PRECISION STEEL AND ENGINEERING WORKS AND ANOTHER versus PREM DEVA NIRANJAN DEVA TAYAL

JJ PRECISION STEEL AND El~GINEERING WORKS AND ANOTEER v. .PREM DEVA NIRANJAN DEVA TAYAL October 7, 1982 [D.A. DBSAI, A.P. SEN AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.] Delhi Rent Conlfol :Act, 1958-Sub-s. (5) of S. 258 read with Clouse ( e) of . . f' –

proviso to S. 14( !)-Jurisdiction of Controller-Grant of leave to tenant to contest landlord's application for eviction-Nature and scope of. Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958-Sub-S. (I) of S. 31-Not attracted at the stage of considering affidavit of tenant seeking leave to contest under sub-s. (5) of s.2so:

Code of CM/ Procedure, 1908-0. XXXV!l, rule 3(5) and De/ht Rent Con- trol Act, 1958-S. 25B(5J~Jurisdiction to grant /eaVe-Comparison of., Re1tt restriction legislation-Approach to interpretation of. Laws of procedure-Approach to interprela!ion of.

A landlord cab make an application for recovery of possession under Clause (e) of the proviso to s. 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, on the ground that the premises let for residential purposes· are required by him bona fide for occupation as-a residence for himself or for any me(I!.ber of bis family dependent upon him, provided be has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. Sub·s. (5) of s. 25B lays down that the Controller shall give to the tenant leave to contest the application, if the affidavit filed by the tenant "discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining on order for recOvery of posstssion" of the premises on the ground specified in Cl. (e) of the proviso to s. 14(1).

The respondent, a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF), filed a petition under Cl. (e) of proviso to s. 14(1) through the constituted attorney of its karta for an order for recovery of possession of the premises in question alleging that the premises had initially been given to the .appellant on leave and licence, that the landlord (the karta of the HUF) who had gone out of the country had since settled down in Delhi, that the landlord bad called upon the appellant 'in May, 1974 to vacate the l'remises as be had no otbcr suitable accommodation and that .. >

PRECISION STEEL, V. PREM DEVA 499, the landlord bona fide required the same for hiS personal'occ~pation. The appel- lant SOU;ght leave 'tO cont~~t the petitioll and filed an affidavit denying the allega- tioi;i that it bad entered the premises initially as a licensee and.contending that accbrding to cl. 6. of the lease agreement the premises Were let for residential as well as comme'rcial pufpose, that the landlord ·had been 'residing in a house as spa~ious as the demised premises and equa.lly spacious accommodation 1in an idehtical unit located at the back side of the demised premises was available to . hirh which had beeri let successively to three tenants during tho period 1970 to ' 197,6, each· time ~:Hsing the rent, and further-that .the landlOrd owned spacious acCommodation at. another place in Delhi. An affidavit in reply was filed on be'half of the landlord slating that the landlord had no interest in the building in vAiich he was residing, that the identical· unit located on the back side of the ~cm.ised premises had been let to a tenant upto 19_81 and that the accommodation ~ocated at anot~er place in Delhi and referred to by the appellant was only a t'

garage block. The Controller decided all questions of fact t'aking the affidavits as un- questioned evidenc~ and· refu'sed to grant · teave to the appellant to contest thC petition and passed an order of ev'iction in favour of the landlord. The revision petition filed by the appellant against· the order was rejected by the High Court.

' The question before the court was : What is the jurisdiction of the Con- troller un~er Sub-s. (5) of.s.25B while dealing with. an affidavit of the tenant seeIC- ing leave to contest an application fof eviction filed by a landlord under ·cl. (e) of the proviso to s. 14(1) · 1

Allowing the appeal, HELD : (By the Full Court) Leave to contest the petition for evictiOn under ct: (e) of proviso to S.14(1) must be granted to the appellant under sub s. (5)'of sub-s. 25B 1 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, J958.

~ ( pttr Desai a_nd Baharul Islam, JJ.) . 1. (a) While examining the question whether leave to defend ought or ough not to be granted, the limited jurisdiction which the Controller enjoys is prescribed, within well defined limits. ·The langtiage of sub·s·. (5) of s. 2.SB casts a statutory duty on the Controller to give to the tenant leave to contest the application, the – only pre-cc;>ndition for exercise of jurisdiction b~ing that the affi.davi~ ff!Cd by the tenant discloses such facts as wOuld: diseiltitle the . landlord froni. obtaining an ·order (or the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground mentioned in s. 14(1)(e). The legislature has used. the expression ''t.he Controller shall give leave to the tenant to cqntest ·the applicaf.ion." When the 13.nguage of a statute is plain the principle that legislature speaks ''its mind in the plainest' language has to be given full effect. The legfslature bas used the plainest language na,mely •'facts,disclosttd in the affidavit of the tenant,. and av~ided th~ v,hraseolo~y of th,e c

( 1983] 1 S.C,ll. analogous provision in Order XXXVll, C.P.C., namely "substantial defence" and "vexatious and frivolous defence". [513 F; 514 E; 513 G,· 514 B-D] c (b) Undoubtedly, the rules of natural justice, apart ·from the adversary system.we foUow Must permit the la~dlord to contest the affidavit file~ by the tenant and he can do so by filing an' affidavit in reply. If the averments mad.e in the affidavit of the tenant are controverted by the landlord, that fact may be bom.e in mind but if the facts disclosed in 1the affidavit of the tenant are contested by way of proof or disproof or producing evide~ in the form of oth~r affidayits or documents that would not be permissible. The Controller has to confine him· self to the affidavit filed by. the tenant under sub-s. (4) of s. 2;B and the reply', if any and on perusing these, he has to pose to himself the only question : D6es the affidavit disclose, not prove, facts a_s would disentit1e the landlord froin obtaining an order for the recovery of possession on the grpund specified in El: 14(l)(e) 1 On browsing through the affidavit of the tenant~ if there emerges averment of facts wh~ch, on a trial, if belie~ed would non-suit the landlord, leave ought to be granted. The Controller is not to record a fitlding on disputed questions Of facts or his preference of onl! set of affidavits against other set of affidavits as it is clear from the language of sub-s. (5) of s. 25B that be has to confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant disclosing such facts as Would prima facie and not on contest disentitle the landlord-from obtaining an order for recovery of possession. It is wholly impermissible for the Controller to proceed to examine the rival contentions on the basis of affidavits untested by cross- , examinat4on and unproved documents. The regular trial required to be hC:ld by a Court of Stnall Causes as contemplated by sub-s. (6) read with srib-s. (7) of s.25B is not to be substituted by affidavits and counter.affidavits. The scheme of s. 258 ~ 'does· not introduce· a· trial for arriving at the truth at the stage of proceeding con- templated by sub-s. (4) of s. 25B. It is immaterial that facts alleged and disclosed are contr'6verted by the landlord because the stage of proof is yet to come. Plau- sibility of the defence raised and proof of the same are materially di!fere~t from

each other and ·one cannot bring in the concept of proof at the stage when plau- sibility has to be shown. [524 B; 523 H; 524 A; 515 G-H; 514 A; 516 A-C; 517 E-G; 518 B; 516-E] Santosh Kumar v. flhai Moo! Singh, [1958] S.C.R. 1211, rel!ed on. S. Kanjibhai & Ors. v. Mohanraj Rajendra Kumar. A.LR. 1970,_Gujarat 32 ,.):

and Kishan Singh v. Mo~d. Shafi & Ors., A.LR. 1964 J & K 39; approved. (c) 'Section 14(1) starts with a non obstante clause whi~h would necessarily imply that the Controller is precluded from passing an order for recovery of possession in favour of the landlord unless the case is covered by any of the clauses of the proviso. Upon a true construction of cl. (e) of the proviso t~ s. 14(1) it would appear that the burden is on th.e landlord to satisfy tbe Control- ler that the pren1ises are let for residential

purpos~. that possession is required by him bona fide for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family and that he has no other reasOnably soi.table residential accommodation. · This burden, the-landlord is required to discharge before the Controller gets jurisdiction to make an order for eviction. On a combined reading of s. l4(1)(e) and sub~ss. (1) and (4) of s. 25B, the legal positiOn that emerges is that on a pro- per application being made iq the prescrib~d manner which i.s requir~d to be PRECISION STEEL v. PREM DEVA

supported by an affidavit, unless the tenant obtains leave to defend as c~ntempla.' ted by s"ub-ss. (4) and (5) of s. 25B, the tenant is deemyd to have adfnitted all tJ:ie averrnents made in the petition filed by the landlord and the Controller "'oul.d act on the admission of the tenant presuming every averment in the petition of the landlord as uncha1lengable and truthful. This consequence itself is sufficient to liberally approach the prayer for leave to' contest the petition. [514 E-H; 515 D-E; 513 E]

(d) The underlying thrust of all rent restriction legislation is to chCck profiteering by owners of property and to protect weaker sections. Their provi- sions are not to be so construed or interpreted as would make the protection con- ferred on the tenant illusory. [512 E'F; 510 E-F]

Bahadur Singh & Anr. v. Muni Sabrat Das & Anr., [1969]' 2 S.C.R. 432, Kaushalya Devi & Ors. v. Shri K.L. Bansal, [1969] 2 S.C.R. 1048, Bega Begum & Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan & Ors., [1979] 2 S.C.R. I and Kewal Singh v. Lajwanli, [1980] !"S.C.R. 854 referred to.

(e) A code of procedure is something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends. Our lawS of procedure are grounded on a principle of .natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard. Too technical a construction that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should be guarded against lest the very means deSigned .for the rurtheranCe or justice be used ·to frustrate it. The procedure prescribed in Chap. IIIA is harsh ~ and weighted

agai~st the tenint. The Contro Iler is the final arbiter of facts. Once leave is refused no appeal is provided against the order refusing leave. No one should be in doubt about the narrow \.onstricted jurisdiction of the High Court While interfering with 'findings of facts in exercise of ieVisional jurisdiction. Wisdom, sagacity and the consequence of refUsal to grant leave coupled With limited scope of i_nquiry being confirled to facts disclosed in the affidavit of the tenant should guide the approach of the Controller.

