Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
3. The Lessee/Purchaser shall construct a building in the property as per plans, designs and conditions to be approved by the Lessee/ Vendor and in conformity with the provisions of the City of Bangalore Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, and the bye-laws made there under within two years from the date of this agreement Provided that where the Lessor/Vendor for sufficient reasons extends in any particular case the time for construction of such building, the Lessee/Purchaser shall construct the building within such extended period.
4. The Lessee/Purchaser shall not sub-divide the property or construct more than one dwelling house on it; The expression "dwelling house" means a building constructed to be used wholly for human habitation and shall not include any apartments to the building whether attached thereto or not, used as a shop or a building of warehouse or building in which manufactory operations are conducted by mechanical power or otherwise.
5. The Lessee/Purchaser shall not alienate the site or the building that may be constructed thereon during the period of the tenancy. The Lessor/Vendor may, however, permit the mortgage of the right, title 599 and interest of the Lessee/Purchaser in favour of the Government of A Mysore, the Central Government or bodies corporation like the Mysore Housing Board of the Life Insurance Corporation of India, Housing Co-operative Societies or Banks to secure moneys advanced by such Governments or bodies for the construction of the building
6. The Lessee/Purchaser agrees that the Lessor/ Vendor may take B over possession of the property with the structure thereon if there is any misrepresentation in the application for allotment of site.
7. The property shall not be put to any use except as a residential building without the consent in writing of Lessor/Vendor.
8. The Lessee/Purchaser shall be liable to pay all outgoings with reference to the property including taxes due to the Government and the Municipal Corporation of Bangalore. c
9. On matters not specifically stipulated in these presents the Lessor/Vendor shall be entitled to give directions to the Lessee/ D Purchaser which the Lessee/ Purchaser shall carry out and default in carrying out such direct5ions will be a breach of conditions of these presents.
10. In the event of the Lessee/Purchaser committing default in the payment of rent or committing breach of any of the conditions of this E agreement or the provisions of the City of Bangalore Improvement (Allotment of Sites) Rules, 1964, the Lessor/Vendor may determine the tenancy at any time after giving the Lessee/Purchaser fifteen days' notice ending with the month of the tenancy, and take possession of the property. The Lessor/Vendor may also forfeit twelve and a half percent of the amount treated as security deposit under clause 1 of F these presents.
11. At the end of ten years referred to in clause 1 the total amount of rent paid by the Lessee/Purchaser for the period of the tenancy shall be adjusted towards the balance of the value of the G property.
12. If the Lessee/Purchaser has performed all the conditions mentioned herein and committed no breach thereof the Lessor/Vendor shall, at the end of ten years referred to in clause 1, sell the property to the Lessee/ Purchaser and all attendant expenses in connection H [2005] I S.C.R. with such sale such as stamp duty, registration charges, etc., shall be borne by the Lessee/Purchaser. c
13. On complying with the terms and conditions of this agreement in the manner stated above but not otherwise the Lessor IV end or shall be obliged to execute the sale deed in favour of the Lessee/Purchaser.
14. The Lessee/Purchaser hereby also confirms that this agreement shall be subject to the terms and conditions specified in the City of Bangalore Improvement (Allotment of Sites) Rules, 1964, and agreed to by the Lessee/Purchaser in his/her application for allotmmt of the site.
15. In case the Lessee/Purchaser is evicted under clause 9 he shall not be entitled to claim from the Lessor/ Vendor any compensation towards the value of the improvements or the superstructure erected by him on the scheduled property by virtue of and in pursuance of these presents.
