H. H.Rqja Harindd Singh S. X arnail Singh Ymkatarama Ai1<11' ]. (1957} largely to the effect that the appellant's men did election work in the morning or in the evening, that is, out of
office hours. That shows that the work of the staff was in addition to their normal duties, and on the principles stated above, they could not be held to have been employed in connection
with the election. As the first respondent does not appear himself to have under- stood the true position under Rule 118 and has failed to adduce evidence requisite for a decision of the ques-
tion, he must fail, the burden being on him to establish that that Rule had been infringed. In the result, this appeal is allowed, the order of the Election Tribunal is set aside and the election petition
of the first respondent will stand dismissed. As the parties have each succeeded on one issue and failed on another, they will bear their own costs throughout. A p~al allowed. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK Ltd.
v. SRI RAM KANWAR, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, DELHI. (BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AIYAR, B. P. SINHA and s. K. DAS JJ.) Industrial Dispute-Travelling and halting allowances to the workerl representatives-Order of the
Tribunal directing employer payment of such expenses pending adjudication proceedings-fun's· diction-Practice of the Industrial Courts-Costs-Discretion of the Tribunal-lndtutrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947), s. 11(1) (7)-Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908), s. 35.
Sub-section (7) of s. 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as inserted by Act 48 of 1950, provides : "Subject to the rules made under this Act, the costs of, and incidental to, any proceeding before a Tribunal shall be in the discretion of that
Tribunal, and the. Tribunal shall have full power to determine by and to whom and to what extent and subject to what conditions, if aoy, such S.C.R. costs are to be paid, and to give all necessary directions for the pur- poses aforesaid, and such costs may, on application made to it by the perpon entitled, be recovered as arrears of land revenue or as
a public demand by the appropriate Government." During the pendency of the proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal for the adjudication of a dispute between the appellant Bank and its workmen, an application was
made by one of the. representatives of the workmen praying inter alia that the appellant should be ordered . to pay travelling and halting allowances' for the representatives of the various
Unions coming from different stations other than Delhi to attend the hearing before the Tribunal at Deihi, on the ground that the appellant had branches all over India and that there were several Unions
of its employees at those branches who were involved in the dispute in question. The Tribunal while conceding that there was no provision of law in support of the claim made by t~e res- pondents nevertheless made
the order relying on the general practice of the Industrial Courts. The appellant appealed by special leave and contended that the order was wholly without jurisdiction and was also unjust, while the respondents supported the order relying on s. 11 (7) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 : ' Held, that the order of the Tribunal was without jurisdiction and could not be supported either on the basis of the general practice of the Industrial Courts or with reference to the provisions of s. 11 ( 7) of the
Act, because (I) there was no uniform or consistent practice in the matter and even if there was any such practice, it was neither warranted by law nor by the principles of reason and justice ; (2) on a proper construction of the . sub-section there was no power in the
Tribunal to direct the payment of the costs of a party in advance by the other party, irrespective of the final result of the proceeding. The discretion which is given to a Tribunal under s. 11 (7) of
the Act is a judicial discretion and must be exercised according to the rules of reason and justice, not by chance or caprice or private opinion or some fanciful idea of benevolence or sympathy.
feevan Textile Mills, Hyderabad (Deccan) v. Their Workmen, (1956) I L.L.J. 423, approved. Cmain Banking Companies v. Their Workmen, (1952) 2 L.L.J. 54, in so far as it decided that the
Tribunal had power and juris- diction under s. 11 (7) of the Act to direct the Banks to meet the expenses of the workmen i.n a pending proceeding, disapproved. CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil
Appeal No. 134 of 1955. Appeal by special leave from the order dated April 17, 1954, of Sri Ram Kanwar, Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, made on an application filed on April 17, 1954.
Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Sri Ram Kanwar, Industrial Tribunal, Delhi. Pur!}ab National, Bank ltd. v. Sri Ram Kanwar, lndustrial Tribunal, Delhi. S. IC. Das J, [1957] Ram Lal Anand and Naunit Lal, for the appellant.
