P}i::er (P) Ltd. JJomhay v. 17u worl.:eme1J Gajendragadkar, J, 652 SUPRJ<:ME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP. holidays which are granted by the appellant to the respondents should be reduced from those sanctioned
under the Negotiable Instruments Act to 16 every year. The result is, both the appeals are allowed. Appeal No, 625 of 1962 succeeds and the change proposed to be made by the appellant according to
the notice of change served by it on the respondents is allowed to be made, subject to the decision of the Tribunal on the question. remitted to it. Appeal No.626of1962 is also substantially allowed and the
number of paid holidays in a year is raised from 10 to 16. In the circumstances of this case, there would be no order as to costs. A ppeala aUowed. R. S. PANDIT STATE OF BIHAR (S. J. IMAM, K. SUBBA RAo, N: RAJAGOPALA
AYYANGAR andj. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.) Criminal Trial-Sanction for prosecution-Validity a/- Defective charge-Particulars of person.• from whom bribes taktn not mentioned-Point not mentioned in courts below, not also menlioned in special leave petition or statement of C01Je- Not allowed to be raised-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act II), BB. 5, 6-Conatitution of buUa,Art.136.
The appellant was convicted under sub.section (I) read with sub-section (3) of s. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1~)47, ancl sentenced to rigoro11~ imprisonment for thrf"..e years. The High Court confirmed the conviction and sentences 2 S.C.R.
passed on him. He came to this court by special leave. It was contended that the mnction given by the Government for his prosecution was illegal on the ground that the sanctioning authority had not before it all the relevant facts constituting the offence for which •anction was asked for before giving it, the sanction was givtn for prosecuting the appellant under sub-section (2) read with sub-section (3) but he was convic.tcd for a different offence under sub-section (1) of s. 5 read with sub-section (3) and the sanction was given under sub-section (3) of s. 5 which lays down only a rule of evidence on a wrong assumption that the said sub-section created an offence. It was also contended that the charge was defective o.s it did not disclose the amounts appellant had taken as bribes and also persons from whom he had taken them. On account of this,
the appellant was not given an opportunity to prove his in- nocence. Htld, that there wa5 no merit in the contention of the appellant that sanction was invalid. The orde1s issued by
the government show that the sanction for prosecution was given after considering all the relevant facts necessary to satis- fy the mind of the sanctioning authority. The first informa- tion report and the letter of the Superintendent of Police gave all the necessuy facts to satisfy the mind of the sanctioning authority that the appellant was habitua Uy receiving gratifica- tion other than legal
gratification and by cormpt and illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as public servant, he had obtained for ' himself pecuniary advantage within the meaning of s. 5 (1) (d) of the Act. The conten- tion of the appellant that sanction was given under s. 5 (2) and not under s. 5 (1) is based upon a misapprehension of the scope of the said sub-sections. Although the sanction refers . to sub-section (2), in effect it must be deemed to relate to sub- section ( 1) read with the sub-section (2), ber.ause the expression ucriminal miscondurt" in sub-section (2) takes in the defini .. tion of criminal
miscondui:t. The third contention is also basec! on a n1isrca<ling of the sanction. The sanction was given under sub-section (2) read with sub-section (3) nf s. 5 of the Act. The phraseology used
indicates the consciousness on the part of the sanctioning authority that sub-section (3) is not a separate offence but is only a supporting provision to the substantive offence, under sub-section ( 1) and (2). Sub-section (3) does not create a separate offence. It only lays down a rule of evidence; It marks a departure from the. well-established principle of
criminal jurisprudence that onus is always on the prO!lecution to bring home the guilt to the accused. When sanction is given nduer sub-section (2) read with sub-section (3), it only means R. S. Pandit
Statr of Riliar R.S. Pandit v. Sta11 ef Bilw that on the facts disclosed, a case has been made out for draw- ing a presumption of guilt against the appellant. Section 6 of the Act docs not require the sanction to be given in a parti- cular form. Though the sanction orders ex facie do not dis- clo;e the facts, the documents which are exhibited in the case give all the necessary relevant facts constituting the offence of criminal misconduct.
