Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
11. The said transitional provision came up for consideration before this Court in several judgments and there was some divergence of judicial opinion which was ultimately settled by the Constitution Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of K. S. Paripooman vs. State of Kera/a and others, (1994) 5 sec 593.
12. In the case of Paripooman (supra) the majority judgment was rendered by Justice S.C. Agrawal. In rendering the majority judgment their Lordship held that the decision of this Court in Union of India vs. Zora Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 673, is not correct and in paragraph 70 of the judgment the learned Judges held that the Parliament has given a clear indication of its intention in Section 30 (1), which was a transitional provision. The learned Judges held that since a clear intention has been given in Section 30(1), there is no scope for any speculation about the parliamentary intention by G reading Section 23( 1 A) in isolation from Section 30( 1) of the Act. (See para 70)
13. The learned Judges also noted the purpose of a transitional provision in the statute and referred to Francis PRALHAD AND ORS. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 923 AND ANR. [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.] Bennion on Statutory Interpretation and also to Thornton on A Legislative Drafting. Relying on those treaties on interpretation, this Court held that Section 23 (1A) and Section 30 are interconnected (See para 73, page 639).
14. In paragraph 74 at page 639 and 640 of the report B this Court, on a conjoint reading of Section 23(1A) with Section 30(1), held as follows: " … A perusal of sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the· amending Act shows that it divides the proceedings for acquisition of land which had commenced prior to the date C of the commencement of the amending Act ir'lto two categories, proceedings which had commenced prior to 30-4-1982 and proceedings which had commenced after 30-4-1982. While clause (a) of Section 30(1) deals with proceedings which had commenced prior to 30-4-1982, D clause (b) deals with proceedings which commenced after 30-4-1982. By virtue of clause (a), Section 23(1-A) has been made applicable to proceedings which had commenced prior to 30-4-1982 if no award had been made by the Collector in those proceedings before 30-4- 1982. It covers (i) proceedings which were pending before the Collector on 30-4-1982 wherein award was made after 30-4-1982 but before the date of the commencement of the amending Act, and (ii) such proceedings wherein award was made by the Collector after the date of the commencement of the amending Act. Similarly Section 30(1 )(b) covers (i) proceedings which had commenced after 30-4-1982 wherein award was made prior to the commencement of the amending Act. .. "
15. In subsequent judgment, in Prem Chand and others G vs. Union of India, AIR 2010 SC 1308, following the ratio in Paripooman (supra) this Court granted relief to the claimants in accordance with the provision of Section 23(1A) of the Act. In that case the land acquisition commenced on 22nd of March (2010] 11 S.C.R. 1978 and the award was passed on 25th February 1983.
16. Keeping in mind the aforesaid declaration of law, this Court holds that in the instant case the acquisition proceeding commenced with notification under Section-4 which is dated 5.3.1983 and the award was passed on 1.3.1984. Therefore, the landowners who were affected by the instant acquisition . proceeding were entitled to the benefit of the amending provision under Section 23(1A) in view of the ratio in Paripooman (supra).
17. Now, the only question which remains is whether the landowners, without filing an appeal before the High Court from the order of the Reference Court, are entitled to the aforesaid benefit on the basis of their application under Order 41 Rule 33 of CPC.
18. The provision of Order 41, Rule 33 ofCPC is clearly an enabling provision, whereby the Appellate Court is empowered to pass any decree or make any order which ought to have been passed or made, and to pass or make E such further or other decree or order as the case may require. Therefore, the power is very wide and in this enabling provision, the crucial words are that the Appellate Court is empowered to pass any Order which ought to have been made as the case may require. The expression 'Order ought to have been made' would obviously mean an Order which justice of the case requires to be made. This is made clear from the expression used in the said Rule by saying 'the court may pass such further or other Order as the case may require.' This expression 'case' would mean the justice of the case, Of course, this power cannot be exercised ignoring a legal interdict G or a prohibition clamped by law.
19. In fact, the ambit of this provision has come up for consideration in several decisions of this Court. Commenting on this power, Mulla (CPC, 15th Edition, pg. 2647) observed H that this Rule is modelled on Order 59, Rule 10(4) of the PRALHAD AND ORS. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 925 AND ANR. [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.] Supreme Court of Judicature of England, and Mulla further A opined that the purpose of this rule is to do complete justice between the parties.
20. In Vanarsi vs. Ramphal, AIR 2004 SC 1989, this Court construing the provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 of CPC 8 held that this provision confers powers of the widest amplitude on the appellate court so as to do complete justice between the parties. This Court further held that such power is unfettered by,considerations as to what is the subject matter of appeal or who has filed the appeal or whether the appeal is being C dismissed, allowed or disposed of while modifying the judgments appealed against. The learned Judges held that one of the objects in conferring such power is to avoid inconsistency, inequity and inequality in granting reliefs and the overriding consideration is achieving the ends of justice. The learned Judges also held that the power can be exercised D subject to three limitations: firstly, this power cannot be exercised to the prejudice of a person who is not a party before the Court; secondly, this power cannot be exercised in favour of a claim which has been given up or lost; and thirdly, the power cannot be exercised when such part of the decree E which the party has been permitted to become final by a party is reversed to the advantage of that party. (See para 15 at pg. 1997). It has also been held by this Court in Samundra, Devi and others vs. Narendra Kaur and others, (2008) 9 SCC 100 (para 21) that this power under Order 41, Rule 33 of CPC cannot be exercised ignoring a legal interdict.
21. In the instant case, the right of the landowner to receive the benefit under section 23(1A) of the Principal Act is legally permissible in view of the majority decision in Paripoornan G (supra). Therefore, the law declared by this Court in Paripooman (supra) is binding on the High Court under Article 141 of the Constitution and High Court is bound to follow the same, especially when an application has been made by the landowner under Order 41 Rule 33 of CPC.
22. In view of the aforesaid interpretation given to Order 41 Rule 33 of CPC by this Court, we are of the opinion that the High Court denied the relief to the appellants to which they are entitled in view of the Constitution Bench decision in Paripoornan (supra), by taking a rather restricted and narrow view of the scope of Order 41 Rule 33 of CPC and also on a misconstruction of the ratio in Paripoornan (supra).
23. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court holds that the appellants are entitled to the benefit of the amended provision of Section 23 (1A) of the Principal Act in view of the clear law C laid down by this Court in Paripoornan (supra). The appeals are allowed to the extent indicated above. No order as to costs. B.B.B Appeals partly allowed.