2 S.C.R. .R. L. ARORA v. STATE OF U. P. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,, A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.) Land Acquisition-Acquisition for Cf!mp<;iny-"Work likely
w prove useful to the public", Meaning· of-Right of access w per.ans having business with company-Product of company being useful to the public-If satisfy requirement-Land Acquisi- tion Act, 1894 [1of1894], ss. 6, 40, 41.
The Government acquired appellant's land for a company for setting up a textile manchinery parts factory. The entire compensation for the acquisitio11 was to be paid by the company. The Government was satisfied that the product of
the company would be useful to the public and the agreement between the company and the Government provided that those who had business with the company shall have access to the land and works.
The notifications under ss. 4 and 6 of the Land acquisition Act, 1894, were issued showing that the land was acquired for the company. The appellant contended that the notification under: s. 6 was invalid as the acquisition was not for
the construction of any work which was likely to prove useful to the public as contemplated by s. 40 (l)(b) read with cl. (5) of s. 41. Held, (per Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo, Das Gupia and
Ayyangar, JJ., Sarkar, J. contra), that the notification under s. 6 of the Act wa> invalid and the proceedings should be quashed. Section 40 (l)(b), which alone could apply to the
case, provided that in case of acquisition for a company the Government could give its consent if the acquisition was needed for the construction of some work which was likely to prove useful to the public.
For such cases cl. (5) of s. 41 provided that the agreement between the company and the Government shall state the terms on which the public shall be entitled to use the works. These provisions had to be read together and required that the work should be directly useful to the
public and that the agreement should contain a term as to ho\v the public shall have the right to use the work directly thernselves. The provision of access to the land or works to those having business
with the company or the fact that the product of the con1pany would b~ useful to the public were not sufficient to bring the acquisition for a cornpany withir:t the meaning of the relevant \vords in ss. 40 and 4 l. The satisfaction of the <;;-overnment that the work was likely December 1.
IHI B. L •Arora S<.11 of U.P. w–.J. 150 SUPREME ootmr REPORTS [1962) SUPP. to prove useful to the public upon a wrong COD1tructlon of s. 40 and s. 41 was not binding. The concluslvencu attached by s. 6(3) to the notification under s. 6( 1) wu only to thit CX· tent that the land was needed for the purposes of a company and this was not in dispute.
Bahu Barlcya Thakur v. TM. Stale of Borrtbay, 11961! 1 S.C.R. 128 and Pandit Jllandu Lal v. Stat. of Ptmjab, 1961 2 S. C. R. 459, referred to. Per Sarkar, J.-The acquU!tion for the company to set
up a textile machinery parts factory wiu for some work which wu likely to prove'· useful to the public and wu valid. The work contemplated in s. 40( I )(b) was work from which the
public could in any way derive benefit, whether by dlrm use of the work or by enjoyment of tilt fruits of the activities carrird on therr or otherwise; it could not be confined to a cor.struction for
philanthropic purpose or to such work u could be itself used by the public. The meaning could not be restricted by cl. (5) of s 41 aa that would defeat the intention of th• statute. The provisions in the agreement about tbe
terms on which the public would be entitled to use the work were inapplicable to cases where the work was auch that the public could not use it. CzvIL AFP:&LLATB JumsDIOTION: Civil Appeal
No. 446 of 1959. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated July 30, 1958, of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 202 of 1957. C. B. Aganrola andNauntt La/, for the Appel-
!ant. G. S. Pathak, S. T. Duai and C. P. LGl for Repondents Nos. l to 3- S. T. De8ai, Devemlm Swarup and J. P. Gogal for Respondent No. 4. 1961. December 15. The Judgmeni of Gajendragadkar,
Wanchoo, Du Gupta and Ayyangar JJ., waa deliver•d by Wanchoo, J, Sarkar J., delivered a separatll Judgment. WANOHOO, J.-Thia' iB an ap_peal on a oerti1l- cate granted by the All~hab&d High Court. The
appellant is the owner of. certain fanda In village Nauraiya Kher&. Out of\thoee lands, 16.5 acres 2 S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS were requisitioned by the Defence Department of the Government of India and are still in their
possession and we are not concerned with that. Besides that, the appellant has 9 acres of land which he had purchased many years ago with the idea of erecting a factory thereon. The appellant
got information in May 1956 that steps were being taken to acquire his nine acres of land for an industrialist in Kanpur. He therefore wrote to the Collector of Kanpur in that connection. On June
25, 1956, however, a notification was issued under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act No. 1 of 1894 (hereinafter called the Act), stating that certain land which was specified as 11.664 acres in village
Nauraiya Khera was required for a company for the construction· of textile machinery parts factory by .Lakshmi Ratan Engineering Works Limited, Kanpur (hereinafter called the Works). This was followed on
July 5, 1956 by a notification under s. 6 of the Act, which was in terms similar to the notification under s. 4. The notification also provided for the Collector to take possession of any waste or arable land
forming part of the land mentioned in the Schedule to the notification immediately under the powers conferred by s. 17(1) of the Act. It is not in dispute that this notification was issued without taking any
action under Part VII of the Act. On July 31, 1956, the Collector took possession of the land and handed it over to the Works along with the buildings standing on it. In the mean time the appellant had filed a
writ petition in the High Court on July 31, 1956, praying that the notification of July 5, 1956, be quashed and had also applied for interim stay. As however possession had already been taken on
July 31, 1956, the application for interim stay was infructuous. One of the main grounds in support of the writ petition of J µly 31, 1956 appears to hava been that ss. 38 to 42 of the Act had not been
complied with: It seems that thereafter steps were 19GJ R. L. Arora v. State o.f U.P. Wanchoo J. R, L. Arora Siii" of U. P, w""""'° ./. )52 SUPRlWE CX>URT REPORTS (1962] SUPP. taken hy the State Government 'tc comply with the
provisions of ss. 38 to 42 of the Act, An agreement was entered into between the Government and the Works on August 5, 1956 and was published in the Gazette· on August 11, 1956; but this was done
without making an inquiry either under e. 5A or s. ·IO of the Act. Therefore, on Sept.ember 14, 1956, an enquiry was ordered by the Government under s.40. The enquiry was accordingly made and
the inquiry submitted his report on October 3, 1956. This wa11 followed by a fresh agreement between the Government and the Works on December 6, 1956. On December 7, 1956, a fresh n~ification was issued
under s. 6 of the Act after the formalities provided under es. 38 to 42 had been compieted. Thereupon the appellant filed another writ petition on January 29, 1957, challenging the notification of
Decemb<•r 7, 1956 on various grounds. It is not ne006Sary to give in detail the ground& on which the notification of Deoomber 7, 1956 WM attacked. It is enough to say that one of the
grounds was th:i.t the notification wa.s invalid as it was not in compliance with s.40(l)(b) of the Act read with the fifth clause of the matter to be provided in the agreement UDder s. 41.
The leiirned Single Judge however held that the agreement was in accordance with the provisions of ss. 40 and 41. He also held that there was no force in the other contentions raised on behalf oi the appellant and
dismissed the petition: The appellant then went in appeal which was di~missed. He then applied for a oortit'ica.to to enable him to appeal to this Court, which was granted; and that is how the matt.er has
come up before us. The only question that haa been urged on behalf of the appellant before us is that the consent of the Government is being sought to be given to an acquisition for a company which is not in
accordance with s. 4lJ (1) (b) read with the fifth clause of the matters to be provided in tho 2S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORT.3 agreement under s. 41 and therefore the notification of December 7, 1956 is invalid
To determine the question raised by the appellant it is necessary to look into the scheme of the Act. The preamble to the Act shows that it is an amending Act enacted for the purpose of
"acquisition of land needed for public purposes and for Companies and for determining the amount of compensation to be paid on account of such acquisition." Section 3(e) defines the expression
"company." The expression "public purpose" is given an inclusive definition in s. 3(f). Then comes s. 4 which provides for the issue of a preliminary notification to the effect that land in any locality is
needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose. On the issue of such notification steps are taken to survey the land and take all other action necessary to decide whether the la.nd is fit for the
purpose for which it is needed and in that connec- tion s. 5A provides for objections by any person interested in the land, ,and the Collector hears the objector and submits his report to Government for
appropriate action. Then comes a. 6 which is in these terms :- "(l) Subject to the prov1s1ons of Part VII of this Act when the appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the
report, if any, made under s. 5A, 1ub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a company, a declara· tion shall be made to that. effect under the signature of a. Secretary to such Govern·
ment or of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders : Provided that no such declaration shP JI be made unless the Compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by the Company, or
R. L. Arora v. Stae ojU.P. fVanclwo J, R:L.~tDTO v. Si.1, of U. P. Waehoo J. 15i SUPREME <X>URT REPORTS [1962) SUPP. wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.