Y. Kumar, for respondent No. 13. l.956. December 20. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by , S. K. DAs J.-The Punjab National Bank Ltd. is the appellant before us. Shorn of all details not necessary
for our purpose, the facts are these. By its Order No. LR-100 (98) dated September 2, 1953, the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, appointed Shri Ram Kanwar, respondent No. 1, as the Industrial
Tribunal for the adjudication of a dispute which had arisen bet- ween the appellant and its workmen in respect of the following matter : "Absorption of Bharat Bank employees in the
Punjab National Bank Ltd., and their service condi- tions." On April 17, 1954, in the course of certain pfelimi- nary proceedings before respondent No. 1, an applica- tion was . made on behalf of the
All India Punjab National Bank Employees' Federation, in which it was stated that a number of other Unions were involved in the dispute in question, because the appellant had branches all over India and there were several Unions
of its employees at those branches. It was further stated in the application that some of those Unions had submitted their statements when the dispute in question was referred to the
Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, with Shri Panchapagesa Shastri as its sole member and Chairman; that Tribunal did not, how- ever, function as Shri Panchapagesa Shastri was appointed a member of the Labour Appellate Tribunal
of India. Two substantial prayers were made in the application of April 17, 1954: one was that due publi- city of the adjudication proceedings should be given by issuirtg notices to all those Unions to participate in
the proceedings, and the · second prayer was that an order should be made directing the appellant to pay travelling and halting allowances to the representatives of the various Unions so as to enable the latter to send
their representatives to Delhi, the place where the S.C.R. adjudication proceedings were pending. A list of four- teen Unions and organisations was given along with the application, with
the number of representatives which each Union or organisation wished to send. In the present appeal we are concerned only with the second prayer made in the aforesaid application,
and the order which respondent No. 1 made with regard to that prayer, being the order impugned before us, was in these terms : "The management objects to the grant of any T .A. or halting allowance to the representatives of the
Unions. It is, no doubt, correct that there is no pro- vision of law on this point in favour of the representa- tives, but the general practice of various Tribunals has all along been to allow reasonable T.A. and halting
allowance to the representatives of the Unions, specially in Banks' cases. It is, therefore, ordered that the re- presentatives of the Unions, who put in appearance in the Tribunal from stations outside
Delhi, shall be paid 2! second class railway fares to and from Delhi, plus Rs. 10/- per day as halting allowance, by the management of the Bank. The Bank is also requested to direct its respective
branches to pay travelling and halting allowances in advance to the employees who intend to come to Court as representatives." It may be stated here that out oi the fourteen Unions and organisations which wanted to send their
representatives to take part in the adjudication pro- ceedings, two have their offices in Delhi. Respondent No. 1 directed the payment of travelling and halting allowances to the representatives
of the remaining twelve Unions and organisations, and fixed the number of representatives to be sent by each Union or organi- sation. The plea of the appellant was that the order passed
by respondent No. 1 was wholly without jurisdiction and was also unjust, involving as it did an expenditure of Jll>t less than Rs. 2;500/- for each day of hearing in Punjab National
Bank Ltd. Sri Ram Kanwar, Industrial Tribunal, D1fhi S. K. Dtu J. Vi Sri Ram Kanwar, lndrulrial Trib .. al, Delhi. S.K.Da1 J. P957l the course of the proceedings before respondent No. 1.
On that plea the appellant moved . the Punjab High Court for the issue of a writ of certiorari or such other writ as might be appropriate, for the purpose of quashing the order of respondent No. 1.
The Punjab High Court, however, dismissed the petition of the appellant in limine on May 14, 1954. The appellant then asked for and obtained special leave from this Court on October 18, 1954.
