May 4. SUPl{EMl!:' COURT REPOR'r8 !1963] R. VISWANATHAN v. RUKN-UL-M.ULK SYED ABDUL WAJID . (S. K·. DAS, N. IIIDAYATULLAH and J. c. SHAH, JJ.) Foreign Juag~nt-How far binding-If affects
properties outsiae jurisdiction of foreign Court-Proceedings in foreign Court-Natural justice, violation of-Proof-If "coram non judice"-Scope of enquiry-!Jindu Law- Joint family property-Disposal ·by
Will-Corle of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), s. 13. One Ramalingam died at Bangalore leaving a will whereby he devised considerable immovable· and movable properties in the States of Mysore and Madras. The
executors applied for probate of the will and it was granted by the District .Judge, Bangalore, Shri P. MedapJ1i1. There- upon the sons of Ramlingam instituted two stli"ts in the District Court, Bangalore and the· District Court Civil and ·Military Station for possession of the immovable properties in Mysore and the movable properties devised by the will
and a suit in the Madras High Court for possession of movable arid immovable properties in Madras devised by the will. The movable included certain shares of the India Sugars and Refineries Ltd., a company with its registered
office at Bellary in the State of Madras. The suits were based on the ground that all the properties were joint family properties and Ramalingam had no power to dispose of the property by his will. The Madras suit was stayed pending
the disposal of the . Bangalore Suits. The District Judge, Bangalore who tried the suit after the retrocession of the Civil an<l Milit_ary Station Bangalore, decreed the suit holding that the property devised by the will was of the joint family of Ramalingam and his sons and the will was on. that account inoperative.
The executOrs preferred appeals lo the Mysore High Court which were heard by a Bench con•isting of Balakrisbanaiya and Kandaswami Pillai, .JJ. Balakrishanaiya J., · delivered a judgment allowing the appeals and Pillai J.,
delivered a judgment dismis.c..ing the appeals. Thereupon Balakrfahanalya J. referred the appeals to a Full Bench. The Full Bench consisting of P. Medappa, Acting C. J., Balakrishanaiya aµd. Mallappa, JJ., allowed the appeals and dismissed the suit holding that the property was. the self ae<Juired proper.ty of Ramalinpatn and he cpuld dispese it 3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COUR1' REPOR'.tS of by his will. Thereafter, in the Madras suit the executors urged that the judgment of the Mysore High Court was· binding upon the parties and the suit was barred as res
juaicata. The plaintiff contended that as to the immovables in Madras the Mysore Court could not and did not adjqdicate upon their claim and that in any event the Mysore judgment which was a foreign judgment was not conclusive as the
proceedings in the Mysore High Court were opposed to natural justice within the meaning of s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure because Medappa, Acting C. ]., and Bala- krishanaiya, J., showed bias before and during the hearing of the appeals and were incompetent to sit on the Full Bench
and their judgment was coram non juaice. The Trial Judge held that the judgment of Mysore High Court was coram non judice and was not conclusive under s. 13 of the Code and that all the properties movable and immovable disposed of by Ramalingam belonged to the joint family and he accordingly decreed the suit.
On appeal the High Court held that it was not established that the Mysore Full Bench was coram non juaice, that the properties in suit were joint family properties which Ramalingam was incompetent to dispose of by his will, that the Mysore judgment did not effect the immovable in
Madras but it was conclusive with respect to the movables even outside the State of Mysore and accordingly modified the decree of the trial Court by dismissing the suit with res- pect to the movables which consisted mainly of shares of ihe fodia Sugars & Refineries Ltd.
Held (per Das and Shah, JJ.), that the Madras High Court was right in decreeing the plantiffs' suit for possession with respect to the immovable property in Madras and dhmissing it with respect to the movable property.
The judgment of the Mysore High Court was not con- clusive between the parties in the Madras suit with respect to the immovable properties in Madras but was conclusive with respect to the shares of the Company in the State of Madras. A foreign Court has jurisdiction to deliver a judgment in rem which may be enforced or recognised in an Indian Court
provided that the subject matter of the action is property, whether movable or immovable within the jurisdiction of that Court. The Mysore Courts were not competent to give a binding judgmer.t in respect of the immovable property
situate in the State of Madras nor did they in fact give any judgment with respect to immovable property outside Mysore. But there is no grne1al 1t::e of p1i\ate international law that a court can in no eHnt c:xercise jurisdiction in rclatiop R. Viswanath•n
v. Rukn·ut·mulk 8-r•d Abdul Wajid tll/J2 R. Vtsliw:inathan \P, Rukn-ul;rnul~ Sy,a Aii'dn(W'G,;itl to persons, matters or property outside its jurisdiction. The ·Mysore Courts Were competent to g.ive a binding judgment
in respect of the shares. The claim in the Mysoie suit was for the adjudication of title of the plaintiffs against the exe· cutor~ who had wrongfully po,.essed themselves of the shares. Thougldn dispute between the company and the share-holders the situs of the shares was the registered office of the
Company· in Bellary (outside the State of Mysore) the share certificates must be deemed to be with the executors. decree could properly be passed by the Mysore Courts against the executors for the retransfer of. the shares.
The Mysore· Courts were not incompetent to grant a decree directing; the transfer. of. the shares. and such decree was bindfog on the parties for the Madras suits. It is not necessary for the conclusiveness of a foreign
judgment that that-· judgmen.t should have .been delivered before the suit in which it is pleaded, is instituted. The Madras High Court could not investig,.te the property"of the protetlure followed in the Mysore High
Court in referring· the case to the Full Bench and the judgment· af the Full' Bench was not exposed to the attack of want of competence Oecause the case was referred after the two judges constituting the Bench, had delivered sepa- rate and" final opini<liis of the· points in dispute.
Whether the procetlure or a foreign Court which does not offend rules of natural justice is proper, is for the foreign court to decide and not for the court in which the foreign judg, ment is pleaded as· conclusive.
To be conclusive a foreign 'judgment must be . by a Court competent both by the law of the State which has constituted it and· in an intcrn.ational sense, and it must have directly adjudicated upon the· "matter" which is pleaded as resjudicata.. The exprCs~ion "matter" is not equivalent to subject roatter :. it means the right claimed. To be conclu- sive the judgm•nt of the foreign Court must directly adjudi- cate upPrt the. matter.
The Mysore judgment was conclusive only with respect to.the matters·actually decided by it. The suit as- framed did not relate to succeSsion to· the estate of R'anialingam, nor did· it: relate to· the personal status of R•arnaligam•and his sons. The dispute r1elated primarily to the character of the property devised by the will and the
Mysore Court htld that the property devised under the will was self acquired property ; it did not pnrport to adjudicate on any question of persona) status 1>f the parties to the dispute f.i!'fore if!
J·I 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT RERORTS It was not esta 9lished that the judgment of the Mysore Full Bench was croam non judice. In view of cl. (d) of s. 13 a foreign judgment is not conclusive if the proceedings in which it was obtained are opposed to natural justice.
A judgment which is the result of bias or of impartiality on the part of a judge, will be regarded as a nullity and the trial as coram non judice. The Court will always presume, in dealing with the
judgment of a foreign courts, that the procedure followed by that court was fair and proper.and that it was not biased, that the court consisted of Judges who acted honestly and however wrong the decision of the Court on the facts or law appear to be, an inference of bias, dishonesty or unfairness will not normally be made from the conclusions recorded
by the Court upon merits. The estate devised under the will was the estate of the joint family of Ramalingam and his sons. The finding of the Madras High Court to this effect was supported
by the evidence on the record. Prima facie the findings of the High Court are findings of fact, and the Supreme Court normally does not enter upon a reapp· raisal of the evidence, but in this ca:ie it entered upon
a review of the evidence on which they were founded as the Mysore High Court bad on the identical issue about the character of the property devised under the will of Ramalingam arrived at
a different conclusion. Per Hidayatullah, . J.-The judgment of the Full Bench of the Mysore High Court was not coram non judice and was binding on the Madras High Court in so far as it negatived
the right, of the coparcenary in the Kolar Gold field business and held it to be separate property of Ramalingam. The question whether the Full Bench of the Mysore High Court had violated principles of natural justice during the hearing of the appe11l, could not be considered by the Madras High Court· as if it was sitting in an appeal
over the Mysore High Court, and the refusal of the Mysore High Court to adjourn the hearing to enable the appellants to bring an outside counsel did not violate any principle of natural justice, as they had already three other counsel briefed in the appeals.
In accordance with the practice of the Mysore High Court, the appeals had been properly refened to 1he full Bench by the Division Bench. A foreign Court . will not lightly hold that the
proceedin~s in apotJier cpurt were oppose~ tp !latural justi~~ R. Vishwanatluin y, Rukn-ul·mulk Syed Abdul Wajid I96S B. Viswa1.athan v. i;.ukn-ul-mulk Syed J,bdul WaJid The rule of law about judicial
conduct is as strict as it is old. No Judge can be consic!ered to be competent to hear a case in which is directly or indirectly interested. A proved interest in' a Judge nof only disqualifies
him hut renders his judgment a nullity. But ·nothing has 'been proved in the· present case to establish this interest. The objection to the jurisdiction of the Court in a foreign country on
other than international considera- tions mtist be raised- in the country where the trjal took place. Objections to it internationally can be raised in the Court in which the judgment is produce.
But, even if the objection to the jurisdiction be raised in the court where the judgment is produced, that court will consider in action in rem, whether the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the defendant and also in actions in personam,
whether the jurisdicti1n was possessed over the subject matter and the parties. In dealing with the question of foreign judg- ments, Indian Courts have to be guided by the law as codi- fied in this country.
Section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code make a judgment conclusive as to any matter directly adjudi- cated between the same parties or between the parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same
title. There is no real difference in so far as compt":tency of a foreign court goes between action in rem actions t"n personam. The subject matter of controversy in the Mysore Courts was the status of Ramalingam who was a subject and resident of Mysore Stale.
His will made in that jurisdiction was admit- ted to probate there. His sons· and other relatives who figured as parties and those iii. pos~ession of the ·property were in that State. It is clear that the Mysore Courts were competent
internally a.s well as internationally to decide about the status of Ramalingam or the rights in the Kolar Gold Fields busin- ess between these- parties.. The same questions were raised in the Madras suit. The question for determination was the effect of the Mysore judgment upon the suit in Madras in view of s. 13 of the Code. Section 13 of the Code contemplates
both judgments in rem and juolgments in personam. The matter relating to Hindu co~parcenary and the position of Ramalingam were really question of status.. The Mysore Courts had directly adjudicated that Ramalingam was not
cafrying on the Kolar Gold Fields business as co-parcener but as his own separate business and this adjudication was bind· ing on the parties in the suit at Madras. The decision of the Mysore High Court with respect of the 'tatus of Ramalingam via a _vis the Kolar' _Gold Field business must be regarded in ))le Madr11s sµit l's i'
~on~liisive ~djm;licatioq. T)l~ M'l\l~as 3 S.C.R. Court could not try the question of Ramalingam's status de novo and that part of its decision, which went behind the adjudication of the Mysore· High Court, was without juris- dicti~n. On this finding the immovable properties in Madras were also the separate properties of Ramalingam which he
could dispose of by will, if thoy were the product of the Kolar Gold Field business. The only question that could be tried at Madras was whether they were. The Mysore Courts were competent to order the share scrips to be handed over to the successful party and if necessary to order transfer of the shares and its jucigment in regard. to them was binding in the Madras Courts.
C1VIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 277 to 283 of 1958. Appeals by certificate from the judgment and decrees dated December 15, and October 20, 1954, of the Madras High Court in Original Side
Appeals Nos. 127, 153, 156 and 158 of 1953. ' S. T. Desai and B. R. L-. Iyengar, for the app- ellauts in 0. As. Nos. 277, 279, 281 and 282/58 and respondents Nos. I to 3 in C. A. No. 278/58.
M. 0. Set,alvad, Attorney-General of India, M.K. Nambiar, E. V. Mathew, J.B. Dadachanji, S. N. And- ley, Rameshwar Nath and P. J.,. Vohra, for the app- ellants in C. As. Nos. 278, 280 and 283/58 and res-
pondents in C. A. Nos. 277, 279, 281 and 282/58. Ratna Rao and K. R. Ohoudhry, for the res- pondent No. 6 in C. A. No. 278/58. B. R. L. Iyengar, for respondents in C. A. No. 280/58 and respondent No. 1 in 0. A. No. 283/58.
S. Venkataicrishnan, for respondent No. 2 in C. A. No. 283/58. 1952. May 4. 1he Jutlgment of Das and·Shah, JJ. was deliverecl. by Shah, J., Hidayatullah, J. deli- vered a separate judgment.
SH.AH, J.-Ramalingam Mudaliar-a resident of Bangalore (in t)le former India.n ~tate of R. Vishwanathan v. Rukn-ul:mulk Syed Abdul Wojid ShahJ. B. Vi8Wanathan v. RUl<n·ul·mulk· Syed
.db,dul W ojid Shah J, Mysore)-started ·life as a building ·contractor. He prospered in the business and acquired .an extensive estate which included many houses in the Civil and Military station at Bangalore, in '"-
Bangalore city and also in the towns of Madras, Hyderabad and Bellary. He dealt in timber, established cinematograph theatres, obtained a motor-car selling Agency .and made investments _
in plantations and coffee estates. He set up a factory for manufacturing tilrs, and later floated a sugar company. ·The Indian Sugars & Refineries Ltd., of which he became the Managing Agent
and purchased a large block of shares. For some years before his death Ramalingam had taken to excessive drinking, and was subject to frequent coronary attacks. He became peevish and easily
excitable and his relations with his wife and children were strained. Hamalingam felt great disappointment in his eldest son Vishwanatha who borrowed loans from money-lenders at exorbitant
rates of interest, attempted to evade payment of customs duty, failsified accounts and otherwise exhibited "utter lack of business of capacity." Ramalingam had developed a violent antipathy
towards a sadhu named 1{11maling swami, but his wife Gajambal and his children persisted in attend· \ ing upon the sadhu and visited him frequently. This led to frequent quarrels between Ramalingam
and his wife aud children. Ramalingam stopped the allowance for household expenses, and cancelled the power which he had given to his son Vishwa- ,nath to. operate on the joint Bank account. Shortly
thereafter, he left the family house. On June 2, 1942, his wife Gajam.bal presented a petition before the District Judge, Civil Station Banglore, for an order against l\amalingam for inquisition under
the Indian Lunacy Act. On that application evidence was directed to be recorded ·and the District Judge called for . a medical report as to I · t}:l.e pieptal con~ition of ltamalingaµi,
3 S.C.R. In the meanwhile, Ramalingam executed his will dated September 10, 1942; By thi1 will he made no provision for hii:i eldest son Vishwanath, to each of other two sons and to Thygaraja, son
of Vishwanath he gave immovable property valued at R's. 55,000/-and shares of the value ofH.s. 20,000/- in the Indian Sugars & Refineries Ltd. To his wife Gajambal he gave life interest in three houses
then under construction with remainder in favour of Thygaraja, son of Vishwanath, and till the construc- tion was completed a monthly allo.wance of Rs. 150/-. To five out of his nine daughters he gave
c;iash and immovable property approximately of the value of Rs. 25,000/- each and to three others cash amounts varying between Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 7,500/ aind excluded Bhagirathi, his daughter, altogether
from the benefit under the will. He also made provision for the marriage expenses for his un- married daughters and provided for payment of Rs. 5,000/- to Mukti, daughter of Bhagirathi. Out
of the remaining estate, he directed that Rs. 50,000/-· be spent in erecting a Gynaecological ward in the Vani Vilas Hospital, Bangalore, and stop tae balance of the estate be invested in a
fund, the income whereof be applied ''for· encourage- ment and development of industries, education or medical research, diffusion . of medtcal knowledge, including work in nutrition . and dietry by the
grant of scholarship etc." The executors of the will were A. Wa.Jld (retired Revenue Commissioner of the Mysore State), Narayanaswamy Mudaliar and S. L. Mannaji Rao. Ramalingam died on December
18 1942, leaving him surviving three sons-Vishwa- nath, Swaminath and Amarnath-his widow Gaja.mbal and nine daughters. The executors applied to the District Court, Civil & Military Station,
B~ngalore, for probate of the will dated Septem- ber 10, 1942. The widow and children of Kama.- lingam entered caveat and the application was 19614 R. VishW<ltl&lhan y, Rulen-ul-mulk, ll.11tl
-'.bilul Wq,jU SMeh J. R. Vtshwanathan v. RuA:n-ul-mulk Byed Abdul Wojid Shah J. registered as Original Sult No. 2 of 1943. Mr. P. Medappa, who was then the District Judge dis· missed the caveat and by his order dated Nov. 27
1943, granted probate of the will. An appeal against the order to the Court of the Resident in Mysore, was dismissed on July 5, 1944. Leave to appeal against that order to .the Judicial Com·
mittee of the Privy Council was grant_ed and a petition of appeal was lodged. ~ut by order dated December 12, 1949, the Judicial Committee declined to consider the appeal on the merits, for,
in the view of the Board, since the Civil & Military Station of Bangalore was before the bearing of the appeal retroceded to H. H. the Maharaja of Mysore and was within the jurisdiction of his State at the
date of the hearing of the appeal. His Majesty-in- Council could not effectively exercise jurisdiction which was expressly surrendered and renounced. 'I'he order passed by the District· Court granting
probate accordingly became final and the· validity of the will in so far as it dealt with property in the Civil & Military Station, Bangalore, is not liable to be challenged on the ground of want of due execu-
tion. Applications f9r probate of the wil,l limited to property within the jurisdiction of the District Court, Bangalore and the Madras High Court were also filed and orders granting probate subject to the
result of the proceedings befor6 the Privy Council were made. During the pendency of the probate ;toceed· ings, the sons of Ramalingam-who will hereinafter be collectively referred to as the plaintiffs-institut-
ed three actions against the executors and other persons for establishing their title to and for posses· sion of the estate disposed of by the will of Rama- lingam. These actions were :
(I) Suit No. 56 of 1942/43 of the fil~ of \the District Court, Bangalore for possession of 'enmovable properties in Bangalore and the • J a S.C.R. business carried on in the name of Rama·
lingam and also movables such as shares together with the profits and income accrued therefrom since December 18, 1942. (2) Suit No. 60 of 194! in the District Court, Bangalore Civil & Military Station for a.
decree for possession against the executors of immovable property within the territorial jurisdictlon of that Court, and (3) Suit No. 214 of 1944 in Madras High Court on its original side for a decree for
possession of immovable properties· in the town of Madras and also for a decree for a possession of "certain business" and movables in Madras including the shares of the India Sugars Refineries Ltd.
After the retrocession of the Military Station Bangalore in 1947 to the Mysore State, Suit No. 56 of 1942/43 was renumbered 61A of 1947 and was consolidated for a trial with Suit No. 60 of 1944.
Hearing of Suit No. 214 of 1944 on the Original side of the Madras High Court was ordered to be stayed pending the hearing and disposal of the Mysore suits. In the three .suits the plaintiffs
claimed possession of the property devised under the will of Ramalinga.m dated September IO, 1942, on the plea that the property belonged to the joint· family of the plaintiffs and the testator, and the
executors acquired under the will no title thereto because the will was inoperative. The suits were resiated by the executors principally on the ground that Ramalinga.m was competent to dispose of the
estate by his will, for it was his self-acquisition. In the suit in the District Court at Bangalore they also contended that the Court had no jurisdiction to grant relief in respect of any property moveable or
immovable outside the Mysore State. This plea was raised because in the plaint as originally filed tho R, V ishwanalh.:• v. Rnkn-ul-mulk .Sy, , Abil<I Wajid Sha'• J. t96B 11. 1"1'wanalhan
Ru!uz-ul-mulk Syed Abclul Wa.jid Shah 'J. . !l2 plaintiffs had claimed a decree for possession of. the immovable ·property in the Province of Madras and also on order for re transfer of the shares which were
originally held by Ramalingam in the India Sugars & Refineries Ltd., and which were since .the death of Ramalingam tr!J,hsferred to the names of the execu- tors. By an amendment of the schedule to the .
plaint, claim for possession of immovables situate within the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court but not the relief relating to the shares was deleted. The plea .that the claim for
possession of moveables outside the State of Mysore was not maintainable was .apparently not persisted in b<ifore the District Court. The District Judge, Bangalore,.held that the property devimed by the
will dated September 10, 1942, was of the joint- family of Ramalingam and his sons and the will was on that account inoperative. He accordingly decreed the suit for possession of. the properties set
out in the schedules and within his jurisdiction, and . directed that a,preliminary decree be drawn up for account of the management of the properties since the death of Ramalingam by the executors.
Appeals preferre~by the executors against the decrells of the District Judge in the two suits to the ·nigh Court of Mysore were heard by Param- shivayya, C.J., and Balakrishanaiya, J. After the
appeals were heard for some time, the hearing was . adjourned for six weeks to enable the parties to negotiate a compromise. · The plaintiffs say that .it ,r was agreed between them and the executors that the
widow and the children ·of Ramalingam should take 3/5th of the estate covered by the will of Rama- lingam executed on.Septembei; ll', 1942, and that the remaining 2/5th should,go to charity mentioned
in. the will and that in the event of the sons and "- widow of· RamaliJ?gam succeeding in the pending appeal in the Probate Proceedings before the Privy 3 S.C.R. Council, the 2/5th share should also be surrendered
by the executors. The appeals were then posted l•efore a Division Bench of Balakrishanaiya and Kandaswami Pillai, JJ. Before this newly constituted Division Bench, a decree in terms alleged to be settled between the
parties was claimed by the widow and sons of Ramalingam, but the Court by order dated March 15, 1949, declined to enter upon an enquiry as to the alleged compromise, because in their view the
compromise was not in the interest of the public trust created by the will of .Hamalingam. The appeals were heard and on April 2, I9rn, the two Judges constituting the Bench differed. Balakrishan-
aiya, J., in exercise of the powers under s. 15(:>) of the MJsore High Uourt Regulation 1884 referred the appeals to "a Full Bench for decision under s1;1ction 15(3) of the High Court Act." The appeals
were then heard by a Full Bench of Medappa, Acting C.J., Balakrisbana.iya and Mallappa, JJ. For reasons which will be set out in detail hereafter, no arguments were adva.nced on behalf of the plaintiffs
in support of the decree of the District Judge, and the appeals were allowe-d, and the plaintiff's suits were dismissed. An application for review of judg- ment was submitted by the plaintiffs on diverse
• ground!!, but that application was also dismissed. After the disposal of the suits in the Bangalore Court, in suit No. 214 of 1944 it was submitted before the Madras High Court by the executors that
the judgment of the Mysore High Court dismissing plaintiffs' suit for possession of immovable proper- ties and for an order for retransfer of shares of the India Sugars & Refineries Ltd., was re,s judicata
between the parties and accordingly the suit filed by the plaintiffs in the Madras High Court be dismiss- ed. The plaintiffs contended that as to immovables in Madras, the Mysore judgment was not oonclusivo
because the Mysore Court was not competent to 19611 R. Vishwan.than v. Rukn-uJ-mulle Syed Abdul Woji~ Shah J. R .. Vishwanathan , Rultn-ul-mulk SY•d A~dul Wojid sh,h J. adjudicate upon the title of the plaintiffs to the
iYladras properties and that the Co1irt did not, in fact, adjudicate upon the cl'iilll of the plaintiffs, and that, in any event, tho judgment was not conclusive because Medappa, C.J., and· Balakrishanayia, J.,
showed bias before and dutin15 the hearing of the appeals they were incompetent to sit in the Full Bench, and "their judgment was coram rwn judice". On "the preliminary irnne of res judicata",
Rajagopafan, J., held that the Full Bench judgment of the Mysore High Court did not bar the hearing of the suit in regard to the immovable properties in Madras claimed by the plaintiffs for two resons (1)
that the title to those properties was not, in fact, adjudicated upon by the Mysore Court, and (2) that the lex situs governed the immovable properties in Madras. The learned Judge a.Jso indicated the
scope of the enquiry on the plea of conclusiveness of the foreign judgment raised b,y the executors. He observed that the Madras High Court not investi- gate the allegations made against the Judges of the
Mysore High Court in the cond11ct of the appeal itself, or of the property or co1Tectness of their decisions in the appeals or in the legal procPedings connected therewith, but two questions fell outside
the purview of that rule; (a) whether Mr, Medappa had been and was using a motor car belonging to the estate in the hands of the executors, and (b) whether Mr. Medappa Hent for L.S. R1ju who was
engaged to appear as counsel for the plaintiffs and · attempted to dissuade him from conducting the case for the "plaintiffs' family". If these two allegations were establish€d, observed Rajagopalan, J., they
might possibly furnish pwof that one of the Judges of the Mysore High Court who h,~d heard the appeals was "interested" in the subject matter of suit itself and that would be a ground falling within
the scope of exception (d) to 8. 13 Civil Prorednre Code. He accordingly ruled that the plaintiffs may • a s.c.R. SUPREME COtJltT REPORTS lead evidence on those two allegations but not as to
the rest. Against the order, two appeals were preferred to the High Court under the Letters Patent, one by the plaintiffs and the other by the executors. The plaintiffs submitted that
Rajagopalan, J., was in error in restricting the scope_ of the enquiry into the allegations of bias, interest and partiality. The executors conte.1ded that the judgment of the Mysore High Court was
conclusive as to title to all properties mov- able and . immovable belonging to the • estate of Ramalingam and disposed of by the will and that no enquiry at all as to the allegation of·
bias and proof of interest, about the use by Mr. Medappa of a motor car belonging to the estate and the dissuasi@n by Mr. Medappa of Raju should be permitted. . The High Court of Madras held that
evidence about the attempts made to dissuade Raju from appearing for the plaintiffs was admissible, but not evidence relating to the use by Mr. Medi:i.ppa of a motor car belonging to the estate.