16. It is also agreed between the parties hereto that Rs ……… . (Rupees ……….. ) in the hands of the Lesser/Vendor received by them from the Lessee/Purchaser shall be held by them as security for any loss or expense that the Lessor IV end or may be put to in connection with any legal proceedings including eviction proceedings that may be taken against the Lessee/Purchaser and all such expenses shall be appropriated by the Lessor IV endor from and out of the moneys of the Lessee/Purchaser held in their hands. THE SCHEDULE SITE No …… formed by the City of Bangalore Improvement Trust Board in Block No ………. .in the ………… Extension. Site bounded on East by ; West by ; North by ; South by ; And measuring east to west… …… North to south ………. . In all measuring ……… Square Feet. ,,. . R&MTRUSTv. KORAMANGALA RESIDENTS VIGILANCE GROUP [A.K. MATHUR,J.160] In witness whereof the parties have affixed their signatures to this A Agreement.
Chairman The City of Bangalore Improvement Trus Board Witnesses : 2. Lessee/Purchaser Witnesses : c 2. The conditions which have been set out in the lease agreement and which is relevant for our purpose is condition No. 4. Condition No. 4 has D already been reproduced above which provides that lessee/purchaser shall not sub-divide the property or construct more than one dwelling house. Condition No. 12 says if the Lessee/Purchaser has performed all the conditions mentioned herein and committed no breach thereof the Lessor/Vendor shall, at the end of ten years referred to in clause 1, sell the property to the Lessee/Purchaser E and all attendant expenses in connection with such sale such as stamp duty, registration charges, etc., shall be borne by the Lessee/ Purchaser. Condition No. 13 says that on complying with the terms and conditions of this agreement in the manner stated above but not otherwise the Lessor/Vendor shall be obliged to execute the sale deed in favour of the Lessee/Purchaser.
Therefore, looking to the scheme of the Act, the Rules and the terms and conditions of F the lease cum sale agreement, it transpires that once an allotment is made to the lessee and he makes all payments then after the payment the Lesser/ Vendor shall at the end of ten years sell the property to the Lessee/ Purchaser and the Lessee/Purchaser will get the sale deed registered. Therefore, if all the conditions of the lease agreement are fulfilled, at the end of the stipulated G period of ten years then outright agreement of sale shall be executed by the Lessor/Vendor with the Lessee/Purchaser and the lessee will have absolute right. The lease agreement also says that during the currency of the lease, the Lessee/Purchaser shall abide by the terms and conditions of the lease. As per condition 17 (7) reproduced above, the Lessee/Purchaser shall not alienate the property during the period of tenancy.
Once all the payments have been H (2005] I S.C.R. A fulfilled by the lessee, then the land is registered in favour of the lessee by the lessor and the lessee becomes absolute owner of the land. So long as the \building is not constructed under condition No. 4 of the agreement the lessee is neither entitled to alienate the property under condition 17 (7), nor shall be sub-divide the property or construct more than one dwelling house on it. B These restrictions are there so long as the complete sale agreement is not executed under condition No. 12 of the lease-cum-sale agreement. As soon as the lease agreement is executed conforming full title to the lessee, then the conditions of the lease cum sale agreement come to an end and the lessee acquires full right to deal with the said property in accordance with the Act and the Rules bearing on the subject. After acquiring this full right the lessee C has right to alienate the property or whenever either lessee or his successor wants to construct a building thereon he can do so in accordance with the provisions oflaw.
Condition No. 4 of the lease agreement was only to survive so long as the lessee continued to be lessee as his rights of lessee are restricted i.e. he cannot alienate the property nor can he subdivide the property and he has to construct one dwelling house. The moment the lease cum sale agreement D is executed after following the conditions of the lease as laid down, then there is no further hurdle or condition like not to construct multi-storeyed building or multi-dwelling house. The only condition that he will construct only one dwelling house is contained in Condition No. 4 of the lease cum sale agreement and so long as the full rights are not transferred to the lessee- E purchaser, this condition would survive and after the sale is made, this condition will no longer survive and conditions contained in absolute sale deed will govern. If the lessee or his successor wants to raise a construction, then the provisions of the Kamataka Municipal Corporation Act will come into play and he has to obtain prior sanction for construction of the building.