[527 B-C; 513 D; S27 _F-G-H; 528 A] c Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah & Anr., [1955] 2 S.C.R. I and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978} 2 S.C.R. 621\ referred to. -F

In the instaOt case, the Controller had overJooked disclosure of important \. facts which put the bonafides of the landlord in issue and necessitated gra'.nJ of leave to the appellant: The leave and ~licence ag-reement had been renewed in 1972'and 1973 though the landlord had been in Delhi since 1972; the landlord had admitted that the identical unit at the back of the demisod Premises which .bad fallen vacant in 1973 had been Jet out to another tenant.; no actiOn had been taken till 1979 on the notice seeking- eviction served in 1974; every tirne a·fresh letting had been indulged into, it had been done after raising the rent; and the landlord who had sought possession 'for himself and was admittedly in Delhi had not stated a single word on oatQ. about his requirements and as to in what right be was occupying the premises ·in which he was staying. [529 B-H; 530 A·E] The High Court had adopted an incorrect approach as to how the matter · had to be ex:imine~ at the stage of $,rantipg or refusing to grant leave under s~~~ (1983) 1 S.C.R.

s. (5) of s. 25B. It had failed to ascertain as to when the licence bad been termi- nated and a contract Or lease entered into and what were the terms of the lease as alleged by the landlord and whether the rules of the local authority pern1ttted use of the premises for non~residential purposes. The High Court had dismissed the 'Contention that the landlord had othet suitable accommodation by an observation that the Controller had rightly come to the con:Iusion that the premises in which the landlord was residing belonged not to' the landlord but to his brother. This approach was unjustified because the question was not whether the landlord was the owner of the premises occupied by him but the substantial question was in what right he was occupying it for a period extending. over 7 years and bow it had beeomo imperative for him to"vacate the same. [5.30 F-H; 531 A·H) c

2. The contention that the non obstante clause in sub-s. (7) of s. 25B ex- cludes the application of sub-s. (2) of s. 37 but not. of s\Jb·s.(1) of s. 37 and there- fore it was obligatory for fbe Controller to .not only hear the landlord but exa- mine evidence at the stage of granting or refusing to grant leave to contest' cannot 'be accepted. Sub-s. (2) of s. 37 provides· that subject to any rules that may be made under the-Act, the Controller shalJ, while holding an inquiry in any proceedings before him, follow as fai' as may be, the practice and procedure of a "Court of Small Causes. including the recording of eVidence. The very fact that sub-s. (7) · of s. 25B provides that while holdins an inquiry in a proceeding to· which Chap. IIIA appiies, the Cbniroller has to ,follow the practice and procedure of a- Court of Small Causes including the recording of evidence i~di~ates the legislative intention of treating Chap. IIIA and especially s. 25B as a self-contained code and this conclusion·. is buttressed by· the provision in sub-s. (1) of s. 25B which · provictes that every application by· landlord for recovery of possession of any premises on the ground speci{ied in cl. ,(e) of the proviso to. s. 14(]) shaU be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in s. 25B. That is why sub-s. (7) of s. 25B .opens with a non obstante clause. Any other section, including sub-s. (l) .of s. 37 p.rescribing procedure for disposal of an application covered by sub·s. (I) of s. 25B is therefore excluded . .The exclusion of s. 37(1) also necessarily follows. from the provision contained in sub-s. (10) of s. 25B which makes it .clear' that the procedure prescribed for hoiding a~ inquiry consequent upon the granting of -leave to contest shal-1 by the same as required to be followed · by the Controller for disposal of applications.

Sub~s. (10) of s. 25B operates to · 'bring ins. 37(1) after leave tO contest is granted. If sub-s. (1) of s. 37 were to govern all proceedings including the application for leave to contest the proceed- ings, both sub-s. (7) and sub-s. (IO) of s. 25B w6uld be rendered redundant. [525 C;

524 E-F; 526 A·B; 525 A-B; 525 E-F-H) 3. Neither the argumer\t that the Scope arid ambit of sub~s. (5). of s. 25B of the Act in it~ comparison with 0. XXXVII, r. 3 sub-r. (5) C.P.C. is no more res integra in view of the decision in Busching Schmitz ( P) Ltd. v. P.T. Mengha'ni & Anr. nor the interpretation of t~e C1bservations therein to the effect that the scope for granting leave undef sub-s. (5) of s. 25B is narrower than the one under 0. XXXVII, r. 3-Can be accepted. It is not clear from the decision whether the Court took Dote of the whole of the re-structured r. 3 or it was keeping in veiw the unamended .r. 3 of 0. XXXVII. The provisoes to O. XXXVII, r. 3 make it clear that leave to defend shall not be refused unless· the Court is satisfied that the facts disclosed by the defendant do not indicate thai he has ·a substantial (l~fen~ t<.> rajse qr t~~t che defence intended tp be put up by the defendant is PRECISION STEEL v. PREM DEVA

frivolous or vexatious. On the other hand. sub·s. (5) of s. 25B makes it obligatory upcn 1hc Controller, by u~e of mandatory Ja~guage, to give leave · if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would· diSentitle the ·landlord from Qbtaining an order for recOvery of posseision. Under 0. XXXVII, r. 3,.defenCe has to be sllbstantial before leave can be obtained. fyferC disclosure of facts is the ,sine qua non under sub s. (5) of s. 25B. Further, the Court can grant

1conditional leave or leave limited to the issue under 0. XXXVII, r. 3; no· such power is conferred on the Controller under sub·s. (5) of s. 25B. Assuming that O. XXXVIJ, r. 3 (5) confers wider discretion on the Court, that, by mere comparison, cannot cut down 9r narrow or limit the power coupled with the duty conferred On the Contro'Uer under sub s. (5) of s. 2SB. , [519 D-H; 520 A·G; 519 A-B; 521 Fl

Busching Schmitz (P) Ltd. v. P.T. Menghani & Anr., [1977] 3 S.C.R. 312;. B.N .. Mutta & Anr: y. T.K. Nandi, [1979] i S.C.R. 409; Charan Dass DUffgal v. Brahma Nand (C.A. No. 179/82 decided

OD 11-1-1982) and Om Prakash S~lu}" v. Smt. Saraswati Devi (C.A. No. 527/82.~ecided OD 8-2-1982), referred to. · Sa~~a.n. Singh & Anr; v. Kasturilal, [1971] 2 S.C.R. 421, distinguished. Mohan/al v Tirath Ram Chopra. & Anr. 22 (1982) Delhi Law Times !, disapproved.

(per Sen, J., disSenting) 1. (a) ·There is a definite public purpose behind ·enactment of Chap. IIIA and sub-s. (5) of s. 25B musl be construed in a Sense whiCh. would carry out that purpose. I s.' 1"4A was eii~Cted to ensure that all government servants to whom residen.tial accommodation had been a Hotted by . the Government vacated such accommodation if they had any, house of their oWn in the Union Territory or· Delhi 1 and the section conferred upon them the right" to recover immediate possession of their own houses. Further, experience in the past had shown. thit landlords who were in bpnafide requirement of thCir accommodation( · for residential purpose under cl. (e) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 14 were being pUt tO great hardship due to the dilatory procedure of the suit. The object behind enactment of Chai). IllA was that these two classes of landlords should not be at the mercy of law's delays but there s,hould be a quick and ~>-…i._~, expeditious re_medy ava.ilable1to them agai!lst their" own tenants. The provisions 'fri Chap. IIJA confer a real, effective and immediate right to obtain possession by confining the trial only to such 'cases where the tenant bas such a defence ·as 1 would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order fof eviction under s:t4(l)(e) or under. s. 14A. Chap. Ill A seeks _to stiike a balance ·betwee,n the competing needs of a . 1andlord and a tenant and has therefore provided that the tenant· shall have a right to apply" for leave to contest. The words ''if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such f<icts" usCd in· sub-s.· (5) of s. 25B must therefore take their colou·r from the context 'in which they appear . . [533 A-D-E-F-H; 534 A; 536 D; 535 C-D;. 535 A-BJ

Sarwan Sinch'. v. Kasturi Lal, [197'1] 2 s'.c.R. 421, referred to. (b) The Controller obviously ."cannot cbme 'to a deci~ion as to whether 1or not loavo to contest should be granted under sub•s. (S) of s. 25B without c

c SUPll.BME cOURT ll.EPOP.Ts [1983) l S.C.ll., affording the parties an opportunity of hearing. The Controller must conform to the rules of natural justice. Once it is conceded that the landlord has a right to be heard, the . Controller is bound to give him. an opportunity to refute the• facts alleged by the tenant in ·his affidavit filed under sub-s. (4) of sc25B. The Controller nlust app(y his mind not only to the averments made by the landlord in his applicaiion for evicfion, but also to the facts alleged by the tenant in bis affidavit for leave to contest as well as the facts disclosed by the landlord in his affidavit in rejoinder, besides the othei- maleriat on record i.e., the documents Hied by the parties in support of their-respective claims, in order to come to a conclusion whether the requirements of sub-s. (l) Ors. _25B are fulfilled. To ask Controller to confine himself only to the affidavit filed by the tenant is to ask. him not to apply bis mind in a ·judicial manner even if be feelS that the justice of the case so demands. The Controller must endeavour to resolve.the' · competing claims of landlord and tenant to the grant or refusal of !Cave-by finding a solution which is just and fair to both the parties. It is not that the proceedings initiated QD an application by the landlord~under s. 14(1) (e), or under s. 14A must undergo trial at two stages. Under sub-s. (5) of s. 25B. the Controller ·must prima facie be satisfied that· the facts a1leged by the tenant are such as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of possession. The word 'disentitle' is a strong word, and the Controller must be satisfied that the tenant has such a defence as wOuld defeat the claim of the t'andlord under s. 14 (1) (e) or under s. 14A. It cannot be that the Controller would set down the application for trial merely on perusal of the affidavit filed by the tenant without applying bis mind to the pleadings of the parties and the material on record.

If he finds that the pleadings are such as would entail a trial, then the Controller must grant the tenant leave to contest as the words. ''shall grant to the tenant leave to contest" in sub-s. (5) of s. 25B make the grant of leave obligatory. [536 G; 537 ll-H; 538 A-Bl

2. The scope of sub-s. (5) of s. 25B is restricted and the test of "triable issues" under 0. XXXVII. r. 3 (5), C.P.C. is not applicable, as the language of the two provisions ~s different. The use of the word 'such' in sub~s. (S), of s. 25B implies that the Controller has the power to limit the grant of leave to a · particular ground.

A tenant may take all kinds of pleas in defence. The · whole object of sub-s. (5) of s: 25B was to prevent the taking of frivolous plev by tenants to protract the trial. Where the tenant seeks leave 'to contest th~ applicaiion for eviction ·under s. 14(1) (e), or "Qnder s. 14A, be must file an affi~ davit under :ub-s. (4) of s. 25B raising his defence which must l;>e clear, specific and~positive. The defence must also be ·bona fide and if true, must result iii the dismissal of landlord's. application. Defences of negative char_acter which are intended to put the landlord to proof or are vague, or are raised ma/a.fide only to gain time and protract the proceedings, are not of the kind which will entitle the tenant to the grant of leave. The Controller cannot set down the ff .

application for bearing without n1aking an order in terms of sub-s. (5) of s. 25B •. ·The tdal must be confined only to such grounds as would disentitle the land·. lord to any relief. [538 C-F]

.;.> Pil.ECISION STE~L v. PREM DEVA (Desai, 1.) CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 209 . of 1981. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 8th December, 1980 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Revision No. 317 of 1980.

. Dr. Y.S. Chitale, K:K. Mancha.nda and C.N. Murty for the Appellant. D.V. Patel U.R. La/it, Pramod D"yal; Rajesh Mitra and S.K. Gupta for the Respondent.· ·The following Judgments were delivered

DESAI, J. A provision conferring power enacted to mollify slogans chanting public opinion of speedy justice, if not wisely· interpreted. may not only prove counter-productive but disastrous.· And that is the only raison d'etre for this judgment because in the course of hearing at the stage of granting special leave Mr. D.V. Patel, leamed counsel for the respondent straightway conceded that this is such a case in whic1l-1eave to defend could ·never have been refused. Unfortunately, however, not a 'day passes without the routine refusal of leave, tackled as a run of mill case by the High Court in revision with one won! judgment 'rejected', has much to our discomfiture impelled u; write to this short judgment. 'First the brief narration of facts .. Respondent M/s. Piem Deva Niranjan Dava Tayal (Hindu Undivided Family) through Prem

Deva Tayal, constituteil attorney of Niranjan Deva Tayal (landlord) moved the C,ontroller having jurisdiction by a petition under sec- tion 14 (1) proviso (e) [for short 's. 14 (e)'] read with section 25B of the Delhi. Rerlt Control Act, 19 58 ('Act' for short), for an order for recovery of possession of the premises being, front portion of premises bearing No. B,44, Greater Kailash Part I, New Delhi, 'on the ground that the premises were let out for residential purpose and are now required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself and the members of his family dependent on him and that

the landlord has no other reasonably suitable accommodation. To this petition he impleaded M/s. Precision Steel & Engineering Works (tenant), a firm and Shri B.K. Beriwala cons- . titutcd attorney of the firm.