It is true that the charge should have contained better particulars so as to enable the appellant to prove his case, but the appellant never complained that the charge did not contain the necessary parliculars. The
record disclosed that the appellant understood the case · against him and adduced all the evidence which he wanted to place before the court. The appellate court could have set aside the conviction if the defect in the charge had occasioned a failure of justice but the
appellant did not raise any objection either before the Special Judge or in the High Court on the score that the charge was defective and he was misled in his defence on the ground that no particulars of the persons from whom the bribes were taken were mentioned.
No such objection was taken in the state- ment of the c:ase. The objection was merely an after-thought and could not be allowed to be raised at the time of argument. Gol<uk/r.and Dwarkadas Morar/ca v. The King, (1948)
L. R. 75 I. A. 30, Bi&wabhuahan Naik v. State of Ori.aa, A.I.R. 1953 S. C. 359, Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradtsh, A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 637 andJaswalll Singh v. State of Punjab, A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 124, referred to.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 46 of 1961. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 20, 1960 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 32 of 1958.
N. O. Ohatt.e.rjee, R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh, 8. O. Agarwal and M. K. Ramamurthi, for the appellant. 8. P. Varma, for the respondent. 2 S.C.R. 1962. December 4. The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by SUBBA RAO, J.-This Appeal by Special Leave is preferred against the Judgment of the High Court of.Judicature at Patna confirming the conviction of the appellant under s. 5 of the Prevention of Corrup-
tion Act by the Special Judge, Bhagalpur. The facts may be briefly stated. The appellant joined Government service in 1942 as a teacher in the Reformatory School, Hazaribagh, on a pay of
Rs. 125/-. In 1945 he became a lecturer in Mechanics in Sabour Agricultural "College, in which he served till November 30, 1949 in the scale of Rs. 125 to 250/- till August and from September
to November in the scale of Rs. 200 to 450/-. In December 1949 he became Mechanical Assistant Engineer at Sabour and conti- nued to hold that office till August 31, 1952. During that period he was drawing salary with ·five advance
increments in the scale of Rs. 220 to Rs. 750/-. Then he was reverted to the post of lecturer in mechanics in the A~icultural College in the scale of Rs. 200 to Rs. 450/-. It would be seen that his salary was only
ranging between Rs. 125/- and Rs. 300/-. He had two wives and had three children by them. ;'\dmitted- ly ·his family was not in affluent circumstances, and his wives did not bring him any fortune.
During the year 1951-52 his Bank account and other evidence showed that he came into possession of a sum of Rs. 66,832/7 /3. The case of the prosecution is that during the years 1950 and 1952 the Government introduced a
scheme called •Grow More Food Scheme' subsidized by it. Under that" scheme pumping sets were pur- chased by the Government and supplied to agricul'. turists on payment of 50 per cent of the cost incurred
by the Government. The appellant had a hand in 1'62 R.S. Pandit State of Bihm Subba Rao, J. R.S. Pandit v. SltJlt of Billar ·'·11Jiba Ran, J. the purchase of sets and in the distribution of the
same to various agriculturists. In that connection he had the opportunity to make money on both ends i.e. when they were purchased and when they were distributed. The appellant took an illegal
gratification during the implementation of the said scheme. On l\1:arch 25, 1957 and April II, 1957 the Supdt. of Police obtained the sanction of the Government of Bihar, Development Department, for
prosecuting the appellant under s. 5(2), read with clause (3) of s. 5 of the · Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act II of 1947), hereinafter called the Act. On obtaining the sanction the appellant was
put on trial before the Special Judge, Bhagalpur, for an offence punishable under s. 2 read with sub-ss. (1) and (3) of s. 5 of the Act. The Special Judge, on a consideration of the evidence, found in the light of
the presumption laid down in s. 5(3) of the Act that the accused was taking "illegal gain out of his economic position" in the scheme during the year 1051-52. On that finding the learned Judge convict-
ed the appellant under Sub·s. (I) read with Sub-s.(3), of s. 5 of the Act, and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years, and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-. On appeal the High Court
accepted the finding of the Special Judge and con- firmed the conviction and the sentence passed on him. Hence the appeal. Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the sanction given by the Government was illegal
for three reasons :- 1. The sanctioning authority had not before it all the relevant facts constituting the offence for which sanction was asked for before giving the sanction. 2.