As soon as the permission is granted by the Corporation, then he is to abide F by those conditions along with the condition laid down in absolute sale deed. Now, adverting to the facts in C.A. No. 1416of1999, an absolute sale deed was executed on 13.7.1982 in favour of U.L. Nagaraj after he constructed the house. The only condition which was incorporated in Clause 2 of the sale G deed reads as i.;nder : "The building to be constructed shall be used wholly for human habitation and shall not include any apartments to the building whether attached thereto or not used as a shop or a building or warehouse or building in which manufactory operations are conducted by mechanical power or otherwise." R& MTRUSTv. KORAMANGALA RESIDENTS VIGILANCE GROUP [A.K. MATHUR, J.] 603 Therefore, the only condition was that it shall be used for human habitation A and it shall not allow any apartments to the building whether attached thereto or not , used as a shop or a building or warehouse or for manufacturing operation.
There is no condition that one cannot raise any multi-storeyed building over the schedule property. The condition not to have more than one dwelling house was the condition No. 4 of the lease cum sale agreement but B that condition has not been repeated when the absolute sale was made in favour of a party. As such, the condition No. 4 of the lease cum sale agreement survived during the currency of that agreement. As soon as absolute sale is made then prohibition comes to an end. The lease cum sale agreement was to continue for a period of ten years or till all the conditions are fulfilled. The moment the conditions laid down in the lease cum sale agreement are fulfilled C i.e. the entire money is paid and the registration is done and thereafter final absolute sale agreement is executed then the so called lease cum sale agreement comes to an end and the condition No. 4 cannot subsequently guide the sale purchase agreement.
The sale purchase agreement has its own tenns and conditions and the condition as reproduced above, only says that the building D to be constructed shall be used wholly for human habitation and shall not include any apartments to the building whether attached thereto or not used as a shop or a building or warehouse or used for manufactory operations by mechanical power. Therefore, in this final agreement which has come to be executed and which has been registered the condition is that the building has to be used for human habitation and there is no prohibition contained therein E that it cannot raise multi-storeyed building. In this connection, much emphasis was laid on the decision in Pee Kay Constructions case. With respect we do not see any condition under the provisions of the Act and the Rules which prohibits raising of multi-storeyed building after final sale agreement has been executed.
This condition was to remain in force so long as the absolute F agreement has not been executed. The condition to construct one dwelling house was only so long as the other conditions laid down in the lease agreement were not complied and final sale agreement has not been executed. Therefore condition 17(4) lays down that within 10 years the lessee-purchaser has to complete all the formalities or earlier than 10 years , then in that case, the final agreement for absolute purchase could be executed. Once the final G agreement is executed then the lessee- purchaser becomes absolute owner of the schedule property and he has to abide by the conditions of the final agreement for sale and other provisions bearing on the subject. The final agreement only contains the condition that th~ lessee purchaser should use the schedule property for human dwelling purpose and it will not be used in H (2005] 1 S.C.R.
A apartment of that building for purpose of shop or for warehouse or for manufacturing process, therefore, the view taken in Pee Kay Constructions case cannot be said to be a good law. Learned counsel for the respondents has tried to raise certain objections that in the final agreement the expression "apartment" has been used which B shows that there cannot be more than one dwelling house. We regret to say that this interpretation does not bear out in the face of the language used in the clause 2 of the final agreement which says that the building to be constructed shall be used wholly for human habitation and shall not include any apartments to the building whether attached thereto or not for shop or C warehouse or manufacturing purposes but that does not make out a case for prohibition of raising of the multi-storeyed building. Once the Municipal Corporation has permitted to raise construction more than three floor then this condition for construction will hold good and they are not contrary to any of the provisions of the Act.