(2) x x x x x (3) The said deolaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public pur- pose or for a Company, as the e&11e may be; and after making such declaration, the appropriate
Government may acquire the land in manner hereinafter appl'aring." Where however land is to be acquired for a com- pany no notification under s. 6 can be iseued till the provisions of Part VII of the Act are complied
with, for action under s. 6 for acquiring land for a company is subject to the provisions of Part VII. Thie is made further clear by s. 39 which lays down that "the provisions of sections 6 to
37(both inclusive) shall not be put in force in order to acquire land for any Company, unless with the previous consent of the appropriate Government, nor unless the Company ehalI have executed the agree-
ment hereinafter mentioned." Before therefore the machinery provided for acquisition of land under as. 6 to 37 (both inclusive) of the Act is put into force for acquiring land for a company two
conditions precedent must be fufilled, namely, (i) the previous consent of the appropriate Goverment has been obtained and (ii) an agreement in the terms of s. 41 has been executed by the company :
(see Baba Barkya Thakur v. The State of Bombay) ('). In that case the notification under s. 4 of the Act was challenged as it did not 11ay that the land was required for a public purpose as provided there-
in but only said that the land was required for a company. Thie Court however pointed out that- " though it muy appear on the words of the . .\<:t contained in Part II, which contains
the operative portions of the proooedinge 11) Ll961) IS. C.R. 128. 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COUR'l' REPOR'l'S leading up to acquisition by the Collector that acquisition for a Company may or may not
be for a public purpose, the provisions of Prat VII make it clea! that the appropriate Government cannot permit the bringing into operation the effective machinery of the Act unless it is satisfied as aforesaid, namely, tliat
the purpose of acquisition is to enable the Company to erect dwelling houses for workmen employed by it or for the provision of ameni- ties directly connected with the Company or that the land is needed for construction of
some work of public utility. These require- ments indicate that the acquisation for a Company also is in substance for a public pur- pose inasmuch as it cannot be seriously contend that constructing dwelling houses,
and providing amenities for the benefit of the workmen employed by it and construction of some work of public utility do not serve a public purpose." Therefore, though the words "public purpose" in
ss. 4 and 6 have the same meaning, they have to be read in the restricted sense in accordance with s. 40 when the acquisition is for a company under s. 6. In one case, the notification under s. 6 will
say that the acquisition is for a public purpose, in the other case the notification will say that it is for a company. The proviso to s. 6(1) shows that where the acquisition is for a public purpose, the compen-
sation haa to be paid wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. Where however the acquisition is either for a company, the compensation would be
paid wholly by the company. Though therefore this distinction is there where the acquisition is either for a public purpose or for a company, there is. not a complete dichotomy between acquisitions for the two
purposes and it cannot be m~intained that where R.L.Arora v. State ~r U.1'. Wanchoo J. R. L ..41010 81411 of U. P1 Woncllo. J. the acquisitiqn is primarily for a company it muet always be preceded by action under Part VII and
compensation must always be pa.id wholly by the company. A third class of cases is p011sible where the acquisition may be primarily for a company but it may also be at the Sil.me timo for a public
purpose and the whole Ol' part of compensation may be paid out of public revenues or some fund controlli-d or m;rnag )d by a local authority. In such a case though the acquisition may look as if it
is primarily for a oompa.ny it will be covered by that pa.rt of s. 6 which lays down that acquisition may ho ma.de for a public purpose if the whole or part of the oompensa.tion is to be paid out of the public
revenues or P.ome fund cotrollcd or managed by a local authority. Such wae the case in Pandit Jhandu Lal, v. The State of Punjab('). In that case the acquiHition was for the construction of a labour
colony under the Government Mponsored housing scheme for the industrial workers of the Thapa.r Industries Co-operative Housing Society Limited and pa.rt of ihe compensati0n was to be paid out of
the public funds. In such a case this Court held that "an acquiaition for a company may also be made for a public purpose within the meaning of the Act, if a part or the whole of the oost of acqui-
sition is met by public funds" and therefore it wae not necessary to go through the procedure prea- cribed by Pa.rt VII. It is only where the acquisi- tion is for a oompany and its cost is to be met
entirely by the company itself that tho provisions of Pa.rt VII apply. In the present case it ia not the oaae of the respondents that any part of the oompensa.tion is to be paid out of what may be
called public funds. It is not in dispute that the entire compensation is to be paid by the Works and therefore the provi8ion of Pa.rt VII would apply to the present case; and it is in this backgrolllld that
(II [1961) 2 S. C.R. 459. -11 2 S.C.R. we have to consider the contention raised on behalf of the appellant. We have already pointed out that s. 39 as well as the opening words of s. 6 make it clear that
the operative provisions of the Act for the purpose of acquiring land for a company will only apply when two conditions precedent have been satisfied, namely, (i) the previous consent of the appropriate
government has been given to the acquisition, and (ii) the company has entered into an agreement as provided in the Act. This takes us to ss. 40, 41 and 42 of the Act. Section 40 lays down when the
consent of the appropriate government can be given. Section 41 lays · down the terms which must be incorporated in the agreement. Section 42 then provides that every such agreement shall be publi-
shed in the official gazette and shall thereupon so far as regards the terms on which the public shall be entitled to use the work have the same effect a~ if it had formed part of the Act.
Now s. 40(1) lays down that such consent shall not be given unless the appropriate govern- ment is satisfied either on the report of the Collec- tor under s. 5A (2) or by an inquiry held as herein-
after provided (a) that the purpose of the acquisi- tion is to obtain land for the erection of dwelling houses for workmen employed by the company or for the provision of amenities directly connected
therewith, or (b) that such acquisition is needed for the construction of a work, 3.nd that such work is likely to prove useful to the public. The Government therefore cannot give con-
sent to the acquisition of land for a company unless it is satisfied about one or other of the two conditions mentioned ins. 40(1). We are in the present case not concerned with cl. (a) of s. 40(1)
and need not refer to it further. The case of the respondents is that the Government was satisfied as to cl. (b) of s. 40(1) and that is why it gave the R, L . .Aror• v. State of U. P.