The sanction was given for prosecuting the appellant under snb-s. (2) read with sub·s.3 2 $.C.R. 65i of s. 5 of the Act, whereas he was convicted for a different offence tmder s11h·
s. (I) of s. 5 read with sub-s. (3). 3. The sanction was given under sub-s. (3) of s. 5 which lays down only a rule of evidence on a wrong assumption that the said sub·section creates an offence.
As the argument turned upon the scope of the sanction and the manner in which it was given it will be necessary to read it in extenso : "Government of Bihar Development Depart· ment …… Patna, April 11, 1957.
No. 1186D. Whereas the Governor of Bihar has considered the facts stated in the }', I. R. and the letter No. ll!l5/CR, dated l'vfarch 26, 1957 of the Superintendent of Police, Bhagal·
pur, addressed to the Secretary to Government of Bihar, Development Department (copies enclosed) through the Commissioner, Bhagalpur Division. And whereas the Governor of Bihar has
reasons to believe, on a consideration of the facts mentioned in the aforesaid documents that Shri Ram Sagar Pandit Lecturer (now under suspension) · Sabour Agricultural College, Bhagalpur has committed offences under clause
(2) read with clause (3) of section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 194 7 (II of 194 7). Now, therefore, the Governor of Bihar in pursuance of the provision laid down in section
5 of the said Act, 194 7 is pleased to accord sanction to the prosecution of the aforesaid l'Jiri Ram S11-gar Pandit under the said section, R. S. Pandit v. Stat< of llihar Subba Rttfl, J.
19f2 R. S. PIUliit Stale ef BU..r !irU.b1 ltn, J. A copy each of the letter of the Supdt. of Police Bhagalpur and the F .I .R. of the case i:s attached herewith • By order of the Governor of Bihar
Sd/· H. N. Thakur Joint Secretary to Government." It appears that on May 7, 1957, the Supdt. of Police sent another letter to the Secretary of the Government of Bihar under s. 197 of the Criminal
Procedure Code as well. On receipt of that letter sanction was granted on June 25, l 957, in the follow· ing terms:- "No. 2250-D. "Whereas the Governor of Bihar has consi · dered the facts stated in the F.I.R. and the letter
No. ll95 Cr. Dated March 25, 1957, of the Supdt. of Police, Bhagalpur addressed to the Secretary to the Government of Bihar Develop· ment Dept. (copy enclosed) through the Commissioner Bhagalpur Division and whereas
the Governor of Bihar has reasons to believe on the consideration of the facts mentioned .in the aforesaid documents, that Shri Ramsagar Pandit, Lecturer (now under suspension) Sabour
Agricultural College, Bhagalpur has committed offences under clause (2) read with clause (3) of section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 (Act II of 1947). Now, therefore, in partial modification of
the sanction accorded in Govt. Order No. 1136 D dated April ll, 1957, the Governor of Bihar, in pursuance of the. provisions laid down in s. ( 6) of the said Act and under s, 197 of
Criminal Procedure Code, is pleav.d to accord 2 S.C.R. sanction to the prosecution of the aforesaid Shri Ram Sagar Pandit under the said sanction. A copy each of the letter of the Supdt. of
Police, Bhagalpur, and the First Information Report of the case is attached herewith. By order of the Governor of Bihar (Sd) H.N. Thakur, 25.6.57 Joint Secretary to Government, Govt; of Bihar, Development Deptt."