They observed that even if the "Mercedes car" of the estate was used by Mr. Meda.ppa, the user was before he was appointed Judge of the Mysore High Court and the motor car ha.d been sold away more
than three yearR before the date on which Mr. MeJappa sat in the Full Bench and it could not therefore be said that because he had used the car some years before the date on which he sat in the
Full Bench, "he had so identified himself with the executors that in taking part in the hearing before the Full Bench," the proceeding was contriJ.ry to natural justice. They also held that the judgment
of the Mysore High Court, unless the "plea coram non judice" was established, was conclusive as to all items of property in dispute in the suit, except as to the four items of immoveable property in
Madras. The suit waB thereafter allotted to the file of Ra.ma.swami, J., for trial was heard together with R. Vishwanatlr.•n v. Rukn-ul-mulk Syed Abdul Wajid Shah J. J961 R. V1's/iwanathan
v. R1Jkn-ul-mulk Syed Abdul W~Hd Shah J-. five other suits-Suits.Nos. 91of1944, 200of1944, 251 of 1944, 274 of 1944 and 344 of 194ti all of which directly raised questions relating to Lhe
interest which the plaintiffs claimed in the estate devised under the will as members OJ a joint-family. By consent of parties, the evidence recorded in Suit No. 60 of 1944 and Suit No. 6 IA of 1947 of
the file of the District Judge, Bangalore, was treated as evidence in these suits and proceedings and the record of the Mysore High Court in the civil suits and the printed record of
the Privy Council in the probate preceedings and the record in the petition for a writ of prohibition filed in this Court restraining enforcement of the judgment of the Mysore Court
were treated as part of the record of the suit. In Suit No. 214 of 1944, three principal questions fell to be determined : (l) whether the judgment of the Mysore High Court holding that the estate 'devised
by Ramalingam by his will was bis self- aoquired property was conclusive as – to title to properties movable and immovable, situate without the jurisdiction of the Mysore State; (2) whether the proceeding in the Mysore
High Court in which the judgment pleaded as – c0nclusive was rendered, was vitiated because it was opposed to natural justice ; and (3) whether by his will dated September IO; 1942, Ramalingam attempted to dispose
of the estate which belonged to the joint- family of himself and his sons, the plaintiffs. )… Ramaswami, J, did not expressly deal with ''- the first question, pr<·sumably because (so far as be
)…_ was concerned) it was concluded by the judgment 3 S.C.R. t of the Division Bench in ,appeals against the interlocutory order relating to the scope of the enquiry in the suit, but on the second and the third
questions he held in favour of the plaintiffs. He held that for diverse reasons the "Full Bench judg- ment of the High Court was coram non judice" and therefore not conclusive within the meaning of s. 13
of the Code of Civil Procedure, and 'that the 6vidence disclosed that the property movable and immovable set out in the scheduled to the plaint and the business conducted by Ramalingam be-
longed to the joint family of Ramalingam and his soni!. He accordingly decreed the claim of the plaintiffs for possession of the property movable and immovable), set out in the Schedule to the
lf plaint (except l 650 shares of the India Sugars and Refinerie8 Ltd.) and directed an account of the management by the executors of the properties from the date of Ramalingam's death till delivery
of possession of the properties to the plaintiffs. He also declared that the business carried on in the name of Oriental Films at 9 Stringers St., G. T. >, Madras, was the sole proprietary concern of the
joint family and the profits realised from "Palm- grove" and Vegetable Oil Factory constituted the assets of the estate of Rama,lingam "subject to such equities as might arise in favour of Narayanaswami
Mudaliar on the footing Of the doctrine of Quantam M eruit to b'3 determined by the final decree or execution proceedings." … , Against the j~dgment of Ramaswami, J. the executors appealed to the High Court. The High
Court observed that the decision of the Mysore High Court could not '•take effect in respect of thl:l immovable properties situate in the State of Madras; but it could ll'1turally affect the moveables
_,.(,,situate there. In fact, the immovable properties -. in Madras State were not included in Mysore suite. It is thereforli neoessary for the members of R. V ishu11nathan v. Rukn-ul-mulk Sy•d
Abiul Wajid Shah J. 1VG2 R. Visl1w11natlian ·Ruku-uZ~mulk Syed Abdul Wajid Shah J. STiTPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] Ramalingam's family to get rid of the deoision of the Mysore High Court before they oan have any
chance of obtaining the movable properties of Ramalingam situate in the i::ltate." The High. Court after an elaborate review of the evidence held that the estate whioh Ramalingam sought
to dispose of by his will was joint-family estate, and he was on that account incompetl(nt to dispose of the same, and th_e plaintiffs were entitled to the immovables in Madras, but as to movables the
judgement of the Mysore High Court was conclusive there being no reliabl~ evidence fo establish the plea cif "coram non judice". The High Court accordingly modified the decree of the trial Court.
They confirmed the decree in so far as it related to immovables in Madras and dismissed it as to the rest. They further declared that the sale pro- ceeds of a property called '•Palmgrove"-which was
execlud .!d from the Schedule to the plaint in the Bangalore suit-"constituted the assets of the said joint family" and on that footing gave certain directions. Against the judgment of the High Court
modifying the decree of Mr. Justice Ramaswami two appeals-Nos. 277 and 278 ()f 1958-are preferred : Appeal No. 277 is by the plaintiffs, and Appeal ,No. 278 of 1858 is by the executors. The
plaintiffs contend that the judgment of the Mysore Full Bench is not conclusive between parties in the Madras suit, for the Mysore Court was not /– a court of competent jurisdiction as to property
movable and immovable outside the territory of the Mysore State, that the judgment was not binding because the Judges who presided· over the Full Bench were not competent by the law of the
Mysore State to decide the dispute and that in any, event it "was coram nonjudice" because they were )-. . interested or biased and the proceedings before· them were oouduoted in a inaDn11r oppOllld to
,_ .c ;. i t 3 S.C.R. natural justice. On behalf of the executors, it is submitted that the jud~ment was conclusive as to, the nature of "the Kolar Gold Fields business", which was found to be the separate business of
Ramalingam, and the Madras High Court wal'! only competent to decide whether the immovables in Madras were not acquired out of the earnings of that business. Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
Act V of 19('8, provides : "13. A foreign judgment shall be conclusive as to any matter thereby directly adjudicated upon between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any
of t,hem claim litigating under the sam.e title except- ( a) where it has not been pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction ;• (b) where it has not been given on the merits of the case ;
(c) where it appears on the face of the proceedings to be founded on an incorrect view of international law or a refusal to recognise the law of India in cases in which such law is
applicable. ( d) where the proceedings in which the . judgment was obtained are opposed to natural justice ; (e) where it has been obtained by fraud; ( f) where it sustains a claim founded on
a brea.ch of any law in force 'n lndia." R. Yislrwllfl•lhan v. Rukn-ul-mulk S11ed Abdul Wajid Shah J. R VishwJ.rt.•lhUn Rukn-tt~-muJI(, ,'))t-.d ' Abdul WajiJ Sha/iJ, . tslfPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
By that enactment a foreign judgment is made conclusive as to all matters directly adjudi· cated upon between the parties, except as. to oases set out in ols.(a) to (f). The judgment of the
Mysore High Cour.t is, it is claimed by the plaintiff~ not conclusive because- ( I) it has not been pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) that on the face of the proceeding it
was founded on incorrect view of the international law, and (3) that the proceeding in which the judgment was pronounced was oppos· ed to natural justice. The dispute in the appeal file!l by the plaintiffd
primarily relates ·to the shares of the India Sugars & Refineries Ltd, and.movables in Madras. · The judgment of the Mysore Court qua the immov· ab)E's in Mysore has become final and -is not and
cannot be challenged in th.is Court. The Mysore High Court was competent to adjudicate upon, title to immovables within the territory of the State of Mysore, in the suits instituted by the plaintiffs
against the executors. In considering whether a judg- ment of a. foreign Court is conclusive, the courts ·in India will not inquire whether conclusions recorded thereby are supported by the evidence, or
are otherwise correct, because the binding character .of the judgment may be displaced only by establish- ing that the case falls within one or more of the six clauses of s. 13, and not otherwise. The regis·
tered office of the India Sugars & Refineries Ltd., was in Bellary in the Province of Madras, and the situs of the shares which are movables-may nor- mally be the place ,where they can be effectively
dealt with (see Erie Boock Co. v. Attorney.General for Ontario(!) and Bra8sard v. Smith('). The situs of the (2) (1925J fl.C, ~72. •• . 3 S.C.R. shares of the India Sugars & Refineries Ltd. may
therefore be properly regarded as without the territorial j•Jrisdiction of the Mysore Court at the date of the institution of the suit by the plaintiffs. Counsel for the plaintiffs submittrd that the Courts
in the Indian State of Mysore which qua the Courts in the Province of Madras prior to the enactment of the Constitution, were foreign Courts bad no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon title to movables out-
side their territory, for the action to declare title to such movables and order for possession thereof was by the rules of private international law an action in rem, and the judgment of the Mysore
Court was on that acqount a nullity. Counsel urged that the principle of submission to jurisdiction has no application in actions in rem, beacuse jurisdict- ion in rem, rests entirely upon presence actual or
national of the res within the territory over which the Court has power. Counsel also urged that recognition of jurisdiction in transactions involving a foreign element depends upon the doctrine of
effectiveness of j11dgments, and willingness of parties to submit to jurisdiction in actions in rem is irrele- vant. Enlarging upon this theme, it was submitted that the shares of the India Sugars & Refineries
Ltd. had at the material time a situs outside the jurisdiction of the courts of the Mysore State and by the rules of private international law, an action for adjudication of title to the shares being an action in
rem the courts of the State of Mysore were incom- petent to entertain a suit in which title to the share~ was involved because they could not render an effective judgment for pos>ession of those shares.
On the assumption that in an international sense the Court of the District Judge, Bangalore, was incom- petent to adjudicate upon title to the shares and the movables and to award possession thereof, it was
urged that a suit for determination of title to and for pnssession of the shares and movables could be iustituted in the .Madras High Court alone and hr R. Vishwanalhan Rukn-ul-mulk Syed
Abdul Wajid Shah J R. Vi1hwantrtha J (lukn-ul.-mutl.: Sy1d Abdul Wajid Shh J. SUPREME COURT REPOR'T'S [1963) their submission the plaintiffs could ·not invest the Court of the District Judge. Ba.ng~lore, with jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate upon the conflicting claims of title to the shares. 'l'he argument therefore is that the action in~titute<l by the plaintiffs in the District Court of Ba;ngalore being an action in rem that
Court was by the rules of private international law universally recognised, competent to adjudicat~ upon title only to property regarding which it could render an effective judgment, and as the plaintiffs
claimed title to and possession of shares of the India Sugars & Refineries Ltd. and other movables out- side the territor·y of Mysore the judgment of the Mysore High Court that the shares and the movable
property were the self.acquisition of ~amalingam was not binding upon the parties, because the Mysore Court was not a 1.:ourt of competent jurisdic- tion within the meaning of s. 13, Civil Procedure
Code, l 908. A judgment of a foreign oourt to be conclusive between the parties must be a judgment pronounc- ed by a court of competent jurisdiction; and com- petence contemplated by s. 13 of the Code of Civil
Procedure is in an int-:irnational sense, and not merely by the law of foreign State in which the Court delivering judgment functions Ohormal Balchand v. Kasturhand (1), P11nchapakesa
v. Hussim(') and Pemberton v. Highes (•). It is neces- sary to emphasize that what is called private inter-. national law is not law governing relations between independent States : private international law, or
as it is sometimes called "Conflict of· Laws", is simply a branch of the civil law of the State envolv- ed to do justice between litig·iting parties in respect of transactions or personal status involvi 1g "' for-
eign element. The rules of private international law of ea.ch State must therefore in the very nature \I} [1936] l.L.R. 63 Cal. 1083. (2) A.1.R. 1234 Mad. 145. (!) [1899] I Clio 78!·
'f 3 s.c.R. of things differ, but· by the comity o! nations certain rules are recognised as common to civilised jurisdic- tions. Through part of the judicial system of eaeh State these common rufos have been adopted to
adjudicate upon disputes involving a foreign ele-' ment and to effectuat,) judgments of foreign· courts in certain matters, or "s a result of international conventions. Roman lawyers recognised a right either as a
jus in rem or a jus in personam. According ·to its literal meaning "jus in rem" is right in respect of a thing, a "jus in personam" is a right against or. in respect of a person. In modern legal terminology
a right in rem, postulates a duty to recognise the right impo~ed ,upon all persr.ns generally, a right· in person'am postulates a duty imposed upon a deter- minate person or class of P"rsons.
A right in rem is therefore protected against the wotld at large; a right in personam against determinate individuals or p~rsons. An ac~ion to enforce a jus in personam was regarded as an action in rem.
But in course of time, actions in rem and actions in personam acquired different content. Wl:ien in an aC1tion the rights and interest of the parties themsolves in the subject matter are sought to be determined, 'the
action is in personam. The effect of such an action is therefore merely to bind .the parties theret,o. Where the intervention of the Court is sought for the aojudication of a right or title to property, not
merely as between the parties but against all pe'r&,ens generally, the action is in rem. Such an action is one br:mght in the Admiralty Division of the High Court possessing Admiralty jurisdiction by service
of process a'gainst a ship or carQ'o within jurisdiction. There is another sense in which an action in rem is understood. 1\. proceeding in relation to personal status is a!So treated as a proceeding in rem, for the
judgment·of the proper court within the jurisd,iction ~~ whie~ the parties ~e do~ciled is b:f oomit:y of !962 R. Vis,,wanathan Rufm.ul-mulk S~ed :4.bd:Jl Wajid Shah J, SUPR,EME) COUR';I.: RE)BO.RTS (1963]
nations admitted to recognition by other courts. 11. vi,hwanathan As observed by Cheshire in bis 11Private Inter- v. national Law", Sixth Edition at. page 109, '"In Rukn-ul-m•1lk SyB d
b h · d Abdul W•Jid oman aw an act10n in rem was one roug t m or er to vendicate a jus in rem, i.e., a right such as owner- ship a-vailable against all persons, but the only action
in rem known to English law is thA.t which lies in an Shah J. Admiralty con rt against .a particular res, namely, a ship or some other res, such as cargo~assooiated with the ship." Dealing with judgment in rem and judg-
ments in personam, Cheshire observes at page 653, "It (ju'lgment in rem) has been defined as ·a judg- ment of a court of competent jul'isdiction deter min – ing the status of a person or thing (as distinct from
the particular .interest in it of a party to the litiga- tion); and such a judgment is conclusive evidence for and against all persons whet!:ter parties, privies or strangers of the matter actually decided ……….. .
. . . .. … . A judgment in rem settles the destiny of the res itself 'and binds all jlersons claiming an interest in the property inconsistent with the judgment e-ven though pronounced in their absence' ; a judgment
in personam, although it may concern a res, merely determines the rights of the litigants inter se to the res. The former looks beyond the individual rights of the parties, the latter is directed solely to those
rights ………………… A foreign judgment which pui'norts· to operate in rem will not attract extra- territorial recognition unless it has been given by a court intei:nationally competent in this respect. In
~he eyes of English law, the adjudicating oourt must have jurisdiction to give. a judgment binding all persons generally. . If the judgment relates to immovables, it is clear that onl.v the court of the
situs is competent. In the case of movables, how- ever, the question of competence is not so simple, since 'there would appear to be at least three classes of judgments in rem : (a) Judgmep~s whi9h jmµiediateI.r
ve~v ' ,.. ' '- . lf 3 s.c.~. SUPREME CODRT REPORTS the ·property in a certain person as against the whole world. These occur, for instance, where a foreign court of Admiralty condemns a vessel in prize
proceedings. (b) Judgments which decree the sale of a thing in satisfaction of a claim against the thing itself. and ( c) Judgments which order movables be sold by way of administration.''
An action in personam lies normally where the defendant is personally within the jurisdiction or submits to the jurisdiction or though outaide the jurisdiction may be reached by an order of the
court. Bys. 20 of the Mysore Code of Civil Proce- dure a general jurisdiction (subject to SS. 16 to rn which deal with suits relating to immovable prope· rty and movable property under distraint and
certafo incidental matters) was conferred on Courts in respect of suits instituted within the local limits of whose jurisdiction – (a) the defendant, or each of the defen- dants, were there are more than one, at
the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business or personally works for gain; or (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one,· at the time o! the comme-
ncement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of _the Court is given or the
defendants who do not reside, or carry on business, or personally work for gain, as afore- ' said, acquiesce in such institution; or W62. R. V ishwanalhan v. Rukn-ul-mulk Syed Abdul Wajid
Shah,1. R. Vishwanathan Rukn-ul-mulk Syed Abdvl Wajid Shah J. (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part arises. These rules deal with the territorial juriodiction of courts in respect of all suits other than thos0
relating to 'immovable property or for recovery of movable property under distraint . or attachment. But in their application they extend to all persona whether domiciled or not within jurisdiction. Section
20 of the Code extends the jurisdiction of the courts to persons or transactions beyond the territorial limits of the courts. Such jurisdiction in personam which transcends territorial limits is conferred on
the courts by the law making authority of many States. In England, by Order XI, r. 1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, discretionary jurisdiction in personam is exercisable by the courts by effecting
service outside the jurisdiction of a writ of summons or notice of a writ of summons against an absent defendant in the classes set out therein. A court of a foreign' country has jurisdiction
to deliver a judgment in rem which may be enfor- ced or recognised in an Indian Court, provided that the subject matter of the action is property whether movable or iminovable within the foreign
country. It is also well settled that a court of a foreign country has no jurisdiction to deliver· a judgment 0apahle of enforcement or recognition in another country in any proceeding the subject
matter of which is title to immovable pruperty outside that conn try. But there is no general rule of private inter- national law that a. court can in no event exercise jurisdiction in relation to persons, matters or pro-
;….- perty outside jurisdiction. Express enactment of provisions· like a. 20, · Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908) and 0. XI, r. I of the Supreme Court '— Rules in England, negative suoh an assumption. ,,.___<
…. 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT .REPORTS The oourts of a country generally impose a three· fold restriction upon the exeroise of their juris- diction (1) jurisdiction in rem (binding not only
the parties but the world at large) by a court over· res outside tl;te jurisdiction will not be exercised, because it will not be recognised by other courts; (2) The court will not deal directly or indirectly
with title to immovable property outside the juris· diction of the State from which it derives its autho- rity; and (3) Court will not assist in the enforcement within its jurisdiction of
foreign penal · or revenue laws. The suit filed by the plaintiffs was for possession of the estate disposed of by the will of Ramal- ingam. In paragraph 3 of the plaint in the Bangalore
f>istrict Court suit (and that is the only foreign suit to which we will refer, because it is common ground that the averments in the two plaints-in the District Court at Bangalore and in the District
Court, Civil Station Bangalore, which was oonso- lidatl:ld for hearing with the Bangalore suit, were the same) it was averred "The plaintiffs and their father, the late V. H.amn.linga Mudaliar,
were members of the undivided .Hindu joint family and the properties set out in the schedulrs among others belong to the said joint family. The said H.amalinga Mudalia.r died on the 18th of December,
1942, and on his death the three plaintiffs herein have become entitled by survivorship to all the said properties." In para.graph 11, it was averred, ' 1The plaintiffs state that as the properties set out
are joint family properties the late Ramalingam had no disposing power in respect of them and any will alleged to have been executed by him is in any event void and inoperative in law, and not binding
on the plaintiffs. It was then averred in paragraph 13, that the executors under the will of Ramalingam had entered upon tbe properties and business set out in the schedule purporting to be the exeoutors
R. Vishwanathan v. Rukn-ul·m·1lk SJed Abdul W ajld. Shah J. . 1962 R. Vishwanathan v. Rukn·ul-mulk Syed,. At:dul Wajid ._•hah J. under an alleged will of the said l\amalingam, -and Jf
as the said will was, in any event invalid the defendants were in wrongful· possession of the said properties and businesses and the plaintiffs were en. titled to reoover the same from the executors as the
surviving members of the joint familyconsisting of themselves and their deceased father Ramalingam. By paragraph 22 they claimed among other reliefs, the following: ·(a) that the executors be ordered to deliver·
possession of all the properties and busin- esses in their possession, management and control together with the profits and income accrued therefrom since 18th December, Hl42, 'f (b) that defendants 17 and 18 (employees of
Ramalingam) be ordered to deliver poss- ession of the assets a,nd capital together with the profits of the businesses of Kolar Gold Field contracts, military contracts and cinema business,
,… (C) that the executors and defendant 15 who are alleged to hold shares of the India Sugars & Refineiies be ordered to r~tra nsfer the shares to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs in paragraph 19 averred, in implea-
ding the India Sugars & Refineries Ltd., Bellary as Defendant No. 16 in the suit, that the company was impleaded "so give effect to an order of transfer of at least 19,000 shares from the names of defen-
dants 1 to the plaintiffs. The claim in suit was clearly for adjudication . of title .of the. plaintiffs againHt persons who had wrongfully possessed themselves of their property. ,.::..,.._ Manifestly, an action in person am is one brought
in order to settle the rights of the parties as between 3 S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS themselves and only between themselves and per. Rons claiming thr.ough or under them whether it
relates to an obligation or, as in the case of detinue, – to chattels. A decision obtained in this suit is effective only as betwAen tho parties. By the Mvsore Code of Civil Procedure the District Court
of Bangalore was competent to entertain the suit – for possession of immovable properties within the jurisdiction of that court and also for an order against the executors to retransfer the shares of
the India Sugars & Refineries Ltd., to the plaintiff. The situs of the shares in any question between the Company and the holders thereof was the regi· stertid office of the Company in Bellary (outside
the State of Mysore), but the share certificates must, on the case of the plaintiffs as set out in the plaint, be deemed to be with the -0xecutora and comp- liance· with the decree, if any, passed against the
executors for an order of retransfer could be obtai- ned under the Code of Civil Procedure (see Order XX[, rr. 31 and 32 Mysore Civil Procedure Code), There is no rule of private international law recog-
nised by the courts in India which renders the Bangalore Court incompetent to grant a decree directing retransfer of the shares merely because the shares have a situs in a dispute between the
Company and the shareholders outside the jurisdic- tion of the foreign court: Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that the Mysore Court was incompetent to deliver an effective judgment in respect of the
shares, but by personal compliance with an order for retrnnsfer judgment in favour of the plaintiffs could be rendered effective. It is in the circumstances not necessary to express any opinion on the question whether on the
principle of effectiveness is founded the conclusive ch'l.racter of a foreign judgment. On this question, –;. text book writers disagree, and there is singular absenoe of even persuasive authority. Dioey main-
hined (see Dlcey's Conflict of Laws, 7th Edition R. Vishwanath~ll v. Rulcn·ul-mulk "-"' Abdul W •iitl Shah J. 1f62 R. Vishwa11athan Rukn-ul-mulk Syed Abdul W·1jid: Shah J. p. 17 Introduction) that the jurisdiction in personam
of English courts rests upon the principle of effect· iveness which he defined as follows:- "The courts of any country are considered by English law to have jurisdiction over (i. e.,
to be able to adjudicate upon) any matter with regard to which they can give an effect· . ive judgment, and are considered by English law not to have jurisdiction over (i. e., not
to be able to adjudicate . upon) any matter· with regard to which they cannot give an effective judgment." This principle received apparent approval in a dictum of Lord Merri vale, President. of the Matri-
monial Court in Tallack v. Tallack (1)-wherein it was observed at p. 221: ''It is not clear that the judicial tribunals of the Nether lands are able to give effect at all to judgmentg Of foreign courts even
in personal actions against defendants living in Holland. But h~ving -regard to the terms of the . Civil Code, and the evidence of Dr. Bisschop, I am satisfied that a decree of this Court purporting to
. partition the property of the respondent would be an idle and wholly ineffectual process." In Tal'lacks case, the court refused the petition of the husband for an order for settlement of the estate of the wife
upon the children of the marriage after a decree for dissolution was passed, on the' ground that to accede to it would be to extend the jurisdiction of the English Court against a defendent who was not
at the material time domiciled within its jurisdic- tion, and who had appeared only to dispute the ex· ercise · of jurisdiction bey .ind territorial limits. This ground was sufficient to support the decision
of the court and the observation about the principle of effectiveness were plainly unnecessary. (l} (1927) P. D. 211. l i I _, . 3 S.C.R. Schmitthoff in ''The English Conflict of Laws" 3rd
Edition at page 425 observes: " ………………………… the jurisdiction of the courts is not based upon considerations of actual or probable effect of their dicision. The argument from the effect of the judgment
to the jurisdiction of the court represents an approach to the problem under investigation from the wrong end, in the same way as the argument from th-:i effect of the choice of law
to the choice itself is, in the words of Lord Russel, founded upon a falhctious basis." Graveson in his "The Conflict of Laws" 4th Edition at p. 338 observes : "In the doctrine of effectiveness English
jurists have sought to provide for the courts a reasonable and adequate theory to deter- . mine the exercise of jurisdiction. The reason- ableness of the theory is assured by its prac-
tical basi~; but its complete adequacy is refuted by the existence of English jurisdiction over defendants outside the jurisdiction in cases falling within Order 11 of the Rules of the
Supreme Court. .. ………………. The basis of jurisdiction in the English conflict of laws is wider than, though it comprehends, the prin- ciple of effective enforcement of judgments.