Wanchtx1 .J. IHI B. L . .Ar,,,• v. Stall of U.P. W-.\oo J, 158 SUPRJWI: OOU'RT BDORTS [1962) SUPP. consent required under s, 39. The main dispute before us is as to the meaning to be given to cl. (b)
of B. 40(1). We are of opm1on that it. is not poasible to interprets. 40(l)(b) in isolation and by itself; it has to be interpreted in the context of what is provided in s. 41 about th!i agreement to be entered into
between the Government and the company which agreement hecomes a part of the Act under s. 42 so far as regards the terms on which the public shall be entitled to use the work. Now s. 41
provides that if the appropria,te government is 11atisfied that the purpose of tho proposed acquisition is to obtain land for the erection of dwelling houses for workmen employed by the company or for the
provision of amenities directly connected therewith or that the proposed acquisition is netlded for the construction of a work and thnt such work is likely to prove useful to the public, it shall require the
company to enter into an agreement with it, provi- ding to the satiafaction of the appropriate govern- ment for the following matters, namely- ( I) the payment to the appropriate Government of the cost of the acquisition;
(2) the transfer, on ~uch payment, .of the land to the company; (3) the terms on which the land shall be held by the company; (-1) where the acquisition ii for the p1o1~ pose of eree~ng dwelling ho~ or the prov1-
1ion of amenities connected therewith, ihe time within which, the oonditiona on whioh and the manner in which the dwelling houses or amenitile •hall be erected or provided; .and (5) Where the acquisition is for the con-
struction of l\lly other work, the time within which and the conditions on which the work 2 s.c.R. shall be executed and maintained, and the terms on which the public shall be entitled to
use the work. It will be clear from the above that the fifth term is directly related to s. 40 (l)(b) and there can be no doubt that in finding out what is meant by s. 40 (l)(b) we must take into account the fifth term in
a. 41 and it is only by reading the two together that it will be possible to find out the intention of the legislature when it provided for acquisition of land for a company through the machinery of the
Act. We may here eet out the contentions on either side as to the interpretation of these provisions. It is contended for the appellant that though the words of s. 40 (l)(b) are wide in amplitude and pro-
vide for acquisition of land for construction of some work which is likely to prove useful to the public, these words do not carry the meaning that if the product of the company which constructs the
work is useful to the public, land can be acquired for it. It is urged that on this interpretation the Government will be turned into a sort of agent for acquiring lands for all companies which produce
something which may be used by the public. It is therefore contended that when s. 40 (I )(b) says that acquisition may be made for the construction of some work which is likely to prove useful to the
public, it is not the product of the, work which should be useful to the public _but the work itself should be of direct use to the public; and it is further urged that this interpret'1tion of s. 40 (l)(b) is con-
firmed if one looks at the fifth term to be provided in the agreement acoording to s. 41. That requires that the agreement should provide for the terms o.n which the public shall be entitled to use the work.
It is urged that this means that the public should be entitled to use the work as such and not merely the product of the work. R. L. Aroro v. State of U. P. WllnchooJ. R, L. Aroora
v. St.u of U .P. Wnchoo J, On the other band it is contended for the res- pondenta that the words in s. 40(1Xb) are of wide amplitude and land can he acquired under the Act for any company when the work set up by the com-
pany !s likely to prove useful to the public. It is urged that thiR means that the work itself may be useful to the public or the product of the work ma.y be useful to the public; a.nd so in either case the
work would be useful to the public and therefore land can be acquired for it. It is also urged that the fifth term in s. 41 should not be held to cut down the wide amplitude of the words used in s. 40( l)(b) and
should be read in the samo vide manner and the public should be held to be entitled to use the work if it is allowed (say) to go to the work for business purposes. The respondents rely on Ezra v. The Secretary
of Stale (') in support of their interpretation of the relevant words in ss. 40 and 41. In that case the Bank of Bengal, a Company which was incorpora- ted under Act XI of 1876, was anxious to extend
its premises for the purpose of providing a.ecommo- da.tion for the Public Debt Office. The Bank was unable to acquire the premises required by it by private treaty and therefore approached the Goviim-
ment to acquire the land for it under the Land Acqui- sition Act. Action wa~ consequently taken under Part VII of the Act for acquisition of the premises for the oompany and the agreement provided that
the public, subject to the Act constituting and the bye-laws regulating the Bank, Rha.ll be entitled to uso the said building or buildings in relation to the said Government 1->usiness so far as the sa;ae might
bo utilised by the Bank for the purposes of such business. It was urged before the High Court tha.t this was not sufficient compliance with the fifth term of the agreement provided bys. 41
The High Court repelled this contention on the ground, firstly 11) [1903] IL. R, 30, Cal. 36. 2 S.C.R. that the Government was vested with absolute dis- cretion in this matter and was the sole custodian
of the public interllst in this country, and secondly that the rights of the public generally were depen- dant upon the Government business and the Govern- ment had considered the conditions therein inserted
as .sufficiently safeguarding its interests. It was further held that that Court had no power to enter ripon a consideration of the question how far that provisions sufficiently safeguarded the interests of
the Government or of the public, of which it was the custodian (see pp. 79-80).. The problem that has been posed before us does not appear to have been posed before the High Court in that form.
Further the High Court seems to have thought that as the sections provided for the satisfaction of the Government there was no power in a court to enter upon a consideration of the question how far that
provision safeguarded the interests of the Govern- ment or of the public. This decision seems to suggest that the Government's decision as to the terms is completely final and as the Government
was satisfied by the terms it had imposed in that case the matter was no longer open before the court. All that we need say about this case is, as already pointed out, that the question was not raised
before the High Court in the manner in which it has been raised before us and that mav account for the view. taken by the High Court. ·It is also well. to remember that in that case premises were requir-
ed for the Public Debt Ojfice of the Government which was then under the management of the Bank of Bengal and that may have h<td something to do with thefin,11 decision. Rut in any case, this case does
not lay down that it is for the Government to deter- mine what the relevant words in ss. 40 and 41 mean, though the High Court is right when it says that it is not for the court to enter upon a consideration of
the que~tion how far the provision m3de by the Government in the terms of the agreement sufficiently R. L. Aror4 v. Stale of U. P. Wanchoo J. IH1 R. L. Arora Sia" •f U. P. It ..,,,.. J.
safeguard& the intereste of tht> public, that being a matter entirely for tho satisfaction of the Govern- ment. But as the mattl>r was not conaidtred by the High Court from the point of view from which it has
been argued before us, this ca.ae cannot be treated as a decision on the interpretation of the relevant words in sa. 40 and 41 merely by implication. In any case, if by implication the said ded~ion supp._orts
the rospondents' contention, it does not correctly represent the true legal position in that behalf. In our opinion tho interpretation of tho material terms in s. 40( I l(b) and the fifth term of the agreement
provided ins. 41 read together is and must always be within the jurisdiction of th~ court. Turning now to the oppoeing contentions as to the meaning of tho relevant words in 88. 40 and
41, we have already said that the two provisioI!I' of SB. 40 and 4:1 must be read together to find out the intention of the legislature when it provided for acquisition of land for a company through the agen-
cy of government. It seems to us that it could not be the intention of the legislature that the Government should be made a general agent for companies to acquire lands for them in order that
the owners of companies may be able to carry on their activities for private profit. If that was the in- tention of the logislature, it was entirely unneceasary to provide for the restrictions contained in ea. 40
and 41 on the powers of the Government to acquire lands for companies. If we were to give the wide interpretation contended for on behalf of the res- pondents on the relevant words in es. 40 and 41 it
would amount to holding that the legislature inten- ded the Government to be a sort of general agent for companies to acquire lands for them, ao that there owners may make profits. n can hardly be
denied that a company whioh will satisfy the defi- nition of that word in s. 3 (e) will be producing somethini: or other which will be ueeful to the 2 S.C.R. public and which the public ma.y need to purchase.
So on the wide interpretation contended for on behalf of the respondents, we must come to the con- clu iion that the intention of the legislature was that the Government sh·ould be an agent for acquiring
land for all companies .for such purposes as they might have provided the product intended to be produced is in a general manner useful to the public, and if that is so there would be clearly no point in
providing the restrictive provisions in ss. 40 and 41. The very fact therefore that the power to use the machinery of the Act for the acquisition of land for a company is conditioned by the res-
trictions in ss. 40 and 41 indicates that the legislature intended that land should be acquired through the coercive machinery of the Act only for the restricted purpose mentioned in ss. 40 and
41, which would also be a public purpose for the purpose of s. 4. We find it. impossible to accept the argument that the intention of the legislature could have been that individuals should be com-
pelled to part with their lands for private pr9fit of others who might be owners of companies through the Government, simply because the company might produce goods which would be useful to the public.