The said sanctions show that the sanctioning authority has considered the facts stated in the First Information Report and the letter No. 1195 Criminal, dated 25.3.1957 written by the Supdt. of Police. The
First Information Report was lodged by the Sub- Inspector of Police. It was written by the said Sub Inspector of the Officer Incharge, Kotwali Police Station. That lt:ttcr in detail gives the financial
position of the appellant, his meagre resources, large Bank balances and his possession of other funds. It also narrates how during the years 1950 and l!l52 huge quantities of pumping sets worth Rs. 58 or 59
lakhs were"purchased by the Agricultural Department of the State of Bihar, how the accused wa~ in charge of the scheme of purchase and distribution of the same to various agriculturists and how he was in a
position to take illegal gratification. It further states that the accus_ed was reported to have committed some acts of commission and omission by showing favours to different firms. It concludes with
an averment that the accused committed the offence of criminal misconduct as defined in s. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 194 7, and was liable to be punished tinder sub-s. (2) read with sub·s. (3)
of s. 5 of the Act. The letter written by the Superin. tendent of Police to the Secretary to the Govt. of Bihar, Development Department gives again in datail the said facts. It also gives the appellant's inadequate
r,con.omic resources and the disproportionately lar~e R. S. Pandit v. Stal1 of BihoT Subba Rao, I S!•l1 ef llih«r amounts found in his possession. It also states that after the enquiry had started he withdrew the entire
money from the Banks and disposed of the car, which he had purchased earlier. The letter further discloses that huge amounts of commission were debited in the account books of various firms against the agents who
received orders for the supply of the pumping sets to Agricultural Department, Bihar. It particularises that one Baidyanath Saran, Proprietor of Messrs. Seekers and Co., Patna, stated that he had paid a sum of
Rs. 400 to the accused as illegal gratification in respect of the supply of the pumping sets as demand- ed by him. The explanation offered by the accused for coming into possession of such large amounts is
also· given which appears, on the face of it, to be unacceptable. The letter on the said facts purports to draw the conclusion (a) that the accused was receiving money by corrupt and illegal means by
abusing his position as a public servant; (b) that he was in possession of pecuniary resources, dispropor- tiona'te to his known resources bf income which he was unable to explain and (c) that the accused had
committed an offence, punishable under sub· section (2) read with sub-section (3) of s. 5 of the Act. The Supdt. of Police, for the aforesaid reasons requested the Government to give sanction under s. 6
of the Prevention of Corruption Act ands. 197 of the Cr. P. Code for the prosecution of the appellant under s. 5 (2) and (:!) of the Act in a proper criminal Court of law. The First Information Report and the letter
give all the necessary facts to satisfy the mind of the sanctioning authority that the appellant was habitu- ally receiving gratification other than legal grati- fication within the meaning ofs. 5 (1) (a) of the Act,
and that he by his corrupt and illegal means or otherwise was abusing his position as public servant to obtain fur himself pecuniary advantage within the meaning of s. 5 (I) ( d) of the Act.
The orders issued by the Government show· that it gave the sanction under sub·s. (2), read with sub-s (3) ofs. 5 2 S.C.R. of the Act, after considering the facts disclosed in the said two documents.
It is therefore clear that the learned counsel is not right in his contention that all the relevant facts necessary to satisfy the mind of the sanctioning authority were not placed before it.
The second contention, name] y that the sanction was given under s. 5 (2) but not under s. 5 ( l) is based upon a misapprehension of the scope of the said sub-sections. Sub-section
(1) describes the ingredients of the offence .of criminal misconduct. Sub-section (2) is the penal section, that is the section which imposes punishment for such a criminal mis- conduct. The sanction refers to sub-s. (2) which is
the provision that makes criminal misconduct punish- able. The sanction ex-hypothesi must have reference only to criminal misconduct as defined in sub-s. (1). The sanction, therefore, though in terms it refers to
ss. (2), in effect must be deemed to relate to sub-s. ( 1) read with sub-s (2), for the expression criminal mis- conduct in sub-s.(2) takes in the definition of criminal misconduct. The second contention therefore has no
merits Nor are there any merits in the third conten- tion either. lt is said that the sanction was given to prosecute the appellant f9r committing an offence under sub-s. (3) of s. 5 of the Act.