Landlord alleged in his petition th;it . —-·— – c c SiJl>iUJM~ COURT REPORTS [ 1983 I 1 S.C,R. the premises in question were first given on leave and license and subsequently relationship of lessor and lessee was established and that the tenant is in possession since Octpher I, 1971. Landlord further alleged that he now requires the premises for himself and the members of his family consisting of himself, his wife and two school going children. He admitted that he has been; employed in India ~ince 1965 .but was posted at Bombay in 1970 arid returned to Delhi in 1972. He went to Saudi Arabia and has now returned to India. It was alleged that on May I, 1974, he called upon the tenant to vacate the premises but the ro;quest has fallen on deaf ears. It was specifically alleged that as tl:ie landlord has now taken up a job and has settled down'in Delhi and that he has no other suitable accom- modation, and accordingly he bonafide requires possession of the demised premises for his personal' occupation. It. was allege(! that M/s. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal (HUF) is the owner of the suit premises and Shri Niranjan Deva Tayal is the Karla of the · HUF and second notice dated June 22, 1979 was given under

instructions by the constituted attorney Prem Deva Tayal. Even though the landlord who sought possession of tire premises for his personal requirment was in Delhi at the relevant time, i.e. in 1979, the petitioh' was also filed through the constituted attorney and Niranjan Deva Tayal who seeks p°Ossession for his use being in Delhi and available is conspicuous by his absence throughout the pNceedings.

On the petition being lodged the Controller directed summons· to be ser.ved in the prescribed form. On service of the summons the tenant being a firm M/s. Precision Steel & Engineering Works, and its constituted attorney Shri B.K. Beriwala appeared and filed an affidavii seeking leave to contest eviction petition. Io the affidavit teriant contended that respondent I, i.e. M/s Precision Steer & Engineering Works is the tenant and respondent 2 does not claim any interest in the premises in question in his personal capacity and ought not to have been impleade\! as ·a respondent. While denying that there is any undivided family styled as Prem Deva· Niranjao Deva Tay al it was contended that. the petitioner is not entitled to file a petition ,under section 14 (1) (e) because the purpose'o( letting · was not residential alone but combined purpose of residence-cum- business. It was denied that the tenant entered the premises as a licensee and subsequently the conrract of lease was entered into and it was submitted that the tenant entered the premises as tenant . PRECISION STEEL· v. PREM DEVA (Desai, J.)

effective from September 13, 1971, and .the lease was for residential- cum-commercial purpose. A specific agreement was pleaded that the tenant which is a partnership was entitled to use the premises for the residence of the director and/or partner as also for. the office purpose. Reliance was placed on clause 6 of the License agreement, which was really and substantially according to the tenant a contract of lease. Jt was also alleged that since the inception of the tenancy the preJ!lises have been used both. for residence and business purposes · to the knowledge of liindlo,rd and local authorities and no objection · has been raised in this behalf. It was emphatically denied that the premises were required by the landlord for his .personal use as ' well as for .the use of the members of his family and it was also denied· that the landlord has not in hi.s possession reasonably suitable aecommodation in Delhi. It was positively averred that Niranjan Deva Tay al who claims to be the owner of the premises· and for~ ·whose pers~nal requirement the eviction petition, has been filed · has

been residing at · 32, Anand Lok, New Delhi and that · is the address of the landlord set out in cause title or' the petition filed by the attorney. Dimension of the premises in possession of

the landlord was gi~en out as.2-1/2 storey building built on a plot of 1000 sq. yards. It was averred that the building now in posses- sion of the lail~lord is divided into four blocks or units, each block consisting of four bed rooms, three bath rooms, one kitch~n, one ·living room and one ctrawing-cuoi-dinfog room. It was in terms stated that the whole of the house is in occupation and possession of petitioner landlord and he has been residing all along in the house much.prior to the beginning of tenancy and.·he is in possession' of' the· same. It was further averred that the petitioner has concealed the fact that petitioner is the owner of another building at ·52 Anand Lok, New Delhi, ~hich building is equally big. One other a~erment of which notice may be taken is that the petitioner has been managing both the buildings and whenever blocks fair vacant he lets · ·~. them out at higher rent. It was· specifically stated· that front portion of the building at B-44, Greater Kailash Part I has the same accom- ) modation as the building which the landlord has in his possession 'at present. In order to point out' that the petitioner landlord when he comes inio possessio11 of premises vacated by tenants lets out the :same at higher rent thereby .contravening law and obtains unlawful enrichment, It was averred that the premises of identical size and nature situated at the back of the demised' pr~mises were taken on rent ,bY M/s. Kirloskar Company during the period .1970-73 and when ·A

c .o ll • StJPkEME COURT REPORTS [ 1983 I t s,c.k. vacated by the tenant the same was let out to Food Corporation of India from 1974·1975 and after getting the same. vacated the same was let'oqt in 1976 to Yash Mahajan and on each such opportunity rent was enhanced. It was accordingly_ alleged that the petition is malafide and the claim of bona fide requirement ii' utterly un· tenable.

A counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the landlord to the · affidavit seeking leave to defend reiterating what was averred in \he main petition, namely, that Prem Deva Niranjan De~a Tay al (HUF) is the owner of the property and · that Niranjan Deva Tayal is the Karla of the same. It was stated that the landlord bona fide required the . premises for his own 11se. With reference to 'the building situated at 32, Anand Lok, New Delhi, it was stated that Niranjan peva Tayal has no interest in the property and that the petitioner Niranjan Deva Tayal has no other suitable residential accommodation in Delhi. It was claimed that the property d{ 32, Anand Lok, New Delhi, belongs to one K.D. Tayal. .The dimension of the house was also disputed. With reference to the premises at 52, Anand Lok, . it

was stated that the building is not being used as residential premises but is only a garage block. It was further averred that Niranjan Deva Tayal was serving in Saudi Arabia and, therefore, the premises were given on leave and license but now that the petitioner has returned to India and has perma· nently settled down he requires the premises for his own use. A further averment was made to the effect that the block at the back of the demised premises is at present in occupation of M/s. Corona- tion Spinning· Co., Dadra, and the ·occupant is entitled to occupy the premises till 1981.

Frankly, in appeal by special leave under Article 136 it was not necessary to set out the pleadings in detail.. However, as the ques- tion before this Court is whether leave to contest the petition ought not to be granted and that is clearly relatable and wholly dependent upon the averments in the pleadings and the disputed questions· of facts arising therefrom and that is the apology for detailed narra- tion of rival contentions.

And now to law. Section 14 (I) (e) of the Act reads as under: PRBCISIO~ STEEL' v. PREM i>BV~ (Desai, J.). "14 (1) )'lotwithstanding anything to •the contrary contained in any other law or ·contract, no order ·or decree

for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made ·by any court or Controller in favour of the land' lord against a tenant ; Provided that the Controller may, on an application

made to him in the prescribed· manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or ;,ore ·of the following grounds only, namely :-.. (e) that the . premises let for residential · purposes are required bona' fide by the landlord for occupation .as

· .a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if·he is the owner therecf, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person. llas no other

reasonably suitable residential accommodation; c Explanation : For the purposes of this Clause, "pre- mises let for residential purposes" include any premises which having been let for use as a residence are, without

the consent of the landlord, used incidentally for commero cial or other purposes;" Section 25B which forms part of Chapter IIIA was introduced in the Act by Amending Act 18 of 1976 with effect from December 1, 1975. The fasciculus of sections is headed 'Summary Trial of Certain Applications'. 'Section 25B (!), (ii) and (5) are, material for the present purpose. They read as under :

"25B (I) Every application by a l~ndlord for the' recovery of . possesion of any premises on the ground specified in. clause (e) of the proviso to sub-sec. (I) of section 14 or under section l 4A, shall be dealt with in accor-

dance with the procedure specified in this section. (4) The tenant on whom the summons is duly served (whether in the ordinary way or by registered' post) in the form specified in the Third Schedule shall not

contest the prayer for evictiO!l from the premises unless .B c [1983) l s.C.R. he files an affidavit stati0g the ·grounds on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction. and

obtains leave from controller as hereinafter provided; and in defa~lt of his appearance in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave, the statement . made by the landlord· in the application for eviction

shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the applicant shall be entitled to an otder for eviction on the ground aforesaid. (5) The Controller shall give to· the tenant leave to contest the application if the affidavit filed by the tenant dis-

closes such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14, or under

sec. 14A." • The increased tempo of industrialisation since the independence resulted in mass migration of .population from rural to urban areas. This urbanisation process resulted in phenomenal demand for hous- ilig accommo~ation. Harsh economic law of demand and supply 'operated with full vigour to the disadvantage of the under privileged. To checkmate the profiteering by the owners of property and to protect the weaker sections,' most of the States in our country enac- ted legislation for the protection of tenants of premises situated in urban and semi-urban areas.· These legislations have been enacted with the avowed object of putting a fetter on the unrestricted right of re-entry enjoyed by the ,landlords with a view to protecting the tenants assuring security of tenure. This avowed object and purpose for enacting legislation must always inform and guide the interpre- tative process 'Of such socially oriented beneficial legislation. But the language of the statute·. bas to be kept in view to determine the width and ambit· of protection. Normally in all such statutes a provision is inserted· pre.scribing 'enabling provision under which landlord can recover possession and thereby restricted the unfettered right of re-entry. One such provision normally to be found in all such statutes is the one which enables a landlord to recover posses- sion if he bona fide requires the same. for occupation by himself or for the use of the members of the family dependent .on him. If the landlord seeks possession bona fide for his personal requirement, Ii~ ._/

PREOISION STEEL v. PREM DEVA (Desai, J.) Sil must co1i1mence.the action by filirg a petition and the tenant' would. be entitled to appear and defend the action. While defending the action in an adversary system the tenant would file his written state- ment raising contentions which ·in terms would focus the attention of the court on questions of facts in dispute on .the basis of which issues on which parties are at variance would be framed.

Both the 'parties would lead evidence· and ultimately on evaluation of evi4ence the court/Controller would determine the issues on the principle of preponderance of probability and answer the issues one way ·or the 'other determining the fate of the petition.

That was the position under the Act. On the introduction of Chapter IHA a notable departure has been made in the Act with regard to the procedure for trial of actions brought · under section · 14A and 14(l)(e). ·When a petition is brought before the Controller under section l 4(l)(e) a summorts Ms tO be issued to tlie tenant and when the sum.mans is served the tenant cannot straightway proceed to contest the petition for evi«ti\lll from the premises but either he must surrender possession or seek leave tQ contest the peti" tion. While seeking leave be must file an affidavit setting out the grounds on which he se~ks to contest the application for eviction. This is the Scheme of s~ction 25B(l) and ( 4). Then comes section 25B(5) which provides that the Controller is under a statutory duty- note the expression "shall give leave to the tenant to contest the application"-'-to grant leave if the ''\ffidavit filed by the tenant dis; · closes such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession' of the premises on the ground mentioned in section 14(l)(e), i.e. bona fide requ'irement for his per- sonal use or the use of the members of his family.