If therefore the legislature intended by the pro- visions of ss.40 :i,nd 41 that there should be restric- tions on the power to acquire land for companies it can only be given effect to by putting the narro-
wer meaning on the words used in ss. 40 and 41, as contended for by the appellant. Further, reading s.40 ( l\ :bl and the fifth term of the agreement as provided in s. 41 together (as they must in our
opinion be read together in order to find out the real intention of the legislature) there can be no doubt that the only meaning to be given to these provisions read together is, as contended for on
behalf of the appellant. In this connection we ought to add that as we shall presently point out the material words of the fifth term in the 1~61 R. L. Arora v. State of U. P. Wanchoo J.
R. L Arora v .. Bl•ll of U. I'. Wane~eo J. agreement provided in s. 41 a.re reasonably incapable of the construotion suggested by the respondents. Let us therefore turn to the words of s. 40
(l)(b), which says that acquisition should be for some work which is likely to prove useful to the public. Now if the legislature intended these words ~o mean that even where the produrt of the work
is uteful to the public, land can be ac11uired for the company for that purpose, the legislature could have easily used the words "the product of" before the worilli "such work". The very fact that there
is no reference to the product of the work in s. 40( l)(b) shows that when the legislature eaid that the work shoud be likely to pro~e useful to tho public it meant that the work should be directly
useful to the public through the public being able to use it instead of being indirectly useful to the public through the public being a.hie to use it.a product. We have no doubt therefore that when
s. 40(l)(b) says that the work should be useful to the public it means that it should be directly useful to the public which should be able to make use of it. This meaning in our opinion is made perfectly
clear by what is provided in the fifth term in s. 41. Before the machinery of the Act ca.n be put into operation t.o acquire land for a. company, the Government has to take an agreement from the
company, and that agreement must provide, where acquisition is needed for the construction of some work and that work is likely to prove useful to the public, the terms on which the public shall be en-
titled to use the work. These works oan only mean that the public should have a right to use the work itself and not the product of it; and it is the duty of the Government when it takes an agreement
under s. 41 to see that the public is so entitled to use the work. To say that the public is entitled to.use the work because the public can go to the work in the wa.y of business is in our opinion
not giving any right to the public to use the work 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPO~TS directly as such. All that the agreement has pro. vided in the present case is that "the public will
have such right of access to and use of the land/ works herein and before specified as may be neces. sary for the transaction of their business with the firm." This in our opinion is not what is meant by
the words "the terms on which the public shall be entitled to use the work" in the fifth term of the agreement as provided in s. 41. Such use for busi- ness is implicit in every bu8'ness, even if the
Government does not acquire land for it, for no company can carry on for a moment its business with any profit if it does not allow those with whom it has business to come to its premises. There-
fore, when the fifth term provides for the use of the work by the public as of right it cannot possibly envisage the use only by tho~e . who have business with a factory (for example) and their going there
to transact business; such use would in any case have to be permitted by the owner of the company, as otherwise it will not be worth his while to run the company at all. Therefore, when
the fifth term provides that "the public shall be entitled to use the work" it means that the public shall be entitled to use the work directly and as of ri~ht for its own benefit and does not mean
that those who have business with the company can go upon the work . for that business. Reading therefore s. 40 (l)(b) and the fifth term of the agreement provided in s. 41, there is
in our opinion no doubt that the intention of the legislature was that land should be acquired only when the work to be constructed is directly useful to the public and the public shall be entitled
to use the work as such for its own benefit in accord-· ance with the terms of the agreement which under s. 42 are made to have the same effect as if they form part of the Act. We are of opinion
that this is the only interpretation of the relevant R. L. Arora v. State of U. P. Wanchoo J. llfl R.L.Ar1Wa v. St.U of U. P. W-J. words of se. 40 and 41, and the legislature could
not have intended otherwise. Let us now turn to some of the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents against the clear intention of the legislature which is deducible from the interpretation of the words used in 18. 40
and 41. It is urged in the first place that ss. 40 and 41 both providti for the satisfaction of the Government and it i~ the Government which has to be satisfied that the work is likely to prove useful
to the public and further that it is the Government which has to be satisfied that the terms contain a provision as to how the public shall be entitled to use the work. It is further urged that as the
Government in this case was satisfied that the Works was useful to the public and was also satis- fied as to the terms in the agreement on which the public shall be entitled to uee the Works, the oourt
ha.e no further say in the matter. We are of opinion th$t this argument is entirely fallacious. It is true that it is for the Government to be satisfied that the work to be constructed will be useful to the public;
it is also true that it ie for Uie Government to be satisfied thlit there is a term in the agreement providing that tile public shall be entitled to nae the work; but this does not mean that it is the Govern-
ment which has tho right to interpret the words need in ff, 40(l)(b) or in the fifth term of the agree- ment ins. 41. It iethe court which has to interpret what those words mean. After the rourt has inter-
preted these wcrds, it is the Government which ha.s to carry out the object of. 88. 40 and 41 to ite satisfaction. The Go~ernment cannot say that as. 40 and 41 mean this and further say that they are
satinfied that the meaning they have given to the relevant words in these sections bas been carried out in the terms of the agreement provided by them. It ill for the court to say what the words in
88. 40 and 41 mean though it ill for the Government 2 S.C.R. to decide whether the work is useful to the public and whether the terms contain provisions for the manner in which the public shall be entitled to use
the work. It is. only in this latter part that the Government's satisfaction comes in and if the Government is satisfied that satisfaction may not be open to challenge; but the satisfaction 'bf the
Government must be based on the meaning given. t;o the relevant words in ss. 40 and 41 by the court. The Government cannot both give meaning to the words and also say that they are satisfied on the
meaning given by them. The meaning has to be given by the court and it is only thereafter that the Government's satisfaction may not be open to chal- lenge if they have carried out the meaning given to
the relevant words by the court. The argument therefore that it is the Government's satisfaction which is required both by s. 40 and s. 41 is of no help to the respondents, for it is for t.he court to
say what these words mean and then see whether the Government are satisfied according to the mean· ing given to these words by the court. We have already indicated what these words mean and if it
plainly appears that the Government are satisfied as a result of giving some other meaning to the words, the satisfaction of the Government is of no use, for then they are not satisfied about what they should
be 'satisfied. In the present case the Government seems to have taken a wrong view that so long as the product of the Works is useful to the public and so long as the public is entitled to go upon the
Works in the way of business, that is all that is required by the relevant words in ss. 40 and 41. We have held that this is not the meaning of the relevant words in ss. 40 and 41 and therefore the
Government's satisfaction on this meaning cannot be binding and would be worthless. Learned counsel for the respondents also relied on certain American decisions and pointed R. L. Arora
v. State of U. P. WanchooJ. R.L.Arora v. BW.ojU.P. w …… J. out that the trend in the United States of Amorica these days was to give a wide meaning to the power of eminent domain contained in the fifth
amendp:ient to the Constitution of the United States. The fifth amendment lays down as follows in this respect:- "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
It seems that there has been eontroversy in America as to the meaning of the words "public use" u~ed in the above amendment and there are two views prevalent. The older view was, and it is still held
in some States, that "public use" means "use by the public-that is, public employment-and conse- quently that to make a use vublio, a duty must devolve on the person or corporation holding pro-
perty appropriated by right of eminent domain to furnish the public with the use intended, and that there must be & right on the part of the public, or some portion of it, or some public or quasi-public
agency on beha.lf of the public, to use the property after it is condemned". The later view is that "public use" means "public advantage, convenience," or bene- fit, &nd that anything which tends to enlarge the re-
sources, increase the industrial energies, and pro- …aote the productive power of ~my considerable number of the inhabitantB of a section of the State, or which leads to the growth of towns and the crea-
tion of new resouroes for the employment of capital and labour oontributee to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community and giving the Constitution a broad and comprehensive interpreta-
tion, constitutes a public use" (see American Juris- pmdenoe. Vol. 18. pp. 661-62). In one State, where the older view is stµ! held, the court JlOinted out that "if public wie were construed to mean that the
public would be benefited in the sense that the enterprise or improvement for the use of which the property wu tr.ken might oont-ribnte to the comfr>rt 2 S.C.R. or convenience of the public, or a portion thereof, or
be esteemed necessary for their enjoyment, there would be absolutely no limit to the right to take private property, that it would not be difficult to show that a factory, hotel, etc., the erection of
which was contemplated, would result in benefit to the public, and that, under this power, the property of the citizen would never be safe from an inva- sion." (see ibid. p. 664) It is the later view preva-
lent in some States in America for which the respon- dents are contending, and the result of that would be the same as pointed out above. But we do not think it necessary to examine the American cases
cited before us because the words in our statute are not pari materia with the words used in the fifth amei)dment to the American Constitution. The fifth am'endment contemplates that private property
shall not be acquired except for public use. The public use there is thus connected with th¥ purpose of acquisition and may perhaps in certain co1iceiv- able circumstances depending upon the conditions
in a particular State, be open to a wider interpre- tation. But the two views prevalent about it in America itself show that in one view it is the actual use of the work that is emphasised while in the
other view it is the public benefi~ arising from the work that is emphasised. Now so far as the words in the Act are concerned, it is to our mind perfectly obvious that it is the actual use of the work which
the Act envisages and n0t the public benefit that might directly or indirectly arise from the use of the land acquired. This is clear from the words used both ins. 40(l)(b) and the fifth term of the
agreement provided ins. 41. Section 40( l)(b) re- quires that the acquisition is for the construction of some wor}j:, and that that work is likely to prove useful to the public. It does not say that the ac·
quisition of land would be useful to the public. Further the fifth term in the agreement provided in s. 41 makes this clear beyond all doubt for it R. L. Arora State oj· U.P. Wanclwo J.