The question for decision is a very short one. The respondents appearing before us have sought to support the impugned order on the strength of the provisions of sub-s. (7) of s. 11 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947), hereinafter referred to as the Act. That sub-section which was added by Act 48 of 1950 and which we shall presently read, lays down, inter alia, that t11e costs of, and incidental to, any prcr ceeding before a
Tribunal shall be in the discretion of that Tribunal, and the Tribunal shall have full power to determine by and to whom and to what extent and subje~t to what conditions, if any, such costs are to be
paid and to give all necessary directions for the pur- poses aforesaid. The question is whether respondent. No. 1 had power, in the exercise of his discretion under the provisions of sub-s. (7) of s. 11, to direct the pay-
ment of costs in advance by one of the parties to the dispute to the other parties in a pending proceeding, irrespective. of the final result of that proceeding. In our opinion, the
question admits of only one answer. Sub-section (3) of s. enumerates certain powers vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, and says that every Board, Court and
Tribunal under the Act shall have those powers ; the last enumerated power is in general terms, being "in respect of such other matters as may be prescribed." No rules made under the
Act bearing on. the question of costs have been brought to our notice; therefore, all that can be said, with regard to the effect of sub-s. (3) of s. 11, is that except the enumerated powers,
other powers vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure have not been given to the Board, S.C.R. Court or Tribunal under the Act. The Act, however, contains a separate provmon in the matter of costs
and that is sub-~1 (7) of s. 11. That sub-section reads (we are quoting it as it stood at the relevant time prior to the amendment of 1956) : "Subject to the rules made under this
Act, the costs of, and incidental to, any proceeding before a Tribunal shall be in the discretion of that Tribunal, and the Tribunal shall have full power_ _to determine by and to whom and to
what extent and subject to what conditions, if any, such costs are to be paid, and to give all necessary directions for the purposes aforesaid, and such costs may, on application made to
it by the person entitled, be recovered as arrears of land revenue or as a public demand by the appropriate Government." A comparison of the sub-section with s. 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure shows
that the sub-section is in terms similar to those of s. 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure except for the concluding portion of the sub-section which relates to the recovery of costs as
arrears of land revenue. There is also another difference in tl1at sub-ss. (2) and (3) of s. 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not find place in the Act. On a plain reading of the sub-section, it is manifest
that (1) the expression "costs of any proceeding" means costs of the entire proceeding as determined on its conclusion and not costs in a pending proceeding, nor costs to be incurred in future by a party ; and (2)
the expressioµ "costs incidental to any proceeding" similarly meafis costs of interlocutory applications etc.-such costs as have been detetmined thereon, at the conclusion of the hearing.
Neither of the two 'expressions has any reference to · costs payable in advance or to be incurred in future by a party ; far less do they refer to halting and travelling allowances
to be incurred by a party while attending the Court on his own behalf. Respondent No. correctly appreciated the legal position, and said that there was no provision· of law in support of the claim made by
Purlfah N aJional Bank I.ta. v. Sri Ram KanUJar, Industrial Tribunal, De/Ai S. K. Das J. l'llnjab NalilJnal Bank Lid. v. Sri Ram Kanwar, loduslrial Tribunal, DtlAi S. IC D., ]. [19571
the respondents. He reli~d, however, on the general practice of Industrial Courts, particularly in B:i,nks' cases. V./ e doubt if there was any such ·general or consistent practice ; nor
do we think that such practice, if any, is legally justified. But we shall advert to this matter when considering such of the decisions of Industrial Tribunals as have been placed
before us. Learned counsel for the respondents has not relied on practice, but on the terms of the sub-section. He has submitted that the toncluding portion of the sub- section which states that "such costs
may, on appli- cation made to it by the person entitled, be recovered as arrears of land revenue or as a public demand by the appropriate Government" shows that costs may be granted in advance in a pending proceeding.
His argument has proceeded on these lines : firstly, he has submitted that an Industrial Tribunal becomes functus officio with the submission of the award ; secondly, the concluding portion of the sub-section
sho.ws that an application for recovery of costs can be made to "it" (that is, the Tribunal); therefore, the appli- cation must be made before the Tribunal becomes functus officio ; that is, at a stage when the proceeding
is still pending. In our opinion, this argument is wholly fallacious and proceeds on a mis-reading of the sub-section. The expression "it" in the concluding portion of the sub-section refers
to the appropriate Government and not to the Tribunal ; thus the very basis of the argument disappears and it is unnecessary to consider if the Tribunal becomes functus officio with the submission
of its award-a proposition regard- ing which we express no opinion. It is not disputed that sub-s. (7) of s. 11 of the Act gives a discretion to the Tribunal, and it has full power to determine by and to whom and to what
extent and subject to what conditions, if any, the costs are to be paid. It is clear, however, that the discretion is a judicial discretion and must be exercised according to the ru!es of reason and
justi~e–not by chance or caprice or private opinion or some fanciful S.C.R. idea of benevolence or sympathy. It is a negation of justice and reason to direct the appellant to pay in
advance the costs of the respondents irrespective of the final result of the proceeding. The general rule is that costs follow the event unless the Court, for good r,easons, otherwise orders.
Respondent No. 1 gave no reasons for his order except that of practice-a practice, assuming there be any such practice, which is neither legal nor just. It may be conceded that the
jurisdiction of an Industrial Tribunal is not invoked for the enforcement of mere contractual rights and liabilities of the parties to the dispute referred to the Tribunal for adjudication;
its jurisdiction in the matter of adjudication of an industrial dispute is wider and more flexible. All the same, it is not an arbitrary jurisdiction it may be readily conceded that an
employee is as much entitled to a fair deal as an employer and he must be protected from victimisation and unfair labour practice, but 'social justice' does not mean that reason and fairness must always yield
to the convenience of a party-convenience of the employee at the cost of the employer as in this case- in an adjudication proceeding. Such one-sided or partial view is really next of kin to caprice or humour.
