PRAKASH CHAND v. STATE OF H.P. AUGUST 9, 2004 [ARIJIT PASAYAT AND C.K. THAKKER, JJ.] Penal Code, 1860 : Exceptions I, 2 & 3 to Sections 300, 302 and 304 Part I : Accused committed fratricide-Exception 4 to Section JOO-Applica- c bility of-Trial Court convicted the accused under Section 302 and sentenced him to life imprisonment-Affirmed by High Court-On appeal, Held: Exception 4 to Section. 300 covers acts done in a sudden fight-It more appropriately covers a case not covered by Exception I-Quarrel D whether sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of the case-When accused in a sudden quarrel committed homicide without premeditation and has not taken undue advantage/acted in a cruel manner, Exception 4 become applicable-In the facts and circumstances of the case, Exception 4 to Section 300 clearly applicable-Accordingly, custodial sentence altered to I 0 years.
Exception I and 4 to Section JOO-Distinction between-Discussed. Words and Phrases : 'sudden fight/quarrel ' and 'undue advantage '-Meaning of in the context of Exception 4 to Section 300 !PC.
There was a quarrel between two brothers, the deceased and the accused-appellant as the dogs of accused had entered into the kitchen of the deceased. Accused took out his gun and fired gunshot at the G deceased from a distance of about 35 feet. Deceased succumbed to gun shot injuries'. Trial Court found the accused guilty, convicted him under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to imprisonment for life. In appeal, conviction and sentence were upheld by the High Court. Hence the present appeal.
Accused-appellant contended that the incident had occurred during he course of sudc .en quarrel; and that the Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is applicable. Partly allowing th~ appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The Frnrth Exception of Section 300 IPC covers acts done in a sudden fight. fhe exception deals with a case of prosecution not covered by the first exception, after which its place would have been more appropriat• '· The exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both 0 ere is absence of premeditation. But, while in C the case of Exception l 1 here is total deprivation of self-contro~ in case of Exception 4 there is only that heat of passing which clouds men's sober reasons and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do. (392-G, H; 393-A)
1.2. A 'sudden fig 1t' implies mutual provocation and blows on D each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor in such cases could the whole blame be placed on one side. For fit were so, the Exception more appropriately applicable would be Ex· :eption 1. There is no previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which both E parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but if the other had 11ot aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the serio11s turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to 9pportion the share of blame which attaches to each ighter. To bring a case within Exception 4 all F the ingredients mentior ed in it must be found. [393-B-E) 1.3. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudde 1 quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown ti 1at the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or onus ual manner. The expression 'undue advantage' G as used in the provision means 'unfair advantage'. In the present case, when the factual scenario is considered in the light of legal principles, the inevitable conclusic n is that Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is clearly applicable. Addi:ionally the shot was fired from a distance of 35 feet. Though the distanc•' is always not determinative abontthe intention H or knowledge of accusec I, the factual background has to be considered PRAKASH CHAND v. STATE OF H.P. [PASAYAT, J.]
taking into account the nature of injuries sustained, the weapon used A and such other relevant factors. [393-F, G, H; 394-A] Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai Nayak v. State of Gujarat, (2003) 5 Supreme 223 and Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1958) SC 465, relied on. 2. For cases to fall within clause thirdly of Section 300, it is not B necessary that the offender intended to cause death,' so long as the death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinarily course of nature. Even if the intention of the accused limited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and did not extend to the C . intention of causing death, the offence would be murder, Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out the point. On that score also the proper conviction will be under Section 304 Part I IPC and not Section 302 IPC. [394-D, E, F)
Abdul Waheed Khan v. State of A.P., [2002) 7 SCC 175 and Ruli D Ram & Ors. v. State of Haryana, (2002) 7 SCC 691, relied on. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 830 of 2004.