It lies in the administration of justice." In an action in personam the court has juris- diction to make an order for delivery of movables where the parties submit to the jurisdiction. A
person who institutes a suit iu a foreign court and claims a decree in personam cannot after the ju<lg- ment is pronounced against him, say that th,., court had no jurisdiction which he invoked anr1 11•1.ich the
o mrt exercised, for it is well recognised that a party who is present within or who had submitted to jurisdiction oa.nnot afterwa.rd-i q11estion it. R. Vi•hwanathar. v. Rukn-ul-Mu.'k Syed
Aldul Wajid Shah J. 19U2 R. Vishwan ithan v. Ruk11-ul·mulk Sytd Abdul lVojid Sh1h J, We may briefly refer to cases on which coun- sel for the plaintiffs relied in support of his plea
that the judgment of the Mysore High Court in so far as it relates to movables outside the State of Mysore was not conclusive between the parties in the Madras suit. In lrf essa v. 11-f essa (l) the judgment of the
Alexandria Supreme Court relating to the validity of a will executed by one Bunin l\fonahim Messa – · was held not binding as a judgment in rem upon th<i parties to a litigation in Aden in which the
defendants claimed to be executors under the will of the testator~ The t.estator was not domiciled within the territory over which the Supreme Court of Alexandria exercised jurisdiction, a.nd therefore
the judgment though in rem was not held binding upon the executors. That case has no bearing on the contention raised by the plaintiffs. Nor is the opinion of the Judicial Committee in Sardar
Gurdayal Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote (') of any assis- tance to the plaintiffs. In that case it wai obser- ved that a money decree passed by a foreign court against an absent foreigner was by international
law a nullity. ·Lord Selborne in that case at p. 185 observed: •'Territorial jurisdiction attaches (with special exceptions) upon all persons either permanently or temporarily resident within
the territory while they are within it; but it does not follow them after they have with- drawn from it, ani:l when they are Jiving in another independent country. It exists always
as to laud within the territory, and it may be exercised over mova hies within the territory; and in question of status or succession govern- ed by domicil, it may exist as to persons do-
miciled, or who when living were. domiciled, within the. territory. As between different (I) I. L. R. (l~JB) Born. S29. (2) [1891] L. R. 21 I. R. 171. \ … ' c 3 S.C.1{. str1?REME C'OURT REPORTS
provinces under the sovereignty (e.g., under the i~oman Empire) the legislation of the sovereign may distribute and regulate juris· diction; but no territorial legislation can give
jurisdiction which any foreign Court ought to recognise against foreigners, who owe no all· egiance or obedience to the Power which so legislates. In a personal action, to which none of
these causes of jurisdiction apply, a decree pro- nounced in absentem by a foreign Court, to the jurisdiction of which the Defendant has not in any way submitted himself, is by inter-
national law an absolute nullity. He is under no obligation of any kind to obey it; and it must 'be regarded as a mere nullity by the Courts of every nation except (when authorised
by special local legislation) in lhe country of the forum by which it was pronounced." In Gastrique v. Imr·i (1) a bill issued by the master of a British ship on the owner for costs of
repairs and necessaries supplied, was dishonoured, and the endorsee a French subject sued the master in tLe Tribunal de Commerce at Havre. In mean· time, the owner mortgaged the ship and became
bankrupt. The Tribunal ordered the master to pay the sum due which was "privileged on the shjp." In default of payment the ship was seized and deta- ined. The judgment of the Tribunal was by the
French Jaw required to be confirmed by the civil court C?f the District and accordingly the Civil Court s~mmoned the owner and the assignee in bankrupt- cy, but not tho mortgagee and his assignee and in
default of appearance decreed sale of the ship by auction. The consignee of the mortgagee Castrique then commenced an action in the "nature of rep- levy" of the ship and the court of appeal held-
though erroneously-that the bill of the sale to (l) (1870) 4 H. L. 414, J96Z R. Vishwanathan v. Ru~n-ut-mulk Syd Abdul Wajid Shah J, R. VisAwanathan v. Rukn-ul-mulk SJ·ed Abdul lf'ajid
Shah J. SUPI{EME COURT REPORTS (1963] Castrique not having been registered was invalid and he had no locus standi to maintain the action. Tbe ship was then sold to ·a British subject, who
brought it to Liverpool and registered it in his own name. Castrique then commenced an action in the · Court of Common Pleas in conversion against the purchaser pleading that the sale in France was void.
The House of Lordi held that there was a judgment in rem in the French Court and the title of the pur- chaser to the ship could not be reagitated in the courts in England. The proceeding in the French Court was man-
ifestly one in rem, for it was to enforce a maritime lien, which by the French law was a proceeding in rem, and as the ship was in the French territorial waters, it must in th'll English Court be 'so treated
and held. These cases do not support the P,]ea that the judgment of a foreign court qua movables out side its jurisdiction will not be conclusive between the same parties in an action relating
to those movables in an Indian Court. The plea that conclusiveness of a foreign judg- ment set up as a bar where that judgment was delivered after the suit in which it is pleaded, was
instituted is without substance. The language of s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is explicit: a foreign judgment is made hereby conclu. sive· between the parties as to any matter directly
adjudicated and it is not predicated of the judg- ment that it must be delivered before the suit in which it is set up was instituted. Section 13 in· corporates a branch of the principle of res juilicata,
and extends it within certain limits to judgments of foreign courts if competent in an international sense to decide the dispute between the parties. The rules of res judica applies to all adjudications
in a "former suit", which expression by the Expla- nation I to s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure denotes a "suit which has been decided prior to 3 S.O.R. the s•1it'in question whether or not it was instituted
prior thereto. This explanation is merely decla- ratory of the law: the decisions of the Courts in India prior to its enactment establish that propo- sition conclusively. (Balkishan v. Kishan Lal (1)
Beni Madho v. lnder Shahi( 2 ) ). The dictum to the contrary in The Delta: "The Erminia Foscolo (•)"is not sufficient to justify a departure from the plain words of the Indian Statute.
One more ground of incompetence of the Mysore High Court to deliver the judgment set up as a bar to the trial of the Madras suit in so far as it relates to movable needs to be adverted to. It
was submitted that Balakrisbnaiya, J., was not competent to refer to a Full Bench the appeals for hearing, after judgments recording final opinions were delivered by him and by Kandaswami Pillai,
J. To recapitulate the facts which are material on this plea: Appeals Nos. 104 and 109 of 1947-48 against the judgment of the District Judge, Banga- lore, filed by the executors were heared by Bala•
krishanaiya and Kandaswami Pillai, JJ. The Judges after hearing arguments differed on a.lmost every question rais<ld in the appeals. Bala- kri11banaiya, J. was for reversing the judgment
of the trial Court and Kandaswami Pillai, J., was for affirming the same. Balakrishanaiya J., observed in the concluding part of his judgment "In the result, I am of opinion that the judgments
a~d decrees of the learned District Judge cannot be sustained and are liable to be set aside by dismiss- ing the suits with costs throu~hout." After the opinion of Ba.lakrishanaiya, J., was delivered
Kanda.swami Pillai, J., delivered his opinion. He observed, "In the result, the judgment and the decree iu the suits have to he confirmed, and regular Appeals Nos. 104: and 109of1947-48 have
(1) (1888) I.LR. ll All. 148. (2) (1909) I.L.R. 32 All. 67. (3) L. R. \ 1876/ P.D. 393, 404. R. V i8hwanathltn v. Rukn·ul-mulk Syed Abdul Wajitl Shah J, R. Vi.rhwan11rha'I v. lf1lkn·ill-mulk Syed
Abdul Wojid Skah J. to be dismissed with costs to ha borne bv appe· llants (defendants l to 3) from the estate of Rama- lingam." Thereafter, Balakrishitnaiya, J., referred the case to a Full Bench under s. 15(3) of the
Mysore High Court Regulation of 1884, and signed his "judgment". The relevant statutory provisions then in· operation relating to the pl'ocedure to be followed in the event of a difference between Judges
constituting a Bench were these: ·Section 98 of the Mysore Civil Procedure Code provided: "(1) Where an appeal is heatd by a Beh<ih of two or lilore Judges the appeal shall be decided in accordance with the opinion of
such Judges or of the majority (if any) of such Judges. (2) Where there is no such majority which concurs in a Judgment varying or reverBing the decree appealed from such decree shall be
confirmed. Section l5(3) of the Mysore High Court Re.gula· tion, 1884, as amended by Aot XII of 1931), 'r provided: «The decision of the majority of Judges comprising any Full Bench of the High Court
or other Bench of the said Court consisting of not less than three Judges shall be the decision of the Court. When a Bench of the High Court consists ._ of only two Judgesandthere is a difference of
opinion between such Judges on any material question pending before it, such question shall be disposed of in the manner prescribed by Section 9fl Civil Procedure Code or s. 429 of the Criminal Procedure Code as the case
may be or at the discretion of either of the '…. Judges composing the Bench. it shall be 3 S.C.R. SUPR:mME COUHT REPORTS referred to a Full Bench and the decision of the majority of the ,Judges on such Full
Bench shall be the decision of the High Court." If Judges constituting the Bench differrd and there was no majority concurring in varying or reversing the decree appealed from, the judgment had to be
affirmed. But it was open to the Judges or either of them to refer under s. 1.5( 3) of the Mysore High Court R9guhtion the questions on which there was a_ difference to a Full Bench. The true rule en vi-
saged by s. 15(3) of the Mysore High Court Regu- lation is that the Cuurt or the referring Judge shall set out the ffi(l,terial questions on which there is a difference of opinion without expre:>sing
any opinion on the result of the appeal. The two Judges did disagree: they disagreed on almost every question which had a bearing on the claim made by the plaintiffs, and they delivered their
separate opinions expressing their mutual dissent, and even incorporated in their respective opinions the final orders to be passed on their respective views in the appeals. In so doing the Judges
committed a procedural irregularity; but, in our judgment, this procedural irregularity does not affect the competence of the Full Bench consti· tuted to hear the reference under s.
15 (3). Balakrh:1hanaiya, .J., and Kandaswami Pillai, J., did deliver separate and self-contained opinions, setting out the final orders which in their respec- tive opinions should be made in the appeals, but
their intention was clear: they intended that in view of the difference of opinion (so expressed the case should go before a Full Bench, and Balakri- sbauaiya, J., passed an order for reference pre-
sumable with the concurrence of Kandaswami Pillai, J. The decision of the Allahabad High Court in Lal Singh v. Ghansham Singh (I) does not assist the (I} (l!J57) I.LR. 9 All. 62S F.B.
R. Vi1hwanathan v. Rukn-ul.mulk SJ-.d Abdul W1,jid Shah J. R. Vishwanathan v, Hul·n-ul-mulk SJ ed Abdul Wojid Shah J plaintiffs in support cf the plea that the reference the Full Brench was invalid and the Mysore High
Court was incompetent to hear the reference. In Lal Singh' s case the majority of the Court held that "Where a Bench of two Judges hearing an appeal and differing in opinion have delivered judg-
ments on the appeal as judgments of the Coui·t without any reservation, they are not oompetent to refer the appeal to other Judges of the Court under s. 575 of the Civil Pro cedure Code (of 1882) ." In that case, a reference
was made on a difference of opinion between two Judges, but not a question of law. By s. 575(2), Civil Procedure Code, 1882, difference on a ques- tion of law being a condition of reference, the
reference was manifest.\y. incompetent; it was so pointed out by Brodhust, J., who was one of the Judges composing .the original Bench of Judges who differed. There is, however, no such restric·
ti on in s. 15( 3) of the Mysore High Court Regub- tion, 1884. Again, the principle of Lal Singh's case as broadly enunciated by the majority of the Court has not been approved in inan; later cases in
other High Courts; for instance, j[arali Charan Sarma v. Apurba Krishna Bajpeyi ('), Umar Baksh v. Commissionor of Income Tax, Punjab (') and Jehangir v. Secretary of State ('). In these cases it
was held that in each case the question is one of intention of the Judges differing in their opinions. The Mysore High Court held in Nanjamma v. Lingappa (') that it is not illegal to refer a case
under s. 15(3) of the Mysore High Court Regulation, 1884, after the Judges differing have recorded judgments including the . final orders. they are to make, and without any reservations. It was observ-
ed in the judgment of the Court "The long standing practice of this. Court is that one of the Judges makes a reference by a mere record in the order (I\ (1930) I L.R, 58 Cal. 5~9.
·2) (!931) I.L.R. !2 Lah. 725. \3) (1903) 6 Born. L.R. Ill, 206. (4) 4 L.R. Mys. 118. 3 S.C.R. SOL>RF!~E COURT REPORTS sheet after the judgements are separately pronoun- ced." It appears therefore that there waq a settl·
ed practice in the Mysore Hi~h Court to refer cases under s. 15( 3) after deli veriog differing opinions including the final orciers to be passed in the appeal on such opinions. In adjudging the competence
of the foreign court it would not be open to us to ignore the course of practice in that court even if it be not strictly warranted by the procedural law of that State. Whether the procedure of the
foreign court, which does not offend natural justice is valid is for the foreign court to decide and not the court in which the foreign judgment is pleaded as conclusive. In Brijlal Ramjidas v.
Govindram Gordhandas Seksaria (1) the judicial Committee in dealing with the authority of the Indore High Court to transfer proceedings from the District Court of Indore observed : "the
question whether a foreign Court is the "proper Court'' to deal with a particular matter accor- ding to the law of the foreign country is a question for the Courts of that country. There i.i no doubt
that some Court in Indore was "a Court of comp- etent jarisdiction." It was for the High Court of Indore to interpret its own law and rules of proce- dure, and its decision that the High Court was
the "proper" Court must be regarded as conclusive." The Madras High Court could not therefore inves- tigate the propriety of the procedure followed by the l\1ysore High Court referring the case to the
Full Bench and the judgment of the Mysore Full Bench was therefore not exposed to the attack of want of competence because the c11se was .referred after the two Judges constituting the Bench had
delivered sep'l.rate and complete opinion.i exprtlssing their views on the points in dispute. In the plaint in the Bangalore District Court suit the plaintiffs claimed possession of the proper
(I) (1947) L.R. 74 I.A. 203. 196!4 R. Viahwanothan v. Ru~n-u/-mulk SJed Abdut Wajid Sha~ J. R. lii.sfiwanalhan v. Kukn-111.mUlk Sfed .A.btltil IJ' ajirl .3UPREME COURT REl'OR'tS [l9Uil)
ties set out in the schedule on the ground that those and other properties belonged to the joint family of which they and their father Ramalingam Mudaliar were members, and to which they were
entitled by survivorship on.the death of Ramalingam. In Schedule •B' to the plaint the first item was the business at Kolar Gold Fields.. The claim was decreed by the trial court but the High Court rever-
sed the decree and dismissed the suit. Tho Attor- ney-General submits that the judgment of the Mysore High Court was conclusive between the parties in respect of all matters adjudicated thereby
and the Madras High Comt in considering the claim of the plaintiffs in the suit before it was debarred from investigating whether the Kol11r Gold Fields business was the separate property of Ramalingam.
The issue as to the. ownership of the Kolar Gold Fields business being directly adjudicated upon by the Mysore High Court, which was competent in an international sense as well as according to
the municipal law of Mysore in that behalf, it was submitted; that adjudication was conclusive between the parties in the Madras suit. Reliance in support of this submission was placed upon the definition
of •foreign judgment' in s. 2 (9) of the Civil Proce- dure Code, 1908, and the use of the expression 'matter' in s. 13 of the Code. A foreign judgment is conclusive as to any • matter directly adjudicated upon thereby; but it
does not include the reasons for the judgment given by the foreign court. What is conclusive under s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure is the judgment, i.e., the final adjudication, and not the reasons
Brijlal Ramjidas . v. Govind!'am Gordhandas. ('). Section 13 in essence enacts a branch of the rule of res judicata in its relatfon .to foreign judgments, but not every foreign judgment is made conclusive
in the Indian Courts by s. 13. To be conclusive, (I) (1947) L.R. 74 I.A. 20:l. 3 S.C.R. a foreign judgment must be by a court competent both by the law of the State which has constituted
it and in an international sense, and it must have directly adjudicated upon the "matter" which is pleaded as res judiyata. '1.'he expression ''matter" in s. 13 is not equivalent to subject matter; it means
the right claimed. To be conclusive the judgment of the foreign Court must have directly adjudi- cated upon a· matter, the adjudication must be between the same parties, and the foreign Court
must be a court of competent jurisdiction. Story in his "Conflict of Laws' , Eighth Edition at p. 768 s. 551 says "In respect to immovable property every attempt of any foreign tribunal to found a
jurisdiction over it must be from the very nature of the case, utterly nugatory, and its decree must be for ever inc:tpable of execution in rem." Similarly, Dicev in his ''Conflict of Laws" 7th Edition, Rule
85, enunciatc.s the rule as follows: "All rights over or in relation to an immovable (land) are (sutject to the exceptions hereinafter mentioned) governed by the law of the country where the immovabl'3 is
situate (ex situ~)." The exceptions for the purpose of the present case are n it material. In the com-. ments under the Rule, Dicey states at p. 513: ''The sovereign of the country where
land is situate has absolute control over the land within his dominion: he alone oan beli!tow effective right over it; his courts alone are as a rule, entitied to exercise jurisdiction over
such land. Consequently, any decision b.v an English Court which ran counter to what th'l lex situs bad decided or would decide would be in most case!i a brn.tum fulmen." In Oompandia de JYJ ocambique v. British South a.
De Sou'za v. Samb (1). Wright, J., observed at P· 366: "The proper conclusion appears to be that, (I) [Ill91] 2 Q.B. 338. R. Vi•hwmalhan Ru\n-u!-mu/k Syd Abdul Wajid fhik J, R. Vi1hw'1nathan
v. Rutn-ul-mulk Syed Abdul Wajid Shah.J. SUPREME COURT .REPOR'rS (1963] speaking general, subject to qualifications depen- ding on personal obligation, it is a general principal of jurisdiction that title to land is to be directly
determined, not merely according to the law of the country, where the land is situate, but by the Court, of that country, and this conclusion is in accordance with the rule ordinarily adopted by the jurispru-
dence· of other countries". Title to immovable property may therefore be determined directly or indirectly only by the law of the State, and by the courts of the State in which it is situate. A
decision of a. foreign Court directly relating to title to immovable property within its jurisdiction will of course be regarded between the same parties as conclusive by the Courts in India: but that decision
is ineffectual in the adjudication of claims to irn mo- vables without the jurisdiction of that foreign Court, even if the foundation of title in both the jurisdic- tions is alleged to be identil!al. A foreign Court being
incompetent to try a suit relating to immovable property not situate within its jurisdiction, the grounds on which its decision relating to title to immovable property within its jurisdiction is founded
will not debar investigation into title to other property within the jurisdictfon of the municipal courts, even if the latter properties are alleged to be held on the Bame title. .!£very issue and every
compommt of the iPsue relating to title to immov- able property must be decided' by the Court within whose jurisdiction it is situate: to recognise the authority of a foreign court to adjudicate upon even
a component of that issue would be to recognise the authority of that Court to decide all the compo- nents thereof. In Boyse. v. Colclough (') the Court of Chancery In Engfand was called upon to consider the effect
to be given to a decree of an Irish Court de.termin- ing the validity of a will of one Colclough who.died (I} [1855] K. & J. 114: 69 E.R. 396. y l 3 S.C.R. leaving lanrls i.n England and Ireland. · The Court
in Ireland in a proceeding relating to the will dec- lared it invalid. The plaintiff to whom the estate was devised under the will by Colclou~h, thereafter filed a bill in the Coiirt of Chancery in England in-
sisting upon the validity of the will, and for a declar· ation that the im•novables in England passed under and as devised by th~ will. The defendant insisted that the decree of the Court in Ireland was in regard
to the validity of the will conclusive as the judg- ment was of a court of competent jurisdiction bet.ween the parties. Page Wood V. C .. rejected the defendant's plea. He observed "The foreign Court
in this case did not try and could not try the effect of the will of the testator on l~nd in England. It is impossible that the question could even, in any shape be raised before that Court in that suit, or,
I apprehend, in any suit. The Court had before it a certain alleged will, purporting to devise certain Irish estates, and it directed an is1me to try the validity of that will. The issue was founded against
the validity of the will and the Court then decided upon the only thing upon which it could decide, namely, that that instrument was not an operative devise of the Irish estates." This case was aizain
brought before the Court, and the judgment is repor- ted in (1855) K. & J. 502-69 E. R. 557. It was directed that to prevent misconception an order of the Court of Chancery in England, establishing
the will should be expressly limited to the extent of the jurisdictiOn. In Ohockalinga v. Doraiswamy(1) a dispute arose between two persons each of whom claimed the right to trusteeship of three reli-
gious endowments known as Chidambaram, Mailam and Ala.pakkam charities. Of the Chidambaram charities all the landR were in British Tndi!l. and the charities were to be carried out also in British
India, In the Mailam charities the performance was to be in British India and Pondicherry (French (I) { 1927) I.L.R. 51 Mad. 720. R. Vi1hw•nathan v. Rukn-ul·mu/k Syed Abdul W•Jid S\ah J.
1902 – R. Visliw1nalhan R11kn~ut~mulk Syed .Abdul Wajid 6! territory), ~ud a· large majority of the immovable · properties were in Pondicherry and only one· in British India. In a suit filed in the Subordinate
Judge's court at Pondicherry, the trial court held that the first defend11.nt Doraiswamy could not act as trustee because the original trustee Murugayya had no power to appoint him.
The Appellate Court reversed the decision and held that Dorai- swamy was properly appointed. A suit was then imtituted in the British Indian Court in which the question as to the right of Doraiswamy to func-
tion in respect of immovable property in British India was questioned. The Court held that to Alapakkam charities, neither the plaintiff nor the 1st defendant had any rights because by the deed
of settlement the right of trusteeship dPscended to the sons of Murugayya. About the Chidambaram charities it was held by the court that the Pondi- oherry court had no jurisdiction as all the proper-
ties were situate in British India and "Charities were to be performed" in British India. About the Miiilam charity, Kumaraswami Sastri, J., held th•it in respect of the property in British India the _order
was not binding, but having regard to the ·nature of the trust and the inexpediency of having separate management and appropriation of the inconie of the trust the British Indian Courts would be
justified in upholding the claim of the trustee appointed by the Pondicherry court in respnct of that charity. Srinivasa Aiyangar, J., held that as the Mailam charity had its 11domi.cile" in the French
territory, the decision of the French Court with regard to the appointment of the trnstee, and recovery by him of the ofliue of trustee was a decision of a Court of competent jurisdiction within
the meaning of s. 13, Code of Civil Pncedtire. The judgment· proceeded upon the theory of "domicil" of the truot which the learned Judge himself characterised as "inappropriate" but he held that
"on a proper application and appreciation uf princi pies of Private International Law" in disputes l 3 S.C . .k. relating to the office of trusteeship the court of com- petent jurisdiction within the meaning of s. 13 is
the court which can be regarded as court of the situs of the trust. It is difficult to accept this view expressed by Srinivasa Aiyangar, J. It is, however, noteworthy that both the learned Judges held that
the decision of the foreign court qua the Chidam- baram and the Alapakkam trust was not binding on the Indian Courts. • The decisions in Samson Ricardo and Johan Lewis Ricardo V· Garcias (1), Elizabeth Hendren v.