Section 505 of the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 only says that the Corporation shall exercise power in D confonnity with the provisions of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961. Therefore, the Corporation at the time of granting pennission has to keep in mind the provisions of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961. But we have not been able to find any provisions of the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act or Kamataka Town and Country Planning Act, E 1961 where any ceiling has been applied on the construction of the multi- storeyed building. Therefore, we do not find that the Municipal Corporation has committed any illegality in granting pennission to the appellant for raising construction up to third floor. In view of the discussions made above, we are of opinion that pennission F granted by t~e Bangalore Municipal Corporation to the appellant for raising the construction up to third floor is not in violation of any of the provisions of the Act and the Rules.
Next question is whether such Public Interest Litigation should at all be G entertained & !aches thereon. This sacrosanct jurisdiction of Public Interest Litigation should be invoked very sparingly and in favour of vigilant litigant and not for the persons who invoke this jurisdiction for the sake of publicity or for the purpose of serving their private ends. Public Interest Litigation is no doubt a very useful handle for redressing H the grievances of the people but unfortunately lately it has been abused by ….. …. 605 some interested persons and it has brought very bad name. Courts should be A very very slow in entertaining petitions involving public interest in a very rare cases where public at large stand to suffer. This jurisdiction is meant for the purpose of coming to the rescue of the down trodden and not for the purpose of serving private ends. It has now become common for unscrupulous people to serve their private ends and jeopardize the rights of innocent people B so as to wreak vengeance for their personal ends.
This has become very handy to the developers and in. matters of pubJic contracts. In order to serve their professional rivalry they utilize the service of the innocent people or organization in filing public interest litigation. The Courts are sometimes persuaded to issue certain directions without understanding implication and giving a handle in the hands of the authorities to misuse it. Therefore, the C courts should not exercise this jurisdiction lightly but should exercise in a very rare and few cases involving public interest of large number of people who cannot afford litigation and are made to suffer at the hands of the authorities. The parameters have already been laid down in a decision of this Court in the case of Ba/co Employees' Union (Regd) v. Union of India and Ors., reported in [2002] 2 sec 333, wherein this Court has issued guidelines D as to what kind of public interest litigation should be entertained and all the previous cases were reviewed by 77.
Public Interest litigation, or PIL as it is more commonly known, entered the Indian Judicial process in 1970. It will not be incorrect to say that it is primarily the Judges who have innovated this type of litigation as there was a dire need for it. At that stage, it was intended to vindicate public interest where fundamental and other rights of the people who were poor, ignorant or in socially or economically F disadvantageous position and were unable to seek legal redress were required to be espoused. PIL was not meant to be adversarial in nature and was to be a cooperative and collaborative effort of the parties and the court so as to secure justice for the poor and the weaker sections of the community who were not in a position to protect their own interests. Public interest litigation was intended to G means nothing more than what words themselves said viz. "litigation in the interest of the public". 78.
While PIL initially was invoked mostly in cases connected with the relief to the people and the weaker sections of the society and in H [2005) I S.C.R. areas where there was violation of human rights under Article 21, but with the passage of time, petitions have been entertained in other spheres, Prof. S.B. Sathe has summarized the extent of the jurisdiction which has now been exercised in the following words : "PIL may, therefore, be described as satisfying one or more of the B following parameters. These are not exclusive but merely descriptive : c Where the concerns underlying a petition are not individualist but are shared widely by ·a large number of people (bonded labour, undertrial prisoners, prison inmates). Where the affected persons belong to the disadvantaged sections of society (women, children, bonded labour, unorganized labour, etc.). Where judicial law making is necessary to avoid exploitation (inter-country adoption, the education of the children, bonded labour, unorganized labour, etc.). Where judicial law making is necessary to avoid exploitation (inter-country adoption, the education of the children of the prostitutes). Where judicial intervention is necessary for the protection of the sanctity of democratic institutions (independence of the judiciary, existence of grievances redress al forums). Where administrative decisions related to development are harmful to the environment and jeopardize people's right to natural resources such as air or water." 79.