lNJ R. ! .. Ar01a SW. of U. P. WoncA.o J, 170 SUPREME COURT ft.l!PORTS [lllM] SUPP. provides that the e.grecment. she.11 contain the terms on whic.h the public shall be entitled to use the work.
These words therefore in the Aot a.re clearly refer- able to the narrower v.iew preve.lent in America., which emphasises the use by the public of the actual work constructed. We a.re thl'refore of opinion that
the respondents can derive no advantage from the Americe.n ca.sos cit.ed oil their behalf to show the wider interpretation of the words used in the fifth amendment to the American Constitution.
Another argument on behalf of the respondents is based on s. 50 of tho Damodar Valley Corporation Act (No. XIV of 1948) which provides the.t "any land required by the Corporation for carrying out
its functions under this Act she.II be deemed to be needed for a public purPQllC and auch land shall be acquired for tho Corporation &8 if the proviaions of Pe.rt VII of the Land Aoquiaition Act, 189' (l of
1894), were applicable to it and the Corporation were a company within the meaning of ol. (e) of s. 3 of the il&id Act." That eection is not before Ull for interpretation and it is therefore not neceuary for
us to sa.y anything about the scope and meaning of that section. All that we need point out is the.t that section was no~ enacted to explain what the legislature meant by the use of the relevant words in
BB. 40 and 41. Whe.tever therefore may be the interpretation of that section and whatever may be the reason why the legislature enacted that 1eOtion in that Aot th"t will not control the mee.ning of the
relevant words in 11. 40 and 41, and it is therefore not neceesa.ry for ID to interpret that section in the present proceedings. As •gainst this, learned Coon- eel for the appellant pointed out that there are
many other later Aote creating 1tatutory oorpor•- tiona like the Damodar Valley Corporation, in which there is no provision corresponding to s. 50. That again is a matter into which we need not go, and
it is unneoesae.ry to consider why the legislature providocl s. 50 in the Damodar Valley Corporation 2S.C.R. Act and did not provide some similar section in other Acts creating statutory corporations which
were enacted after the Damodar Valley Corporation Act was put on the statute book. These considera· tions in our opinion have no relevance to the inter- pretation of the relevant words of ss. 40 and 41 of
the Act and we do not therefore propose to say any- thing about s, 50 of the Damodar Valley Corpora- tion Act. We may add that the works are not like the Damodar Valley Corporation and what we say
in the present case may not necessarily be taken to apply to a statutory. corporation like the Damodar Valley Corporation, which is wholly owned by the State, Then it was urged on behalf of the respondents
thats. 6(3) makes the purpose noted in the notifica- tion under s, 6(1) not justiciable. We have not been able to understand how that provision helps the respondents. All that s. 6 (3) says is that the decla-
ration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company, In this case the declaration was that the land was needed for a company arid that according to s. 6(3)
is conclusive evidence that tqe land is so needed, Now it is not the case of the appellant that the land was not needed for the Works in th(J"·present case, nor does the appellant say that though the land
was needed for some other purpose, t·he notification falsely declares that it wru:i needed for the Works. In the circumstances the conclusiveness envisaged by s. 6 (3) is of no assistance to ~he solving of the
problem with which we are concerned in the present case. It is then urged for the respondents that though the appellant had alleged ma1a ji<ks, that part of the case was given up by him and therefore it is not
open to him to urge the contentions that have been urged before us. There is no force in this argument either, for there is no question of any mala /ides or R. L. Arora v. Stare of U.P.
Wanchoo J, ll6l R. L. Arora St.ii •f U. P. Wanthoo J. fraud on the Act in the present case. What the appellant contends is that the relevant words in ss.40 and 41 have a certain meaning and that on that
meaning the action of the State Government in gh ing consent for the use of the machinery prov idcd in the Act for the acquisiti<·n of land for the Works is not within the contemplation of the Act.
This contention has nothing to do with mala /ides or with fraud on the statute. It has always been the case of the appellant that the consent given by the Government was not within the meaning of the
relevant words in ss. 40 and 41 and tht>refore the entire proceedings for acquisition of the appellant's land must be quashed, for the conditions precedent for the issue of the notificatidn under s. 6 had not
been complied with. On that case the appellant must succeed, if we accept the meaning for which he contends, and that has nothing to do with ma/a fidl!8 or fraud on thee tatute on the part of the Govern-
men't. Lastly we may notice an argument on behalf of tho appellant that if we look to the history behind the legislation which culminated into the Act, we shall find that acquisition for a company was always for
construction of some work which the public could use. Keference in this connection was made to Act XXII of 1863 which provided for acquisi~ion for private individuals and companies. That Act ap-
plied to works of public utility, which wMe defined under s. II to mean any bridge, road, railroad, tram- road, canal for irrigation or navigation, work for the improvement of a river or harbour, dO<lk,
quay, jetty, drainage' work or electric telegraph and also all works subsidiary to any such work. At the same time there was another Act in force, namely, Act VI of 1857, whioh provided for acquisi-
tion of land for publio purposes. Then ca.me the Act (X of 1870), which repealed both Acts No. VI of 11!57 and No. XXII of 1863 and made 2 s.c.R. a consolidated provision for acquisition of land for
public purposes and for companies and brought in Chap. VII for the first tim9. This Act was replaced in 1894 by the present Act. Howe\'er, Act X of 1870 was a consolidating and amending Act.