Bathal Hendren (1} and Bank of Australia v. Nios (') on which the executors rely are not of cases in which an issue decided by the foreign court was regarded as conclusive in the trial of a suit relating
to title to immovable .property in England. The decision in Dogliani v. Crispin (4 ) also does not support the plea of the executors. In that case the judgmtint of a Portuguese Court holding that
the defendant was the illegitimate son of one Henry Crispin and entitled according to the law of Portugal to inherit the property of Henry Crispin who was of a particular station in society (a plebian and not
noble), and was domicil(\d in Portugal was held binding between the parties in an administration action in the Court of Probate in England between the same parties relating to Government of England
Stock. The Court in that case was not called upon to decide any question of title to immoveaLles in England. The rule of conclusiveness of a forei~n judgment as enactPd in s. 13 is somewhat different in its
operation from the rule of res judicata. Undoub- tedly both the rnles are founded upon th<> prinoiphi of sanctity of judgments compPtently rflndered. But. the rule of res judicata applies to all matterR
r ll r•M'\ 1? Clark & Finnolly 3~7: BE. R. 145p. (21 ['841] 6Q. B. 2~7: 115 E R. )JI, 13) [1851) 16 Q. B .. 717: 117 F. R. 1055 L. R. ('81•1 I. English &IrishAppea!Cases30'. R, Vishwanathan
Rukn·uJ-mulk Syed Abdul H aj1d Shah J, in issue in a fotme_r suit which have been heard and finally_ decided ·between the parties, and includes R, Vishwanathan h" h h d h v. . matters w IC
mig t an oug t to have been made· Bukn-u1-mu11< Sy1d ground of attack or defence in the former suit. The .<lbdul w.,;;d rule of conolu~iveness of foreign judgments applies Shah J.
only to matters directly adjudicated upon. Manifestly, therefore, every issue heard and finally decided in a foreign court is not conclusive between the parties. What is eonolusive is thejudgment. Again,
the ooinpetenoe of a Court for the application of the rule of res judicata falls to be determined strictly by the municipal law; .but the competence of the foreign tribunal must satisfy a .dual test of compe·
tence by the faws of the .State in which the Court functions, and also in · an international sense. The submission of the Attorney.General that the claim made by the plaintiffs in the Mysore suits
waa one relating to succ_ession to the estate of Ramalingam, and the decision of the Mysore Conrt which adjudicated upon the question as to the right to succession was conclusive as to all property-
whether within or without jurisdiction-need not detain us. The suit as framed did not relate to succession to the estate of Ramalingam: the plain- tiffs claimed that they had acquired according to
the well-recognised rule relating to coparcenary property, an interest therein by birth, and that Ramalingam's interest in the property was on his death extinguished. Succession to the estate of a
person is governed by the lex situs in the case of immovables, and _in the case of movables by the law of his domicile, hut. these appeals raise ques- tions not about the law applicable to the devolution
of the estate, but about title which the testator could devise by his will.. That title must be adjudi- cated upon in the case of immovables by the Courts · of the country · in which such immovables are
situate and on evidence led in tha~ court. 3 S.C.R. In considering whether the !mit filed by the plaintiffs was one relating to succession, cases like in the matter of the Hindu Womens' right to Property
Act, 1937('),. and in the matter of the Fed~ral Legisl· ature to provide for the Levy of an Estate Duty in respect of property other than agricultural land, passing upon the death of any person (2) which deal primarily
with questions ns to the power to legislate in respect of interest of a co-parcener in a joint Hindu family have little relevance. The suits also did not relate to the personal status of R11malingam 11.nd his sons.
The plaintiffs claimed in the Mysore High Comt that the will of Ramalingam was invalid. because he was under the Hindu Law, by which he wa!'1 governed, incom- petent to dispose of thereby the property of the
joint family. The dispute related primarily to the character of the property devised by the will, and the Mysore High Court held that the property devised under the will was his self-acquired property;
it did not purport to adjudicate upon any question of. personal status of the parties to the dispute before it. We may now consider the plea that "the judgment of the Mysore High Court was coram non
judice." It was urged that the Judges of the 'Mysore Court who constituted the Full Bench, were biased against the plaintiffs, that they were interested in the dispute before them and that they denied oppor-
tunity to the plaintiffs to defend the a}Jpeals. It was urged by the _plaintiffs that Mr. Medappa who presided over the Full Bench had tried·the probate proceeding in which the will of Ramalingam wat- up-
held and in the judgment in that case had made severe strictures against "the family of the plain- tiffs", and the witnesses appearing in support of the caveators' case, that Mr. Medappa was a close friend
·. (I) J [1941] F> ·c. R. · 12. (2) (1944) F. C. R. 317. R. Vuhwanathan v, Rukn-ul-'11Ulk Syed Ahdul Wojid ShahJ. R. V ishuxinaffiot· · v. Bukn~ul.mu/k ..)_;.,, Ab4ul Wajid Shah J.
· 68 SUPREME COUET REPORTS [1963] of A. Wajid, the first executor under the will, that he had for many years before and after he became a Judge of the High Court _used a motor car belonging
to the estate in dispute and had attempted to dissuade · Raju, advocate of the plaintiffs, from appearing· for tl:em in the suit relating to the estate. Against Mr. Balakrisbanaiya, it was urged that he should
not have fat on the· Full Bench BB he was to be examined as a witness in the matter relating to proof of the settlement of the dispute between the parties, that he bad made up his mind and had
delivned a judgment expressing a final opinion on the merits of the appeal and on that account was biased against the plaintiffs, and that he had in the course of the hearing of the appeals sitting with Kandas-
wami Pillai, J., made diverse observations indicating that he was not open to argument, reconsideration and independent conviction on the merits of the dispute. It WijS also urge~ that the proceedings in
the Mysore High Court were conducted in an atmos- phere of vindictiveness towards the plaintiffs and tha1; observations made and orders were passed from time to time by Mr. Medappa and Mr ..
Balakrishanaiya at diverse stages of the hearing of the appeal which left no room for doubt that the two Judges were biassed against the plaintiffs and that they by their orders denied to the plaintiffs
an opportunity of presenting their case before the Court. · Before we deal with· the contentions it may be necessary to dispose of the contention advanced ) .. ..r· by the execµtors that it is not · open in this suit
to the plaintiffs to raise a contention about bias, prejudice, vindictiveness or. interest of the Judges constituting the Bench. They submitted ·that according to recent trends .in the development
of Private International law a plea that a foreign judgment is' contrary to natural justice 'is admissible only if the party setting up the plea is not duly 3 S.C.R. served, or has not been given an opportunity of
being hea:·d. In support of that contention counsel . for the executors relied upon the statement made by the Editors of Dicey's "Conflict of Laws", 7th Elition Rule 186 at pp. 1010-1011 and submitted
that a foreign judgment is open to challenge only on the ground of want of competence and not on the ground that it is vitiated because the proceeding culminating in the judgment was conducted in a
manner opposed to natural justice. The following statement made in "Private International Law" by Chesire, 6th Edition pp. 675 to .677 was relied upon: "The expression •contrary to natural jus-
tice has, however, figured so prominently in judicial statements that it is essential to fix, if possible, its exaot scope. 1'he only st<.tement that can be made with ani approach to
accuracy is that in the present context the expression is confined to something-glaringly defective in the procedural rules of the foreign law. As Denman, C. J., said in an early case:
"That injustice has been done is never presumed, unless we see in the clParest light that the foreign law, or at least some part of the proceedings of the foreign court, are repugnant to natural justice:
and this has often been made the subject of inquiry in our courts." In other words, what the courts are vigilant to watch is that the defendant has not been deprived of an opportunity to-present
his sides of the case. The wholesome maxim audi alteram partem is deemed to be of univer- sal, not merely of domestic, application. The problem, in fact, has been narrowed down to
two cases. The first is that of assumed jurisdiction over absent defendants a …………………….. . R. Vishwanat~an v. Rukn-ul-mulk Syed Abdul IYajid Shah J. 196> R., V ishwanathan
v. Rukn•ul-mulk Syed Abdul Wajid Shah J. Secondly, it is a violation of natural justice if a litigant, though ·present at the proceedings, was unfairly prejudiced In the presentation
· of his case to the Court.'' It is unnecessary to consider whether the passages relied upon are 'susceptible of . the interpretation suggested, for private international law is but a
branch of the municipal law of the State in which the court which is called upon to give effect to a foreign judgment functions and by s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act V of 1908) a
foreign judgment . is · not ·regarded as conclusive if the proceeding in which the judgment was obtained is opposed to natural justice. What- ever may be. the 'content of the rule of private
international )aw relating to "natural justice" in England or elsewhere (and we will for the purpose of this argument assume that the plea that a foreign judgment is opposed to natma;l justice is n!)w restric-
ted in other jurisdictions only to two grounds-want of due notice and denial of opportunity to a party to pr,esent case) the plea has fo be considered in the light of the statute law of India; and there is
nothing in s. 13 of the· Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which warrants the restriction of the nature suggeste<!-. By s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code a foreign judgment is made conclusive as to any matter
thereby directly adjudicated upon between the same parties. But it is the essence of a judgment of a Court that it must be obtained after due obser• . vance of the judicial process, i.e., the Court :rende-
ring the judgment must ohserve the· minimum requirements of natural justice-it must be composed of impartial persons, acting fairly, without bias, and in good faith, it must give reasonable notice tci the
parties to the dispute and afford each party adequate opportunity of presenting his case. A foreign judg· ment of a competent court is conclusive even if it p,roqeeds on an erroneous view of .the evidence ·or
the law, if the minimum requireiµents of the judicial -,_ 3 S.C.R. process are assured : correctness of the judgment in law or on evidence is not predicated as a condi- tion for recogniti ln of its conclusiveness by the
municipal court. Neither the foreign substantive law, nor even the ?rocedural law of the trial need be the same or similar as in the municipal court. As observed by Charwell, J , in Robinson v. Fenner(1}
"In any view of it, the judgment appears, a_ccording to our law, to be clearly wrong, but that of course is not enough : Godard v. Gray (2 ) and whatever the expression "contrar¥ to natural justice", which
is used in so many cases, means land there really is very litt.le authority indeed as to what it does mean), I think that it is not enough to say that a decision is very wrong, any more than it is merely
to say that it is wrong. It is not enough, therefore, to say that the result works injustice in the parti- cular case, because a wrong decision alway!) does." A judgment will not be conclusive, however, if the
proceeding in which it was obtained is opposed to natural justice. The words of the statute make it clear that to exclude a judgment under cl. ( d) from the rule of conclusiveness the procedure inust be
opposed to natural justice. A judgment which is the result of bias or want of impartiality on the part of a .T udge will be regarded as a nullity ·and the · "trial ooram non judice" (Vassilades v. Vassilades (')
and Manik Lal v. Dr. Prem chand (4 )). We may now deal with the diverse objections raised against the two Judges-Mr. Medappa and Mr. Balakrishanaiya-alleging bias and partiality against them and also against the court collectively.
In proceeding to deal with evidence, it has to be remembered that we are dealing with the judgment of a foreign tribunal constituted according to the laws of the foreign State for hearing the
appeal. We also cannot forget that tJie conduct of the plaintiffs and their lawyer may have (I) [I913 J 3. K. B. 835, 842. (2) [T870] L.R. 6 Q. B. 139. ( 3) A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 38, 40.
(4) [1957) S. C.R. 575. R. Vishwanatha.n v. Rukn-ul-mulk S:11tl Abdul Wojid Shah J. -..:.-· R. Vi.rhwanathan v. Rukn-ul-mulk Syed Abdul W.aj.d sh,h J. SUPREME COURT REPORT8 (l!J63]
appeared to the lea~ned Judges as asking for unrea- sonable indulgence if not offering deliberate ohstruc- tion, and that the Judges in passing the diverse orders on which the plea of bias, prejudice and
interest were sought to be founded were primarily concerned with effective progress and di~posal of the appeals. It is somewhat unfortunate that all the material '.evidence which had bearing OU the case as
to the allegations of bias, prejudice interest and hostility ha.s because of c~rtain orders passed by the Madras High Court not came on the record. Again Raju, the advocate of the plaintiff could not
be examined at the hearing of the suit as he was undergoing a long term of imprisonment and the commission issued by ·the Madras B:igh Court to examine him as a witness could not be executed_
owing to, what Ramaswamy, J., in his characteristic style· states, "interminable legal obstacles and conundrums which arose." For the examination of Mr. Medappa an order was made and commission
was issued but the executors did not ultimately examine him. Mr. Balakrishanaiya was examined in Court but even his evidence was not full because of the order passed by Rajagopalan, J. restricting the
scope of enquiry of conclusiveness laid down· by him on the issue and which was confirmed by the Appel- late Court. It may be recalled that the executors applied to the learned Judge for an order that the
suit be heard on the preliminary issue, that it was "barred as resjudicata because of the' judgment of the Mysore High Court" and for examination of witnesses in Bangalore on the plea set up by the
plaintiffs of pronounced hostility and bias on the part of Mr. Medappa, and Mr. Balakrishanaiya. The learned Judge passed an order that on the allegation _ that had been made on the application against the
·two Judges of the Mysore High Court it was not permissible to embark upon an investigation relating to the manner in which the appeals were conducted -;y- 3 S.C.R. or with reference to their decisions in other legal
proceedings conne.:ited or otherwi-ie with the appeals that they eventually heard. But on the plea of bias, prejudice aT\d hostality the evidence relating to the manner in which the proceedings were conducted
by the Judges and various orders made were, in our judgment, material. ltajagopalan J. permitted evidence to be led on two matters only ( 1) that Mr. Medappa was using a motor car belonging to
the estate of the deceased, and (2) that Mr. Medappa had sent for Raju, cou 1sel for the plaintiffs and had attempted to dissuade him from taking up the case of the plaintiffs and appearing for the plaintiffs'
family. In appeal against the order of Rajagopalan, J., the High Court of Madras held that the enquiry into the use of the "Mercedes car" belongiug to the estate by Mr. Medappa was not permissible.
The learned Judges observed : "It is not as if the plaintiffs have alleged that i\Iedappa, C.J. had claim- ed the Mercedes car to be his own and was therefore, not a. person competent to decide on 'the title to
the properties under s. 13 (a). It was merely alleged that he used the car for himself and his wife and children. It was not even stated whether he had used the car free or for hire. There was no
claim by the plaintiffs or others on Medappa, C.J., for any dues in respect of the alleged use of the car. The car itself was alleged to have been used in 11:143-45 when Medappa, C. J., was District Judge,
Bangalore Cantonment, and wa'l hearing the pro- bate applicatio11. It was' sold away in 1945 or 1946, long before Medappa, C. J., sat on this Full Bench. It is too much to say that . .from these facts
C. J., would be coram non judice, or he had identified himself with the executors, and that his taking part in the Full Bench would be opposed to natural justice.'' These observations
contained certain statements which are either in exact or not support- ed by evidence. According to the plaintiffs, Mr. Medappa berame a Judge of the High Court at R. Vishwanalhan
Ji ukn..ul-mulk ~,Id Abdul IVojii • Shah J. R. Viah~anathan v. Rul·n-ul-mulk Syed Abdul Waj.d Shah J. Mysore in 1944 and that is amply supported by evidence on the record. Again, our attention has
not been invited to anything on the record that the "Merceds-car" was disposed of in the year 1945.46. But the evidence relating to the use of the motor llar was excluded by this order.
About the attempts made by Mr Medappa to persuade Raju not to appear for the plaintiffs in the District Court, no direct ·evidence was led. The direct evidence about t.he alleged dissuasion of
Raju could only be of Raju and Mr. Medappa, but this evidence has, because the parties did not choose to examine them, not come ori the rPcord. But some indirect evideno•' was sought to be led
before the High Court about the alleged dissuasion. Raju had made an affidavit in June 1950 in this Court in certain proceedings taken by the plain tiffs for the issue of a writ of prohibition restraining
execution of the decree passed in Appeals Nos. 104 and 109 of i947-48 of the file of the High Court of Mysore on the ground that because Mr. Medappa and Mr. Balakrishanaiya who were members of the
Bench were incompetent .for diverse reasons to hear and decide the appeals, the judgment of the High Court was a nullity.. In that affidavit Raju stated that he 'was an Advo_<iate for the plaintiffs who
had filed two suits against the executors of the estate of Ramalingam and that "during the later part of 1945 and the beginning of 1946," Mr. P. Medappa who was therl a Puisne Judge of the
High Court of Mysore, Bangalore, tried to dissuade ' him "from appearing for the family of Ramaling- am and vehemently criticised the family members." . l'his was not evidence on which the Court could
~ct. Raju was alive and :could be examined : the Court had not directed proof of a.ny facts by affidavits, and the executors had no opportunity to cross-examine Raju on the statements made in the
affidavit. Vishwanath the first phtintiff deposed 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT .REPORTS that sometime before the hearing of the appeals bef0re the Full Bench of the Mysore High Court he was told by Raju that Mr.
Medappa had tried to dissuade him from appearing for the plaintiffs in the District Court of Bangalore. He further stated that on July 25, 1949, during the course of the hearing of the appeals before the
Full Bench Raju had stated in open Court that ''he was not competent to take up the case on account of the dissuasion bv the Chief Justice" and that ''Chief Justice Medappa had sent for him and
dissuaded him from appearing on behalf of Ramalin~a's family. Thereupon Chief Justice Medappa felt upset and refused to hear" Raju. He also deposed that Mr. Puttaraj Urs (who was for some time a Judge of the Mysore High Court
had told him that Ra.ju had told Urs that Medappa had asked him H.aju not to appear for the "plain- tiffs" "family" and h1td sent for him and dissuaded him from appearing for Kamalinga's family. Elabor-
ate argument were advanced before us as to the truth of the statements made by Vishwanatha and Puttaraj Urs. It was urged that the statement about the dissuasion of Raju was made for the first
time in the Madras High Court on April 7, 1950, and that it was not made by Vishwanath in the Mysore Court or in the petitions to H. H. The Maharaja of Mysore for constituting "an ad hoo
Bench" for hearing tile appeals. It was pointed out that there were atleast two earlier occasions in the Madras High Court in which Vishwanath could have made the allegations relied upou by him in his affi~
davit dated April 7, 1950. Strong reliance was also placed upon a letter dated August 21, 1952, addressed by the 1st plaintiff Vishwanatha to the executor Abdul Wajid that the al-
legations made in Application No. 444 of 1950 and the affidavit filed in the Madras High Court that the Judges of the Mysore High Court were preju- diced and that Mr. Medappa had used the "estate
R. Vishwanathan v. Rukn-ul-mullc Syed Abdul Wojid Shah.J. .1962 R. Vishwanath~n v. Rukn-ul-mulk s.~ed · Abdul Wajid ShahJ. motor-car" and bad asked Raju· not 'to appear for the plaintiffs had been put forth by him as their
advocates told him that they were the only method of challen!Sing the judgment of the Full Bench and that he had been assured that those allegations were true and that they would supply the evidence
in support. of these allegations and it was at their instance and believing their assurances that he incorporated the allegations in his affidavit. It was further stated that he was not able to find any
credible evidence at that time ·to Rupport these a1legations anci hence withdrew them all and pro- posed to let in no evidence on those allegations for the decision of the pr~limiiiary issue.
This question does not call for any detailed examination, There is no direct evidence about the alleged dissuasion of Raju by Mr. Medappa during the course of the hearivg in the trial Court,
and the indirect· evidence is mostly heusay and otherwise infirm. The evidence of Puttaraj Ura has little value 1 he has no personal knowledge about the attempted dissuasion of Raju by
Mr. Medappa. He only relates what he heard from Rg,ju, But the truth of the statement <iannot he established by this indirect method. The evidence of Vishwanath as to what Raju told him before
the hearing of the appeals is also of no value. About the incident which took place in the Court on July 25, 1949, there is the statement of Vishwa- natha on the one hand which is contradicted by
Abdul Wajid and Narayanaswamy, the two execu- tors, and no questions in that behalf were asked to Mr. Balakrishanaiya. In this state of the record we do not think that we would be justified in dis-
agreeing with the High Court that the case that Mr. Medappa persuaded Raju, counsel for the "plaintiffs, family" has not been proved. We may, however, state that we are unable to accede to the contention raised on behalf of the
( r '·'le 3 S.C.R. executors that the letter dated August 21, 1952, furnishes· evidence that the allegation regarding dissuasion of Raju and about the use of the motor car of the estate was an after-thousht and made by
Vishwanatha at the instance of his advocate. This letter was written when Suit No. 214 of 1944 was pending in the High Court at Madras. In that suit the judgment of the Mysore High
Court was challenged on the ground that the Judges who heard the appeals were interested and biassed, Bnd liberty was reserved by Rajagopalan, J., to the plaintiffs to lead evidence on those two
matters only. We are unable to believe that of his own accord Vishwanatha would address a letter to the execut<or Wajid and substantially destroy his cflse for setting aside the judgment of the
Mysore High Court. Vishwanatha has stated in · his evidence that he prepared the letter at the instance of Wajid to "prove his bona fides with Medappa." He stated that the letter was written
at BangalorA in the office of one 8ubramaniam brother of the executor Narayanaswami in the presence of Wajid about 2 or 3 months prior to Au~ust, 1952, and that about that time there were
"meetings and talks of compromise" and that Wajid had told him that the letter "was necessary to prove the bona fides with Medappa before reaching the compromise." Wajid has denied that
he had persuaded Vishwanatha to write the letter. But the story about delivery of the letter at the residence of Wajid' is highly improbable. Wajid says that the letter was delivered by hand by some
unknown person at his place in his absence. This letter was followed by another letter addressed to Subramaniam brother of the executor Narayana- swami dated August 25, 1952, in which there is a ref-
erence to the letter dated August 21, 1952. This letter was addressed to S. N. Subramaniam brother of Narayanaswami, and recites that a co{>y of the letter addressed to W ajid dated
R. Vishwa ,.athan v. Rukn-ul-mulk Syed Abdul ;vaJid Shah J. !l· V:Jh~anathan v. R'ukn-ul.mulk S1ed .Abdul Wajid · Shah J. August 1952, was sent to Subramaniam By · tha.t letter Viswanatha requested Subram-
ani~m as a "well-wisher of . the. family" and a friend of his father "to take into consideration the plight in which the family was and to intercede" on their behalf "with the executor to secure as
much benefit as possible by way of compromise." A photostat copy of this letter has also been produced by Wajid. Vishwanatha stated that even this letter was prepared at tho instance of WRjid.
·He asserted that the first Jetter was prepared pn the representation that it was to be shown to.Mr. Medappa, and the second letter was 'com- posed by Wajid. Wajid, had denied the allegations.
We do not think that Vishwanatha- voluntarily wrote the two letters admitting that the allegations that Medappa was biassed against him and 'the ground for such allegations were, invented shortly
before April 7, 1950, at the.instance of the lawyers of the plaintiff~. y. Mr. MFdappa did try the probate proceeding and dismissed the caveat filed by the plaintiffs .\ .. but on that account we are unable to hold that
he had any .interest in ·the subject matter of th~ appeals or was biased agains,t the plaintiffs. Our attention has not been invited to any part of the judgment in the probate proceeding which. might
supply any ground for inferring bias. Even · though some of the witnesses in the probate pro- ceeding and in the suit for declaiation of title of the plaintiffs to the properties were common it,
would not be possible to . infer bias merely from the circumstances that Mr. Medappa as District Judge tried the earlier suit in which the enquiry was strictly restricted to the validity of the will
and be subsequently was a m<'mber of the Full Bench of the Mysore High Court which decided the question of title set up by the plaintiffB. 3 S.C.R. The plea that Mr. Medappa and Wajid were
close friends does not appear to have bef'n denied by the executors. In his affidavit filed in June, 1950, the first plaintiff Vishwanath alleg.,,d that Mr. Medappa was a friend of the executors, and
that Mr. Medappa was the Chief Steward of the Turf Club and the first executor Wajid was the Secretary and that they were "intimate and bosom friends," Wajid did not deny these alle~ations. He
merely stated that he ,.,was once the Hony. Secretary of the Bangalore Race Club for about three months on account of the removal of the permanent secre- tary. As a stop-gap arrangement, (he) being a
Committee Memher was appointed to act as secre- tary for this short period. Mr. Justice P. Medappa was appointed by His Highness the Maharaja as a steward of the club", and submitted tha.t ''it was
insulting and improper to suggest tbat a Judge was biassed because he came into social contact with other gentlemen of the State in the course of his public and social activities. In his affidavit dated
July 5, 1950, Vishwanath stated that Mr. Medappa and Abdul Wajid have ''been very intimate friends, and chums for over a decade." Mr. Balakrishanaiya, it is true, did hear the appeals sitting ·with Chie~ Justice Paramshivayya.