There is, in recent years, a feeling which is not without any foundation that public interest litigation is now tending to become publicity interest litigation or private inten:st litigation and has a tendency to be counterproductive. 80. PIL is not a pill or a panacea for all wrongs. It was essentially mea~t to protect basic human rights of the weak and the disadvantaged and was a procedure which was innovated where a public spirited person files a petition in effect on behalf of such persons who on account of poverty, helplessness or economic and social disabilities could not approach the Court for relief. There has been in recent times, increasingly instances of abuse of PIL. Therefore, there is a )I 607 need ;to reemphasize the parameters within which PIL can be resorted A to by petitioner and entertained by the Court. This aspect has come up for consideration before this Court and all we need to do is to recapitulate and reemphasize the same." In this connection reference may be made to a recent decision given by this Court in the case of Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra B and Ors., S.L.P. (C) No. 26269 of (2004) in which Hon'ble Pasaya! J. has also observed as follows : "Public Interest Litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly C private malice, vested interest and/or publicity seeking is not lurking.
It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armory of law for delivering social justice to the citizens. The attractive brand name of public interestlitigation should not be used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or D public injury and not publicity oriented or founded on personal vendetta." We fully share the views expressed in the aforesaid decision of this Court and reiterate that it should go a warning to the Courts that this extra- ordinary power should be used sparingly and absolutely in necessary matter E involving down trodden people. Jn this connection learned counsel has rightly pointed out that delay is very material. He has invited our attention to a number of decisions of this Court where this Court has declined to interfere on account of delay. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. v. Bhailal Bhai and Ors., reported in AIR (1964) SC l 006, it was observed as follows : "The provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such apply to the granting of relief under Art. 226.
However, the maximum period fixed by the Legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit G in a ciyil court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Art.226. can be measured. The Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, H c [2005] I S.C.R it will almost atways be proper for the Court to hold that it is unreasonable." In the case of Rabindra Nath Bose and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., reported in AIR (1970) SC 470. it was observed as follows : "No relief can be given to petitioners who, without any reasonable · explanation, approach Supreme Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution after inordinate delay. The highest Court in this land has been given Original Jurisdiction to entertain petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution.
It could not have been the intention that the Supreme Court would go into stale demands after a lapse of years. Though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intentionof the Constitution makers that Supreme Court should discard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after in ordinate delay." In the case of Durga Prasad v. The Chief Controller of Imports and Exports and Ors., reported in AIR ( 1970) SC 769 Their Lordships observed as follows : "Where an applicant for an Import licence in 1959 received a licence only for a fraction of the amount for which he had asked for, chooses to wait and comes to a Court in 1964 requesting for a writ of mandamus even if his fundamental rights are involved, the matter is still in the discretion of the High Court, and the High Court in its discretion can refuse the issue of a writ because of the !aches of the applicant." In the case of Ramona Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and Ors., reported in AIR (1979) SC 1628, even five months delay was considered to be fatal. It was observed as follows : "Moreover, the writ petition was filed by the appellant more than five months after the acceptance of the tender of the 4th respondents and during this period, the 4th respondents incurred considerable expenditure aggregating to about Rs. 1,25,000 in making arrangements for putting up the restaurant and the snack bars and started running the same.
It would now be most inequitous to set aside the contract of the 4th respondents at the instance of the appellant. The position would have been different if the appellant had filed the writ petition immediately after the acceptance of the tender of the 4th respondents .l _ .. R & M TRUST"· KO RAMA NGA LA RESIDENTS VIGILANCE GROUP [A.K. MA THUR, J.]609 but the appellant allowed a period of over five months to elapse A duringwhich the 4th respondents started their position. We are, therefore, of the view that this is not a fit case in which we shou Id interfere and grant relief to the appellant in the exercise of our discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution." In the case of Ashok Kumar Mishra and Anr. v. Collector, Raipur and B Ors .. reported in AIR (1980) SC I 12, it was observed that when the final electoral roll was published in Nov.15, 1978 it was notified that the nominations could be filed on and after Nov.25, I 978 and the poll , if necessary, would take place on Dec. 31,1978.
