be said to be unconscionable so as to attract the vice of discrimination.
29. Resultantly, the appeal is found to be without any merit and the same is hereby dismissed. IA No. 6 of 2017 has been filed for de- freezing the bank account of the appellant. In case, the appellant has deposited the amount ofRs.5,29,58,937 /-as per the fresh recovery citation No.484002 and the interest as well, till the -date when the amount was deposited, it would be open to the concerned Tehsildar to de-freeze the account on being satisfied that the amount has been so deposited. The cost is quantified at Rs.50,000/- to be deposited in Supreme Court Advocates on Record Welfare Trust within six weeks. Divya Pandey Appeal dismissed.