It is the plaintiffs' case that after hearing arguments for over a fortnight, Mr. Balakrishanaiya suggested that the parties should compromise the dispute. Mr. Balakrishanaiya has denied this statement; he
stated that the parties themselves decided to nego- tiate a com promise. Even if it be true that he suggested that the possibility of a compromise of the dispute be explored, bias on his part from that
suggestion cannot be inferred. It is also true that sitting with Kandaswami Pillai, J., on March 15,1949, he declined to order an enquiry into the compro- mise set up by the plaintiffs on the ground that to
record the compromise would "result in the entire 196~ R. Vishwanqthan v. Rukn-ul-mulk Syed Abdul Wa31d Shah J. 1962. R. Vislrwanathcin Rukn-ut-inulk :,yed. Abdul Wajid Shah J, intention of the testator being completely negati-
ved." Assuming that the order was, in la'W, incorrect-on that question we cannot express any opinion-the making of this order will not justify an inference of bais on the part of Mr.Balakrishanai-
ya. It was also alleged against him that he had never "disguised his hatred" of the "widow and children of Ramalingam" and had "openly declar- ed it by his frequent observations and interruptions
in the course o'f the plaintiffs' counsel's arguments" (vide affidavit field in June 1950, in the proceedings in this Court for a writ of prohibition). It was further alleged in the affidavit of Vishwanath dated
April 7, 1949, that Mr. Balakrishanaiya had from the beginning becom"l "openly hostile and his hosti- lity had become pronounced after the retirement of Chief Justice Paramshivayya." In the course of
bis cross-examination Mr. Balakrishariaiya denied the suggestion that he was hostile to the members of "the. plaintiffs' family''. As no enquiry was permitted to be made on these matt.era by the order
of Rajagopalan, J., evidently all the material evi- dence is not before the Court. Vishwanath in his evidence has not spoken about ·the statements all.eged to have been made by Mr. Balakrishanaiya
from which bias may be inferred. We are unable to hold, therefore, on the plea of the plaintiffs that the conduct of Mr. Balakrishanaiya at the hearing of the appeal sitting with Kandaswami Pillai, J.,
supports the plea that he was biassed. The con- , tention that after the plaintiffs had informed the Court Mr. Balakrishanaiya was to be examined as . a witness in the compromise petition, the latter
should not have set in the Full Bench has, in our judgment, no substance. The application for recording the compromise was disposed of on March 15, 1949, and the Court without enquiring into the truth or
otherwise of the compromise set up, declined to permit such a compromise to be mad~ a decree of the Court of the sole ground that it wa.s "contrary ).- i a S.C.R. Si to the intention of the testator." There could,
thereafter, be no scope for any enquiry into the truth of the plea set up by the plaintiffs about the compromise between them and the l"Xecutors. It would have been more consonant with justice
if the application for recording a compromise was posted for hearing before a Bench of which Mr . • Balakrishanaiya was not a member especially when the plaintiffs formally objected to him,
but from the circumstance that of the bench as constituted he was a member, an inference of bias cannot be raised. Even according to Vishwa· nath, Mr. Balakrishanaiya stated that he was "si+,-
ting for hearing the appeals" with Kandaswami Pillai, J., because he was so directed by the Chief Justice, and that Mr. Balakrishanaiya gave Visha- wanath liberty to move the Chief Justice for an
order for constituting anot,her Bench. Vishwanath says that he did.go to see the Chief Justice but the Chief JusticFl ordered him out of his Chamber. The last ground on which the plea of bias is
·set up is that Mr. Balakrishanaiya had delivered a judgment on the merits of the dispute and had incorporated therein the final order to be passed in the appeal, and thereafter he referred the case to
the Full Bench and sat as a member of the Full bench after making up his mind on the merits of the appeals. This, it is contended, is ·opposed to natural justice. It was submitted that it is of the
e·ssence ef a judicial trial that the Judge should be '-~, unbiassed and must have no predilections for either side, but Mr. Balakrishanaiya having made up his mind on the merits of the diepute of which fact th"'
judgment delivered by him is strong evidence, he was incompetent to sit in the Full Bench for hea· ~ing the appeals. Our attention was invited by the Attorney- General to a large number of decisions· of the Courts
R. ViJhwanathan v, Rukn-ul.mulk Syed 4,b(luf W ajid Shah J. 1901 . Ill. Yis1iwancuha'J .• idin·ril~lk Syed Abdul Wojii ……..,_ Shah J. inh Indbia and Efngland in support of his plea that in · y t e a sence o a statutory provision a Judge is not ., 1.._ prohibited from.sitting in an appeal or, in an appli-
cation against his judgment. Oµr attention was also invited to a number of decisions of the Allaha- bad High Court in which it was held. that in refe- rence under s. 57 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1882, the Judges differing should sit on the Bench "r/ together with other Judges and decide the appeal (e.g., Rohilkhand and Kumaon B(J,nk Ltd. v. Row(')) . and also . to the practice prevailing in certain
Chartered High Courts of. Judges presiding at the Sessions trial being associated at the hearing on a certificate granted by the Advocate-General under cl. 26 of the Letters Patent, e.g., The King
Emperor v. Barendra Kumar Ghosh(') and Emperor 'I'. v. Fateh Chand Agarwalla (3 ), and to cases in which in appeals under ol 10 of the Letters' Patent of the Allahabad High Court Judges, who decided the
proceeding in the first instance sat in the Court of Appeal, e.g., Lyell v. Ganga Dai('), Daia Chand v. Sarfraz ('), Imam Ali v. Dasaundhi Ram ('), Nanak \ Chand v. Ram Narayan (7), Rup Kuari
v. Ram r Kirpa Shukul(')and Kallu Mal v. Brawn('), and also to the statutory provision of O.XLVII of the Civil Procedure Code of 1908 permitting review before the Judge who decides a suit or appe~l. Reliance was also
placed upon R. v .. Lovegrove (' 0) in which it was held · that on an applioation or appea.l to the Court of Criminal Appeal (in Enghmd) there is a general rule. no object on to the trial Judge sitting as a \
·mernber of the Court to hear the application or ( appeal. It may appear, that in the absence of a. sta.tutory provision the fact that a judge sits in appeal or in an. application against a judgment after
(1) (1884' 1.L R. 6All. 468 (3, (1916) J.L.R. 44 Cal. 477. · (5) ( 1875) I.L.R. I All. 117. (7) ( 1879) I.L.R. 2 All. 181. (9) (1881) I.L.R. 3 All.·504. (2) A.LR. 1924 Cal. 75 257. ·
(4) 1!875)1.L.R. I All 60. (6) (1877) 1.L.R. l All. 508. 'f (8) (18~0) I.L.R. 3 All. 141< (JO) (1951) l All. E..R 804. 3 S.C.R. he has decided the case would not by itself render the judgment of the Court invalid. In a
strictly technical sense therefore it is true to say that a Judge is not incompetent to sit in an appeal or application against his own judgment. But the courts are not merely concerned to deal
with cases in a rigid spirit of legalism. It is of the essence of a judicial trial that the atmosphere in which it is held must be of calm detachment and dispassionate and unbiassed application -of the
mind. It may be pertinent to observe that since t.he Federal Court was constituted and after this Court was invested with jurisdiction to try appeals there has occurred no case-our attention has not been invited to any-in
which. a Judge who bad tried a case in the High Court or elsewhere sat in appeal against his own judgment sitting in the Federal Court or in this Court. The practices preva_iling in the High Courts
of including a Judge against whose judgment an appeal or proceedings in the nature of an appeal is filed, appears to have also fallen into desuetude and it is proper that it should. Whatever may have been
the historical reasons in England and whatever may be the technical view as to the constitution of a Bench in which one or more Judges sit after they have expressed their opinion-not tentative
but final,-the practice which permits a Judge to sit in appeal against his own judgment or in cases in which he had an opportunity of making up his mind and to express his conclusion on the merits of
the dispute has little to commend itself for accep- tance. We are t.herefore unable to agree that the circumstance that Mr. Balakrishanaiya delivered a final opinion in the appeals filed by the plaintiffs
and thereafter sat in the Full Bench even after objection was raised by the plaintiffs to his part- icipation .may be discarded altogether from consid- eration in deciding whether in the light pf other
J96t R. Yi•hw1nathan Ru~n-ul-rnulle S,,j Abdul Wajitl Shoh J. I96S '1l. ~Vi8h~~~·ithan v. R~ipi-ul-~~lk Syed ·Abdul !Vajld Sh•h ,J. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963j circumstances the · plaintiffs had a fair tri~l and y·
they were afforded an adequate opportumty of _.;. .. presenting their case before an unbia~sed court. If the circumstances established by the other evidei;ice disclose a prirna facie case of bias, the fact that Mr.
Balakrishanaiya notwithstanding the objection raised by the plaintiffs sat in the Full Bench .after expressing his final opinion may have to be taken into account. We may now proceed to deal with the grou-
nds on which it is clai.med on behalf of the plaintiffs they had no opportunity of being heard before the Full Bench of the Mysore High Court consisting of unbiassed Judges. The plaintiffs succeeded before
the District Judge in establishing that the property ..,. disposed of by HamiLlingam by his will dated ' September 10, 1942, w.as joint-family property. Against that decision appeals were filed in :pecember
194 7. The appeals were taken up for hearing in Sept.ember 1948: and the hearing lasted more t,han a. fortnight. On September 20, 1948, the Court adjourned . the proceeding to enable the parties ''I
to negotiate a compromise. It is the plaintiffs' case that the dispute was settled, but that ii! denied by the executors. On November 22, 1948, according to the plaintiffs, the terms of
compromise were to be filed .in Court, but. on that· date one of the Judges-Mr. Paramshiv&yya -did not sit in Court because he was "compulsorily .retired". Mr Medappa who was appointed Acting
Chief Justice was admittedly a friend of Wajili, ~ the principal executor under the will of Ram~ lingam. ·The plaintiffs say that Mr. Medappa was biassed against the members of their family and·
they were unwilliµg to have the appeal heard by Judges who had dealt with the case or were close friends of one of the parties. On January 5, 1949, the plaintiffs submitted an application requesting 'j
the Court to move the Government of Mysore to a s.c.n. t constitute a special Bench. It was stated in that application that Mr. Balakrishanaiya would have to be a 'witness in the compromise petition; Mr.
Kandaswami Pillai had delivered a judgment in a connected proceeding; and that other Judge.c:i had "dissociated themselves" from the case. This application was rejected on January
10, 1949, by Acting Chief Justice. Another application dated January 29, 1949, stating that the plaintiffs had approached the Gqvernment of Mysore to constitute an ad hoc special Bench to hear the appeals and
praying that the hearing may be postponed was rejected on February 7, 1949, as ''not maintaina- ble". The appeals were then posted for hearing on …,, February 14, 194), but at the request of the execu-
tors the hearing was adjourned, the ground for adj · urnment being that their counsel was busy in a case posted on that date for hearing in a Court in Orissa. Another application dated March ·1, 1949
for adjournment to enable the Government to consider the application for constituting a special _,,( ad hoc Bench was also rejected by order of the Acting Chief Justice on March 12, 1949. On March
15, 1949 the Court consisting of Mr. Balakrishanaiya and Mr. Kanda.swami Pillai rejected the application for recording compromise set up by the plaintiffs. · The appeals were then taken up for hearing. At that
time another application for adjournment was made by counsel for the plaintiffs stating that the appeal against the order in the probate prcceeding was pen, ',___ ding before the Judfoal Committee and the decision
in that appeal may be awaited : this application was rejected on the ground that a similar applica- tion previously made had been dismissed. It is the plaintiff!!' case that Mr. Balakrishanaiya during the
course of the hearing made observations from time to time that in his opinion there was no substance .. , in the plaintiffs' case. Vishwanath in his affidavit dated April 7, 1950, has stated what according to
billl transpired in the Court : R, V ishwanathan v. Rukn·U/·mulk Syed Abdul Wajid Shah J, lBU. R. J/ i1hwanathr;.11 v. Ruk.,…ul•mulk Syt-d Abdul W'!)id Shah J .. "9. · Finding that any further argument '"( ·
before Mr. Justice Balakrishanaiya was practi· • ·. cally useless, my counsel ·Mr. N. R. Ragha- vachariar left for Madras and my counsel Sri L.S. Raju filed a memo seeking for permi11·
siori. to retire as .he could do no useful service to his clients in further addressing the Court in the circumstances mentioned," \……… "!O. Objection was taken.to this retire·
ment by the other side and my counsel SrLL.S. Raju who bad by that time disconti· nued addressing fort.her arguments was asked whether he had my consent to retire. I was then present, in Court and Sri L.S. Raju said
that it is only at my instance, he was retiring." y "1 I. At this stage, Justice V. Kanda· swanli Pillai intervening stated that he was new to the case and that he has not made up
his . mind and requested my counsel Sri L.S. Raju to give the benefit· of his argu· men ts." Vishwanath in the same affidavit also stated that )':- Mr. Balakrishanaiya had been "openly hostile" to
the plaintiffs. On this part of the case, by the order of Rajagopalan, J., no evidence was permitted to .. be given. The record, therefore, contains merely an assertion made by the plaintiffs
and denial by the executors. After the judg)Ilent was delivered by the Court on April 2, 1949, Judges having differed the case was referr- /~_./ ed to a larger Bench. On June 23, 1949, the
Registrar of the High Court notified that the appeals will be posted for hearing in the last week of July. It appears that on July 4, 1949, the · plaintiffs submitted an application for adjournment
stating that Sir Alladi Krisbnaswami Ayyar, a lead· '..,t ing member of the Madras Bar, who had argued ·the appeals at the earlier hearing and who was· engaged tP arisue the appeitll! w,as u,nable t,o ,atte;od the Copr~ 3 s.c.R.
'°·' / in the month of ,July, 1949, and requesting that .t.__, adjournment be granted to enable him to appear and argu~ the appeals. This application was reject- ed by the Registrar of the High Court on some
technical ground precise nature whereof it is not possible to asct>rtain from the record. Another application was submitted on July 18, 1949, accom- · panied by a letter from Sir Alladi Krishnaswami
' Ayyar stating that he was proceeding to Delhi to attend the meetings of the Constituent Assembly (of which he was a member) and was on that account unable to attend the hearing of the appeals in
July t949 : it was also stated in the application that 'the plaintiffs ''were engaging" Mr. Sarat Chandra Bose-a m:imber of the Calcutta. Bai·-to appear in the appeals, but he '•found September convenient''.
"7 · This application was rejected as "belated", and also because the parties had been litigating ever ·since December 1942 and the objections of the executors were "entitled to consideration." On
July 25, 1949, another application supp~Hted by an affidavit was filed for adjournment of the case and that an ad hoc Bench in which the Chief Justice and M1·. Justice Balakriehanaiya were not inoluded be
constituted. It appears that at the hearing of this application there were "angry scenes in Court between the Acting Chief Justice and L. S. Raju". In this affidavit dated April 7, 1950, Vishwanath has
stated in paragraph 28, " …… the Officiating Cbief Justice Mr. P. Medappa was very wild with me and rude. He threatened me and said that I should disclosed to him as to whom I consulted regarding
this affidavit and if I did not do so, I will be sent to Jail. I was in a fix an in a state of terror and, when I said that among other counsels I consulted Sri L. S .. Raju also, Sri P. Medappa
turned round and said, "lam glad you mentioned it, I know what to do for him.'' In para.graph 29 Vishawana.th stated : ''Later on, the same day he 11s~ed :M:essrs. N. R. Ragha.vaoharia.r and L. S. l~a.ju
lllll R. Vishwanathan v. Rukn-ul-mullc· Syed· Abdul "W•iiil R. Yiskwanatha.f.. .. ~ .'. ':. .. "' Rukn-ul-mulk S.J<d ,bdul w.;;a _,__ Shah J, . ' ' to disclose what transpired between me and them
in connection with the filing of the affidavit and they declined to do so oil the ground that it would be breach of professional confidence." Then in paragraph 30, he st~ted : "In disgust and as he had
other business; Mr. N. R. Raghavachariar left for Madras the same day filing a memo of retirement. Sri L. S. Raju also filed a memo of retir~ment." The order rejecting this application was pronounced
in the afternoon of July 25, 1949,' but the hearing of the appeal was taken up in the afternoon of July 25, 1949. In the affidavit dated April 11, 1950 filed in the Madras High Court by the executors in ~
reply to the affidavit dated April 7, l 920, there was no denial of the allegations relating to what transpir- ed in Court on July 25, 1949. The evidence of Mr. Balakrishanaiya-though the replies given are
somewhat vague-gives some support to the story of what is described as "a stormy session" on July 25, 1949. Mr. Balakrishanaiya was asked by the plaintiffs whether he remembered that on the first
day, i e., July 25, 1949, it was a "very stormy session". 'i'he allswer given was that he did "not . understand". To the question whether "Medappa threatened the respondent to tell him the name of
the advocate who drafted the affidavit", he answer- ed "There was a question whether it was drafted by the party or with the aid of Coundel". The witness was then asked a oomposite question-11Did
Medappa threaten him to put him in Jail?· The storm means the storm of the session-the other colleagues were.so distracted that they could not he~r what was passing between Medappa and
others?" No reply to first part of the question was apparently given. The answer recorded is, far we were concerned we were never distracted." lt'is true that the witness denied that Mr. Medappa
had told the first plaintiff Vishwanath that when it was disclosed that Raju had .dzafted the affidavit llf;r. M:edappa. llt!i-W4 "1e ~ew "what to d~" Wbe~ 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT ,REPORTS
the Court insisted on hearing the appeal on July 25, 1949, it appears, that Raju and N. R. Raghava- ohariar (who belonged to the Madras Bar) applied for leave .to withdraw. On that itpplicatbn an
order refusing leave to withdraw was, it appears, immediately recorded. The order declaring permis- sion to retire from the case bears the date July 25, 1949, but for some reason not apparent from the
record, it was pronounced on July 27, 1949. Argu- ments were heard on the 25th of July, ::'.6th of July and 27th of July, 1919, and the Advocates of the plaintiffs were in the singular position of not
knowing whether they did or did not continue to remain advocates for the plaintiffs. After the argu- ments of the executors, an application to enable the plaintiffs to secure the presence of Sir Alladi
Krishnaswami Ayyar was made and was rejected, and •'judgment was reserved" without hearing any argumE'nts on behalf of the plaintiffs. Judgmimt of the Court which runs into thirty closely printed
pages was delivered on July 29, 1949, at 4 JJ.m. From a resume of what transpired since M'r. Medappa was appointed the Acting Chief Justice, it cannot be doubted that the Judges of
the Mysore High Court were not willing to consider any request of the pbintiffs for formation of a Bench which did not include Mr. Medappa and Mr. Balakrishanaiya. Nor did they consider his
applications for adjournment with sympathy. The attitude may appear to be somewhat rigid, but that attitude by itself may not justify an inference of bias. 'The plaintiffs were since the <tppointment of
Mr. Medappa as Acting Chief Justice making appli- ·cation after application for the constitution of a Bench in which Mr. Medappa and other Judges who bad been at some time concerned with this <'ase be
~:x,eluded,. But a \it1ga.nt is not en tit.led to ()hoose R. Vishwanalhan v. Rukn•ul-mulk Syed Abdul Wajid Shah J. Ii62 R, V ishwanathan v. Rukn-ul-mulk S,.d Abdul IV ajid Shah J.
the personnel of the Court to hear his case, nor can he insist upon an adjournment of the case be- eause the date fixed for hearing is not. ·convenient . to his counsel Convenience of ·counsel ·must
subserve the larger interest of the administration .of justice. It is trne that where by a too strict observ. ' ance of legal forms injuRtice has been. done, by an apparer,tly biassed tribunal, the decision may be
declared "'coram non ju.dice" whether the decision is of the tribunal subordinate to the appellate jurisdic- tion of the court or of a foreign tribunal. But only facts proved in this cam in support of the plea of
bias are that Mr. Mcdappa was a close friend of the executor Syed Abdul Wajid, aud Mr. Balakrishanaiya had ('Xpressed his view on the merits of the pla.intiffs ·ease. It would have been consistent with the
diguity of the Court if Mr. Medappa and Mr. Bala- krishanaiya had not sat in the Full Bench. But it cannot be forgotten that unless the Government of Mysore ngreed to constitute an ad hoc Bench, there
were no Judges in the Court who could form a Full Bench to hear the appeals. Mr. Puttraj Urs had · recorded evidence in the suits out of which the a.ppeals arose: Mr, Mabppa was also concerned with
some proceedings connected with the litigation and ML · enkataramaiya the only rc>maining Judge had appeared as.an Advocate for the plaintiffs. Mr. K. Knndaswami Pillai had retired. We may certainly
not approve -if we are called upon to do so-of the incidents in Court at and before the hearing. But all these incidents may very well be the result of deliberate provocation given by the plaintiffs and
their lawyer Raju, who appenrs to hav" attempted frequently to thwart the effective hearing of the appeals. The High· Court has caref1;lly weighed the circumstances and bas held that. frc,m the various.
pieces of conduct attributed to Mr. Medappa and r · _!\lr. ~f!'la}l:ri~hl!-)lai;Ya, 1J.n i~feren~e of pias ma_;y no~ 3 S.C.R. 9i be made. We are dealing with the judgment of a foreign tribunal: however much we may regret the
pronouncement of certain orders, especially orders declining to grant a reasonable adjournment to enable the plaintiffs' counsel to appear and argue the case, the constitution of the Bench and the
manner in which the appeals were heard, it is difficult for us to disagree with the High Court and to attribute bias to the Judges, who constituted the Full Bench. The plea of bias, of a fqreign Court is indeed
difficult to make out. The court will always pre- sume, in dealing with the judgment of a foreign Court that the procedure followed by that Court was fair and proper, that it was not biassed, that
the Court consisted of Judges who acted honestly, and however wrong the decision of the Court on facts or law may appear to be, an inference of bias, dishonesty or unfairness will not normally be made
from the conclusion recorded by the Court on the merits. The party setting up a case that the judg- ment of a foreign court is not conclusive, because its proceeding was contrary to natural justice, must
discharge this burden by cogent evidence, and we do not think that in this case such evidence has been led. The Judges had no pecuniary interest in the dispute. Bias in favour of the executors is
sought to be inferred from close friendship of the Chief Justice with one of the defendants, and the expression of opinion by the other Judge on the merits-such expression of opinion being consistent
with the practice prevailing in the Court-and refusal to grant facility to the plaintiffs to secure the presence of their chosen counsel. These grounds either individually or collectively do not justify us
in inferring cont.rary to the view of the High Court that the Judges had forfeited their independence and impartiality BDd had acted not judicially bnt with bias. R. VishW••athan v.
Rukn-•l-mulk S,J•d Abdul W ajid Shah J. . —:–. t R. Vi1hw~nathan .. v. . .. Rukn···ul-mulk 'Sj;d .Abdul Wajid Shah J. I J 1' t, , "' f, The last qtlesticin whic\h fails to he aetermined
is whether the estate devised under the will dated . Sept~mber l 0, 1942, was the joint family estate of Ramalingam and his sons.' If the estate. belonged to the joint-family, the will
was undoubtedly. inpperative. Certain facts which have a bearing on this question and which are mainly undisputed may be set out. Vydialingam was an employee in the .Mysore Subordinate Judihlal service and drew a
monthly salary rising from Rs. 75/- to Rs. 125/-. He worked fint as a translator in the .Mysore Chief Court. In 1898 he was appointed Sheristedar· of the District Coui't at Shimoga and was . later trans-
ferred to Bangalore. One Logana than M ndaliar, a ·building contractor carrying on business at Kolar Gold Fields, was a close frien'd of Vydialingam. In 1896, Log.inathan fell ill and after bis illness took a
serious turn in 1898, he was unable to attend his business. . Loganathan executed a will appointing Vydialingam and others ·as guardians of his children and also executors under his will, and died in 1900.
Vydialingam was maintaining an account with the Cavalry Road Bank at Kolar Golcl Fields since 1891. By 1895 .substantial amounts were credited in that account of which·the source could not be the meagre
salary of Vydialingam. In the y~ars 1896 and 1897, diverse amounts aggregating to the more than rupees one lakh were credited in that account. In 'May · 1898 Vydialingam borrowed on his personal security
from the Bank Rs. 2,000/- and gave it to Shanm- ugam, his eldest son. Shanmugam opened an account with the Cavalry Road Bank in October, 1899, by borrowing Rs. 25/·, but the entries in
this account are few and for very small amounts. From th.e account maintained by the .Mining Company it appears ·that the building construction work which was originally done by Loganathap,
was later done by Shanmugam and since 1901 large amounts were pnid to Shanmugam ilOme of wl!.icli were ~redited l~io tlie Cavah? Road l3an~ ,y· 3 s.c.R.. SUJ,>REME COuRT :i;tEPORTS
account. Since July 1904. some books of account maintained. in the name of Shanmugam for busin- ess, household and other expenses are available. About the year 1904, Devraj, the second son of
Vydialingam, started attending to a building con- tractor's business at Gadag. B,amalingam after complljlting his training in the Victoria Jubilee Technical Institute at Bombay also took to that
business. Vydialingam died in May 1905. He was then possessed of two houses which were orally qirected by him to be given to Ramalingam. The three brothers continued to live jointly even after
the death of Vydialingam and the household expen- ses were jointly incurred. In 1910 Ramdingam sold one of the two houses and received Rs. 4,000/-. On March 30, 1912, a deed of release was executed
by Ramalingam and Devraj under which Devraj and Ramalingam each received Rs. 2,500/- and the Kolar Gold Fields bu3iness was thereafter carried on apparently as a partnership bush;1ess
between Shanmugam and Ra.malingam. Manavalam, father-in-law of Devraj died in 1910, and Devraj migrated to Madras and settled down in that town to attend to the business of bis father-in-law.
Shortly after April 1912, Shanmugam proceeded to the United Kingdom. There is no clear evidence whether he took part in the business after he retu- rned from his journey abro'l.d. He continued to
make withdrawals from his account in the business. By 1961, he had overdrawn an amount exceeding Rs. 35,000/- which was written off. Thereafter he ceased to have any interest in the business.