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.6.2003 of the Himachal E Pradesh in Crl. A. No. 362 of 200 I. Ajit Kumar Pande (A.C.) for the Appellant. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.: Leave granted. Over a petty matter the appellant is supposed to have committed fratricide. He was found guilty by the Trial Court for offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. In appeal, conviction and sentence were upheld by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla. Accusations which led to the trial of the accused are essentially as follows:
·H Shri Sukh Dev alias Guddu (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') was real younger brother of the accused. On 6.2.2000 at about 9.00 p.m. there was a quarrel between the deceased and the accused. Cause of the quarrel was that the dogs of the accused had entered the kitchen room of the deceased and when the deceased had asked the accused to keep his dogs B tied in the chains, verbal altercation took place and tempers flew, the accused went to his room, took out his gun and fired a gun shot at the deceased from a distance of about 35 feet, as a result of which pellets of the gun shot had pierced into the chest of the deceased. Information was lodged with the police, investigation was undertaken and charge sheet was C filed. Accused pleaded innocence and false implication. During trial, father of the deceased and accused was the star witness as he claimed to be an eye witness. He graphically described the factual scenario. Placing reliance on his evidence, the trial court found the accused guilty. Appeal filed by him was dismissed by the impugned judgment.
The Trial Court and the High Court did not accept the plea of the accused-appellant that the incident has been occurred during the course of a sudden quarrel, and Section 302 IPC has no application and Exception 4 to Section 300 l.P.C. is applicable. The plea was reiterated during the course of hearing of the present appeal. Additionally, it was submitted that E the shot was fired from a distance of about 35 feet and it cannot be said that the intention was to cause death.
Learned counsel for the State supported the judgments of the Courts below. For bringing in operation of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC it has to be established that the act was committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel without the offender having taken undue advantage and not having acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
The Fourth Exception of Section 300, !PC covers acts done in a sudden fight. The said exception deals with a case of prosecution not covered by the first exception, after which its place would have been more appropriate. The exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception I H there is total deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is PRAKASH CHAND v. STATE OF H.P. [PASAYAT, J.]
only that heat of passion which clouds men's sober reasons and urges them A to deeds which they would not otherwise do. There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1; but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the B quarrel may have originated, yet the subsequent corirluct of both parties puts them in respect of guilt upon equal footing. A 'sudden fight' implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor in such cases could the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the Exception more appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. There is no previous C deliberation or determination to fight.
A fight suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the share of D blame which attaches to each fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation, (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and ( d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must E be found. It is to be noted that the 'fight' occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300, !PC is not defined in the !PC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties have worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning.
A fight is a combat F between two and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown G that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression 'undue advantage' as used in the provision means 'unfair advantage'. These aspects have been highlighted in Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai Nayak v. State of Gujrat, [2003) 5 Supreme 223. When the factual scenario is considered in the legal principles indicated above, the H A inevitable conclusion is that Exception 4 to Section 300 !PC is clearly applicable.
Additionally the shot was fired from a distance of 35 feet. Though the distance is always not determinative about the intention or knowledge B of accused, the factual background has to be considered taking into account the nature of injuries sustained, the weapon used and such other relevant factors. As illuminatingly highlighted in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1958) SC 465 under clause Thirdly of Section 300 JPC, culpable homicide is murder, if both the following conditions are satisfied i.e. (a) that the act which causes death is done with the intention of causing C death or is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury; and (b) that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It must be proved that there was an intention .. to inflict that particular bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death viz. that the injury found to be present was D the injury that was intended to be inflicted.
For cases to fall within clause, Thirdly, it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. According to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh 's case (supra) even if the intention of E the accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would be murder. Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out the point. The above aspects were highlighted in Abdul Waheed Khan v. State of A.P., [2002] 7 SCC 175, and Ruli Ram & Ors. v. State of Haryana, [2002] 7 SCC 691. On F that score also the proper conviction will be under Section 304 Part I !PC and not Section 302 !PC as done by the Trial Court and upheld by the High Court. The conviction is accordingly altered. Custodial sentence of ten years would meet the ends of justice.
The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated. S.K.S. Appeal partly allowed.