Lord Halsbury L. C. put the matter in characteristi- cally forceful language when he said : ". . . . 'discretion' means when it is said that something is to be done within the discretion
of the authorities that that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion : Rooke's Case (1 ) ; according to law, and not humour. It
is to be, not arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and regular." (Susannah Sharp v. Wakefield) ( 1 ). There ar.c special cases where in a pending proceed- ing some costs may have to be borne by ·a party to a
litigation; for example, sub-r (4) of r. 4 of 0. XXXII, Code of Civil Procedure, says that where there is no other person fit and willing to act as guardian of a minor for the suit, the
Court may appoint any of its officers to be such guardian, and may direct that the (1) 5 Rep. 100, a. (2) [18 91) A. C. 173, 179. PUlfiab Na1ional BanA;Ltd. v. Sri Ram Ir-or, Industrial
Tribvnal, Delhi S. Ir. Dos J. Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Sri Ram Kanwar, Industrial Tribunal, Delhi S. K. Das J. [1957] costs to be incurred by such officer in the performance of his duties
as such guardian shall be borne either by the parties or by any one or more of the parties to the suit. Section 35 of the Code is not only subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, but is
also subject to the provisions of any law for the time being in force. Under the Matrimonial Causes Rules, 1950, the practice in English Courts is that after the registrar's certificate
for trial has been granted, or, with le'ave, at an earlier stage of the cause, a wife who is a petitioner and has asked for costs or who has filed an answer, may apply for security for her costs of the
cause up to the hearing, and of and incidental to the hearing (see Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed., Vol. 12, para. 765 at p. 358). When such security is ordered, unless the husband elects to pay the amount into the
registry and gives notice to the wife's solicitor, a bond is required from him. Such cases stand on' a special footing and are governed by special statutory pro- visions. They have no application in the present case
and afford no justification for the order impugned before us. We now turn to the question of practice in the Labour Courts. The earliest decision which has been brought to our notice is Kirloskar Brothers Ltd. v. Their
Workmen(.1 ). That was a case in which one of the demands for adjudication was the demand for travell- ing and other expenses of the workers' representatives, when such representatives were required to go
out at the instance of any duly constituted authority or Court in respect of any industrial matter. It was observed : "The demand according to the company amounted to financing the administration of the Union
and was therefore objectionable even on psychological grounds." The Tribunal directed that the travelling and other expenses to be incurred in connection with the Union work must be paid out of the
Union funds and the employer could not be required to contribute the sum. (•) [•95•) 2 L. L. J. 557· S.C.R. In the well-known case, Certain Banking Companies v. Their Workmen( 1 ), the
question of facilities for effective representation of their cases on behalf of the employees was raised and considered at some length. The decision given was that the Tribunal had power
and jurisdiction, under sub-s. (7) of s. 11 of the Act, to direct the Banks to meet the reasonable expenses of the workmen in a pending proceeding in order to ensure. a fair and effective hearing.