Shanmugam died in 1924 and Devraj died in 1936. It is the plaintiffs' 0ase that Vydialingam was carrying on the business of a building contractor since about the Jear 1895 or 1896: into this busin-
ess Shanmugam was first introduced and thereafter Devraj and Ramalingam. After the death of Vydialingam, according to the plaintiffs, this busi- ness was carried on by the tliree brothers· till the
JY62 R. Vishwanalh<Jn Rukn-ul-mulk Sy~d ·Abdul W a;id ShahJ R. Visln.oanathan Rukn-ul-mulk Syed Abdul Wdjid Shah J. SUPR.EME COURT REPORTS [196Rj year 1910 11t different places. Devraj was attending
to a hrangh of the business at Gadag: Ramalingam attended to the business at Kolar Gold Fields and also at Gadag. The plaintiffs claim that the buRin- ess which was carried on by Ramalingam since the
year 19 l 6, was directly connected with the business which was inherited from Vydialingam by his sons and being in his hands ancestral business, the acquisitions out of the same wore impressed with
the character of joint-family property. They also · claimed that Ramalingam disposed of two ancestral houses which he received and used the sale proceeds in conducting his· businesfi and also Rs. 12,50<i/-
received from the Administrator-General as the Share, out of the estate of :i:.oganathan. of his wife Gajambal who was the daughter of Loganathan. With this fund Ramalingam carried on tb.e business
of a building contract.-,r in the conduct of which he was assisted by his sons and he acquired the estate in dispute. The case of' the plaintiffs therefore was that Vydialingam was carrying on the
business of a building contractor, that his sons . assisted him in carrying on the business, that after his death the business which devolveq upon his sons was carried on by them till 1910 when Devraj,
the second son ceased to be interested therein. Theu Shanniuga.m, the eldest son severed his conn- ection in 1916 leaving Ramalingam to conduct the ancestral business alone. The executors contended that Vydialingam
did not carry on business of a building contractor, that Shanmugam started his own business as a building contractor sometime in 1898 and neither his father nor his brothers had any interest there.in,
and that for the first tinie, in 1912, in view of his impending departure for 'the United Kingdom, Shanmugam aqmitted Ramalingam into his busin- ess as a partner and ultimately iri 1916,. Ramalingam.
became the sole owner of the business,· because · 't– ti.c. ' ..,) 3 S.0.R. SUPREME cou1~T 'R.EPOHTS Shanmugam aevered his interest therein. The case of the executors, therefore was that the business .
in the hands of Ramaliu~11m had no colJnAction with any ancestral business or estate received by Ramalingam from his father. The trial Judge dealt with the qu~st.ion under five heads :-
Firstly, that Vydialingam carried on the business of a building contractor. He had left. two houses which were unen- cumbered, and the contractor's business: these became joint-family estate in
the hands of his son, and out of this estate Ramalingam's fortune was built: Secondly, that after the death of R1tmalin- gam, his three sons carried on a joint family business. This joint-family busi-
ness was attended to by the three bro- thers at different places and that the joint acquisitions were divided some- time in the year 1910 and each ·brother received a share of Rs. 34,000/- odd,
and out of the share received by Ram- alingam, estate devised by the will was acquired: Thirdly, that Ramalingam received a sh<.>.re of the ancestral estate of the value of ·Rs. 40,000/· and also Rs. 12,500/- as
share of his wife out of the estate of Loganathan and the entire amount was invested in his business as a building contractor and out of this the estate in dispute was acquired : Fourtlily, that Ramalingam and his eldest
son Vishwanath were actively associated in carrying on the building contractor's business and the acquisitions out of /.962 R. Vishwanolhan v. Rukn-ul-mulk Sy ell Abdul Wajid Shah ,1.
R. V isllwana than v. Rukn-"1-mulk S;•d Abdul Wajid Shah.). the business were joint-family estate : and Fifthly, tha.t Ramalingam had by his decl- arations impressed his acquis\tions with
the character of joint-family property and therefore the property was joint- family property. He held on all the five heads that the property devised under the will of Ramalingam was joint-
family property. In appeal, the High Court held that the case of the plaintiffs under the 4th and the 5th heads was not established. About the 3rd head the High Court held that there was no clear evid-
ence that Ramalingam had received an ancestral fortune of Rs. 40,000/- or Rs. 12,500/- on behalf of his wife Gajambal from the estate of Loganathan. But the High, Court held that Vydialingam was
carrying on the business of a building oon•ractor since the year 1896 and that in this business were associated his sons as they grew up; that the busi- ness was carried on in the name of Shanmugam
because Vydialingam being a public servant could not carry it on in his own name; that. after the death of Vydialingam this business ';Vas conducted as a joint-family business; that in the year 1910,
Devraj who was attending to the Gadag Branch of the business left the family and commenced atten- . ding at Madras to the business of hi• father in-law who died about that time; and that Shanmugam
ceased to have any connection with the business. in 1916. The High Court summarised the conclu- sion as follows :- "The business which Ramalingam subsl quently extended was a business which-desce-
nded to him from his father, his two brothers having successively left it. It is probable though is not clearly proved-that Ramalin- gam put the money which is obtained by sale , . .
3 S.C.R. of the house in Bangalore into business. He also put in the money he was paid under the release deed of 1912. Into the nominal partner· ship which he entered into with Shanmugam,
he brought in as his capital a sum of Rs. 5,000/· representing a fragment of the old business. No less important, he also brought in the goodwill of the old business. At no time before
the final few months preceding his death, when he had quarrelled with the members of his family, did Ramalingam, notwithstanding the claims he made in his will, and other documents, seek to exclude the members of
family. He made no effort to keep distinct what were acquired with the aid of indubitably joint-family nucleus from what it might have been possible to contend were the result of his own una:'!sisted exertions. Taking all the
circumstances into account, we are of the opinion that the learned trial Judge was right in concluding that the properties which Ram- alingam left behind must be treated as joint-
family properties." To establish their case the plaintiffs relied upon the evidence of five witnesses-Kuppuswamy :Mudaliar, Sitharam Naidu, Varadaraja Mudaliar, Venugopala Mudaliar a11d Dharmalingam, some of
whom had been examined beford the Court of the District Judge, Bangalore. By their evidence it was sought to prove that Vydialingam did carry on in and before l 898 business as a building contractor
at Kolar Gold Fields and that this business had on his death descended to his sons. The plainWfs also relied upon extracts from the accounts 0f Ramalingam and Shanmugam with the Cavalry Road Bank at
Nandidurg, and thP. extracts from the accounts of the Nandidurg Mini11g Company recording payments made from time to time to Shanmugam some of which were credited in the accaunt of Vydialingam
R. Vishwanathan v. Rukn-ul-mulk Syed Abdul Wajid Shah J, R.· Yiahwanathan RuJ:n-ul-mulk 816d Abdul Wajid Shah J. with the Cavalry Road Bank. Reliance was also placed upon the entries in the books of account
maintained in the name of Shanmugam from the year 1904 showing receipts from Devraj at Gadag and amounts debited as sent to Devraj at Gadag, collection of rent from the houses credited in that
account, expenses debited for purposes connected with building construction items showing that Devraj or Vydialingam had participated in those transactions and other entries of house-hold
expenses showing that the account maintained in the name of Shanmugam was in truth the account of the joint-family. Th" plaintiffs also relied upon certain letters written by Ramalingam and Devraj
which from their terms evidenced their case that they were not acting merely as agents of Shanmugam but . as owners of the business. Reliance was also placed upon the testimony of Clne Masilamany· Pillai, an Advocate
(who later acted as a Judge of the Madras High Court), that in the arrangements made a few months before M-irch 30, 1912, it was agreed that the good- will of the Kolar Gold Fields business was allotted
to Ramalingam. The learned trial Judge accepted the evidence of all the witness whose testimony was relied upon by the plaintiffs and held that the extracts Vydialingam's account established that he
was carrying on busioese as a building· contractor, and the books of account maintained in the name of Shanmugam were family accounts; In appeal, the High Court relied upon the evidence of onlv t-wo. of the five witnesses who
deposed that Vydialin~am was working as a bllilding contractor. In the view of the High Court the flvidence of Varad<iraja Mudaliar and Sitharam Naidu but not of other witnesses was reliable.
Witness Sitharam Naidu deposed that he was work- ing as a building contractor since the year 1898 at 3 S.C.R. Kolar Gold Fields, that he had taken up a "tene· ~ ment in the compound of Loganatha Mudaliar" and
that he knew that Vydialingam was looking after the contract work of Loganath, that Vydialingam was assisted by his three sone, that Shamingam wa.8 doing business of a building contractor and was &!so
helping his father Vydialingam. The witness was described by the High Court as a respectable person · ·-/ "not readily corruptible" and who "had no ascertain· able motive for giving false evidence''. Varadaraja.
Mudaliar deposed that he used to see Vydialinga Mudaliar when he (the witness) went to Oorgaum in 1898 to see his father-in-law who was it Mistry in the Oorgaum mines working under
Loganath Mudaliar, that his father-in-law A at first worked under Loganath and later under Vydialingam. The evidence of this witness was also accepted by High Court. The evidence of these two witnesses establishes that
Vydialingam Mudaliar was conducting the business of a building contractor. There is also evidence that since the year 1898 Loganath was too ill to .) attended to his business and that he died in 1900.
· The testimony of the two witnesses Sitharam and Varadaraj is supported bv entries in the account of Vydialingam with the Cavalry R0ad Bank. The account of Vydia.lingam with the Cavalry Road
Bank was opened in 1891. Vydialingam was an Employee of the State of Mysore and the maximum salary thrtt he ever drew was Rs.125/· IJ.m. Between the years 1891 and 189-1 the entries in the bank
· … _,. account were for small amounts, the largest being Rs. 478/4/.. In the yt>ar 1895, there were two itemg each exceeding Rs. I ,000/- credited in that account. but in 1896, the items of credit and dis-
bursement were very large : it appear.> from the entries in th'i.t account that in the vears J 896 -1897, amounts aggregating to Rs. One lakh and more were ) credited in the account of Vydialingam and large
disbursements were also made from that account. The High Court observed, and in our judgment the R. Vishwaftathan Rukn-ul-mulk Sye rl Aedul Wnjid Shah J. R. Vishwanathan v. &kn·ul·mulk Syed
Aba~l Wajia Shah J. High Court was rightin its view that the transac- tions in the books were "to large to be referred to the emoluments of Vydialingam as Sheristedar. It is legitimate inference that he has been engaged in
other ·business". The executors did not, deny that an inference that Vydialingam was carrying on some business clearly arose from the entries in the books of account. But it was suggested that Vydialingam
may have carried on the business of a money-lender and for that purpose he may have withdrawn funds from the Cavalry Road Bank and utilized them as his circulating capital for his money-lending transactions. It was asserted
that Vydialingam was a Director of the Cavalry Road Bank and was on the account able to help himself to the funds of the Bank for his private business. But our attention has not been invited
to any evidence on the recard that Vydialingam was a director of the Cavalry Road Bank. The entries are of such large amounts and the credit and debit entries· are so.frequent that the inference that
were made in the course ofa money-lending business would be difficult to make. It also appears that Vydialingam had mortgaged his house in 1892 for Rs. 25,000/· in favour of Thirunaglingam Pillai and
he discharged this mortgage by borrowing a loa9 of Rs. 3,000/· on the security of the house from Loganathan on Auglist 31, 1892. The amount was repayable in monthly instalments of Rs. 50/-.
An- other deed encumbering his house was executed by Vydialingam in 1894 for repayment of Rs. 2,000/-. These two mortgages remained outstanding till 1903. · We are unable to accept the theory that Vydia-
lingam carried on money-lending business when his own house was mortgaged, and he had agreed to pay the dues by instalm~nts. The Cavalry Road Bank account also shows entries for amounts
brought from the Madras Bank. These show that Vydialingam had received cheques which were encashed with the Madras Bank and the amounts were received by him. These entries render the
theory of a money-lending business improbable. \._/ \, . 3 s.c.R. The entries in th,e bank account of Vydialin'gam support the case that he was carrying on a business, and the. testimony of two witnesses Sitharam Naidu
and Varadaraja Mudaliar clearly shows that this business was of a building contractor. Before 1898, even according to the case of the executors, Shanmugam was not employing himself
as a building contractor. The entries in his account with the Cavalry Road Bank are for very small amounts till April 1901, when, for the first time, Shanmugam borrowed Rs. 800/- on the security of
jewels. In the account of the Mining Company also, there are no entries for any payments made to Shanmugam till 1901 for work done by him. ';['he entries in the Cavalry Road Bank account therefore
support the inference that Vydialingam was carry- ing on business and Shanmugam had no business of his own atleast till 1900. The entries in the Cavalry Road Bank account for the period· subsequent to 1900 also suggest that
Vydialingam operated the account of Shanmugam. Part of tile amounts received from the Mining Com- pany account by Shanmugam for the work done was applied for satisfying loans borrowed by Vydia-
lingam. It has also to be noted that in Shanmugam's account till 1901 no large amounts were credited. It appears from the account of the Mining Company that on January 18, 1901, he received. Rs. 5,000/-
by cheque and other large amounts within the next three months aggregating to nearly Rs. 7,500/- in cash and cheques. But the eccount of Shanmugam with the Cavalry Road Bank shows only ·a total
credit of.Rs. 780/- between October 1899 and April 1901 in the suspense account. No books of account about the construction work done in the name of Shanmugam are available for the period.
There are certain entries in the .accounts of Vydialingam and Shanmugam which show ·inter- relation between the two accounts. For instance, R. Vi.shwanatl•an v. Rukn-ul-mitlk SJ ed
Abdul Wojid Shah J. R. Visf.wan4fha,n Rukn-ul-Mutk Syeti Abdul W o.;i_d ShahJ, on January 9, 1904, according to the Mining Com- 'f pany's account Shanmugam was paid three amounts Rs. 36/-, Rs.· 362/14/l and Rs. 12,243/5/·, About
this time Shanmugam was indebted to the Cavalry Road Bank iu the Rum of Rs,,3,400/- on promissory notes. On January l\J, l 90i, he paid Rs. 3,100/- into the Bank and partially satisfied this liability.
Rs.12,120/6/9 are found credited in the account of\..u Vydialingam on January 23, 190! and Rs. 12,000/- are withdrawn on January 29. There is no direct evi- dence to connect the payments made in the accounts
of Shanmugam and Vydialingam with the amounts received by Shanmugam, but it would be a reason- able infere'nce, having regard to the proximity of time, that it was out of the Amount of Rs. 15,900/- 'f.
received by Shanmuga.m on January 19, 1904, that his liability for Rs. 3,100/- to the Cavalry Road Bank was discharged and an am'Ount of Rs. l:l,120/ . 6/9 was paid into the Cavalry Road Bank and an
amount of Rs. 305/- was utilized for satisfying the debts of Vydialingam in his personal account. There are also other entries disclosing interrelation~ between the accounts. Vydialingam borrowed –
Rs. 140/- on February 18, 1904, under promissory. note dated February 18, 190!, and the identical amount is credited in the account of Shanmugam under the entry "Receipt from V. S. Vydialinga
Mudaliar." The Ohitta number under which amounts are credited and debited are identical. On . December l, 1904, Shanmugam received a cheque . for Rs. 10,000/- from the Mining Company. The \ .. _/
cheque was credited in the Cavalry l;toad Bank on 10-12-1904.. On that day Shanmugam was . indebted in the sum of Rs. 2,625/- in the promissory note account. On December 19, he withdrew a
total amount of Rs. 8, 733/2/0. The Ohitta entry in that behalf is No. 113. On that very day there are two entries under Chitta No. 113 . for payment { of Rs. 1,050/- in Vydialingam's account. There
are entries in Shanm_ugam's account with the Bank 3 S.C.R. showing debts made pursuant to directions given by Vydialingam. For instance, on March 25, 1903, Rs. 500/- are debited pursuant to directions
given by Vydialingam. There are two similar debit entries pursuant to directions given by Vydia- lingam on April 4, 1903, and April IO, 1903, for Rs. 500/- each. In Vydialingam's account on July 13, 1903
there is an entry of Rs. 280/- paid for cart hire. That is also indicative of the fact that he was carrying on the business of a building contractor, otherwise this entry is not capable of explanation.
There are also entries in the account maintained in the name of Shanmugam showing expenses incurred by Vydialingam and Devraj for travell- ing in connection with the building of the ' English
Church". On August 7, HJ04, l\s. 20/- were debi- ted as spent by Vydialingam for going to Madras. There is also a debit entry of Rs. 3/- dat1d July 26, 1904, for travelling expenses of Devraj
and Shanmugam. The acco•mt maintained in the name of ~hanmugam for the period prior to July, 1901, is not produced. The account is available till 1907 and then there is a break. There is an
account book for 1910-11, but not for ·the period immediately before April 1, HH2, when a partner- ship was started bet .veen Ramalingam and Shan- mugam. There are numerous entries in this
account showing that large amounts were received from Gadag from Devraj and also for amounts sent to him. On May 5, HI05, an amount of Rs. 1,000/· wae raised on a promissory note and
sent to Devraj. On July 19, 1905, there was a remittance to Devraj by Shanmugam of Rs. l,Of1I/ 8/2. There is a similar remittance on September 17, 11J05, On September 26. 1905, Rs. lOU/· had been
paid through Ramalingam. There are credit entries for large amounts received from Devraj. On May 27, 1907, Devraj remitted its. 7,0UO/- R. Vishwanathan v. Rukn-u/-mulk Syed Abdul Wajii,
Shah J. 196t R. Viahwanathan v. Ruk.n-ul-mulk Syed Abdul Wajid Shah J. from Gadag to Kolar Gold Fields. It is unneces: sary to examine all these entries. Also in the account in the name of Sbanmugam there are sev-
eral credit entries for house rent collected from tenants of the two houses which Vydialingam died possessed of, and debit entries for payment of municipal taxes. There are also in that account
numerous entries for amounts collected by Rama- lingam and paid into tbe account. There are also four letters which throw some light on the connection of the three brothers with the Kolar Gold Fields business. On October 5,
1909, Devraj addressed a letter to Ramalingam enquiring whether the letter did go to Gadag and gave several directions with regard to business matters. There is another letter dated· Octo-
ber 6, 1909, also written by Devraj to Ramalingam which states "Pariapa" (Shanmugam) has come fro!ll Bangalore and he expectR you here as soon as you finish your work there." This letter also
gives directions for procuring certain articles. There is a letter dated January 18, 1911, addressed by Ramalingam to Shanmugam. By the letter Ramalingam informs Shanmugam that the ques-
tion. of (departmental employment in the Nandi- durg Mining Company was discussed and that it "was finally decided not to do so'' and to have the sundrv works carried on as usual.
He then proc~eds to state that the Oorgaum Gold Mining Company had tempora- rily stopped all operations for "some unknown rea- sons". Then there is a reference to the Electricity Department of putting in and concrete in "N's
Bungalow". There is also reference to "drudging on with the drains and the compressor work we have been having." Regarding the Oorgaum Gold Mines, he says that all the ''works on hand" in the
mines had been completed and the prospects fo new work were gloomy. There is also a referenc 3 8.C.R. tq the timber department. In the next letter dated February 11, 1911, addressed to
Shan'llugam, Hamalingam states that Mr. Bullen had sent for him and had enquired of him whether he would undertake some small building contract at Mani- gatha where they were prospecting for gold and
further that he {Ramalingam) had agreed "to do the work and promised to be there to receive ins- tructions." He also stated that he would return by the week-end after the arrangements were made
and he would take lea.ve of Messrs. Mcky & Cooke and tell'them that Mr. Ramaiah will lookafter the business (during his absence). The letters do sug- gest tha.t Ramalingam and Devraj were interested
as owners in the business about which informt1.tion was given to 8hanmugam and they were not merely acting as his agents. There are numerous entries in the General Account also indicting that these accounts are not
in respect of the personal transactions of Shanm- ug<tm but they are the accounts of the family. Expenses of various members are debited in that account. They are found side by side with busi-
ness expenses. The High Court was, in our judg- ment, right in holding that these were not the accounts of Shanmugam personally but were of the joint family. The Attorney-General, however, says that
certain circumstances relied upqn by him conclusi- vely establish that the business done by Shanmu- gam was his separate business. He points out that Vydialingam was a public servant and his service
record showed that he was on leave only for short periods in the year 1898 and when he was posted at a considerable distance from Kolar Gold Fields, it would be impossible for him to attend at the
latter place to any business requiring his conti- nued attendance. But only a few extracts from the service record of Vydialingam have been R. Vishwanathan v. Rukn-ul-mulk S:ied Abdul Wojid
Sh.h J. R. Vishwan than v. RuJcn .. ul .. m•1/k S.J1tl Abdul. Wajid Shah J. SUPREll/..E COURT REPORTS [1963) printed in the record. Ext. 368 shows that Vydia- lingam drew a salary of· Rs. 125/- for 20 days for
working ns Nazir and Sheristedar, and that he was transferred to tLe District Court of Shimoga in SeptemLer, 1901. There is also an entry that Vydialingam was appointed Munsif for 12 days i11
June, 1900. Ext. 370 shows the .amount of salary that Vydialingam drew from time to time. These \…../ documents do not show that it was impossible for Vydialingam to attend to the business. It is true
that in the Mining Company's account payments made for constmction work are debited till 1900 to Loganathan and after Loganathan's death to Shanmugam, but, .evidently, Vydialingam being
a public servant could not publicly appear as carry- ing on a building contractor's business and receive +.. payments for the work done by him in hia own name. '!he debit entries in the name of Shanmu-
gam in the Mining Company's account are there- fore not decisive, nor would they be sufficient to destroy the direct evidence of the two witnesses Sithar;.,m Naidu and Varadaraja Mudaliar.
It wast.hen urged that Cavalry Road Bank Account showed a payment of Rs. 2,000/- in May, 1898, to Shanmugam and that this account was returned to Vydialingam by Shanmugam in December 190~. From this it is urged that Shan-
mugam started b~siness as a building contractor with the amount borrowed from his father Vydiu- lingam and ultimately he repaid it after four years \..__) and seven months. But the evidence of the two
witnesses Sitharam Naidu aud Varadaraja Muda- liar does' establish that the business of building contractor was conducted by Vydialingam and that is amply corroborated by the entries in the
Cavalry Road Bank account. The debit entry relating to payment of Rs. 2,000/- to Shanmugam ·/ from Vydialingam's account, and the credit entry for repayment by Shanmugam will not, in our
3 S.C.R. judgment, necessarily lea.d to the inference that this amount was borrowed by Shanmugam for starting his bu~iness as a building contractor. It was also urged that the account started in July
1901: and continued till the year 1912 was the private account of Shanmugam. We have already dealt with this question in dealing with the evi- dence of the plaintiffs and we are unable to hold,
having regard to the numerous entries posted there- in that the account was the personal account of Shanmugam. It is also true that Vydialingam was indebt- ed to Loganathan for amounts borrowed by him
on the security of his two houses and that the debts were paid off in the year l!:l03. But having regard especially to the direct evidence supported by contemporaneous entries in the account books,
an inference that Vydialingam did not carry on any business will not be justified. Strong reliance was placed on certain recitals in two documents-a sale deed executed by Ramalingam for sale of the house inherited by
him from Vydialingam, by deed dated July 27, ll:flO, and a deed of release executed on March 30, 191'.:l, by the three brothers. It is urged that the recitals in these two documents completely destory
the case that after the death of Vydialingam there was a subsisting joint family or that Ramalingam and Devraj had interest in the business carried on bYi Shanmugam. In the sale deed dated July 20,
1910, executed by ~amalingam in favour of Mandi Mohammad Hussain Saheb it was recited that Shanmugam and Devraj had acquired properties out of their own earnings and were in enjoyment
thereof, but he (Ramalinga) had no property of bis own earning and therefore Vydialingam had given oral directions that the immovable property belonging to Vydialingam should be in the posses-
sion or enjoyment of Ramalingam alone and that R. Vishwanathan Rukn-ul·mulk '1ed Abdul Wajid Sh"h J. 1!:162 R. Vlshwanathan Bukn-ul-mulk y~d .!bdul Wajid -· ~ Shah J. Shanmuga'n and Devraj should have no right therein
and that in accordance with the directions and with ·the permission of his two brothers, Ramalingam was in possession and enjoyment thereof and that he conveyed one of the houses for Rs. 4000/- to the
vendee and in order to prove that his aforesaid brothers had no right in the property, he had got them to attest the documents. The sale deed bears the attestations of Shanmugam and Devraj. There
is another document dated March 30, 1912, which is calleda "Release Deed", between Shanmugam on the one hi.nd and Devraj and Ramalingam Mudaliar on the other, The three brothers are described as
doing business as building contractors. It is recited_in that deed that in 1898 Shanmugam started life as a building contractor and merchant by his own exer- tions and without t]l.e use . or aid of funds of the
joint family to which he belonged and found his own "means of living" on the Kolar Gold Fields and elsewhere and by his own exertions he had made acquisitions described in the schedule annexed
to the deed and that the same · were his separate property. The deed also recited that before his death on May 3, 1905, Vydialingam had given directions for the disposal of the immovable and
movable properties in favour of Ramalingam and accordingly the said properties bad been appropria- ted first towards the discharge of his debts and thereafter the immovable properties had been taken
over by Ramalingam and that "nothing in the nature of. an undivided Hindu joint-family · remained". The document then proceeded to recite that in consideration of a sum of Rs.2,500/- pa.id
by Shanmugam to Devraj and another sµm of Rs. 2,500/· paid to Ramalingam and his minor son Vishwanath, Devaraj · and Ramalingam declared that they will not claim any "manner, of right or
title or interest in the property of Shanmugam" des- cribed in the schedule· attached to the deed and agreed that they or any of them had never any 1_…,,, 3 S.C.R. right, title or interest in the propertv and th.at if
there was any such right it '•shall be deemed to have been released, relinquished and quit claimed so that Shanmu~am Mudaliar remain the sole and absolute owner thereof." In the schedule to the deed was
described a bungalow at Robertsonpet and movables and outstanding of the value of Rs. 1,79,000/- . At the foot of the document were en'dorsed a receipt for Rs. 2,500/- by Devraj and another receipt for
Rs. 2,500/- by Ramaling'lm. The Attorney-General conten ied that the admissions in these documents were unequivocal and destroyed the case of the plaintiffs, that there was any subsisting joint-
family after the death of Vydialingam or that the business carried on by Shanmugam was joint-family business. Counsel submitted that the trial Judirn had evolved a theory which wits not supported by any pleading or evidence
that the sale deerl. and tbe release deed were parts of a scheme of division of the property of the joint family of the three brothers. It is true that the recitals in the sale deed
show that the house sold by Ramalingam was given by Vydialingam to him under an oral direction and he dealt with that ho\1"le on that foJting. It is also true that in the "Release Deed" it has been
recited that Shanmugam was carrying on business as a contractor since the year 1898 without the aid of any joint-family funds and that the acquisitions made by him were his self-acquired properties.