Let us recall the procedure for obtaining a ·decree'or order for· eviction agai.nst. a tenant entitled to protection of Rent Act other . than Delhi .Rent Act. What would the court expect the lalidford to prove before he seeks to recover possession from the tenant on the ' ground that he bo.na fide requires possession· for his. own use or the use of the ·members of his family ? In a catena of decisions it bas been decided that in order to succeed thr landlord should show that the premises have been let out as a: residence or for' residential pui'- poses; that the landlord needs to occupy the premises which may imply that either he has got no other accommodation in the city or town in which the premises in question are situated or the one in c

sq . ( 1983 I I S.C.11. his possession does not provide him a suitable residence and he is required to shift to the premises in ·question, that his need is genuine and that it is not, merely a fanciful desire of an affluent landlord who (or the fancy of ·changing the premises would like to shift to the one from which .the tenant is sought to be evicted; that he is acting bona fide in approaching the court for recovery of possession; and that his demand is reasonable. , These facts have to be proved to the satisfaction of the Court and once the trend of judicial .opinion as expressed by the court went so far as to say that the court cannot pass a decree on .compromise because the st~ute has cast duty on the court to be satisfied about the requirement of the landlord and a compromise ,decree was held to 'be a nullity (See Bahadur Singh & another v. Muni Sabra/ Dass & another.(1) Kaushalya Devi & others v. Shri K.L. Bansal.(') Certain states have in their respei:tive le&isla- tions also imposed an additional condition before the landlord can obtain possession for personal requirement" viz. before making a decree or order of eviction the Court must weigh the relativ~ hard- sh}p of the landlord and the tenant anil if greater hardship is likely to be caused to tenant, the court is under an obligation to refuse to pass the decree notwithstanding the fact that landlord has proved. his requirement. Rent Restriction legislation enacted by States may differ from State to State. ·Restrictions on the landlord's unfettered right to re· entry may be stringent or not so stringent depending upon the local situation. But the underlying thrust of all rent restriction legislations universally recognised must not be lost sight of that the enabling provisions of the rent restriction Act are not to be so cons- trued or interpreted as ~ould make the protection conferred on the teriant illusory by a liberal approach to the desire of the landlord to evict tenant under the camouflage of- personal.requirement. It is not for a moment suggested that a landlord should not get possession if he genuinely requires the premises for his own use and occupation . That much incidental element -of ownership in a country governed by mixed economy is still being recognised though in the wake of agrarian relorms the tenants of agricultural land have been made the owners thereof in· aln1ost the \vhole country.

But that" is a su.br ject with which we are not concerned. We must proceed on the accepted principle that the one element of ownership, viz., right to personally occupy and enjoy, stands legislatively recognised when an enabling provision was made while restricting the unfettered right of (I) [1969] 2 SCR 432.

(2) [1969] 2 SCR 1048. .I PRECISION STEEL v. PREM DEVA (Desai, J.) the landlord ·to renter demised premises at bis sweet will giving him an opportunity to seek possession on the ground of personal require-· men!. But care bas to be taken to visualise that the lust for increas- · ing rent by getting the .premises vacated masquerading .under the • garb of personal ·requirement does not over reach the Courts. This is the gist of observations of this Court in Bega Begum & Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan & Ors.; (1 ), where it was held that the expression 'reasonable requirement' iil section l l(h) of the Jammu & Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966, undoubtedly postulates that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire oi wish. . The distinction between. desire and need _should doubtldss be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need nothing but a desire as the High Court appeared to have done in that case. This observation was quoted with approval in Kewal Singfl v. Laj- wanti.(2) In Kewal Singh's ~ase this Court repelled challenge to the con,stitutional validity of section 25B of the Act.

Undoubtedly the procedure prescribed in Chapter IHA oft h e Act is materially different in that it is more harsh and weighted against the tenant. But should this procedural conundrum change

the entire landscape of law ? When a landlord approaches Con- troiler under sectfon 14(1) proviso (e), is the court to presume every averment in the petition as unchallengeable and trut.hful? The consequence of refusal to grant leave must stare in the face of the Controller that the landlord gets ail order of evictioll without batting the eye lid. This consequence itself·is sufficient to liberally approach the prayer for leave to contest the petition. While examining the question whether leave to defend ought or ought not to be granted the limited jurisdiction which t~e Con !roller enjoys is prescribed within the well defined limits and he cannot get into a sort of a trial by affidavits preferring one -set to the other and thus concluding the triat'witliout holding the trial itself.

Short-circuiting the proceed- ings need not masq.uerade as a strict" compliance with sub-~ection (5) of section 25B. The provision is cast in· a mandatory·form. Statu- tory duty. is cast on the Controller to give leave as the legislature uses the expression 'the Controller shall give' to the tenant leave to contest if the affidavit filed by the tenant disclos.es suC,h fact as would disentitle the landlord for an order for recovery of possession.· The Controller has to fook at the affidavit of the tenant seeking leave to (ll [i979] 2 SCR l.

(2) (1980) I SCR 854 @ 864, c ff c .F [ 1983 J I s.c.R. contest. Browsing through the affidavit if there emerges averment Of facts Which On a trial, if believed, would !)On-suit the landlord, leave ought to be granted.

Let it be made clear that the statute is not cast in a negative form by enacting that the Controller· shall '-'- refuse to give to.· the tenant leave to contest the application unless • the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such· facts as would disen- title the landlord from obtaining an order etc. That is not the mould in which the· section is cast..

The provision indicates a positive approach and not a negative inhibition. When the language ofa statute is plain, the principle that legislature speaks its mind in the plainest language has. to be given full effect. No canon of construc- tion pemits in t)le name of illusory intendment defeating the plain, unambiguous language expressed to convey the legislative mind. And the legislature h!\d before it Order 37, an analogous provision where ;,_.

leave to defend is to be granted and yet avoiding the phtaseology of fhe Code of Civil Procedure, namely, 'substantial defence' and 'vexatious and frivolous defence', the legislature used the plainest language, 'facts disclosed in the affidavit of the 'tenant' .. The language of sub-section 5 of section 25B casts a statutory duty on the Controlier to give to the tenant leave to contest the application, the only pre-condition for exercise of jurisdiction being that the affidavif–filed by. the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground mentioned in section 14(1) (e).

Section 14(1) starts with a non obstante clause which would necessarily imply that the Controller is precluded from passing an order or decree for recovery of ,possession of any premises in favour of the landlord against the tenant unless the case is covered by any of the clauses of the proviso.

The proviso sets out various enabling provisions on proof of one or the other, the landlord would be entitled to recover possession from the tenant. One such enabling provision is the one enacted in section 14( I) proviso (e). Upon a

. true construction of proviso (e) to section 14(1} it would unmistak-. ably appear that the burden is on the landlord to s~tisfy the Control- ler that the premises of which "possession is sought. is; (i) let for residential purposes; and (ii} possession of the premises is required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for any membei;. of his family. etc. and (iii) that the landlord or the person for who'e b·~fit possession is sought has no other reason- ably suitable residential accommodation. This burden, landlord is required to discharge before the Controller gets jurisdiction to make PRECISION STEEL v. PREM DEVA (Desai, J.)

'··-~- an order for eviction. This necessarily transpires from the language of section 14(1) which precludes the Controller from· making any order or decree for recovery of possession unless .the landlord proves to bis satisfaction t.be conditions in the enabling provision enacted as proviso un.der which possession 'is sought.

Initial burden is thus on the landlord. The question is' whether this burden is in any way diluted or stands discharged or wholly shifted to the tenant because· of a diffe- \ rent procedure prescribed in Chapter IHA.of the Act.· Section 25(4) · provides that in default of the appearance of the tenant in pursuance of the summons or, ~is obtaining such leave, the statement made by the landlord in the application for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the landlord shall be entitled . to an order for eviction on the ·ground set out in section 14(l)(e). · On a combined reading of section 14(1) proviso (e) with section 25B(l)· and ( 4) the legal position that emerges is that on a proper applica- tion being made in the prescribed manner which is required to be supported by an affidavit, unless: the tenant o11tains le~ve to defend · as contemplated by sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 25B, the tenant is deemed to have admitted all the avermeots made in the petition filed by the 'landlord. The effect ofthese provisions is that \ the. Controller would act on the admission of the tenant and there ·is no better proof ·of fact as admission, ordinarily because facts.which ·are admitted need not be proved. ·But what happens if the tenant appears pursuant to the summons ·issued under sub-sec, 2 of sec- ·tion 25B, files an affidavit stating the grounds on which he seeks to contest the application. . As a · corollary it would transpire that the facts pleaded by the landlord are disputed and controverted; How

\…_ is the Controller thereafter to proceed in the matter ,J ~t would be ·· '\_ open to. the landlord to contest the application of the tenant seeking leave to contest .and for I.hat purpose he can ·file an affidavit in reply but production and admission and evaluation of documenis at that stage bas no place. The Controller has to ~e

himseJLt_<> _the . .• affidavit filed oy the tenant under sub-section 4 and the re.·pJy, if any. \- . Oiiper&uing the affidavit filed by the tenant and the reply if any filed by landlord the Controller bas to pose to himself the only question : Does the affidavi~ disclose, not prove, facts as would dis- entitle the landlord from obtaining · an order for the . recovery of possession on the

~round specified in Gla11se (e) of the proviso to c 'A c ,D ~iJPREME COURT REPORTS [1983) l s.c.R. '—section 14(1). The Controller is not to record a finding on disputed questions of facts or hi~ preference of one ~et of affidavits against other set of affidavits. That is not the jurisdiction conferred on the Controller by sub-sec. 5 because the Controller while examining the question whether there is a proper case for granting leave to contest the application has to confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant disclosing such facts as would prima facie and not on contest disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of possession. At the stage when affidavit is filed under sub-section (4) by the tenant and the same is being examined for the purposes of sub-section (5) the Controller has to confine himself only to the averments in the affidavit and the reply if any and that becomes manifestly cl~ar from the language of sub-section (5) that the Cont- roller shall give to the tenant leave to contest the application if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from recovering possession etc. The jurisdiction to grant leave to contest or refuse the same is to be exercised on the basis of the affidavit filed by the tenant. That alone at stage is the relevant document and one must confine to the averments in the affidavit. .,/Ir the averments in the affidavit _di'sclose such facts which, if ultima- tely proved to the satisfaction of the Court,.would disentitle the landlord fro!ll recovering possession, that by itself makes it obliga- tory upon the Controller to grant leave. It is immaterial that facts alleged and disclosed are controverted by the landlord because the stage of proof is yet to come, It is distinctly possible that a tenant may fail to make good the def enc~ raised by him. Plausibility of the defence raised and proof of the same are materially different from each other and one cannot bring in the concept of proof at the stage when plausibility has to' be shown.

This view taken in S. Kanfibhai & Ors. v. Mehanraj Rajendra Kumar,{') Kishan Singh v. Mohd. Shafi & Ors.(') appears to have been approved in Santo•!/ Kumar v. Bhai Moo/ Singh(3) where at p. 1217 this Court while commenting upon an order granting conditional leave under Order XXXV!I, r. 3, passed by the trial judge which was to this effect :

~In the absence of these documents, the defence of the defendants seems to be vague consisting of indefinite assertions " observed as under : "This is a surprising conclusion. The facts given in

the affidavit are clear and precise, the defence could hardly (I) A.LR. 1970 G.ui. 32. (2) A.l.R. 1964 J&K 39. m [1958] S.C.R. 1211 @ 12p; PRECISION STEEL v. PREM DEVA (Desai, J.)

have been clearer. We find it difficult to see how a defence that on the face is. clear bec9mes vague· simply because the evidence by which it is to be prove~ i~ not brought O? file a.t the time the defence is put in.