On that assumption it is contended that sub-s. (3) is only a rule of evidence and docs not deal with an offence. This is ag::iin based upon a misreading of the sanc- tion. The sanction was given under sub-s. (2) read
with sub-s. (3) of s. 5 of the Act. The phraseology used indicates the consciousness on the part of the sanctioning authority that sub-s. (:!) is uol a sqpr;itc offence but it is only a supporting provision to the
substantive offence under sub-ss, 1 & 2. Sub-s. (3) docs not create a separate offence. It only lays down R. S. l'aniit v. State •f .8ih.r Subba Bio, J, 11. S. Pandit Sta 16 of Bihar
Su/J/Jollao, J, a rule of evidence which marks a departure from the well-established principle of C..'riminalJurisprudence that onus is always on the Prosecution to bring home the guilt to the accused. Under this provision in
the circumstances mentioned therein the Court shall presume unle11s the contrary is proved that the accus- ed person is guilty of Criminal misconduct in the discharge of his official duty. When the sanction
is given under sub-s. (2) read with sub-s. (31 it only means that on the facts disclosed in the said two documents, a case has been made out for drawing a presumption of guilt against the appellant.
Now we shall proceed to refer to the decisions cited at the Bar. The leading case on the subject is that of the Judicial Committee in "Gokulahand Dwarkadas Morarka v. The Kiny". (1)
Reliance is placed upon the following passage in the judg- ment:- "In order to comply with the provisions of Cl. 23, it must be proved.that the sanction was given in respect of the facts constituting the
offence charged. It is plainly desirable that the fact should be referred to on the face of the sanction, but this is not essential since Cl. 23 does not require the sanction to be in
any particular form, nor even to be in writing. But if the facts constituting the offence charg- ed are not shown on the face of the sanction, the prosecution must prove by extraneous
evidence that those facts were placed before the sanctioning authority." Section 6 of the Act also does not require the sanction to be given in a particular form. The principle expressed by the Privy Council, namely
that the sanction should be given in respect of tlic facts constituting the offence charged equally applies to the sanction under s. 6 of the Act. In the present (I) A. I. R. 19411 P. C. 83;75 I. A. 30,
2 S.C.R. case all the facts constituting the offence of mis· conduct with which the appellant was charged were placed before' the Government. The second principle, namely, that the facts should be referred
to on the face of the sanction and if they do not so appear, the prosecution must prove them by ex- traneous evidence, is certainly sound having regard to the purpose of the requirements of a sanction.
In the present case though the sanction ex-facie does not disclose the facts, the documents which are exhi- bited in the case give all the necessary relevant facts constituting the offence of criminal mis-conduct.
This Court in Biswabhusan Naik v. The State of Orissa (1) rejected a contention similar to that now raised before us. There the sanction given under s. 6 of the Act referred only to sub-s. (2) of s. 5 of
the Act and it did not specify which of the four offences mentioned ins. 5(1) was meant. This Court adverting to a similar contention observed "It was evident from the evidence that the facts placed
before the Government could only relate to offences under s. 101 of the Indian l'enal Code and clause (a) of s. 5 (1) of the l'revention of Corruption Act. They could not relate to cl. (b) or (c), when the
sanction was confined to s. 5 (2) it could not, in the circumstances of the case, have related to any· thing but cl. (a) of sub-s. (1) ofs. 5. Therefore the omission to mention cl. (a) in the sanction did not
invalidate it." The aforesaid. two decisions therefore answer the first two contentions of the learned counsel. Nor docs the decision in 'Madun Molta.n Sing/, v. &tute of Utk1r J>mrksl'' (') help the appellant.
It is stated thcrciu the burden of proving that the requisite sanctiou has been obtained rests on the prosecution <m<l such burden includes proof that the sanctioning authority had given the sanction in re·
fercnce to the facts on which the proposed prosecution (IJ A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 359. (2) A.I.R. l!IM S.C. 637 \Vol. 41). R. S. Pondil Stile nf Biluzr Subb1 R101 J. R. S. Pandit v. Slate qf Biliar
Subia Rao, J. was to be based; and these facts may appear on the face of the sanction or may be proved \>y extraneous evidence." The proposition so stated is unexception- able. In the present case not only the sanction discloses
that the sanctioning authority has considered the documents placed before it, but the documents so plac- ed give all the necessary facts constituting the l)ffence of criminal mis·conduct.