The deed also recites that there was no joint-family property which remained to be divided. But these two documents cannot be regarded as decisive of the question whether Vyilialingam was earring on
the business of a building contractor and whether that business devolved on his three sons. The three brothers during the life time of Vydialingam were living jointly and the building contractor's
business wi:is being conducted during the life time of Vydialinga. We have already pointed out that · R. Vi•hw•natha 1 v. Rukn-.,l-mu 'k Syei ' ,Odul Wajid R. V isl.wtAnath«n Rukn-ul-mulk s,~a
Abdul Wajid Shah J. the evidence shows that even before 1898 Vydiii.- lingam was carrying on a contractor's business. Both duriµg the lifetime of Vydialingam and there- after till 1910 the three brothers lived together and
tbe entries in the General accounts maintained in , the name of Shanmugam indicate that their expen- ses were jointly met. It also appears that the rent received from the houses which Ramalingam ulti-
mately disposed of were taken into account and amalgamated with the. family account. Large amounts were sent to Devraj and were itlso received from him. Ramalingam is also shown to have
participated in the business of Shanmugam. It is true that the trial Judge made out a case of a· partition of the joint-family estate in the year l\HO which after Devraj migrated to Madras, was given
effect to in the deed .of release dated March 30, 1912. This case does not find place in any plead- ing and is not supported by direct evidence. But the approach of the High Court to the evidence was
different. In the view of the .High Court the evi- dence indicated that the three brothers continued to carry on business as members of a Hindu joiut- family which had <ievolved upon them from their
father Vydialingam that the business was exteuded to different places such as Gadag, Calicut and others, that Shanmugam was after the death of Vydialingam also carrying on an independent busi-
ness at Kalai ia partnership with one Balakrishna and that. the deed of release was in respect of the property which was claimed by Shanmugam as his separate property and not in respect of the joint-
family property. lJ:Tidently, the recitals in the release deed were made for maintaining a record that Devraj and Ramalinga had no interest in the property of i::lhanmugam. Admissibility of evi-
dence to contradict the recital that there was in fact no property of the joint-family is not pre- cluded by s. 92 of the Indian .1£vidence Act, as the dispute in this suit does not arise between the
partieR to the documents hut between persons who ~j \ … 3 S.C.R. claimed under Ra.malingam the executant of the document. The evidence of Masilamany Pillai who was examined on behalf of the plaintiffs in the District
Court, at Bangalore is in this context of some im- portance. The witness deposed that in 1912 he was consulted in connection with settlement of certain matters between Shanmugam Mudaliar and
his two brothers, that he had discussions with Shanmugam and his lawyers regarding ma.tters relating to the properties of the family and also in respect of the business in Kolar Gold Fields and
that he had given advice after ascertaining from the three brothers several matters in respect of which a settlement had to be effected. He then stated that he had suggested that the release deed
might be obtained from Devraj and Ramalingam releasing and relinquishing the claims if any they might have in respect of any property which were claimed by Shanmugam as his self acquisitions, but
lie had himself not' drawn up the dMd nor had seen it at any time. The witness then made a statement -;.' that at. the interview it "waR understood that good- will of the Kolar Gold Fields contract business was
to be given to Rarnalingam Mudaliar." On tl\is part of his evidenrie there was no cross-examinatiort. rhis eviden<ie is important in two respects 1i) that the release deed was to be drawn up in respect of
properties which were claimed by Shanmugam to be his SAlf acquisitions, and (ii) that it was understood that the goodwill of K0lar Geld Fields business was to be of Ramalingam. If the Kolar Gold Fields
bw•iness was the exclusive business of Sha.nmugam, which he had started, it is difficult to appreciate why the goodwill of that business ehould be given to Ramalingam when for a comparatively small
amounts Ramalingam and Devraj were relinquishing "(' all their interest which they may possibly have in that business, and in the eamings ma.de by R. Vishwanath•n ., . Ru~n-111-mulk Sy1d
. AbJol W •jid Shah J. R. Vi.shwan•than v. RuAn-'.Ul-mulk Syed Abdul W a:jid Shah J. ' Shanmugam out of that business. The trial Court aH well as the High Court have accepted this
evidence. The accounts of the family maintained in the name of Shanmugl!-m immediately prior to April, 1912, have not been produced by the executors. It is true ·that it is their case that they did not
find these account books when they took over the estate of Bamalingam, whereas the plaintiffs assert that the account-books were withheld by the execu- .tors because, if produced, they would have destro-
yed the defence raised by the executors. The High Court, on .the evidence, was unable. to raise any definite inference in regard to this matter. Admit- tedly, the excutors had taken possesslon of the
property of Ramalingam immediately after· bis death and it is somewhat surprising that no inven, tory of the property of books of account or docu- ments of Ramaling'tm, if any, prepared at the tiwe
when the executors took possession of rroperty should have been produced. The executors are men of considerable experience of business affairs and Wajid the principal executor was an officer
holding a high office in public administration. Th<jiY would certainly have realised the necessity of lIDaking an inventory of the documents and the property which they took in their custody.
If the books of account immediately prior to 1st of April, 1912, had not come in their possession, the executors would have forth- with produced the inventory made by them at the time of taking over possession of the estate.
Even if we· draw no adverse inference against the executors because they failed to produce the books of accounts immediately prior to April 1, 1!!12, tl:.ere are other circumstances which support
the inference raised by the High Court: The relense deed does not take into account the husiness at a S.C.R. ..,./ Gadag which was conducted by Devraj and in ~ which Ramalingam assisted.
As we have already pointed out for carrying on this business large amounts were sent from the family account. There is evidence that there were ·assets in that business. In the General Account there
are certain entries in the accounts of Devraj which cannot be· easily appreciated. After the entry ) )· dated 5th March, 1911, crediting Rs. 280/-, there are some debit entries under the date 31st March,
1911, the following four of which are for a.mounts of Rs. 1,000/- and more :- Debit given by V. V. S. Mudaliar in connection with cheque. Rs. 1,000-0-0 Debit S. R. B. cheque one Rs. 15,000-0-0
Debit Electricity cheque one Rs. 1,619-15-8 Debit Nandidurgam cheque Rs. 9,322-12-6 Under the same date there are ten entries, of )) which the following four are for Rs. 2,000/ and
more:- Credit V. V. S. P.Moodr. given previously Credit Credit Credit Rs. 12,14:?-5-7 Rs. 2,000-0-0 Rs. 10,000-0-0 Rs. 10,000-0-0 Ae a result of these entries Rs. 28,085-11·6 stood debited and Rs. 25,689-11-4 stood credited
in the account of Devraj. Counsel for the executors has not attempted to explain these entries. The trial Court thought that the credit entries represen- ted payments made by Ramalingam to Devraj.
I . There is no evidence in support of this view. The learned Judge appears to have thought that because B. Yi1h~notha11 v:· Ruk~-"1"~~J•' ~llUI ~aJitl Shah J. _..,. Skh J. the good will was agreed to be given to Ramalin·
gam-that is how he read the evidence of Masila- many Pillai-Ramalingam became the owner of io.11 its assets, and the account was since the date of the agreement in reality ·an account of Rama·
lingam. · There is no warrant for this view. But the entries do show that · large amounts were credited in the name of Devraj and debited at the end of the year, If these entries were in respect
of the Gadag business, the inference that the deed· of release was only in respect of the separate estate of Shanmugan may receive some support. The conduct of Shanmugam subsequent to
March 30, 1912, has also some bearing on this que~tion. Shortly after the execution of the Release deed Shanmugam left for the United ,4,. ;Kingdom and it is stated that he returned to India
after more than a year. It does not appear that thereafter he took any interest in the Kolar Gold Fields business but he continued to make large withdrawals. In the books of account of the part-
nership between Shanmugam and Ramalingam an amount exceeding !:is. 34,000/- is initially credited to Shanmugam and Rs. 7,500/- to Ramalingam. But what the shares of the two partners in the
business were is nowhere indicated. There is no deed of partnership, nor is any balance sheet drawn. · There is no evidence of division of profits of the business. By 1916, Shanmugam, had not
only withdrawn the amount initially credited to him but he had withdrawn au additional amount of Rs. 35,538/12/-. He. thereafter ceased to have any interest in the Kolar Gold Fields business and
the amount overdrawn was written off debiting it to "premium account." This conduct may indicate that after March 30, 1912, Shanmu- gam had no interest in the business .even though
the books of account showed that it was a partner- ship business. Even if it be held that Shan nugam a s.c.R. SUPREME OOOR'r R~PORTS 115 was a partner in the business from April I, 1910,
to May I, 1916, the inference ia inevit~ able that the building contractors business .carried on by Ramalingam thereafter was directly related the business inherited from Vydialingam. The
circumstance that Shanmugam ceased to have any interest in the business, after overdrawing Rs. 35,000/-odd, also corroborates the testimoney of Masilamany Pillai that goodwill of the business
.was given exclusively to Ramalingam. From this evidence it is clear that Shanmugam was unwilling to continue the joint family business at Kolar Gold Fields and that he desired to secure an assura-
nce from his brothers that they had no interest in his separate business at. Kalai and acquisitions thereof and for that purpose, the "Release deed'' was obtained from them. The High Court held that the amount of
Rs. 4,000/- received by Ramalingam by sale of the house and the amount of Rs. 2,500/· received from Shanmugam were put in the business by Ramalin- gam. Wajid. deposed that the consideration
received by sale of the house was given by Rama- lingam to C. Savade & Co., and to his sister. In our view the High Court was right in holding that the testimony of Wajid who has deposed that he
was present at the time when Rs. 500/- were given by Ramalingam to his sister is not reliable. Wajid was a stranger to the family and there was no reason why Ramalingam should if the story be
true keep Wajid present at the time of handing an a.mount of Rs, 500/- to his needy sister. · The story of Wajid that Ramalingam" was carrying on business of a building contractor in the name of
Rambal and Co., and that in that business he suffered lo3s is not supported by any independent evidence and does not carry conviction. Having regard to all these circumstances we do not think that the recitals in the sale deed and
U62 R;V~,. v. Rukn·ul-mu/I: 8.ft c· Abdul Wajid Sllah ,T. i·. ·ro,M.ioon "\···· Jliat;'fll-lk S,lfl ~Uul W•Ji' SiMih J. the deeds of release are by themselves justify this Court in refusing to accept
of fact recorded by the High Court on of evidence. sufficient to the finding appreciation· 'l'he High Court has held that the business which Ramalingam carried on since April 1, 1912,.
apparently in partnership with Shanmugam till 1916, and thereafter exclusively was directly connec- ted with the business which devolved upon the three sons Vydialingam wheu he died in 1905. Prima. facie ·
the findings recorded by the High Court are findings of fact, and this Court normally does not· enter upon a. reappraisal of the evidence, but we have entered upon a review of .the evidence on which
they were founded, because the High Court of Mysore had on the identical issue about the character of the property devised under the will of Ramalingam arrived at a different conclusion.
A dispute with regard to the nature of the property called "Palm Grove" for the purpose of considering whether the judgment of ·the Mysore High Court is conclusive qua .that property remains
to be mentioned, It appears that at s9me time-· about which there is no clear evidence-"Palm Grove" was agreed to be sold in plots by Rama- lingam. In the suit, as originally filed in the
Bangalore District · Court "Palm Grove" was on!) of the properties in respect of which the plaintiffs made .a claim. But that claim was withdrawn when the Madras properties were excluded, and no decision was therefore. given
by the District Judge in respect of the ''Palm Grove" property. Before ;us no argument was . advanced to.· show that during the life-time of Ramalingam this property had acquired ····the
character of movable property so th,at the decision of the Bangalore Court would operate as conclusive in the Madras • suit. The IHigh Court of Madras· rejected 'the contention of
.,_._, 3 S.C.R. – SUPREME OOURT REPORTS the 'executors that it must be deemed to have acquired the character of movable property. Our attention is not invited to any material in support
of the contention that it had acquired such a. character. Certain directions were, however, given by, the learned trial Judge observing that "the proce- · eds realised from "Palm Grove' constitute the
assets of Ramalingam subject to certain equities that !llay arise in favour of Narayanaswamy Mudaliar ………………… on the foot of the doctrine of quantum meruit to be determined in the final
decree or in the execution proceedings." We need express no opinion as to the true import of this direction, for Narayana~wamy Mudaliar who was . primarily concerned with the direction, dial not
prefer an appeal against that part of tp.e decree, and counsel have not asked us to interpret that part of the decree. The High Court observed t,hat in so far a.s the executors were concerned, all they
can in re~son ask is that such disbursements as being bona fide made should be regarded as proper- ly debitable against the estate and that they should not be surcharged in respect of such paym~nts, and
accordingly they added a qualification that the executors need not pay such sums as they had bona fide made to Na.raya.naswami Mudaliar in respect of that transaction either on the basis of quantum
meruit or as a partner of the business. In that view of the case the decree passed by the High Court on the footing that the plaintiffs are entitled to the immovable properties in Madras
and not the movables must be confimed. The appeals therefore fail and are dismissed. The High Court at Madras has held on the evidence, that the properties which were disposed Qfb1 Ramalingam by his will were not his separate
It. Yi.r#no!lrillthoin v. Rukn·ul-mullc 6.m/, .4biul W•jiti She'AJ. 1S6S R. Viahwantst_han v. Ruko·u/-mu/k s,,d Abiul Wojii Shah J. estate but were ·joint family properties, whereas
the Mysore Higo Court has taken a contrary view. We have· on a review of the evidence. agreed with the view taken by the Mar!ras High Court. Eviden- tly, as a res.ult of the judgment of the Myaore High
,Court the heirs of Ramalingam have lost property · of substantial value. We think that in the special circumstances of this case the plaintiffs should not be out of pocket in respect of the costs of this
litigation. We therefore direct that all costs of the plaintiffs between advocate and client, in the suit, the appeals in the High Court and in this Court ·should . come. out of the estate in the hands
of the executors. The remaining appeals may now be dealt with .4.. briefly. ·o. A. Nos. and 279, 280 of 1958 Appeals Nos. 279 and 280 of 1958 arise out of proceedings for revocation of probate granted by
the Madras High Court. In T. S. 0. No. 52 of 1944, Mr. Justice Chandrasekhara Aiyyar of the Madras High Court, by order dated July 17, 1944, gra.nted probate to the executors under the will of
Hamalingam . dated September ·10,, 1943. The learned Judge expressly stated in the order that the probate granted by him was subject to the result of the appeal filed to His Majesty-in-Council
against the order of the Resident's Court.at Mysore . . After the appeal to ~he Privy Council was disposed of for reasons set out in the principal judgment, by Petition No. 469 of 195;>., the plaintiffs and
Gajambal, widow of Ramalingani applied for revocation of the probate •granted by the Madras· High Court. This petition was · hea.rd together with Suit No. 214 of 1944. The learned trial
Judge ordered that the probate granted on July 17, 1944, be revoked. Against that order ari appeal was preferred by two of the executors to the . High Court of Madras. In appeal, the High Court
. rtw~rjcte4 the opef11-tioµ of the f\)VO~tjoµ, 41 so f~f '°'I ~· 3 S.C.R. EiUPREME COURT REPORTS II9 as it affected the immovable properties in Marlras anrl vacated the order in relation to the movables.
Against the order passed by the High Court, two Appeal~-Nos. 279 a'ld 2~0 of 1958 have been filed. (). A. No. 279 of 1958 is filed by the sons and wicl.ow of Ramalingam, and they have claim•id that
the order of revocation made by Mr. Justice Ra'Uaswami be confirmed. In Appeal No. 280 of 1958 filed by thA executors it is urged that t.he order of revocation be vacated in its entirety. At
the heiring of t;he appeals no substantial arguments were advanced before us. · Th9 executors did not contend that even if this Court hoJ.:ls, agreeing with the High Court of Madras that the will of Rama·
ling~m was inoporativ' in so far it purported to dispose of the immovable properties ,of the joint family of Ramalingam and his sons. at Madras the order granting probate in respect of the immovable
property should still continue to operate. They h we conceded before us that such an order revok· iug grant of probate when it has become infructu· ous because of a decision in a suit relating tO' title
to the property affected thereby may properly be made in exercise of the powers under s. 26:~ ( d) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The claim of the sons and the widow of Ramalingam for revo-
cation of the order granting probate by the Madras High Court in its entirety cannot be sustained because, for r~asons set out by this Court, they are unable to claim title to the movables of Ramalin·
gam in Madras. 'rhe appealu, therefore, fail and are dismissed with costs. Civil Appeal No. 281 of 1958 Th is appeal arises out of a suit filed by the executors undar the will of Ramalingam for
a qecl'l.ration that 2000 shares in the India Sugars & R. Vishwanalha!i y, Ruko-ul-mulk Sy•~ Abdul Wajid Ski\ J, '• ' JBll .. R . . Yish~ri~•h.J'l ' R~~~,.!'.1!fi1k s:~·a~·. AbJUJl~vaJj_~/-
8halLI; . sui>R.EME'COURT 1REPORTS [1963j Refineries Ltd., standing in the name of Vishwa- nath, in truth, belonged to Ramalingam and that be purchased the same for himself &nd ont of his
self-acquisitions but benami in the name of Vishwa- nath:and accordingly under the will of Ramalingam they were . entitled to those shares as part of the estate. Vishwanath resisted the suit contending
that the shares belonged to the joint family con- sisting of R'lmalingam and his sons and that· on the death of Ramalingam, his sons as surviving co- parceners became owners· of the entire property of
the joint family, including the shares. The trial Judge dismissed the suit fl.led by the executors. In appeal; the High Court of Madras held that the judgment of the Full Bench of the Mysore
J;ligh Conrt dated July 29, 1949, was conclusive as between the· parties as to title to those shares. The High Court accordingly allowed the appeal of the executors. Vishwanath has appealed against
the decree of the High Court rejecting his claim. For reasons ·set out in the principal appeals, we ere.of the view that the appeal must be dismis- sed. But we are of the view that the costs of
Vishwanath as between the advocate and client of and incidental to the suit and the appeals in the High Court and in this Court should come out of the ,state of Ramalingam in the bands of the
executors. Civil Appeal No 281of1958 This appeal arises out of Suit No. 200 of 1944; The executors sued Gajambal, widow of Ramalingarii :f6r a declaration that 2695 shares of the India Sugars & R.efineries Ltd. Standing in her
– name were purchased by Ramalingam benami qut of_his own. fonds and the same were his self- acqhisition; and they as executors of the will of the J\amalingam we~ eptitled to- 1hose a!iafel! 111n<lef
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT' REPORTS authority. vested in them under the will dated Sep· tember 10, 1942. The executors prayed for a declara- tion that the shares were held benami by Gajambal
for the benefit of Ramalingam as the true owner. Gajambal admitted that she held the shares benami but she contended that they did not belong to Ramalingam but to the co-parcenary of Ramalingam
and his sons and on the death of Ramalingam the · shares devolved upon the surviving coparueners and the executors had no title or right thereto. This suit was tried with Suit No. 214 of 1944.
The trial Judge held that the shares belonged to ' the joint-family of Ramalingam and his sons and the executors acquired no right to the shares under his will. In appeal, the High Court agreed with
the view of the trail Uourt as to the title to the shares, but, in their view, the judgment of the Mysore High Court in respect of movables including the shares in dispute was conclusive as to the rights
between the parties. The High Court accordingly reversed the decree passed by, the trial Court and decreed the suit of the executors. Against that decree Gajambal has preferred an appeal in this
Court which is No. 282 of 1958. For reasons set out in the judgem~nt in the principal appeals, it must b~ held that the judgment of the Mysore High Court was conclusive as between the executors and Gajambal
in so far as it related to title to the shares in dispute. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed. But we are of the view that the costs of Gajamb&l between Advocate and client of
and incidental to the suit and the appeals in the High Court and this Court should come out of the estate of Ramalingam in the hands of the executors. Civil Appeal No. 283 of 1958
This appeal arises out of a suit relating to an immovable propert1. Nos. 1 and 2 Waddels Road, R. Viahw.anathan v. RuTm-ul-mulk. Syed Abdul Wajid Shah J. R. V iabwanathan v. Ruk n~ul·mulk SJld
Abdul Wajid Shah J, Kilpauk, Madras. Of this property, the second respondent T. A. Ramchandra Rao was the former owner. There were court proce.edings in Civil Suit No. 10 of 1940 filed by Gajambal against T.A. Ram-
ohandra Rao, and a compromise decree was passed in that suit and pursuant to that· compromise, T. A. Ramchandra ltao sold the property to Gajambal by deed dated. August 7, 1940. The
executors of t.he estate of Ramalingam filed Suit No. 91 of 1944 in the High Court of Madras against Gajambal and T. A. Ra,mchandra Rao for a decla- ration that the Waddels Road property formed
part of the estate of Ramalingam and that Gajambal ' was merely a benamidar for Ramalingam, and for an order for possession of the property from Gajambal and T. A. Ramchandra Rao and for
mesne profits at. the rate of Rs. 50/· per mensem from the date of Hamalingam's deat.h till the date of delivery of p,ossession to the execut<Jrs Gajambal contended that the property belonged to her and
that it was acquired by her out of her own funds. T.A Ramchandra Rao denied the title of the execu- tors and also liability to pay mesne profits. The suit was also tried with Snit No. 214 of ; 9 l4. The trial
Court decreed the suit in favour of the executors but he declarep that the property belonged . to the sons of Ramalingam and they were entitled to possession and mesne profits. Against the decree
passed by the trial Court the executors preferred nn appeal to the High Court. The appeal was dismis- sed. In this· appeal filed by the executors the prin.cipal ground set up in the Memo of appeal is
th'}t the sons of Ramalingam were not , parties to the suit, and no decree directing the executors to deliver possession to the sons of Ramalingam could be passed. ln the principal appeals 277 and 278 of 1958,
W!:' kavl'l pe!!l fh!\>t .t~e e;ecutor~ did Ilo~ 9btaiq ~ n7 t 3 S.C.R. title to the immovable properties in Madras which were sought to be disposed of under the will of Ramalingam. It is true that to Suit No. 91 of
1944, the sons of Rama}!ngam were not parties. But a~ on the view taken in the principal appeals, the executors acquired no title to the property in suit -that being the property belonging to the joint
family to which Ramalingam belonged-interference with the decree passed by the High Court will not be called for. Counsel for the executors has advanced no argument in support of the appeal. We may observe
that T. A. Ramchandra Rao has set up a certain arrangement between him and Gajambal relating to his right to occupy the Waddels Road premises free of payment of rent, and it is his case that this arrange-
ment was confirmed after issues were framed in Suit No. 91 of 1944 between himself and Vishwanath. T.A: Ramcbandra Rao, it appears; did not prefer any appeal before the High Court of Madras against the
decree passed by the trial Judge nor did he attempt to prove the agreement set up by .him. He has not preferred any appeal against the decision of the High Court to this Court. We dismiss the appeal
filed by the executors. We may observe that for the purpose of deciding this case it is unnecessary to consider whether the arrangement set up by T. A. Ramchandra Rao is proved. The executors
will pay the costs of the first respondent Gajambal in this appeal. HrnAYATULLAH, J.-One Rama.lingam, .a prosperous contractor and businessman, died on December 18, 1942. "i'hree months before his death,
he executed on September 10, 1942, the last of his many wills. By that will, he cut off his eldest son, Viswanathan and a daughter, Bhagirathi, comple- tely from any benefit, gave some immovable pro-
pert;y and sqllore11 to his widow, small bequests to R. Vishwanathan v. Rukn-ul-mulk Syed Abdul W ajid . Shah J. Hidaya!u//ah J. R.f.V Whwan_f!.l/ii;itt . v. R,.,,,,.,.1,.,,…1~-6,Jl<d.
Abdtd W dji_d1l H ida;·alul/qh J. 124. SUPREME.COURT REPOR:r'S f1~63] his other daughters, his grandson, Tyagaraja, son of Viswanathan and his grand riaughter from Bhagirathi. From the residue of his vast estate
he directed that Rs. 50,000/- be spent over a ward in a hospital and the rest be applied for certain charitable purposes of a public nature. He appoin- ted three executors: (I) A. Wajid (a retired official
of Mysore State), (2) Narayanaswamy Mudaliar and (3) S. L. Mannaji RaQ. For sometime before his death, his relations with his family were . estranged and .the latter had gone to the length of starting
proceedings on June 2, 1942, under the Lunacy Act in the ·District Court, Chdl and Military Station, Bangalore, against him. Some evidence was recorded in that case, and medical experts were examined.