The Act of 1894 is also an amending Act. There- fore, it is not possible to derive much assist>1nce from the previous law existing before the Act of 1870 was passed, for it not only comolidated the previ-
ous law but also amended it. We have therefore to interpret the Act on the words as th<'y now staud and cannot derive much assistance from the provisions of ActXXII of 1863. That is why we have interpreted
above the relevant words of ss. 40 and 41 without any reference to the past history of t4e law relating to acquisition of land for public purposes and for companies. Coming now to the facts of the present case,
we have to see whether the acquisition is for.a work which is useful to the public under s. 40 (l) lbl and which the public is entitled to use in accord- ance with the fifth term to be entered in the agree-
ment under s. 41. We have already set out the term in the agreement which shows that those who have business with the company shall have such right of access to and use of the land/works herein
and before ;;pecified as may be necessary for the transaction of their business with the firm." This in our opinion is not what the relevant provisions of ss. 40 and 41 require. What these provisions
require is that the work should be directly useful to public and the agreement shall contain a term how the public ~hall have the right to use the work directly themselves. It seems to us that under the
relevant words in ss. 40( l)(b) and 4l it is works like a hospital, a public reading room or a library or an educatfonal institution open to that public or such other work as the public may direc~ Jy use that a.re
contemplated and it is only for such works which R. L. Arora v. Stale of U. P. Wane/loo J. lfllJl R. L. Aror• 9. Stot.0 of U. P •• W-HJ. Sorkll< J a.re useful to the public in this wa.y and oa.n be direct- ly used by it that land ca.n ho acquired for a. company
under the Act. This is also the implication of the following observations of this Court in Babu Barkt;a Thakur's ca•e(') at pp. 137-38 with reference to ss. 40 a.nd 41 : "In a.n industrial oonoern employing a.
large number of workmen away from their homes it is a. social ne0088ity that there should be proper housiniz accomodation available for such workmen. Where a large section of t.he
community ia concerned, itll welfaroie a matter of public concern. SilIVla.rly, if a Company is jlenerous enough to erect a hospital or a public reading room a.nd library or an educa-
tioniil institution open to the public, it cannot be doubteri that the work is one of publio utility a.nd comes within the provisions of the Act." The fa.ct that the product of the company would be
useful to the publio is not sufficient to brinlf the acquisition for a. oompany within the meaning of the relevant words in 88. 40 and 41. In tho present oaae a. II that the Government was satisfied about appears
to be that the product of the company will be useful to the public and the provision in the a~reement is merely that the public eba.11 be able to go upnn the works for purpc>se of business. Thie in our
opinion i~ not the mPnning of the relevant words under ss. 40 a.nd 41 and therefore the Government's satisfaction in that behalf.is not enough to entitle it to use the machinery oft.he Act for the purpose
of acquisition in this ca.so. We therefore allow the app_eal with costs and setting aside the order of the High Court quash the notification 1mder s. 6 of the Act and the proceedings resulting therefrom.
SARKAR, J.-The appellant was the owner of certain lands. The Government of L ttar Pradesh acquired the landl! under the Land Aoquisition (ll [1961] I. S.C.R. 128. Act, 1894. The appellant, thereupon, moved the
High Court at Allahabad under Art. 226 of the Constitution for an appropriate with to qu'L~h the order of acquisition made by the Government.. The petition was dismissed by the High Court and the
appellant has filed this appeal against the judgment of the High Court. The land, it may be stated, was acquired by the Government for a company called the Lakshmi Ratan Engineerinl!' Works Ltd ..
which required it for setting up a textile machinery parts factory. Sections 6 to 37 of the Act lay down the procedure for a.II acquisitions under it. Part VII of the Act, which consists of ss. ::18 to 44 provides for
acquisition of lands for companies for certain specified purposes. It is not in. controversy that the acquisition in the present case was made under this part. It is necessary to set out ss. 39, 40 and 41
of Part VII to appreciate the contention of the appellant: S. 39. The provisions of sections 6 to 37 (both inclusive) shall not be put in force in order to acquire land for any Company,
unless with the previous consent of the appro- priate Government, nor unloes the Company shall have executed the agreement hereinafter mentioned. S. 40. ( 1) Such consent shall not be
given unless the appropriate Government be sati9fied, either on the report of the Collector under seotion 5A sub.section (2), or by an enquiry held as hereinafter provided ,- (a) that the purpose of the acquisi-
tion is to obtain land for .the erection of dwelling houses for workman employed by the Company or for the provision of amenities directly connected therewith, or –· – R. L. Arora
v. Slate of U. P. SarkarJ. IP61 R. L. Arora Si.11 of F. P. Sflf'karJ, (b) that such acquisition is needed for the construction of some work, and that such work is likely to prove useful to
the pu hlic. (2) Such enquiry shall be held by such officer and at such time and place as the appropriate Government shall appoint. (:l) Such officer may summon and enforre the> attendan<'e of witnPRReR and compel the
produ<'tion of documPnU! by the Aame meanR and as fqr as possible. in the RamP manern as is provided bv th<> Code of Civil Procedure in thP case of a Civil Court. R. 41. If the appropriate Government is
Rati~fied after considering the report. if anv, of thr> C<il!Pctor under· section 5A, sub- section (2), or on the report of t.he offil'flr making thP inquiry under section 40 that the
purpnsc of thP propoReil a<'quisition is to ohtain land for the erection of dwPIIing houAes for workman employrd by t.heCompan~' or for the provi•ion of amenities dircctlv ronn!'cted
therewith, or that the propoRed acqnisition is nN·rled for th" ronstniction of a work, and that. 8uch work is lik1•ly to prove usefu I to the public, it shall require the company to enter
into an agrePn'liJnt with the appropriate Covnnmrnt, providing to thP. satisfaction of tlw appropriate Government for thr> following matt,,r?, namely:— ( I) the payment to the appropriate
Gover11ment of the cost of the acquisition; ( ~) the trans for, on Ruch paym<'nt of the land to the company; (:l) th<' tt-rms on which tlw land shall be hel<l by the Company; 2 S.C.R.
( 4) where the acquisition is for the pur- pose of erecting dwe Hing houses or the provision of amenties connected therewith, the time within which, the conditions on which and the
manner in which the dwelling houses or amenities shall he erected or provided ; and (5) where the acquisition is for the construction of any other work the time within which and the conditions
on which the work shall be executed and m~.intained, and the terms on which the public shall be entitled to use- the work. There is no dispute that the Government decla- red that it was satisfied
that the acquisition· needed for the .construction of a work, namely, a textile machinery parts factory and that this work was likely to prove useful to the public but the appellant
contends that such a factory is not a work contemplated by s. 40(1)(b) and the Government had no right, there- fore, to give its consent to the acquisition. The precise significance of this contention will have to
be stated more fully later. The first point taken by the respondents against this contention of the appellant is that the satisfac- tion of the Government under s. 40( l )(b) is subjective
and that a declaration in the official gazette that the acquisition is for a public purpose is under s. 6(3) conclusive and cannot therefore be questioned in a court. I think that the appellant is right when he
says that this conclusiveness is of no avail unless the work can be said to be withins. 40(l)(b). The Government cannot by simply making a declara- tion that it is ~atisfied that tbe acquisition is needed
for the construction of some work likely to prove useful to the public· stop further enquiries even R. L. Aro1a v. Stat• of U. P. Sarkar J. JllJIJ R. L. dro,. Stall •f U. P. ,)""'"• J.
though the satisfaction contemplated is the Govern- ment's irubjective satisfaction. If the work is not within the Act, the Government's satisfaction avails nothing. And that is the contention of the appellant.