Reference is made to the decision in the case of Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab. (1) There this court held that after the sanction was granted for the prosecution in respect of one offence,
cognizance could not be taken m respect of another offence in respect of which there was no sanction. In that case sanctiOn was granted to prosecute Jaswant Singh Patwari for accepting an illegal
gratification of Rs. 50/- from one Pal Singh but a charge was framed for his habitual acceptance of illegal gratification. This court held that the prosecution for the offence under s. 5 (I) (b) was
valid but the offence of habitually receiving illegal gratification could not be taken cognizance of and the prosecution for that offence was void for want of sanction. This decision is relied upon in support of
the contention that the letter of the Supdt. of Police only disclosed a specific act of bribery. This deci- sion has no relevance to the question now raised before us. In the present case the sanction was given
for prosecuting the appellant for criminal misconduct under s. 5 (1) (a) and 5 (1) (d) of the Act. On the basis of the said sanction a charge was framed against the appellant for his having habitually
accepted gratification other than remuneration and obtained for himself pecuniary advantage by corrupt and illegal means or by otherwise abusing his p(.)sition as public servant and thereby committed
the offence of criminal mis-conduct, an offence punishable under sub·s. (2) read with sub-ss. (1) & (3) of s. 5 of Act II of 1 !H 7. All the facts necessary (I) A,I.R. W!iU ~.C. 124.
2 s.c.R. therefore to sustain a prosecution under sub-s. (1) (a) and (d) were placed before the sanctioning authority and after having obtained the sanction the appellant was charged in respect of the said offence. This deci-
sion therefore does not help tl1c appellant. For the aforesaid reasons we hold that there are no merits in either of the three contentions raised to invalidate the sanction. Lastly it is suggested that the charge h defective
inasmuch as it has deprived the appellant of his opportunity to rebut the presumption raised under sub-s. (3) of s. 5 of the Act. The charge reads :- ·'I, Bralundev Narain, Special Judge, Bhagalpur
hereby charge you Ram Sagar Pandit as follows:- That during the period of the years HJ51 aml !!JG~, at Sabour P.S. .l\fofassil and at llhagalpur Town, P.S. Kotwali, District Bhagalpur,
you, being a public servant vi~, Mcchauical Assistant Engineer, Sabour Agri- cultural College habitually accepted gratifica- tion other than legal remuneration and obtained for yourself pecuniary advantage by corrupt
and illegal means or by otherwise abusing your position as public servant with the result that during the said period you came in possession of a sum of about Rs. li2,000 which was
disproportionate to your known resources of Income and which you could uot satisfactorily account and you thereby committed the offence of criminal misconduct, an offence punishable
under sub-section 2 read with sub-sections .I and ;; of s. ::i uf Act II <Jf 1947 the Prevention of Corruption Act HJi7 aud within my cognizance and I hereby direct you he tried hy tltis court on
the said charge." .1962 II. S. Pandit v • .State of Bihar SubbaRao, I. I9U Sub-section (3) of s. 5 is :- R. S. Pandit v. Stale of Brlwr Subba Rao, J. "In any trial of an offence punishable under
sub-s (~). the fact that the accused person or any other person on his behalf is in possession, for which the accused person cannot satisfacto- rily account, of pecuniary resources or property
disproportionate to his known sources of income may be proved, and on such proof the court shall presume, unless the contrary is proved, that the accused person is guilty of criminal
misconduct in the discharge of his official duty and his conviction therefor shall not be invalid by reason only that is based solely on such presumption." This section does not incorporate a separate
head of offence. It is only a rule of evidence: If the accused is in possession of pecuniary resources for which he cannot satisfactorily account, there will be a presumption unless the contrary is proved that the
accused person is guilty of criminal misconduct; But this presumption can only apply when there is a specific charge of criminal misconduct visualised under one or the other of clauses (a) to (d) of s. 5.