The learned judge has failed to see that the stage of proof can only come after the defendant has been allowed to enter an appearance and defend the suit, and that the nature of the defence has to be determined at the time when the affidavit is put in. At that stage all that the Court has to determine is whether, 'If the facts alleged by the defen- dant are duly proved' they will afford a good or even a

plausible answer to the plaintiff's claim. Once the Court is satisfied about that, leave cannot be withheld and no questio~- ·about imposing conditions can -arise, and once leave is granted, the normal procedure of· a suit, so far as . evidence and proof go, ob,tains".

The manifost error committed in the procedure followed at present by the Controller under s. 25B may be pointed ont. The tenant ha.s to file an affidavit stating the grounds on which he seeks to contest the application.. The Controller may accept an affidavit in reply if ·landlord chooses to file one. So far there is no difficulty … There · then follow affidavit in rejoinder and sur-rejoinder and the docu- ments are produced and when this procession ends the Controller proceeds to examine the rival contentions as if evidence produced in the form of the affidaviis untested by cross-examination and unproved

documents are before . him on the appreciation and evaluation of which he records an affirmative finding that the 'facts di6closed in the affidavit of tenant . are not proved and therefore leave to

contest should be refused. ""-.,_ In our opinion, this is wholly impermissible. – The regular . ·trial required to be held by a Court of Small Causes as contempla- – ted by sub-sec. 6 read with sub-sec. 7 of section 25B is not to be substituted by affidavits and counter-affidavits at the stage of consi· dering tenant's' affidavit filed for obtaining leave to contest the petition under sub-sec. 4. Sub-section 6 enjoins a duty on the Con- troller where leave is granted to the tenant to contest the application to commence the hearing of the petition as early as practicable and sub-section 6 prescribes procedure to be followed as if the Controller is a Court of Small Causes.

T~e c;:ourt of Sll!~ll <;:au~~s fQllows the c ff c: (1983] I s.c.a. summary procedure in ihe adversary system where witnesses are examined and cross-examined and truth of av•rment is decided on the touchstones of cross-examination .. A speedy trial not conform: ing to the well·recognised principle of arriving at truth by testing evi- dence on the touchstone of cross-examination, should not be easily . read into the provisi-On at a stage not contemplated by· the provision unless the statute positively by a specific provision introduces the same. The scheme ·of section 25B does not introduce a trial for arriving at the truth at the stage of proceeding contemplated by sub- section ( 4) of section 25B.

It is at this stage advantageous to refer to the analogous pro- visions in Order 37 of the CoJe of Civil Procedure to find out whether that provision is bodily incorporated in sub-sec. 5 of sec- tion 25B or there is material departure so that stare decisis may or may not shed light on the vexed question. . Order" 37 Rule I sets out courts and classes of suits to which the order would apply. Rule 2 provides for institution of summary suits and sub·rule 3 of rule 2 provides that the defendant shall not defend the suit referred to in sub- rule (I) unless he enters an appearance and in default of his entering an appearance the allegations in the plaint shall be deemed to be admitted and the _plaintiff shall be entitled to a decree for a sum etc. Sub-rule 3 provides the procedure where the defendant enters an appearance. On such appearance being entered the plaintiff has to serve on the defendant summons for judgment in the prescribed form which is to be supported by an affidavit verifying the cause of action and the amount claimed and stating that in his belief there is no defence to _the suit;

It may be recalled that the language of rule 3 of Order XXXVU Code of Civil Procedure, prior to the amendment of the Code in J 976 was materially different and substantially the whole of rule 3 has been replaced making detailed provision therein about the manner, method and circumstances in which ieave to defend may.be granted or refused.

Leave to defend under sub-ml•· (5) of rule 3 may be granted if the defendant by affidavit 'or otherwise discloses such facts to the Court as·may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend.

The first proviso makes it clear that the leave shall not be refused unless the Court is s"atisfiod that th~ facts disclosed by the defendant do not indicate that he has. a substantial defence to raise or that the de~ence intended to be pui up by the defendant is frivo- lous or vexatious.

Re9all the language of sub-s. (5) of s. 25B which PRECISION STEEL v. PREM DEVA (Desai, J). makes it obligatory upon the Controller to give leave by use of the mandatory language that the Controller shall give leave to defend to the te.nant to contest the application if the affidavit filed by the ·tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlor~ from obtaining an order fol' the recovery of possession, etc. For proper and better apprc.ciation it may be made1clear that when the mandate 6fthe section is that leave shall be granted as it enjoins a positive duty while the proviso. to sub· rule (5) of rule 3 of Order XXXVII provides that leave to defend shall not be refused unless the Court is satisfied that the facts disclosed by the defendant do not indicate that he has a substantial defence to raise; etc. Undoubtedly, ·the test of triable issue has bee'n largely followed by the Court while .considering application for leave to defend under Order XXXVII; tule 3(5) but what constitutes a triable issue always depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and its connotation would change after the recasting of whole of rule 3 ?f Order XXXVII. It was, however, urged that the scope and ambit of sub-s. (5) of s. 25B in ifs comparison with sub-rule (5) of rule 3 of Order XXXVII is no more res integra in view of the decision of this Court· in Busching Schmitz (P) Ltd. v. P.T. Menghani & Anr. (') This Court observed as. und~r :

"But we make it plain even at this stage that it is falla- cious to approximate (as was . sought to .be done) s. 25B (5) . · with Order 37,r. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The

social setting demanding summary proceeding, the nature of the subject~matter and, abo'e all, the legislative diction which has been deliberately designed, differ in the two pro- . visions. The legal ambit and judicial discretion are wider in the latter while, in the former with which we are concern- ed, the scope for opening the door to defence is narrowed

down by the strict words used. The 'Controllet's power to· give leave to contest, is cribbed by the condition that the 'affidavit filed by the··tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the

recovery of possession of the premises on the ground speci- fied in cl. (e) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. J 4 or under · s.' l 4A .. Disclosure of facts' which· disentitle recovery of possession is a sine qua non for grant of Ieav.e. ·Are there facts disentitling the invocation of s·. 'MA 1"

(I) [1977] 3 S.C.R. 312. c ff, SUPREME COURT REPRTS (1983] I S.C.R. It is not clear from the decision whether this Court took note of whole of the re-structured rule 3 of Order XXXVII or it was keep- ing in view the unamended rule 3 of Order XXXVII. Neither is quoted, none is reierred to and it is not clear whether a note of amendment of 1976 was taken. That apart, compare the language of both the provisions as hereinabove indicated. The two provisos to sub-rule (5) of r. 3 make it clear that the leave cannot be refused if the defendant has a substa~tial defence to make or that the defence intended to be put up is neither frivolous· or vexaiious. Defence has to be substantial before leave can be obtained.· Compare it with ex- pre5slon 'affidavit discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord, etc.'. It is not difficult to ascertain where obligatory duty is cast. Mere disclosure of facts, not a substantial defence· is the sine qua non. Further, the Court can grant conditional leave or leave limited to the issue under Order XXXVII, r. 3(5); There is no such power conferred on the Controller under sub-s. (5) of s. 25B. Coming to the social setting referred to by this Court, one must not overlook the fact that a summary procedure can as well be prescribed for all suits to satisfy the felt needs of time referable to highly congested Court dockets. There is no evangelical sanctity in speeding up the actions against tenants alone. The landlord at one stage lets out the premises with the knowledge that it is difficult to evict t~nant and obtain possession and, therefore, would reasonably be expected to foresee that even if he has sorne future need he will not get back possession ahd yet after letting out premises in a short time approa- ches the Court on the ground of personal requirement and the tenant may not get even a chance to defend· himself. Social setting is, therefore, in favour of tenant. However, referring to this decision a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Mohan Lal v. Tirath Ram Chopra & Anr., (') observed that the scope for granting leave under sub-s. (5) of s. 25B is narrower than the one under Order XXXVII, rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure. We do not accept the interpreta- tion of the observations of this Court in Busching Schmitz' s case as understood by the Delhi High Court.

At this stage we may also refer with advantage to the decision of this Court in B.N. Mutta & Anr. v. T.K. Nandi. (2) In this case a petition under s. !4A(I) of the Delhi Rent Control Act was filed (I) [1982] Delhi Law Times .1.

(2) [1979f2 S.C.R. 409. l>Rll~ISION STEEL v. PltllM DEVA (l>esai, J.) for eviction of the tenant on the ground that the landlord has retired from Government service and he bas been called upon to vacate the Gover~ment premises which he was occupying by virtue of his office. The only relevant ·observation to which our attention was drawn .. reads as under :

"Leave ti'i contest an application under s~ction 1.4(1) cannot be said to be analogous to the provisions of grant of leave to defend as -envisaged in the Civil Procedure Code. Order XXXVII, rule 2, sub rule (3) of the Code

of Civil Procedure provides that the defendant shall not appear or defend the suit unless he obtains leave from a . Judge as hereinafter provided so to appea,r and defend. Sub-rule(!) of rule 3 of Order XXXVIIlays down the pro-

cedure .to obtain leave. Under the provisions leave to appear and defend the suit is to be given if the affidavit discloses such facts as would make incumbent on the holdet to prove consideration or such other facts as the court may deem sufficient to support the application. The scope of ' section 25B (5) is very restricted for leave to contest can only be giv~n if the facts are such as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of possession on the ·ground specified in section 14A."

With respect, the fact that. an obligatory d'uty is cast on the Controller to grant leave on disclqsure of facts in: the affidavit.Ills would disen- title the landlord to obtain possession itself specifies and defines the scope and ambit of jurisdiction and power of ihe Controller. Assuming that Order XXXVII, sub-rule (5) of rule 3 confers· wider discretion on the Court that, by mere comparison cannot cut . down or narrow or limit the power coupled with the duty conferred on the Controller under ·sub-sec. (5) of s. 25B.

Mere disclosure of ~facts which when _proved in a regular trial which would disentitle the landlord to obtain relief, such disclosure only impels tbe Controller to grant leave. It is ·not necessary fo record as required by Order

XXXVII Rule 5 whether the defence is substantial .or frivolous as vexatious. We find it difficult to subscribe to the view that the jurisdiction under sec. 25B,(5) is very limited.

We may as well now refer to Sarwan Singh & Anr. v. Kasturi Lal (1) Of course, the qnestion substantially raised in that case was (I) [1977] 2 S.C.R. 421. .A c [ 1983] I s.c.R. about the apparent conflict between Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 and ss. 14A, 25 and 25B of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. What is the scope and ambit of jurisdiction of the Con- troller under sub-sec. (5) of s. 25B did not come up for considera- tion.

What was, however~pointed out was that s. 25B provides for a procedure to effectuate the purpose underlying s. l 4A and s. 14(1) (e) which enables the landlords' to recover; immediate posses- sion of the premises'.

Expostulating the philosop!iy underlying this provision this Court observed as under : "Whatever be the merits of that phllosophy, the theory' is that an allottee from the Ce11tral Government or a 'legal authority should not be at the mercy of law's delays while being faced with instant eviction by his landlord save on , payment of what in practice is penal rent. Faced with a

Robson's choice; to quit the official residence or pay the market rent for it, the allottee had in turn to be afforded a quick and expeditious remedy against' his own tenant. With that end in view it was provided that nothing, hot

even the slum clearance Act, shall stand in the way of the allottee from evicting his tenant by resorting to the sum- . mary procedure prescribed by Chapter BIA. The tenant is even deprived of'the elementary r'ight of a defendant to

defend a proceeding brought against him, save on obtain- ing leave of the Rent Controller. If the leave is refused, by s. 25B (4) the statement made by the landlord in the appli- cation for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the

tenant and the landlord is entitled to an order for eviction. No appeal or second appeal lies· against that order. Sec- tion 25B(8) denies that right and provides instead for a revision to the High Court whose jurisdiction is limited

to finding out whether the order complained of is according to law." This observatiOn 1s rn the. context of a proceeding under s. 14A where a landlord on ceasing to be in Government service' is likely to be on the·road. It ill-compares withs. 14(1) (e). But apart from that, this decision is not helpful because the question did not arise in.that case about the scope and ambit of s. 25B(5). Undoubtedly, as has been stated in the decision, the object and purpose of the legislation assumes greater relevance while interpreting the language of the,,lltatute. The _provision nuder construction finds its place in PRECISION STEEL V, PREM DEVA (Deiai, J.)

the Delhi Rent Control 'Act, 1958. Its long title shows the object underlying the legislation. The long t'itle is : 'An Act to provide for control of rents- and eviction and rates of hotels lodging houses and for the lease of vacant premises to Government in certain areas in the Union Territory of Delhi'. The underlying object is to pro- vide for control of eviction. This must inform every interpretative process including the provision contained in s. 25B(5). By construc- tion of s. 25B(5) let us not retin'n to the days when under the Trans- fer of Property Act except in the C!'Se of fixed period of tenancy the tenant at will had no defence to offer and could· be thrown out at the mere whim and fancy of the landlord.

When leave to contest the petition is refused the uninvestigated averments iO: the petition are deemed to be ohuch great evidentiary value as to r~sult in evic; tion without the examination of those averments. The outcome of refnsal to grant leave 'm\lst stare into the . face while deciding the scope of the power and jurisdiction under s. 25B(5).

In passing we may refer' to tw_o decisions of this Court.. in CA. 179/82 (Charan Dass Dugga/ v. Brahma Nand, decided on Janmry 11, 1982) and CA, 527/82 (Om Parkash Saluja v. Sl]lt. Saraswati Devi, decided on February 8, 1982). We would have avoided any reference to these two decisions because the decision in each .case was rendereo on the facts of the case but the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court referred to these two decisions and observed that the ratio in each of it runs counter to the -large Bench decisions of this Court in Busching S~hmitz and B.N. Mutto' s cases and that the two earlier decisions 'provided the law 'of the land under Article l 41 of the Constitution. We fail to see ·any inherent conflict between the .aforementioned two earlier decisions and the · two later decisions. The earlier two decisions have been fully dis- cussed by us and w~ find .nothing in the later two decisions· which may even remotely be said to run counter to the ratio of the earlier. decisions.

It is indisputable ihat while examining the affidavit of the c tenant filed under s. 25B (4) for the purpose of granting or refusing to grant leave to contest the peiition the landlord who has initiated the action has to be heard. It would' follow as a necessary corollary that the landlord may controvert the averments made in the affidavit of the tenant- bu( the decision to grant or refuse leave must be based on the facts disclosed in the affidavit. "If they are controverted by the landlord tha_t fact may be borne in mind but if the facts· ills- c

SUPllEME COURT REPORTS (1983] I s.C.R. closed in the affidavit of the tenant· are contested by way of proof or disproof or producing evidence in the form of_ other affidavits or documents that would not be permissible. It is not the stage of . proof of facts, it is only a stage of disclosure of facts. Undoub- tedly, the rules of nat_ural justice apart from the adversary system we . follow must permit the landlord to contest affidavit filed by the tenant and he can do so by controverting the same by an affidavit. That would be an affidavit in reply because tenant's affidavit is the main affidavit being treated as an application seeking leave to contest the petition. But, the matter should end there. Any attempt at investiga- ting the facts whether they appear to be proved or disproved is beyond the scope of sub-s. (5) of s. 25B. Viewed from this angle the decision in Mohan Lal's case rendered by the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court is far in excess of the requirement of s. 25B (5) and the view taken therein does not commend to us.

It was, however, urged that s. 37 (I) makes it obligatory for the Controller to not only hear the landlord but examine evidence at the stage of granting or refusing to grant leave to contest. Sec- tion 37 (1) provides that no order which prejudicially affects any person shall be made by the Controller under the Act without giving him a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the order proposed to be made and until his objections, if any, and evidence he may produce in support of the same have been con- sidered by the Controller. Sub-section (2) of s. 37 provides that subject to any rules that may be made under the Act, the Controller shall, whiie holding an inquiry in any proceeding before him, follow as far as may be the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes, including the recording of evidence. Section 37 (1) prescribes procedure 'to be followed by the Controller in a proceeding under the Act and sub-s. (2) makes it clear that subject to the rules that may be made under the Act, the Court has to follow·the practice and proce- dure of the Court of Small Causes inclusive of the provision for recording of evidence.

However, in this context it is advantageous to refer to sub-s. (7) of s. 25B. It reads as under : "25B (7). Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) of section 37, the Controller shall, while holding an inquiry in a proce<!"ding to which this Chapter applies, follow the practice and procedure of a Cour\ of

Small Causes, including the recording of evidence." PRECISION STEEL v. PREM DEVA (Desai, J.) Sub-section (7) of s. 25B opens with a non-obstante clause and pro- · ·A vides that while holding an inquiry in a proceeding to which the Chapter IHA applies, the Controller has to follow the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes including the recording of evidence. Section 25B (l) leaves no room for doubt that it is· a self· contained code and that is why sub·s. (7) had to open with a non- obstante clause. It is crystal clear that while holding the inquiry under Chapter IIIA which incorporates s. 25B, the Court has to follow the practice and procedure of a Court of Sinai! Causes. It was, ·however, submitted that. the non-obstante clause' excludes the application of sub-s. (2) of s. 37 and not sub-s. (!).of s. 37 and, there· fore, when leave to contest is sought by the tenant not only the land· · lord can contest the same which is indisputable but the Conroller will have to follow the procedure prescribed in s. 37 (!), namely, inviting the objections, taking into consideration, the evidence c

that may be ·produced, etc. Ifs. 37 (I)' Is attracted and the evidence has • to be . produced and the Coµtroller is bound to take that evidence into consideration, the evidence can as well be oral evidence which· necessitates the examination and cross- examination of witnesses. If that is contemplated by s. 37 (i}, incorporating it in s. 25B would be self-defeating. On the contrary even the exclusion of. s. 37 (1) will necessarily follow from the pro- –~ vision contained in sub-s. (10) of s. 25B which reads as tinder: "25 (10). Save as otherwise provided in this Chapter,

the .Procedure for the disposal of an application for eviction on the ground-specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (!)_of section 14, or under section 14A, shall be the same as the procedure for the disposal of

-applications by Controllers.'.' It would appear at a glance that, .sub-s. (10) operates to bring in s. 37 (l) after leave to contest is granted. However, if there is any provision in s. 25B for dealing ·with an application under that section that would prevail over other provisions of the Act. While considering an applicatio~ amongst others under s.14 (I) proviso (e), if at the time of considering the application for granting leave the procedure under s.37 (l) is to be followed it would render sub-s. (IO) superfluous aqd redundant. Ifs. 37 (I) were to govern all pr~- . ceedings Including the application , for leave to . contest the pro- . ceedings, sub-s.

(i) and sub-s. (IO) would both be rendered c SUPREME COURT R~PORTS (1983] 1 S.C.R. redundant. ·on the contrary the very fact that sub-s. (7) provides that while considering the affi\}avit of the tenant seeking permission to contest the proceedings the practice and procedure of the Small Causes Court. will have to be followed itself .indicates the legislative intention of treating Chapter IIIA. and especiiiJly s. 25B as self- contained code and this conclusion is buttressed by the provision of .sub-s'. (I) which provides tha'i every application by landlord for recovery of possession of any premises on the· ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to' sub-s. (I) of s. 14 shall be dealt with in accor<jance with the. procedure specified in s. 258. Any other section prescribing procedure for disposal of application covered by sub-s .. 1 of s. 25B will be excluded. And that will also exclude s. 37 (1). The stage for considering the application for leave to contest the petition is anterior to the stage of hearing the substantive petition for eviction and the procedure for the disposal is prescribed in sub·s. (7). After grant of leave to contest sub-s. (JO) of s. 25B comes into operation· and it makes it abundantly clear that the procedure prescribed while holding an inquiry consequent upon the granting of leave to contest shall be the same as required to be followed by Contrail.er. This directlrpoints in the direction of s. 37 (!). There- fore it is crystal clear that s. 37 (I) is not attracted at the stage of . considering an application for leave to contest filed under sub-s. (4) _and examined under rule Sub-s. (5) or's. 25B.

Before concluding on this point conceding that a summary procedure bas been devised so that the bane of law courts and· legal prCicedure as at present in vogue manifestly showing regard for the truth being the last item on the list of· priorities. and, therefore, the tenant should not necessarily be permitted to prolong· the litigation anci cause hardship to the landlord who is seeking possession on the – ground of personal requirement by raising untenable and frivolous defence where speedy decision is desirable in the interest of society, does not imply

that ignoring the mandate of Jaw, the Controller should hold trial at a stage not prescribed by the statute. Inability to make good a defence does not render every defence either , frivolous or vexatious. In a civil proceeding the courts decide on the preponderence of.probabilities and it may be that while evaluating the evidence the Court may lean one way or. the other but the one rejected does not necessarily become vexatious or frivolous.' The last two are positive concepts and have to be specifically found and. it is not an end product of failure to offer convincing proof because some times a party may fail to prove the fact because 'the .other side · …

.;·.-,' PRECISION STEEL v. PREM DEVA (Desai; J) . 527 can so d~ctor or articulate the facts that the· proof may not be, easily available. Coupled with this js the fact that the justice delivery system in tbis country worshipped ao·d ardently eulogised is an adversary system the basic postulate of which was noticed by this Court in Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah ·& Anr,(1) as under:

"Now a code of procedure must be regarded. as such. It is procedure, something designed io facilitate justice and ·further its ends; not a penal enactment for. punishment and penalties, not a thing designed ·to trip people up. Too.

technical a construction of sections ~hat leaves no. room -· for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore he guarded against (provided always' that justice .is. done on both sides) lest the very means. designed for the fur-

therance of justice be used' to. frustrate. it. Next, there must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounde4 on a principle of natural. justice which requires that men should not be condemned un·-

heard, that decisions should not be reached behind their hacks, that proceedings that affect their lives and· property should not continue in their absence ·and that they should not be precluded from participating in them.

Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined· they must be given 'effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our Jaws of proce- dure should be construed, wherever that· is· reasonably

possible, in the light of that principle." Add to ·this the harshness of the procedure prescribed under section 25B. The Controller is the final arbiter of facts: Once leave is refused, no appeal is provided against . the order refusing leave (see sub-section (8) of section 25B). A revision ·petition may be · filed to the High Court but realistically no one should be in doubt about the narrow constri9ted jurisdiction of the- High Court while interfering with findings of facts in exercise of revisional jurisdic- tion. Compared to the normal procedure certainly the procedure is a harsh one and that considerably· adds to the responsibility of the .Controller at the th,;e of deciding the application for leave to contest the 1petition.: Wisdom, sagacity and the consequence of (I) [1955] 2 S.C.R. I @8.

c ff. c [1983] I s.c.tt. refusal to grant leave coupled with limited scope of enquiry . being confined to facts disclosed in affidavit of the tenant sheuld guide the approach of the Controller.

Since Sangram Singh the ever widening horizon of fair proce- dure while rendering administrative deci sion as set out in Maneka Gandhi should guide the approach of the Court while examining the encroachment, fetters and restrictions in the procedure normally followed in Courts. Speedy trial is the demand of the day but in the name of speedy trial a landlord whose right of re-entry was sought to be fettered by a welfare legislation with its social orienta- tion in favour of a class of people unable to have its own roof over the head-the tenant should not be exposed to ·the vagaries of augmenting that right which even when Rent Restriction Act was not in force had to be enforced through the machinery of law with. normal trial and appeal.

What then follows. The Controller has to confine, himself indisputably tq the condition prescribed for e.xericse of jurisdiction in sub-section (5) of section 25B. In other words, he must confine himself to the affidav·it filed by the tenant. If the affidavit discloses such facts-no proof is needed at the stage, which would disentitle the plaintiff from se~king possession, the mere disclosure of such facts must be held sufficient to grant 'leave because the statute says on disclosure of such facts the Controller shall grant leave'. It is difficult to be exhaustive as to what such facts could be but ordinarily when an action· is brought under section 14(1) proviso (e) of the Act whereby the landlord seeks to recover possession on the ground of bona fide personal requirement if the ·tenant alleges.· such facts as that the landlord bas other accommodation in his possession·; that the landlord has in his possession accommodation which is sufficient for him; that the conduct of the landford discloses. avarice for increasing rent by threatening eviction; 'that the landlord bas been letting out some other premises at enhanced rent ·without· any attempt at occupying the same or using it for himself; that the dependents of the landlord for whose benefit also possession is sought are not persons to whom in eye of ·Jaw the landlord was bound to provide accommodation; that the past conduct of the landlord is such as would disentitle him to the relief of possession; that the landlord who claims possession for his personal requirement has not cared to approach the Court in PRECISION STEEL v. PREM DEVA (Desai, J.)

. 529 person though he could have 'fithout the slightest inconvenience approached in person and with a view to shielding himself from cross-examination, prosecutes litigation through an ·agent called a constituted ·attorney.

These and several other relevant but inexbausiible facts when . disclosed should ordinarily· be deem~d to .be sufficient to grant leave. And now fo the facts of this case. Really no elaborate discu.ssion is necessary but what is stated herein is with a view to poipting out with respect bow contrary to well established principles and the mandatory requirements of the statute the learned Controller and the High Court dealt with the.matter. The learned Controller in para two of the judgment set out· five different defences raised by the tenant in bis affidavit seeking leave to contest the petition. The learned Controller t)l.en proceeded,. to note in para 3 of the order tllat the petitio'ner filed a counter-affidavit and also filed the sale deed of the house at 32, Anand Lok and further stated that the landlord : bas only one house of his ~nership and that is the demised premises. In summarising the contentions raised by· the tenant in his affidavit . the learned ·Controller overlooked two most important conten- . tions : (I) that though the landlord Niranjan Deva Tayal for whose benefit the petition was filed has been in Delhi since 1972 yet the Jeave and license agreement in favour of the ·tenant was renewed · ·in 1972 and 1973 which would mean that even though Niranjan Deva Tayal, the real landlord whose proxy is Prem Deva Tayal, . the constituted attorl\ey, did not seek possession but renewed the so called leave and license agreement which would necessarily imply that be was not in need of the premises and that be has some accommodation .in bis occ'upation which be considers

sufficient and could occupy it as of right. If that was not to be he should have so stated in the petition. But the glaring lacuna in summarising the contentions made by the learned Controller is that the tenant state.? in bis affidavit that an identical unit at the back of the demised premises fell vacant in 1973 when M/s. Kirlos- kar & Co". vacated the same and the same was let out to the Food Corporation of India at enhanced rent. The learned Controller did not note the fact that a notice seeking eviction was served in 1974. and that too on

the ground that Niranjan Deva Tayal requires the premises for his personal occupation because he bona fide .needs the same and yet no follow up action . was taken till 1979. when on June 22, 1979, a second notice of eviction was served. If in a regular trial these. facts· are proved, is there any <!oul>t 11bo11t the out9ome of the petitioQ? There was

t!ieJurth~r c c [1983] I S.C.R. averment of which proper summary is not made that even Food Corporation of India appears to have vacated the premises at the back of the demised premises and the same is in occupation of M/s .. Coronation Spiniling!(India) -and it is admitted that the same were let out up to and inclusive of the year 198 l. The averment -_ is that every tiine a fresh letting is indulged into it is done after raising the rent.

Could not the bona fides of the landlord on dis- -closure of these facts be put in issue? Surprislngly, contrary to the provision of law ihe learned Controller took the affidavit and counter-affidavit and reply affidavit as unquestioned evidence and proceeded to decide ali disputed questions of fact.

Is this at all contemplated by section 25B? If not, the whole order would be_ without jurisdiction. But the more objectionable part overlooked by him is that the landlord who seeks possession for himself and is a<Jmittedly in Delhi has not stated a single word on oa'tb about bis requirements as to in what right he is occupying the premises in which he is at present staying, why after nearly seven years he is required to vacate the same and ·w.bat necessitates his seeking possession of the front portion' when identical unit at the back fell vacant- thrice during the period he was permanently in Delhi. If these facts without further elaboration

disclosed in affidavit of the tenant are not sufficient to grant leave, we would find it difficult to see a single case in which leave could ever be granted which – would mean that the 1 landlord fortunately having ·premises in Delhi where rents· are fantastically high can bold tenants at ransom – 'on the threat of eviction on, the ground of personal 'requirement and on refusal of leave obtain possession.

We say no more. We then turn to the judgment of the High Court rejecting the revision petition filed by the tenant. The learned Chief Justice first examined the cont_ention whether rhe demised premises were let for residence-cum-business. While examining the contention, Clause 6 of tlle Licence ·Deed was

referred to which inter a/ia provides that the licensee will however" be free" to ~se the said premises in part or in full also for office J?Urposes provided the rules of the local authorities so permit and _in such an event the licencees' shall pay to the owners any increase in local taxes etc_ etc. occasioned

by such change of use of the said premises from residence to office. 'U1e contention raised in the petition of the tenant is that the pre;n-ises were let for residence-cum-business. Tile landlord has camouflaged license for lease but it is admitted on all sides and – it is so stated in the petition filed before the PRECISION STBBL v. PREM DEVA (D~sai, J.)

Controller ·by t.he constituted attorney of the landlord that the respondent was accepted as a tenant on monthly r_ent of Rs 2,000/·. It is nowhere examined by the High Court as to when the license · was terminated as alleged 'by the landlord in. the petition and a . contract of lease was entered into ·and what were the terms of the lease. ·The learned Chief Justice observed : 'a plain reading of the clause, spells out the sole purpose_ of letting· being residence' and this observation is made in the shape of the positive findi9g. Since the entry in the premises the tenant has been using part of the premises for office with the specific and undisputed permission of <landlord and. this fact is gloated over. Whether the rules permit slich a use; whether there was such rule prohibiting such use, is a. inatter left to be inferred by a statement that no ru'le or bye-law was . brought to the notice· of the Court that such an use was permissible. If the landlord· entered

into ii contract of leaile permitting non-residential use and yet if ii is pleaded that such use cati be made if the rules of the local authority permitted it, ordinarily one would expect the landlord to show that such use was ·impermissible. There is no finding to that effecit.

The .Learned Chief Justice then . proceeded to exall!ine the second contention, whether the landlord Shti Niranjan Deva Tayal as Manager of the Hindu Undivide~ Family has other suitable accommodation · at 32, Anand Lok.

The High Court disposed of. the content\on by an observation which be speaks of non-examina- tion of contention assuming that such examination at that stage . was'< permissible. The High Court observed that the learned

Controller rightly came to the conclusion that the premises belong not io the respondent but to his brother, This approach is wholly l unjustified. because- the question was not whether Shri Niranjan )…….._

Deva Tayal for whose benefit p(!SSession was sought was the owner \. of the premises occupied by him and situated at 32, Anandlok, but the substantial question was in what right he was occupying the premises for a period extending over 7 years on the date ·or the petition before the learned Controller and how it has become imperative for him to v.acate the premises. No examination of the relevant aspects appeared to have been undertaken and the revision petition was dismissed.

With great respect to the learned Chief Justice, if such an approach is to be ·upheld, the legislative ·purpose · in enacting the· Rent Act stands defeated. Therefore it is not possible to accept the conclusiol) ~ecorc;t~d by th~ ·High Court, both -B

c .F SUPllBMB COliRT RBPORTS (1983) 1 S.C.R. on account of non-examination of the relevant contentions and also on account of utterly incorrect approach 8!i to how the matter has to he examined at the stage of granting or refusing to grant leave under sub-section 5 of section 25B.

We accordingly allow this appeal, set-aside the order of the c learned Controller as well as of the High Court and grant to the tenant leave to contest. the petition for eviction and remit the cases to the learned Controller for proceeding according to law . . As Mr. D.V. Patel. learned counsel almost at the commen- cement of the hearing fairly conceded that this is a case in which · leave to contest the petition ought to have been granted and the.re- fore even though we allow the petition, we cannot saddle the landlord with costs.

W~ accordingly direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout, the proceedings. Costs of future proceedings shall abide the final outcome of the petition. As we are remitti~g the' case to the learned Controller where facts on trial a~e to be investigated any observation on the merits of the contentions made for disposing of this appeal have to be .wholly ignored in the subsequent proceedings as if they have never been made.

SEN, J. I agree that this pre-eminently is a fit case where leave to contest'the application under s. 14 (l) (e) must be granted to the tenan.t under sub-s. (5) of s. 25B of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1958 ('Act' for short), but I have the misfortune to differ from the construction placed· upon the provisions con- tained in sub-s. (5) of s. 25B of the Act.

. Sub-s. (5) of s. 25B of the Act reads as follows : "The Controller shall give .to the tenant leave to contest the application if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession <>f the

premises on the ground specified in· clause (e) of the proviso to sub~secti\lg (1) of section 14, or under s~ction 141V' t • PRECISION STEEL v. PREM DEVA (Sen, J.) There is a ·definite public purpose behind the enactment of Chapter IHA introduced 'by the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) . AC!, 1976. The words "if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses. such facts as would. disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order . for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground specified in cl. (e} of the proviso to sub·s. (!) of s. 14 or under s. I 4A" used in sub-s. (5) of s. 25B are to be interpreted in a manner which is in consonance with the intention of the Legislature and must be construed in a sense which would carry out the object and purpose of the Act.. The construction to be adopted must be meaningful · ~nd innovative.

A mechanical and literal construe· tion of these words detached from the context of· the either provi- sions as also the object and purpose_ of the enactment. will reduce this beneficial legislation .to futility.

S. 14A ofthe Ac.t was enacted to confer the right to recover immediate posse.ssion, upon persons who being in occupation of any c residential premises .allotted to them by the Central Government or any local authority, were required, in pursuance of any general or special order made by that Government o~ authority to vacat.e su.ch residential accommodation, or in default, to incur the liability to pay penal rent.. The whole object in s. 14A was to:· ensure that all Government .servants to whom residential aecqmmodation had been allotted by the Government or any local authority; should vacate _ .E

their Government ac«oinmodation, if they have any house of their own in the Union Territory of Delhi. Further, experience in the past showed that landlords who were in bona fide requirement of their accommodation for residential purposes under cl. (e) of the proviso to Sl!b-s. (I) of s. 14 were being · F

put to· great hardship due to the dilatory procedure of the suit. It "'··'- was felt in the public interest that such landlords who were in bona · fide requirement of their residential premises for their own occupa· tion or for.the occupation of any member of their family dependent on them, should not be subjected to protracted trial of a civil suit with concomitant rights of appeals.

