Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
28. This Court in the case of Naresh Kumar v. State of Haryana,16 observed as follows:- “20. This Court in Mariano Anto Bruno v. State [Mariano Anto Bruno v. State, (2023) 15 SCC 560 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1387] , after referring to the abovereferred decisions rendered in context of culpability under Section 306IPC observed as under : (SCC para 45) “45. … It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306IPC is not sustainable.” (emphasis supplied)
29. Having discussed the law on the subject, we now proceed to consider the facts of the present case in view of the established principles.
30. As per the version of the complainant, the following facts have emerged: i. Appellant No. 1 got married to the deceased on 19th November 2009. ii. Disputes arose thereafter, and the parties started residing separately from 8th August 2013 with the deceased residing at her paternal house with her child. iii. A mahalokadalat was held at the court in Sangamner on 17th February 2015 during which the appellants are alleged to have refused to cohabitate with the deceased or accept her or her child at her matrimonial house or settle the proceedings initiated by the deceased. iv. On 20th March 2015, the deceased committed suicide. 2024 INSC 149 : [2024] 2 SCR 830 : (2024) 3 SCC 573 [2024] 12 S.C.R. Prakash and Others v. The State of Maharashtra and Another
31. In the case of Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar (supra), this Court, under similar circumstances, had quashed the chargesheet under Section 306 of the IPC against the accused-appellant. A factor that had weighed with the Court in the said case was that there was a time gap of 48 hours being the alleged instigation and the commission of suicide. This Court held that the deceased was a victim of his own conduct, unconnected with the quarrel that had ensued between him and the appellant, 48 hours prior to the commission of his suicide.
32. In the case at hand, taking the allegations in the FIR at face value, the incident at the mahalokadalat had occurred on 17th February 2015, while the deceased had committed suicide on 20th March 2015. There is a clear gap of over a month between the incident at the mahalokadalat and the commission of suicide. We therefore find that the courts below have erroneously accepted the prosecution story that the act of suicide by the deceased was a direct result of the words uttered by the appellants at the mahalokadalat.
33. We also find that the date of occurrence of the mahalokadalat is disputed. The appellants have vehemently argued before the trial court and the High Court that the mahalokadalat had not been held on the 17th February 2015 but instead had been held about a year earlier, and that the date of the mahalokadalat as mentioned in the FIR and in the statements of the witnesses, is factually incorrect. If this submission is to be accepted, the time gap between the two incidents would widen even further.
34. However, we do not wish to go into that issue. Even if we take the date of the mahalokadalat to be 17th February 2015 to be the factually correct one, there is enough gap between the two incidents to render the instigation or incitement by the appellants, nugatory. The cardinal principle of the subject-matter at hand is that there must be a close proximity between the positive act of instigation by the accused person and the commission of suicide by the victim. The close proximity should be such as to create a clear nexus between the act of instigation and the act of suicide. As was held in the case of Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar (supra), if the deceased had taken the words of the appellants seriously, a time gap between the two incidents would have given enough time to the deceased to think over and reflect on the matter. As such, a gap of over a month 1184 would be sufficient time to dissolve the nexus or the proximate link between the two acts.
35. Apart from that, although an Accidental Death Report was lodged on the day of the incident by the deceased’s brother, there is no mention about any involvement of the appellants in the suicidal death of the deceased. Further, there is no mention about the incident that had occurred at the mahalokadalat which had put the deceased in a state of depression such that she frequently spoke about committing suicide. These facts are alleged for the first time in the FIR which was lodged five days after the incident.
36. We are of the considered view that the reasoning given by the High Court for refusal to discharge the appellants is completely perfunctory. The High Court observed that there is no allegation about any harassment or cruelty meted out by the appellants to the deceased in the Accidental Death Report, however, held that the allegations in the FIR could not be overlooked and the Accidental Death Report and the statements made in the Accidental Death enquiry would be a matter of trial. The High Court also took note of the disputed date of the mahalokadalat but held that incorrect mentioning of the date of the mahalokadalat in the FIR would not be a ground to discharge the appellants, considering the state of mind of the complainant, the deceased’s mother.
37. We further find that the prosecution has failed to prima facie establish that the appellants had any intention to instigate or aid or abet the deceased to commit suicide. No doubt that a young woman of 25 years has lost her life in an unfortunate incident. However, in the absence of sufficient material to show that the appellants had intended by their words to push the deceased into such a position that she was left with no other option but to commit suicide, continuation of criminal proceedings against the appellants would result in an abuse of process of law and as such, we are inclined to allow the appeal.
38. In the result, we pass the following order:- i. The present appeal is allowed. ii. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad passed on 17th [2024] 12 S.C.R. Prakash and Others v. The State of Maharashtra and Another October 2022 in Criminal Writ Petition No. 246 of 2021 and the order of the Assistant Sessions Judge, Sangamner dated 24th December, 2020 in Sessions Case No. 75 of 2015 are quashed and set aside; and iii. The appellants are discharged from Sessions Case No. 75 of 2015 on the file of Assistant Sessions Judge, Sangamner. Their bail bonds, if any, shall stand cancelled.
39. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. Result of the case: Appeal allowed. †Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain