Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
13. Deceased Anita had suffered 95% burn injuries; yet her statement before PW-4, Tehsildar was clear and cogent. G The trial court and the High Court examined the reliability of the dyin.g declaration and recorded concurrent findings of fact that Ext. P11 dying declaration is reliable and inspires confidence of the court. We find no perversity in su<ih findings.
14. PW-7, Dhan Singh is the uncle of deceased Anita. In PREMPAL v. STATE OF HARYANA [R. BANUMATHI, J.] his evidence PW-7 stated that when they reached the hospital, the deceased told him and her father Chhotu Ram that her brother-in-law Prempal had scuffled with her and pushed her down and in the meanwhile, Jai Singh came and asked · Prempal to bring kerosene and set her on fire and Prempal brought kerosene and poured on her and Jai Singh set her on fire and thereafter Jai Singh and Prempal tried to extinguish the fire. It was submitted that during cross-examination of PW- 7, he was also confronted with reference to his statement recorded during investigation under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that there are two c conflicting statements by the deceased and in one statement before PW-4, Tehsildar, Anita named only the appellant whereas in the other statement before PW-7, she not only named two accused persons but also categorically defined the roles individually to the respective accused persons and this contradiction raises serious doubts about the incident and the veracity of the statement by Anita and this aspect was not properly appreciated by the Trial Court and the High Court.
15. Countering the above arguments, the learned counsel for the respondent-State took us through the evidence of PW- 7 and also the judgment of the trial court and submitted that in his statement recorded during inquest PW-7 had stated that Anita told him that appellant was responsible for her burns and the courts rightly• held that there is no inconsistency between dying declaration' and the statement of PW-7.
16. We have gone through the evidence of PW-7 and the judgment of the trial court. So far as overt act of the appellant, pouring kerosene on the deceased, we find no material inconsistency between the evidence of PW-7 and Ext. P11 dying declaration. Referring to the statement of PW-7 recorded during inquest, the trial court recorded factual finding that in his anxiety, PW-7, Ohan Singh tried to rope in Jai Singh also and that in his earlier statement recorded during inquest PW-7, Ohan Singh did not implicate Jai Singh and on those findings, A . trial court acquitted Jai Singh. In the light of such factual finding recorded by the trial court, we find no merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that there were two contradictory version of the deceased.
17. The defence version is that Anita committed suicide as she was frustrated because she could not conceive a child. The appellant-Prempal in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. stated that on 24.10.2001 he had gone to Narnaund for purchase of domestic articles and returned home at 5.00 C p.m. and only then he came to know that his sister-in-law Anita had set herself on fire and his father Jai Singh had taken her to Shanti Hospital for treatment and that deceased Anita used to remain depressed as she did not conceive the child and therefore she committed suicide. The appellant placed reliance upon the statement of his father Jai Singh recorded under D Section 313 Cr.P.C. and also the burn injuries sustained by Jai Singh. The fact that Jlai Singh sustained burn injuries, does not lead to the conclusion that it was a suicide.
18. In burn injury cases, two possible hypothesis arise in E the judicial mind – was it suicide or was it homicide. In cases where the dying declaration projected by the prosecution gets credence, the alternative hypothesis of suicide has to be justifiably eliminated. In the present case, had it been a suicide, Anita who was at the point of death had no reason to falsely F implicate her brother-in-law Prempal. We do not find any substance in the defence version of suicide theory.
19. A perusal of various judgments of this Court, some of which we have r€lferred to above, shows that if a dying declaration is found to be reliable, then there is no need for G corroboration by any witness and conviction can be sustained on that basis alone.
20. In the present case evidence of Tehsildar, the Doctor and other witnesses is cogent and consistent that the deceased PREMPAL v. STATE OF HARYANA [R. BANUMATHI, J.] was conscious and in a fit state of mind to give dying A declaration and courts rightly based the 6onviction upon the 'same. When the trial court as well as the High Court have appreciated the entire evidence in its right perspective, we see no reason to interfere and the appeal fails. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. Devika Gujral Appeal dismissed.