The underlying object behind the enactment of [Chapter IIIA was that these classes of-landlords i.e. a landlord who was i~ 'bona fide re'l_uirement of his residential premises for his own occupation or for the occupation of any memb~r Qf his family <lepondent on .534

[ 1983) I s.c.a. hini under cl. (e) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 14, or a landlord. seeking to enforce the right to recover immediate· possession under s. 14A of the Act, should not be at the marcy of law's delays ·but there should be quick and expeditious remedy against his own – tenant.

c Apart from conferring rights under.s. 14A to recover· imme- diate possession, a summary procedure for trial of applications made' uµder s. ·14 (I) (e), or under s. 14A, was provided for by Chapter IHA. S. 25A provides that the provisions of Chapter IIIA which co'!- tains ss. 25A, 25B and 25C and any rule made thereunder shall have effect "notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith 'contained elsewhere in the Act or in any law for the time being in force." By sub"s. (1) ofs. 25B, every application by a landlord for recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in cl. (e) of the proviso to sub-s. (I) of s. 14, or under s. 14A, has to· be dealt with hraccordance with the procedure specified in 'Chapter lIIA. The conferral of'the right to recover immediate possession ·under~- 14A on a person in occupation of .any residential premises allotted by the Central Government or ·any local authority necessitated a con- sequential change.in the law .. -Such a person, before.the enactment of s. l 4A, could not evict his own tenant because so lqng as he was in'occupation of the residential accommodation allotted to him, he could not satisfy the ,requirement of cl. (e) of the proviso to sub-s. ·(I) of s. 14 that he should not have any other. reasonably suitable accommodation. In order that. the object of s. 14A .may not be frustrated, s. 25C provides that noihiilg contained in sub·s (6) of s. 14 shall apply to a landlord who is in 'occupation of any pre- mises allotted to him by the · Central Government or any local authority is required to vacate that residential accommodation. There was also a similar change brought .about· with respect to a claim by a landlord under cl. (e) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 14.' Sub-s. (7) of s. 14· provides that where an order for recovery of 'possession is made on the ground specified in cl. (ei of the proviso to sub-s. (I) of s. 14; the landlord shall not be entilled to obtain Jmmediate possession thereof before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of the order. Sub-s. (2) of s. 25C reduces the period of.six months to two months.' ·

One of tlJ,e dominant objects with which the legislation was introduced was to mitigate the hardship of landlords who were in bonafide requireOJ<;Q\ of \hier resiq~q\ial premises·an4 h~c! made an , l'Rl!CISION STEEL v: PREM DEVA (Sen, J.)

applicaiion for eviction under s. 14 (I) (e), or under s. 14A, and to obtain immediate possessipn of such premises without well-known travails of our procedural ·1aws .. · The whole. object was to confine the trial only to such cases where the tenant had such a defence as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an· order for eviction · · under s. 14 (I) (e), or under s. 14A, and to provide for a summary procedure of trial of trial of such applications. The ,words '.'if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts" used in sub-s. (5) of s. 25B of the Act must therefore'take their colour from the con· text in which they appear.

. It is to mitigat~ the rigour of the law that Parliament in its wisdom introduced Chapter IHA and made the summary procedure applicable to the trial of applications. under s. 14 (I) (e), or under s. 14A. It seeks to strike a balance betweeen the_ competing needs of a landlord and tenant and has therefore provided that the tenant shall have a right to apply for leave 'to contest. Sub-s. (4) of s. 25B provides that the tenant shall· not contest the prayer of eviction from the premises uriless he has filed an . affidavit stating the grounds on which he seeks to contest the application for_eviction and obtains leave from the Controller. Under sub-s. (5) of s. 25B, the Controller is enjoined t<i give the tenant leave to contest the application only if the affidavit -filed' by the tenant disC!oses such facts as would ·disen- . title a landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of posses- · sion of the premises on the ground specified in cl. (e) of the proviso -tO'sub-s. {I) of s. 14, or under s. 13, or under s. 14A . . ,•

c ' In Sarwan Singh & Anr. v: Kasturi Lal,(') Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) after stating that the object of s. 14A was to confer on a class of landlords the right to recover "immediate · – -~ possession of the premises" observes :

"Whatever be the merits of that philosophy, the theory is that an allottee from the Central Government or a ·local authority should not be at the mercy- bf law's delays while being faced with instant eviction by his landlord ·save on payment of what· in practice is penal rent. Faced with a

Hobson's choice, to quit the,official residence or pay the market rent for it, the.allottee had in turn to be afforded a quick and expeditious .remedy against .his o)Vn tenant. (1) (lm] 2 S.C.R. 421_.

. ~) c SUPllBMB COURT 11.BPOll.TS (1983] I s.c.11.. With that end in view it was provided that nothing, not even the Slum Clearance Act, shall stand in the way of the allottee from evicting his tenant by resorting to the sum- mary procedure ·prescribed by Chapter IIIA. The tenant

is even deprived of the elementary right of a defendant to defend a proceeding brought against him,- save· on obtaining leave of the Rent Controller. If the leave is refused, by s. 25B (4) the statement made by the landlord

in the application for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the landlord is entitled to an order for eviction. No appeal or second appeal lies against that order. Section 25B (8) denies that right and provides instead for a revision to the High Court whose jurisdic-

tion is limited io finding out whether the order complained of is according to law." The provisions of Chap.ter IIIA have been enacted with· the object, in the words of Chandrachud, J.,., "to confer a real, effective and immediate right on a class of landlords to obtain possession of premises let out by tliem to their tenants." The same considera. tions are applicable to the disposal of applications nuder Cl. (e) of the proviso to sub-s.(1) of s. 14. The right to recover immediate possession which accrues under s. 14A. of the Act is equated by Parliament with the landlord's bona fide requirement of residential premises for his own occupation or for the occupation of the members of his family under s. 14(1)(e). Sub-s. (5) of 8. 25B gove,rns the disposal of both an_d therefore must be interpreted in a manner which will carry out the legislative mandate.

Under the scheme of the Act, the grant or refusal of leave under sub-s. (5)°of s. 25B of the Act, is the most crucial stage of the proceedings initiated ·on. an application for eviction ·by the landlord under s. 14(1 )(e), or under s. l 4A, at which stage the Controller has to decide whether the application should proceed to trial, The Controller obviously cannot. come to a decision as to whether or not leave to contest should be granted under sub-s. (5) of s. :25B without affording the parties an opportunity 9f a hearing. The Controller is not a Court but be has the trappings of a Court, and be must conform to the rules of natural justice. It. must1therefore follow as a necessary corollary that the Controller has the duty to hear the parties on the question whether leave to "-<. .

l>RliCISION STilEt•v. PREM DEVA (Sen, J.) S31 contest should or should not be granted under sub-s; (5) of s. 25B . A of the Act . Once it is conceded that the landlord has a right to be· heard · on the question of grant of leave to contest under sub-s. (5) ·or s. 25B, it must follow as a necessary implication that he has a ·right to refute the. facts ~lleg~d by the tenant in his affidavit filed under sub-s. (4) of s. 25B and to· show that' the affidavit fileil under under sub-s. (4) of s. 25B .by the tenant does not represent true facts. The Controller is therefore bound toe give the landlord an opportunity to meet the allegations made by the tenant. The Controller-must apply. his l)lind not only to the averments made by the landlord in his application for eviction, but also to the facts alleged by ihe tenant in his affidavit for leave to contes_t as well as the facts disclosed by the landlord in his affidavit in rejoinder, besides the other material on record i.e. the documents filed by the parties in support of their respective claims in order to come to a conclusion whether the requirements' of sub-s. (I) of s. 25B are fulfilled. . It is difficult to lay down any rule of universal application for each case must depend on its own facts.. To ask the Controller · to confine only to the affidavit filed by the tenant is to ask him not to apply his mind in a judicial manner even if he feels that the· · justice of the case so demands. The Controller must endeavour to resolve. the competing claims of landlord and tenant. to the grant or refusal of leave under sub-s. (5) of s. 25B of the Act, by ·finding.a solutfon which is just and fair t~ both the parties. It is not suggested for a moment that the proceedings initiated on an application by the landlord under s. l4(l)(e), or under s. 14A, must undergo trial at iwo stages,

Under sub-s. (5) of s. · 25B, the Controller must prima facie be satisfied on a perusaI of I.he affidavits ·of the parties to the proceedings and the other · material on record that the facts alleged by the tenant are such as would diseniitle' the landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of possession of the premises on the ground specified in Cl. (e) of the proviso to sub-s. (I) of s. 14, . or under

s~ 14A. The word 'disentitle' is a strong word, and the Controller must he satisfied that the tenant has such a defence as would defeat the claim of the landlord under· Cl. (e) of the proviso. of sub-s. (I) of s. 14, or under s. I 4A. It cannot be that the Controller would set down c

a ·ff · [1983) 1. S.C.R. the application for trial merely on perusal. of the affidavit filed by the tenant without applying his mind to the pleadings of the parties and the material on · record. If he finds that the pleadings are s~cb. as would entail a trial, then the Controller must grant the tenant leave to contest as the words "shall grant to the tenant J~a've to contest" in sub's. (5) of s. 25B. make 'the gr1111t of leave obligatory ..

It is also necessary to emphasize that the scope of sub-s. (5) of s. 25B_ is ·rc:.stricted- and the test of "triable issues" u~der order XXXVII, r. 3(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is not applicable, as the language of the two provisions is different. The use of the word 'such' in sub-s. (5) or" s. 25B implies that the Controller_ bas the power to limit the grant of leave to a particular ground. A tenant may ta:ke all kinds of pleas in defence. The whole object of sub,s. (5) of s. 25B was to prevent' the ta1'ing of. · frivolous pleas by tenants to protract the trial. · Where' the tenant seeks leave to contest the application for eviction under s. !4(1)(e), or under s. 14A, be must file an affidavit under sub-s. (4) of s. 25B raising his defence which must be clear, specific and positive. The defence must also be bona fide and if true, . must result in the dismissal of landlord's application. Defences of negative character which are intended to put the landlord to _proof or are vague, or are raised mala fide only to gain time and protract the proceedings, are not of the kind which will entitle the tenant to the grant of ·the leave.· The Controller cannot set down the application for hearing· without making an order in terms of sub-s. (5) of s. 25B. The trial must be confined only to such grounds as would disentitle the landlord to any relief. Such an order for the grant or refusal of leave to contest under sub-s. (5) of s. 25 of the Act cannot be made without affording to the parties an opportunity of a hearing which, as we all know, does not only mean the right io address the Controlle_r but also consid.eration of the material placed before him · by both the parties ..

I would therefore, for my part, refrain from placing a literal and mechanical construction of sub-s. (5) of s. 25B of the Act as it conflicts with the essential requirements 'of fajr play and natural justice which the Legislature never intended·· to throw overboard. In my view, the landlord has-a right to be afforded an opportunity /-·.

l>RBCISION STBEt v. PREM DBV A (Sen, !.) to meet the allegations made by the tenant in the affidavit for leave to contest. and filed under sub-s. (4) of s. 25B and there is a corres- polldiog duty· imposed on the Controller to hear the parties on the question whether such leave should· or should not be granted und~r sub-s. (5) thereof and apply his mind to the pleadings of the· parties and the material OD record.

H.L.C. Appeal allowed.