After Nov. 25, 1978, a large number of nominations were received by the Returning Officer. It was only on Dec.5, 1978 C for the first time that a letter was addressed by petitioner to the Collector drawing his attention to the error that had crept into the notice published under Rule 4(1) of the Rules. By that time, the nominations had all been received. Tire final list of candidates for the ~lection with their symbols was published on Dec.20, 1978. The writ petition .itself was filed on Dec.28, 1978 when the poll had to take place on Dec. 31,1978. In that context, Their D Lordships observed as follows :· "No satisfactory explanation was given in the course of the petition by the petitioners, as to why they delayed the filing of the petition till Dec.28, 1978 even though they knew that there was an error in the notice issued under R.4(1) of the Rules in the month of Oct.1978 E more than 2 months before the date on which it was filed." Their ·Lordships dismissed the petition as there was no satisfactory explanation for the delay in preferring it.
In the case of State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, reported in [ 1995] 4 sec 683, Their Lordships observed as follows : "The power of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution, if it is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious and reasonable, admits of no controversy. Persons seeking relief against the State under Article 226 of the Constitution, be they citizens or G otherwise, cannot get discretionary relief obtainable thereunder unless they fully satisfy the High Court that the facts and circumstances of the case clearly justified the latches or undue delay on their part in approaching the Court for grant of such discretionary relief. Therefore, where the High Court grants relief to a citizen or any other person under Article 226 of the Constitution against any person including H [2005] I S.C.R. the State without considering his blameworthy conduct, such as latches or undue delay, acquiescence or waiver, the relief so granted becomes unsustainable even if the relief was granted in respect of alleged deprivation of his legal right by the State." There is no doubt that delay is a very important factor while e~ercising B extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
We cannot disturb the third party interest created on account of delay. Even otherwise also why Court should come to rescue of person who is not vigilant of his We are of the opinion that delay in this case is equally fatal, the C construction already started by the appellants in 1987 and building had come up to three floors. Thereafter it was stopped in 1988 and in March, 1991 it resumed after permission was granted. The Writ Petition was filed in November, 1991 meanwhile almost construction was complete. Therefore, delay was fatal in the present case and learned single judge rightly held it. D It was also brought to our notice that 46 multi storey buildings have come up in this area. Learned counsel has produced photographs to show that buildings more than three and four floors have been constructed in and around this area. However, we are satisfied that there is no prohibition under the E provisions of the Act and Rules putting the ceiling on construction of the multi storey building.
We are also satisfied that the delay is also fatal in the present case. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the Appellant that the respondent had no locus standi to file this petition as the present association F is neither representative association nor a registered body. Therefore, the Court should not have entertained the PIL on behalf of ; such unregistered and unrecognized body. It is true locus in such Public Interest Litigation is very relevant factor & Court should always inquire into the locus of person before entertaining such petition. We have already observed above that Public G Interest Litigation should be entertained in very rare cases. Learned counsel has also invited our attention to Section 11 of the Transfer of Property Act to urge that once absolute right has conferred on the property then no rider can be put to enjoyment of that property. It is not necessary to go into this question in this case. 611 As a result of our above discussion, we set aside the judgment of the A Division Bench of the High Court and allow the appeal i.e.
C.A. No. 1416 of 1999. The facts ofC.A. No. 1415of1999 are identical with that ofC.A. No. 1416 of 1999. Therefore, this appeal is also allowed for the reasons mentioned aforesaid. C.A. No. 1417 of 1999, has been filed by persons who have already purchased the flats and they are living in the said flats of the B multi-storeyed buildings. Therefore, third party interest has already been created. As such this appeal is also allowed for the reasons mentioned.above. However, there will be no order as to costs. D.G. Appeals allowed.