To illustrate, if there is a charge that an accused has taken a bribe of Rs. 10,000 from a complainant as a reward, the prosecution can rely upon the presum- ption by establishing that the accused was in
possession of pecuniary resources or property dis- proportionate to his known-sources of income: But the presumption so raised in the circumstances men- tioned in the sub-section can be rebutted by the
accused in two ways, (I) by adducing evidence to prove that he came into possession of the said resources in a lawful manner and (2) though he has failed to explain the circumstances under which he
came intq possession of the said resources, by proving by other evidence that he did not take any illegal gratification. The presumption raised under sub-s. (3) 2 S.C.R. cannot obviously prevent an accused from proving
his innocence in respect of the specific charge levelled against him. On this legal position it is contended that as the charge docs not disclose the amounts he took as bribes and the persons from whom he had
taken, the appellant was not given an opportunity to prove his innocence. But in our view this circum· stance does not invalidate the charge though it may be a ground for asking for better particulars. The
charge as framed clearly stated that the appellant habitually accepted gratification other than legal remuneration and obtained pecuniary advantage by corrupt and illegal means. The charge contains
allegations making out an offence under s. 5 (1) of the Act. The charge no doubt should have contained better particulars so as to enable the appellant to prove his case but the accused never complained that
the charge did not contain the necessary particulars. The record discloses that the accused understood the case against him and adduced all the evidence which hto wanted to place before the court. Section 225 of
the Criminal Procedure Code says 'that no error in stating either the offence or the particulars required to be stated in the charge, and no omission to state the offence or those particulars, shall be regarded at any
stage of the case as material, unless the accused was in fact missled by such error or omission, and it ~as occasioned a failure of justice.' That apart the appellate Court could have set
aside the conviction if the defect in the charge had occasioned a failure of justice but the appellant did not raise any objection either before the Special Judge or in the High Court on the score that the
charge was defective and that he was misled in his defence on the ground that no particulars of the persons from whom the brilx..'S were taken were mentioned. Nor such an objection has been taken in the special
''ave petition, nor in the statement of the case. This R. S. Pandit y, Slate of Bi/tar Suhba Rflo, J. R. S. Pandit v. Stale of Bihru Subba Rao, /. December, .f. objection is an afterthought and cannot be allowed
to be raised at this stage of the proceedings. The appeal fails and is dismissed. PURSHOTTAMDAS THAKURDAS v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, .l:IOMBAY (S. K. DAS, J. L. .KA.PUlt, A. K.
SARKAU, M. HIDAYATULLAH and RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.) Income Tax-Advance payment of tax-Dividena income deducted from total income-If allowable-" lJeductiM of income- tax at the time of payment", Mcm1iny of-Company paying
t"" on <livirlend-Paymcnt of dividencl lo sliare-lwlder-IVhetlwr fa,i.· 1lcduclctl at the ti1nc of z1ayntent-Indian, Income-tax ,,J.ct, 11122 (II of liJ2:!), •s. JU, IS, 11!-A, 19-B.
'l'hc asscsscc .subn1ittcd his e:;timate of inco1uc for advance paymeut of tax under '· IG-A, in which he did not include his dividend income. The Income-tax Ofliocr held that under
s. 18-A(2) the assessec was bound to indnde in his estimate, and to pay advance super· tax, on his dividend income. Since titat was not done a11d the advance tax paid was Jess than 00%, of the lax determined on regular assessment, he levied penal interest under s. 13-A(6) in respect of the supcr·-tax payable on the dividend income. The assessee contended (i) that the
dividend income was income in respect of which provision \Vas made under s. 18 for "deduction of income-tax at the time of payment" and as such s. 18-A was not applicable to it, and (ii) that since s. 18(5) was applicable to dividend income the penal provisions of s .. 18-A(6) were not attracted.
llcld, (per Das, Kapur and Hidayatullah, .J.J., S.u'k'il' aud !Jayal,JJ., ,[i.,-.1<H11g) that •· IC(5) read with ss. 16(~) and 49-B provid•d for the "deduction uf income-tax at the time of payment" in respect of dividend income and therefore s. 1 a.A did not app1y to such inco1ne.
A shareholder's right to the dividend arises upon its declaration. Under the legal fiction