No doubt if the Government says it is e&tisfied, it cannot be contended that it is not satisfied. But the Government haB to bo satisfied about a specified thing and a question can be raiser! as to whether
the thing about which the Government is satisfied is the thing contemplated by the section. I there- fore, proceed to consider whether the work about which the Government.was satisfied in the present
case, is withins. 40(l)(b). The real question raised by the appellant is as to tho meaning of the words "such work is likely to prove useful to the public" in d.(b) of s.40( l ). What is a work likely to prove useful to the pub-
lic ? The appellant e&ys it is a work which the _ public can use for the purpose for which it was constructed. Thua a building for a school would be such a work, for the public can use it for tho pur·
pose for which it was built. So wuuld a building for a hospital or a librar) be. It is said that this is the natural and ordinary meaning of the words. Then it is said, even if it were not 80, they liave to
be so read in view of ss. 39 and U. The matter is put in this way : In view of 8. 39 land cannot be acquired under Part VII unless two conditions are fulfilled. The first is the consent of the Govern-
ment to the acquisition which, in view of s.41, cannot be given-leaving out the OllBE'S o( acquisi- tion for workmen's dwelling houses with which we are not conoerned now-unless the acqui.ition is
needed for the construction of e. work which is likely to prove useful to the pu blio. The second is the execution of e.n 11.greement by tbe Company provid- ing .for the matters stated in s.1U, OJle of which is
the terms on which the public shall be entitled to use the work to be <'Onstructed on the land to be acquired, about which work the Government has 2 S.C.R. SUPREMI!.: COURT REPORTS
been satisfied that it is likely to prove useful to the public. Since both these conditions have to be ful- filled, the work must be such as the public can use directly; if it were not such a work then the condi-
tion as to the agreement cannot be fulfilled. There- fore, the work in s. 40(l)(b) must necessarily be restricted to a work which itself can be used by the public. The appellant contends that the work in the
present case being a factory, it is not one which the public can use and, therefore, it is not a work for setting up of which the Government could under s. 40(l)(b) give its consent to the acquisition; It
appears that in the present case the Company had execute\} an agreement purporting to be in terms of s. 41 and that agreement provided that the public would have a "right of access to and use
of the land-works …………… as may be necessary for the transaction of their business with the firm", that is, the Company. It is contended by the appellant that this is not a compliance with the
second condition. It is said that this is not really providing for the use of the work for that means use by the public of the work, for the purpose for which it was built. Hence, it is argued, that the
acquisition is illegal. I am unable to accept the appellant's reading of s. 40(1 )(b) as correct. 'The words "such work is · likely to prove uoeful to the public'' read by them- selves seem to me plainly to imply a work the
construction which results in some benefit which the public would enjoy. They do not contemplate only a work which itself can be put by the public to its use. For example, a work producina electricity for supply
to the public isa work which ls useful to the public. So ali!O a work producing any commodity like say, f edicines or cloth would he a work wpich would be useful to the public. Again, I feel no doubt that
a radio broadcasting statfon would be a work which would be useful to the public. Take another oase, 19~1 R. L.Arora v. State of U. P · Bark•r J. 1P61 R, L. Arora Sl•u of U. P. S•wJ.
180 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP. namely a. post-graduate college turning out a small number of highly qualified medical doctors. There Ol\ll be no doubt that the building for the colleize
can be said to be a work useful to the public. It would be so not because the public would have a. cha.not> of getting training there and a small number of the memb~rs of the public would after the
training be abfo to make a good livelihood, but because an institution of this kind is ul!<lful to the public as it turne out men who give very useful service to the public. In all the illustrations given
the workA would be useful to the public though the public might have no accese to the work or any right to use them directly. I think it would be unduly restricting the meaning of the word 'useful' to say
that a work is useful to the public only when it ean directly be used by the public. The words are not work which the public can u~e", in whioh case it might with some justification have been said thai
the work must be such as the public could use. In the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, among the meanings of 'useful' appear, "having the qualities to bring a.bout good or advantage", "helpful in effecting a
puroose''. I find no reason not to apply these meanings to the word 'useful' in the section that I am considering. If the meaning for which the appellant con- tends were to be given to the words, then thfl work
contemplated can only be a work like a hospital, school or phflanthropic instituti ona of similar kfud which itself the public can put to ite Ull\l. It seems to me that it would be strange if the section only
contemplated that, Pa.rt VII clearly deals with companies as bllliness institutioDB. A company in the Act means a company incorporated under one or other of eertain Companies Acts and includes a
society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1800 and a registered society within the mea- ning of tho Co-operative Societies Act, 1912: sees. 3( e). Now the first and the last are essentially business
2 S.C.R. institutions. U 'lder s. 38A again, a company for the purpose of part VII is to include "an industrial concern, ordinarily employing not less than one hundred workmen owned by an individual or by an
association of individuals and not being a Com- pany", This again is essentially a business orga- nisation. It is true that land cannot be acquired for this last mentioned variety of "Company" under
Part VII tlxcept for erection of dwelling houses for its workmen or for amenities connected therewith. I am however referring to s. 38A to show that Part VII is dealing with "companies" as business orga-
nisations and not as donors for philanthropic pur- pose$, That being so, it would be curious if Part VII was intended only for acquiring lands for these busi- ness organisations so that they might out of charity
set. up philanthropic institutions. If encouragement of philanthrophy was the idea behind Part VII, why were its provisions not made available to philan- thropic minded private individuals or associations
of individuals ? Another reason which to my mind indicates that s. 40(l)(b) is not confined to philanthropic institutions is that the word 'work' would hardly then have been used; it is to my mind a very inap-
propriate use of the word 'work' to describe a philanthropic institution. 'Work' in the present case can only mean a structure, a building and, therefore, a structure or building for any purpose :
see Shorter Oxford Dictionary, Section 40, furthermore, contemplates. an en- quiry for determining whether the work is likely to prove useful to the public in course of which it may even be necessary to compel the attendance of
witnesses and production of documents. This is not an enquiry to hear the objections of the owner of the land to be acquired, to the acquisition: Ezra v. Sei;retary of State( 1) I can hardly imagine that
(I) 32 I. A. ~~. R•.L. Arora v. Slat• of U. P. Sarkar J. 1'41 R. L. Arora Si.l4°0J U.P. Sarkor ./. provisionR for such elaborate enquiry would have been made if all that the Government had to be satis-
fied was whether a philanthropic institution would be useful to the public. It would also appear inPxpli- cable that Part VII was needed at all for the purpose of acquisition of land for the
establishment of philanthropic institutions by ,companies Jar that could well have been done under s. (3 as that would clearly be an acquisition for a company for. a public purpose.
I do not supp08c there can be any doubt that the establishment of a philanthropic institution would be a public purpose. I &Ill unable to agree with the contention that land can be aoquired tor a
company only under Part VII. Section 43 says that this Part would not apply to acquisition of land for a company for the purposes of which under an agreement with the company, the Government is
bound to provide land. Acquisition in such cases for the company has therefore to be under BB. 6 to 37. It would follow that under s. 6 land can be acquired for a company in a case not coming under
Part VII. In the viow that land oan be aoquired for a company under the Act otherwise than under Part VII, I am supported by A. Natua Aaari v. The State of Madraa ('). Lastly, I think it right to point out that
though the provision~ in P11.rt VII have been on the statute book since at least 1S70", in not a single c&11e it appears to have been held in a.II th61!6 years· that the work contemplated is work of a. phil&nthro-
pio nature which the public can put to its use directly. I am not saying that thia is an argument whioh ia concl1111ive but it strikes me II.ti aomewhat extraordinary if the meaning was as the appellant
contends, it should not have struok anyone so long. In Ezra v. 8~ of State ('), an acquisition of land for the Bank of Beng~l under Part VII for the (I) [1953] 2 M.L J. 684. l2J 32 I. A. 93,
2 S.C.R. purpose of constructing a building in which the .Public Debt Office of the Government which was in charge of the Bank, was to be housed, was upheld. This was not a case of acquisition for a phihnthro-
pic .purpose. In Radha Raman v. State of U. P. (1), an acquisition under Part VII for the purpose of a co-operative housing society was upheld. In Ranibala Bhar v. State of West Bengal (') an acquisi-
tion for extension of the textile mills of a company was upheld. Reading s. 40( 1 )(b) by itself, I am for these reasons unable to accept the view that the work there contemplated is only a building or other con-
struction put up for .a philanthropic purpose or is such as itself can be used by the public. In my opinion, the work contemplated is a work from the con11truction of which the public can in any way
derive benefit, whether by the direct use of the work or by the enjoyment of the fruits of the activities carried on there, or, may be, otherwis.e. The question then is, however wide may be the
meaning of the words "work …. likely to prove useful to the public" when read by themselves, has that meaning to be controlled in view of the fact that under s. 41 an agreement has to be made with the
company concerning the work providing for the terms on which the public can use it ? Is that meaning t.o be restricted and the words understood as contemplating only a work which is capable of
meaning to be restricted and the words public directly ? I do not think so. That would not be a. reasonable way of interpreting the sta.tute, If I am right in what I have said so for, it would be defeat-
ing the intention of the statute ifs. 41 is allowed to restrict the width of the natural meaning of the words us.edin s·. 40(l)(b). In my view, Part VII was enacted ma.inly for acquiring lands for business
organisations and therefore for purposes of their (ll A.I.R. 1954, All. 700. (2) 62 C.W.N. ia. R.L.~r01'• v. State of U. P. Sarkar J. JHl R. l . .A.1010 v. SW. of U. P. ·'tntkor J.