The grounds on which the decision was based were these : ( 1) the Banks were well organised and their managements were in possession of resources ; (2) the adjudication by a Labour Court
or Industrial Tribunal was a compulsory adjudication in the interests of the public, and as disputes relating to Banking companies, with establishments in more than one State, were referred to the Tribunal by the Central
Government, the circumstance that various workmen residing in various States were compelled to submit to an adjudication by a Central Tribunal was sufficient to justify an order for the
payment of their travelling and halting allowances ; (3) there was nothing in the Act to preclude the exercise of such power on the part of the Industrial Tribunal as was required to carry on
the fundamental object of ensuring a proper hearing for the two parties to the dispute, and the weaker party, namely, the comparatively unorganised, numerous and scattered workmen employed in different
branches, needed assistance to present their case ; ( 4) prior to the addition of sub-s. (7) of s. 11 in 1950, various Industrial Tribunals used to pass similar orders and it was ih recognition
of the necessity of such orders that the statutory provision in the sub-section was made ; and '5) the principles of natural justice required that a real opportunity should be given
to the workmen to present their case by asking the employer to pay for their expenses. In our opinion, not one of the aforesaid grounds is really sustainable, either in law or on the
principle of justice, equity and good conscience. The circumstance that the Banks are well organised and their managements are in possession of II) [1952] 2 L. L. J. 54· Punjab National
Banlc Ltd. v. Sri Ram Kanwar, Industrial Tribunal, Delhi S. JC D,,. J. Punjab N alional Ba..! Ltd. v. Sri Ram Jr anwar, 1"4wtrial TribwW, Delhi S. K. Das J. [1957] resources cannot be a ground for making them pay for
the expenses of the other party ; if that is the principle to be applied, then in every case the richer party must be made to pay the expenses of the weaker party, irrespective of the ultimate result of the dispute, even
in a dispute raised by the workmen which may be ultimately found to be devoid of all merit, the employer must be made to finance the workmen. Such a prin- ciple will merely encourage frivolous and unsubstantial
disputes and will run counter to the object and pur- poses of the Act, namely, the promotion of industrial peace in the interests of the general public. The second circumstance that
the adjudication is a com- pulsory adjudication applies equally to both parties. If it is a compulsory adjudication for the employees, it is equally so for the employer and we can see no reason
why that circumstance should involve the imposition of a penalty on one of the parties to the dispute and not on the other. \Ve have already pointed out that on a proper construction of
the sub-section, there is no power in the Tribunal to direct the payment of the costs of a party in advance by the other party, irrespective of the final result of the proceeding, and
the view expressed by the Bank Disputes Tribunal as to the construction of the relevant sub-section is manifestly erroneous ; nor are we satisfied that prior to the addition of the sub-section, there was any con-
sistent or uniform practice in the matter, so as to lead to the inference that the provisions of the sub-section gave statutory recognition to the practice. It is diffi- cult to understand how the principles of natural justice
can be invoked in aid of an order which penalises one party to a dispute by making it pay for the costs of the other party in advance, irrespective of the result of the proceeding.
We can only say that such an order is neither natural nor has any element of justice in it. In a later decision, Associated Cement Companies Ltd., · Dwarka Cement Works, Dwarka v. Workmen Employed
under it ( ), it was observed: "If, therefore, the Union's r_epresentatives thought it proper to attend on the {1) (1953] I. C.R. Bom. 292 at 307. S.C.R. various dates before the Tribunal, it is the Union who
should bear the costs." In a still later decision, /eevan Textile ·Mills, Hyderabad (Deccan) v. Their Workmen('), the question was again considered at some length. With regard to sub-s. (7) of s. 11 it was
observed :- "Although s. 11 (7) is worded in a very wide way and the power to order the payment of costs granted under it to industrial tribunals is made comprehensive and is not even fettered
by a provision like s. 35 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, requiring the tribunal to state its reasons if costs are not ordered to follow the event, orders for costs can only be made, even by
industrial tribunals, on well-recognised principles and not on any abstract ideas as to what, irrespective of such principles, should be considered as desirable in any particular case: vide
United Commercial Bank Case(•)". We are in agreement with the view expressed above. It would appear from what we have stated above that there was no uniform or consistent practice in the
matter, and we are further of the view that if there was any such practice, it was neither warranted by law nor by the principles of reason and justice. In Ex parte Snorv In 1'e Slzerwell( ), an application was
made to review a taxation of costs and the appellant, who was a Barrister-at-law and resided at Liverpool, claimed his travelling expenses from Liverpool to London and back, on the
ground that by arguing his own appeal he had saved the expense of engaging counsel to which he would have been entitled. The claim was dismissed as "preposterous and unheard of". As we began, so we end : there is only 011e answer
to the question and that answer is that respondent No. l had no power, in the exercise of his discretion under sub-s. (7) of section 11 of the Act, to direct the appellant in this case to pay the travelling and halting
allowances of the representatives of the Unions in a pending proceeding and irrespective of its final (1) [1956) I L. L. J. 4~3. (~) [1952] 2 L. L. J. 1. (3) [1879] Weekly Notes 22.
r956 Punjab J( atioul Bank Ltd. SriRmnK-, Industrial Trilnaud, Delhi S. K.DM J. Punjab JVational Bank Ltd. v. Sri Ram Kanwar, lndustriai Tribrmal, Delhi S. K. Das J. [1957] result.
For the reasons given, this appeal is allowed with costs, and the costs must be paid by the contest· ing respondents. The order of respondent Net 1, sO far as it relates to the payment in a pending
proceed· ing of travelling and halting allowances to the repre- sentatives of the various Unions, must be, and is hereby, set aside. Appeal allowed. G!Plll-SV-76 S. C. lnJia/59-22-7°60-1000.