business also, provided that that business was useful to the.public. Obviously, in a very large majority of cases of such acquisition it would not be possible to permit the use by the public of the works put up on
the land. If such is the purpose of the acquisition, that purpose would be largely defeated if the statute at the same time proviried that the public must have the right to use the work put up on the land.
A construction leading to such a result would in my view be wholly unjustified. The proper view to take would be to read the statute a& leaving it to the Government to whom large powers have been given
under the Act to decide the terms of the user of the work by the public, also to decide the caaes in which the public shall have the right to use the work at all. I think that tho interpretation suggested by
me ha& tho support of authority. It ha& to be observed that when it is said that the meaning of s. 40(1 )(b) must be restricted to bring it in conso- nance withs. 41, it is conceded that the two sections
cannot stand side by side, each having it.~full opera- tion. Now, in such a case, I conceive it is the duty of the Court to remove the conflict by such inter- pretation as would carry out the intention or the
legislature. I may read here the following pusa.ge from Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (10th ed.) p. 78, "The beneficial spirit of construction is also well illustrated by cases where there is
so far a conflict between the general enact- ment and aome of ita subaidiary provisions that the former would be limited in the aoope of its ooeration if the latter were not res- trioted.'r
In suoh a O&Be the rnle is to allow scope to the gell.lV91 enactment. Maxwell cites Cortia v. Kent Water W orka(') in anpport of this proposition. There (I) (1827) 7 I!, & c. 314.
2 S.C.R. an Act authorised the imposition of a local rate on all persons occupying land in a parish and gave a dissatisfied rate-payer an appeal but required the appellant to enter into a recognisance for prosecu-
ting the appeal. Under this Act, a corporation was subjected to a rate ard a suit was brought to recover that rate. It was said on behalf of the corporation that the Act did n:it authorise the
imposition of the rate on a corporation because it contemplated the imposition of a rate on a person who could appeal against it and that a corporation was not such a person because it could not maintain
the appeal provided in the statute as that appeal was one which a person who could enter into a recognisance could prosecute, and a, corporation could not enter into a recognisance. Bayley, J.
observed, "But assuming that they cannot enter inte a recognisance, yet if they are persons capaole of beiqg aggrieved by and appealing against a rate, I should say that that part of
the clause which gives by the appeal applies to all persons capbale of appealing, and that the other part of •the clause which requires a recognisance to be entered into applies only
to those who are capable of entering into a recognisance, but is inapplicable to those who are not." I think on the same principle I should in the persent ca.se hold that the provisions in the agreement about
the terms on which the public would be entitled to use the work would be inapplicable to a case where the work is such that the public cannot use it. Thus for example, if land is acquired for setting
up a highly specialised drug factory, it may be a work to which public admission as of right cannot conveniently be granted and to such a work the last part of s. 41(5) would not be applicable.
R. L. A.r.ara v. State of U.P. Sarkar J. JI/fl R, L. Arora 8101< qf U.P. dorurJ. I also find some support for the view that it is not obligatory th:n the public Ehall uso the work
from the fact that the user of the work by the public shall be such as the Government determines. The Government may be satisfied with very little user. The Government's satisfaction as to the quantum
of this user is plainly couclusive. Therefore, it would seem that the prov1oion as to the term of the user of the work by the public w&R not intended to confor a substantial benefit on the public a benefit
which woultl warrant an interpretation defeating which otherwise would appear to be the main pur· pose of the statute. Another reason leading me to the view that it is not obligatory under the stktute that the public
must have a right to use th~ work is this. Obvi- ously, tho public cannot in auy case have the right to uso the whole work. Eveu if a hospital was put up, the public oa.nnot insist on using, say the dis-
pensing room or the place where medicines aro stocked or the residential quarters of the staff. That being so, it would be for the Government to decide what user of the work would be available to
the public. If the Government decides that tho public shall have the use of a very small part of the work, I d•> not think that any complaint can be legitimately made. This would show that the term
as to user by the public was in no case intended to confer a great benefit on the public. If this is true, there would be leas reason for thinking that that was an obligatory term. If it was not obliga-
tory, it cannot of course control the meaning of s. 40(l)(b). What I have said so far does not lead to the reeult that Part VII was enacted for the private benefit of companies as business organisations. Nor
is its effect to convert the Government into land agents for them. In order that land may be acquired under Part VII, the Government must be satis- fied that it is required to put up a. work which
2 S.C.R. would be useful to the public. So the controlling idea is benefit to the public. It is because of this that the Government acquires tbe land for the Com- pany. No doubt the Company would itself derive
some private benefit from the work. But that can- not justify the view that the acqui~ition is for the benefit of the Company only or that the Act con- verts the Government· into a land agent for the
Company. No one can force the Government to acquue the land and when the Government does so, it does for public benefit and not solely for the Company's benefit. Take a case where land is
acquired to house the workmen of a company. Here the public cannot use the land. The aquisi- tion is no doubt for the benefit of the workmen but at the same time the financial advantage goes
solely to the Company. Is it to be said that the Act is converting the Government into land agents for the Company ? Obviously not. If so, neither can it be said in the case of acy_uisition for a com-
pany for putting up a work that the Government would be acting as a land agent for the company. It is no argument that the Government might use its powers under .Part VlI to advance them-
terest of its friends and supporters. Assume the Government does that. The Government may equally use all other powers given to it by various statutes for a similar purpose. But that would not
justify interpretrng a statute plainly giving the Uovernment a power, as not clorng so. A country cannot go on unluos power can ue entrusted to its Government. The remedy agamst the misuse of
such power is not always to the Court I.Jut to those who put the Uovernment where it is, In the present case, it will be remembered, the land w;is acquired for the setting up of a textile
machinery parts factory. The llovernment was satiJfied that it was a work which would prove l!Ml R. L. Arora v. Sta~e of U, P. Sarkar J. Illfl R. L . .drora S141,./U.P. s.,.,,,' useful to the public. It seems to me that Govern-
ment were entitled so to be satisfied within the meaning of s. 40(l)(b). It is no part of the duty of this Court to sit in judgment over the merite of Gov .. rnment's satisfaction. I think it rlght how·
ever to point out that I find no fault with the Government for h!!.ving been satisfied that the work would be useful to the public, Textiles are an essential commodity for our daily life. Their
manufacture therefore is useful to the public. •rextile manufacture requires textile mills and the mills no doubt require parts. Therefore a factory for Lhe purpOBe of manufacturing these partll can,
in my view, be said to serve a pub.lie purpose. I find it impossible to take any objection to the pre- sent acquisition on the ground that the work pro· posed to be set up is not likely to prove useful to
the public. Nor is it a legitimafie objection to the a.cquieitjon that the public cannot directly use the work and the reasons for this view have been earlier stated. I would therefore di.Bmiaa this appeal wnh
COB ta. BY CoURT: In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeal is allowed with oos'8 . .A.ppt.al allowed.