After the death· of Ramalingam, the executors applied for probate of the, will in the District Court, . Civil and Military Station, Bangalore. This was Suit No. 2 of 1943.· It was heard by Mr. P. Mada·
ppa, whc granted probate of the will on November 27, 11143. Two appeals filed against the decision (R. A. Nos. 1 and 2of1944) "'.ere dismissed by.the Court of the British Resident Mysore on July 5,
1944. A further appeal to the Privy Council was admitted, but it was later declared by the Judicial Committee to have become incompetent due to the Constitutional Changes in which
the Civil and · Military Station was handed back to the Mysore State. (P. C. Appeal No. 53 of 1948 decided on December l:l, 1949): Meanwhile applications for probate were also filed ' in the District Court;
Bangalore and the Madras High Court, some of the 'properties affected by the will• being situated; in these jurisdictions. Probate~ were granted but · suliject to the decision of the appeal before the Privy
Council. -~– f. We now come to other suit3, some proceeding from.the sons and widow of Ram~ling~m aI1d some, fro~,j;~ .. ~~toJB ~f.1 ~ wiit Th'11,were jil~!i ~ …. l 3 S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPoRTS
the Mysore State and in the High Court of Madras. Two suits wer13 filed by the sons of Ramalingam in the District Court, Bangalore and in the District Court, Civil and Military station, Bangalore respect-
ively. The first was Civil Suit No. 56of194:, and the second civil suit No. of 1944. These were suits for ·possession of properties, movable and immovable, together with the business
of Ramalingam. within the jurisdiction of these two Courts, on the averment that J amalingam belonged to a Hindu coparcenary, and was carrying on the family business started with the family funds.
These suits were directed against the executors and diverse persons said to be in possession of the properties. The plea of the executors per contra was that these were the personal properties and
business of llamalingam, over which he had full disposing power. The two suits were later consoli- dated and were decided in favour of the sons of Ramalingam by the District Judge. A third suit
was filed by the sons of Ramalingam in the Madras High Court (0. S.), and was numbered C. S. No. 214 of 1944 for possession• of ·properties, both movable and immovable, said to be situated in
Madras. A detailed reference will be made later to these properties. In addition to these suits many suits were filed by the members of the family and the e,xeoutors of the will in the Madras High Court (O.S.). These were
C. S. Nos. 200 of 1944, 203 of 1945, 274 of 1944, 344 of 1.946 and 91 of 1944. To these suits it is not necessary presently to refer. In all these other suits in Madras, the claim was for possession of
some specific property either under the will or on the averment that it belonged to a joint family. Leaving out of account the suits concerning specific properties for the present., the net position was
that C. S. No. 56 of 1942 and C. S. No. 60 of 1944 related to properties in Mysore State, and C. S. No. 214 of 194.4 in the Madr~ High Court related to 1112 — R. YW-nathan · ,•Batkn-ul-mulk Sy1ll
J.f.btlul w .;ill Hii&jil tull111a J. R, V ;shwanalban v. Rukn-ul-mulk $Hd Abdul Wajid /Iitlayatulltih J. SUPREME OOtJRT REPORTS [i963] pr~perties, movable and·. immovable, in Madras.
In both, · the main issue to be tried was whether Ra.malingam died a member of a coparcenary, possessed of joint family property and joint family business. The consolidated suit in the Court of the
District Judge, Bangalore,' was decided first and it was held that the properties were joint and that the will was incompetent. Two appeals were then filed in the Mysore High Court, R. As. Nos. 104
and 109 of 1947-48. The appeals were first placed· before Paramasiviah, C. J., and Balakrishariiah, J. They were adjourned at one of the earlier hearings, as a compromise was contemplated.
Later, the parties were at issue as to whether a compromise took place. According to the executors, none took place; but according to the family, it. did take · place. The ii ppeals were then · fixed for
September 23, 1948. On September 22, 1948, Para- masivhh, C. J., suddenly retired, and Mr. Medappa was appointed Chief Justice. The appeals were then 'placed before Balakrishaniah and Kan- I
daswami Pillai, JJ.: and the. question of compro- mise was raised. The High Court, however, did not enquired into the matter, since . it was of · opinion that the compromise, if any, could not be'
recorded. This. was on March 15, 1949. After the appeals were heard, the . two learned Judges differed, and they pronounced separate judgments on April 2,' 1949. Balakrishaniah, J., was for allo-
wing the appeals, a.nd_Kandaswami Pillai, J., for dismjssing them. According to the Code of Civil Procedure in force in Mysore State, the judgment of the District Court would have been confirmed,
unless a Judge of the Division Bench or both the · Judges referred the cas_e under s. 15 (3) of the l\l~ysore High Court Regulation, 1884. Balakrish' aniah, J., referred t_he appeals to r,; Full B.ench.
St1PlilWE COURT REPORTS The Mysore High Court then consisted of five Judges. Of these, one learned Judge had appeared in the case and wished to be left out. Of the remaining four, Balakrishaniah, J., had already
heard the appeals before, and expr0ssed his judg-· ment on the facts and the law involved in them. There remained three other Judges.-The Chief Justice, who had decided the probate case and
had passed some strictures against t-he familJ in his judgment, Puttaraja Urs, J. (who was appoin- ted in place of Kandaswami Pillai, J.), who had recorded the evidence in C. S. No. 60 of
1944 between 1945-47 and Mallappa, J., had almost no connection with the case. 'Ihe Full Bench th~t was constituted to hear the appeals then was composed of the Chief Justice, Balakri-
shaniah, J., and Mallappa, J. This Full Bench heard the appeals . or rather the arguments on behalf of the executors, since the family took no part in the hearing and their counsel withdrew.
Tbe appeals were allowed by the Full Bench, Mallappa, J., pronouncing the judgment, with which the other learned Judges agreed. Thi9 was on Ju.ly 29, 1949, the hearing having concluded on
the 27th July, that is two days before.· Civil Petitions Nos. 61, 62, 49 and 50 of. 1949-50 were filed to obtain a review, but were dismissed by the Full Bench on November 10, 1949.
Thus finished the Mysore part of the litigation. Before the Full Bench in the Mysore High Court heard the appeals, fruitless efforts were made by the sons of Ramalingam to induce the Maharaja to
appoint ad hoc. Judges to hear thfl appeals. Requests were made by them to the Chief Justice to grant them time, so that the tita.te authorities might be moved against and also to adjourn the· appeals on other
grounds. The sons of Ramalingam said that they were anxious to secure the services of outside counsel to argue the appeals, but the requests were R. V ishwanalhan v. Rukn·ul-mulh ~yed
Abtlul Wajid Hiday•tu/la.Ji J, R. Yishwanathan v. Rukn-ul-mulk Sy1d Abdul Wojid ·mdayatullah J. SUPREME COU&TiDiliP-ORTB [1963j rejected. These are all matters of renord, and there
is no dispute about facts, It was alleged in the Madras suit that there were unpleasant scenes bet- ween Medappa., C. J., and one Raju, counsel for the appellant, about which I shall say something
later, as the facts are in dispute. In short, the appeals were allowed, and the two suits were dismissed. This is a convenient stage to refer to. the pleas raised in the Mysore suits and the . reliefs
claimed therein. In this" connection, we need refer only to 0. S. No. 56 of 194:!. The case of the sons. of Ramalingam was that Rama,Jingam received his:father .considerable paternal estate, both movable
and immovable. The immovable property .was sold and with the proceeds of the sale . and other ancestral . assets, several businesses were started by him commencing with the business of a building
contractor in Kolar Gold Fields. He prospered in this joint family business, and all the properties were acquired from this nucleus and were joint family properties," and even if there was any sepa- ·
rate property it was thrown into the. common stock and became joint family property. Possession was thus claimed . of all the properties in the Schedules to the plaint including inter alia :
Schedule A : (1) Houses Nos. 1 · and 2, Waddell! Road, Madras (Item 13) (2) Palm Grove, Madras (Item 18) – (3) 18566 shares-India· Sugars. ani Refineries, Ltd., in the name ·of Ramalingam (Item 22)
(4) 1000 shares of the Indian Sugars and Refineries,, Ltd., in the name of A.'Wajid (Item 24) 3 S.C.R. i29 Schedule B: (1) Kolar Gold Field business(Item 1) (2) Vegetable oil building
contract (Item 5) (3) Oriental Films (Item 6). 'I'he executors denied that there was any ancestral nucleus or property or funds or business from which the estate was built up. They denied
the existence of a joint family business. Accord- ing to them, Ramalingam by his unaided enterprise carried on business for over 26 years and acquired all the properties in which no other member of the
family had any share. Later, the plaint was amend- ed to exclude the immovable properties outside the.State of Mysore. Suitable issues were framed to cover these allegations and counter-allegations
and all of them were finally decided in favour of the executors. The District Judge decreed the suit, but it was held by tbe Full Bench that none of the properties was aoquir~a with the aid of joint
family nucleus, and that the Kolar Gold Field business was the private business of Ramalingam. The decree of the District Judge, who had ordered possession of the properties in favour of the family,
was reversed. The suit in the Madras High Court had been stayed to await the dicision of the Mysore suits. In that suit, possession of the movable and immov- able properties in Madras was claimed. The immo-
vable properties were : (1) House No. 1, Weddells Road, with land. (2) ·House No. 3, Weddells Road, with land etc. (3) Some parcels of land. (4) House No. 14, Monteith Road, Madras.
The movable properties were : R. V i•hwon ithan v. Rukn-ut-mu/k SJld Abdul Wajid H iioyolullah J, R. Vishwanathan v. Rukn·ul0 mul! Syed .Abdul Wajid li;M,,atulloh J. ….. -· (1) Assets of Oriental Films, Madras.
(2) 18366 shares of Indian :;ugars and l'tefin· eries Ltd., J;Iospet. (3) 1000 shares of Indian 6ugars and Refin- eries Ltd., Hospet. (4) Balance of the amount for building cons- tructed for the Mysore Vegetable Oil Co.,
Madras. It was stated in the plaint that since the executors had objected to the jurisdiction of the Mysore Courts to entertain the claim in respect of the proper- ties situated in Madras, another suit was being.
filed. The same pleas about the joint family, · r: its nucleus, its family members were raised. The defence was also the same. When the judg- ment of the Mysore High Court ·was relied upon
by the executors as conclusive on the point of jointntss of the family, its nucleus and the joint character of the Kolar·. Gold Field business, the sons of Ramalingam alleged that the judgment
was not in accordance with the rules of natural justice, that the decision was ooram non Judice, and ·that the Chief Justice and Balakrishniah, J., were not competent. Judges, due to their bias and interest,
to sit on the Bench. In the course of numerous affidavits, the eldest son, Vishwanathan, made several allegations showing the interest arid preju- ..J~ dices of Med!ippa, C. J., his conduct in and out
of Court, and the violation' of the rules of natural '"°"' justice by the Full Bench, over which he presided. Similarly, the presence of Balakrishniah, J., who had already given one judgment in the .case and
had attempted a compromise between the rival parties, was alleged to rende1· him incompetent to sit on the Full Bench. On the other side, the exe- ->__._· cutors claimed that the Mysore High Court. had
finally decided the issue of jointness in relation 3 S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS 13i to all property, movable and immovable. They claimed that in this suit the questions of jointness
of the family, the character of the Kolar Gold Fields business and ·the absence of nucleus must be taken to have been conclusively decided in the Mysore suits and appeals, and could not be reopened.
The sons of Ramalingam denied that the Mysore Court was ri. Court of competent jurisdiction, in so far as the property in Madras was concerned. In short, the executors claimed that the Mysore
judgment, in so far as any matter decided therein, was conclusive, while the family maintained that it was not a Court of competent jurisdiction and the judgment was itself coram non judice, and had
been rendered by violating the principles of natural justice. The first fight thus was under s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thougn numerous· facts were alleged to show bias and interest on the part of the Chief Justice,
the parties went to trial on one alle~ation only. The allegations against Medappa, C. J., were ; (a) -,.'> that he was a close friend of A. Wajid, (b) that he had decided the probate case, had heard
the witnesses now relied upon and had already formed pronounced opinions about them and his judgment in the probate case was in danger of being annulled by the decision of the District
Judge under appeal before him, as the latter had held the family and the properties to be joint, (c) that when he was a District Judge, he was using a '""' car belonging to the executors and was thus under I
their obligation and also interested in them, and ( d) that he had tried to dissuade Mr. Raju, counsel for the sons of Ramalingam, from conducting this oase. Rajagopalan, J., who heard the suit in the
-A earlier stages, selected from the allegations two which, according to him, if established, wer capable of establishing an 'interest' and a 'bias' in Meddappa, C. J. He declined to frame issues about
fl. riJll1t1t11111JIMil v. Rukn·Uf·mulk s,,a, Abdul WaJiJ Hii.yalullah J, R. Yi1h11Gmdhan ., .. RuJen-ul..mulk S1•d .4b~ul Wajiil Hi«&y.cullah J. SOPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) the other allegations. The two selected allegations
were the use of the car and the attempt to dissuade Mr. Raju. Rajagopalan, J., also held that the judgment of the Mysore High Court, did not constitute res judicaf,a at least in- respect of the
immovable property in Madras, (it) because this -l· _- question was not considered by the Mysore High Court due to amendment of the plaint, and (b) because the Mysore Court had no jurisdiction to try
it. Against the decision of Rajagopalan J., both sides appealed. The executors were aggrieved by the decision a bout res judicata and the enquiry into the conduct of the Chief Justice, and the sons of
Ramalingam, by the restricted enquiry into the ,conduct of the Chief . Justice. Tbe "Divisional· Bench, which heard the appeal, ,agreed with Rajagopalan, J., about res judicata, and affirmed
. that part of his order. The Divisional Bench held that the incident of the µse of the car was too old, even if true, to show interest and was not relevant. The issue regarding the dissuation of Mr. Raju was
allowed to stand. The allegations against Balakrishniah J.; · were that he had suggested the compromise when . sitting with Paramasiviah, C. J., and had discussed, the terms, that he had thus rendered himself a
witness, that he made strong remarks against the family during the hearings of the appeals when sit- . ting with Karidaswami Pillai, J., and the same were expressed in his judgment dated April 2, l 949, and
that he showed his bias by awarding costs not out of the state but against the sons of l{amalingam. He was said to be incompetent to sit on the Full Bench in view of his judgment already pronounced. There
were general 'allegations about the refusal to adjourn the hearing at the request of the sons of Rama- lingam, and even when Sir Alladi Krishanaswami ·I 3 S.C.R. A•~, Ayyar, the senior counsel, was to be absent on
public work in the Constituent Assembly. The parties then went to trial before Rainaswami, J. More affidavits and countar-affida- vits were filed. Though fresh evidence was also led
in this suit, by consent of parties the evidence recorded in the two Mysore suits was treated as evidence in this suit. The records of these suits and of the Privy Council were also marked by
consent. The executors a.sked that the question (Jf the application s. 13. of the Code of Civil Procedure be tried as a preliminary issue. This was declined and a Letters Patent Appeal and one to t.his Court
also failed. The affidavit filed in this Court were also marked in the case. Among the witnesses exa.mined in the case were Vi~wanathan, the eldest son of Ramalingam, and Puttaraja Crs, J., for the plaintiffs,
and Abdul Wajid, Narayanaswami Mudaliar and Balakrishniah, J., for the other side, Medappa, C.J., and Haju were cited but were not examined. After a protracted trial, Ramaswami, J., held that the
judgment of the Full Bench of Mysore was coram non fudice and that the judgment was thus not conclusive under s. 13 of the Code of Civil ProcedurP,. He further held that the properties in
snit were those of a join,,t family. The claim of \, the sons of l\amalingam, was thus decreed, and possession was ordered against the executors and –,. also accounts. Ancillary orders were passed in
the other suits already mentioned, which were tried along with the main suit, C. S. No. 214 of 1944. The executors appealed under the Letters Patent. The Divisional Bench upheld the findings
~ about the joint family, but reversed those about the Mysore judgment being coram 'IZ<m. judice. As a f6B~lt the Mysore judgment ''""'~ held to bin<l the l JfJ6fl R. Vishwonathan
v. Rukn-ul-mulk Svrd Abdul Wapi Hid~J atullah J. B. VishrHinal1ian v. Rukn-ul·mul• s,. d Abdol WaJU 11.iiayalull11~ J. 13<1 SUPREME COURl' REPORTS [196~] Madras Courts in respeot of the movables but not in
respect of the immovable property in- Madras. .From the judgment of the Divisional Bench, Civil Appeals Nos. 277 and ~78 of 1958, have been filed respectively by the sons of Ramalingam and the
executors. The sons of Ramalingam raise the issue that the judgment of the Full Bench of the Mysore.High Court was coram non judice and not conclusive in respect of immovables, · while the
executors claim that it is conclusive in respect of .<tny m&tter decided by it, particularly about the Kolar Gold Fields business· being the private business of Ramalingam, contending that the only
point that was open for decision in the Madras High Conrt was whether any ~tem of property was acquired without the funds of that private business. Thou~h these appeals were argued at
considerable length the points were only two. They are : I. the application of s. l;l of the Code of Civil Procedure from these view points, viz., (1) ~· violation of the principles of natural justice, (2)
bias and interest of some of the Judges constituting the Full Bench, (3) competence of the Mysore Courts as to the controversy between the parties and the extent of that competenoe ; and II. whether
Ramalingain died in the(jointness and whether the estates left by him inoluding his businesses belong · ! to the joint family, the sons of Ramalingam being the survivors. "~,- Section 13 ·of the Code of Civil Procedure
reads: · "13. A foreign judgment shall be con- J elusive as to any matter thereby directly adjudicated upon between the same parties or Qti~ween partie8' tµider wh,mn the;r or an;r of
.\. ' ,_,,,' -, . 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORT'S them claim litigating under the same title· except- ( a) where it has not been pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction ; R. Vishwanathan
Rukn•ul-mulk Syed Abdul Wajid ( b) where it has not been given on the Hidayatul/ah J · merits of the case ; ( c) where it appears on the face of the proceedings to be founded on an
incorreot view of international law or a refusal to recognise the law of British India in cases in which such law is applicable ; ( d) where the proceedings in which the judgment was obtained are opposed
to natural justice ; (e) where it has been obtained by fraud ; (f) where it sustains a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in British India." It will thus be seen that the case was sought
to be brought under els. (a), (c) and (d) of the section by the sons of Ramalingam, while the executor deny the allegations and claim the benefit of the opening words. I shall, therefore, take up
these matters first and shall consider the evidence before deciding how far, in law, the judgment is . conclusive, if at all, I shall follow the same order which I have set out. The first head is whether during the hearing
of the appeal by the Full Bench the principles of natural justice could be said to have been violated. This question divides itself into two parts. The first part concerns the actual hearing and the second
the composition of Benches. The first contention is tJi~t t)le full Bench did not give a. fair hearing ancl v. Rukn-ul-muli Syed Abiul W~jii Hidayatulloh J. compelled the case of the sons of Ramalingam to go
unheard. This was said to have arisen from the refusal to adjourn the appeals as requested by the sons of Ramalingam. Now, such a question can hardly be considered by another Court not hear-
ing, an appeal but deciding whether the conduct of the Judges of foreign Court wh'o heard the appeal, amounted to a violation of the principles of natural justice, unless an- extremely clear and strong case is
made out. The conduct of a case is a matter ordinarily for the Court hearing it. All that is stated is that the sons of Ramalingam were hustled and not granted some adjournments, when they asked for
them. Whether a particu!Ar prayer for adjournment ought to have been granfed is hardly a question for another Court to decide. In this case the conduct . of the sons of Ramalingam cannot be said to be
entirely correct. It is ll1attN of record that from the moment the names. of the Judges of the Full Bench were announced they had no desire to have the case heard and decided by them. Admittedly,
they made applications to the Maharaja and Dewan for the appoint:nent of ad hoc Judges. The attempt to get the appeals adjourned was based on two reasons : firstly to avoid the presiding Judges, or at
least two of them, and secondly, to enable Sir AlladiKrishnaswami Ayyar to appear for them. The attempt to secure adjournments were not only to suit their senior counsel but also to play for time
. to get ·other Judges appointed, if possible. As to the senior counsel, it is enough to say that there were other counsel in the case, but the sons of Ramalingam asked them to withdraw from the
case. This was not done bona· fide but merely to force the Court to grant an adjournment it had earlier refused. In my judgment, the sons of . Ramalingam had Jong notice of the date of hear-
ing, and if they wished to engage other counsel, they had ample time and OP}Jortunity to do so. It 'jl'as ar~ued t}lat t}le apfeals were ad~ourned · o~.c9 by the Full Bench to accommodate counsel for the
executors, but when Sir Alladi asked for a.n ad- journment, it was refused. It was said that this showed a double standard. It is common know- ledge that an adjournment is eometimes given
because it is asked betimes but not another, if delayed. . All Courts do that. Perhaps, the Full Bench might well have granted an adjournment for a short time specially as the sons of Rama-
lingam were nervous about the result of their appeals. But I do not consider that I shall be justified in reaching the conclusion that by the refusal, the principles of natural justice were
violated, when I notice that three other counsel were already briefed in the appeals "and one of them had argued them before the Divisional Bench, I am thus of opinion that it cannot be held that the
principles of natural justice were violated so as to bring the judgment within the ban of cl. (d) of s. 13 of the Code. The next question is the composition of the Full Bench, apart from the conduct of the Judges.
Here, the objection is that Balakrishniah, J., was incompetent to sit on the Bench after his views already expressed in his dessenting Judgment. Now, it is clear that the two learned Judges who
had heard the appeals, had differed and had deli- vered separate judgments. It was contended that Balakrishniah, J , was incompetent to make the reference, because no sooner Kandaswami Pillai
J., delivered his, than the judgment of the District Judge, with whom he agreed, stood confirmed by virtue of s. 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure in force in Mysore State. In other words,
Bala- krisbniah, J., had missed his chance to make a reference, because he had already delivered his judgment and the other Judge having delivered his, the result under the Code follow.
The action ~f Balakrisbniab, J., taken under s. 15(3) of t~e R. V1iAwanatlian v. Rukn-ul-mulk Sved Abdul W~1id Hidayatul/ah J. , R. Vishwanathdt v. Rukn-ul-mulk Sfttl Abdul Wojid Hid ryatullah J.
Mysore High Cnurt Regulation, 1884, was said to be too late to arrest the oonsequences of s. 98. In my opinion, this argument has no substance what- ever, and I think that it would not have been argu-
able if there was no authority to support it. I do not think it necessary to enter into the niceties of the question when is a judgment final, that is to say, whether on pronouncement by the Judge or
on his signing it.. The very interesting argument of the counsrl for the sons of Ramalingam may be left to be decided in a better oase. If the ar6ument is acceptrd, some curious results will follow. Either,
Balakrishniah, J., had to make a reference without waiting for his. brother Judge .to deliver his judg· inent. or to lose his right because no sooner Kanda- swami J illai, . J., read his judgment to tho 'lnd
than the judgment of the District Judge would be confirmed. In faot, whoever delivered the judg- ment first would lose. his turn to make a rderence• It is obvious that Balakrishniah, J., would wait in
common courtesy for his .brother Judge to ddiver his judgment before making the reference. The . judgment of Balakrishniah, J., ends with the order of reference and t.hen follows his signature. What·
happened reall,v does not appear from the record but is conta.ined in affidavits, which, to my mind, should not have been read in this aonnection. It is obvious that the reference was made before tb.e
jndgment was perfected by .the signature. No doubt, there is a rulling of the Allahabad High Court in Lal Singh v. Ghansham Singh (1), but the practice of the Mysore High Court was authorita-
. tively established by a Full Bench decision of that court in Nanjamma v. Lingappa ('). In view of the cursus curiae thus laid down, the Allahabad view,. even if right, cannot be applied.
In my .opinion, the appeal stood properly referred to the Full Bench. \ll !1811'1) J.'!,-ll. 9 ~II~ ~2 V949~ .. D,J-R,MJ'OfO ~111. j 3 S.C.R. The next oontention is that Bala.krishniah, J.,
eat on the Full Bench after expressing his view on the merits of the appeals in a. long and considered . judgment. It was contended that this deprived the sons of Ramalingam was of a proper hearing before
a Judge who had not made up his mind already. There is considerable room for doubt on this point. There have been several cases before, in which Judges who have made a reference to a larger Bench
have sat on the Bench, even though they had ear· lier expressed an opinion. Some of them have also changed their views later. Here again, the practice of the Court must receive 110me attention.
_ The learned Attorney-General drew our attention to three cases of the Mysore High Court in which precedents are to be found. He also drew our attention to cases from the other High Courts in
India and of some Courts abroad. In some of the foreign cases, judges have sat in a Bench hearing case, after decision by them, iri appeal or re-hear- ing. Of course, one need not go so far as that in
our country, though in cases under cl. 26 of the Letters Patent of the Chartered High Court, Judges who have presided over Sessions Trial have sat at re-hearing after the certificate of Advocate-Genera].
Examples of both kinds of ca.see are to be found in the Law Reports: See Emperor v. Fatihchand Agar- walla (1), Emperor v. Barendra Kumar Ghose(2 ). The learned Attorney-General drew our attention
fo the Encyclopedia of Laws and precedents (1906) Vol, 23, p. 588 and American Jurisprudence (1958), Vol. 30A, p. 76, para 187 and William Cramp & Sons v. International Curtis Marine Turbine Co.(")and
Rex v. Lovegrove (4). In some of the ear liar cases the practice was quite common due to the smallness of number of Judges: See, for example, Rohilkhand & Kumaon Bank v. Row ('), The
Q~en Empress v. Saminda Chetti {'), Seshadri (I) (1917) J.l.R.« Cal.417. t2) AJ.R. 1924 Cal. 257. ~3) (1912) 57 J.. J!d. JOIJ', (4) (1951] 1 All. E.R. 804. 15) (1884) 6 All. 469. (6) l l88S) J.l,Jl.7 ~ad. '7t.
R. Vishwanalha11 v. R•1kn-ul-mullc Sye d Abdul Wajid H ida,ratullah J, 18E2 R. Yishwonathan v. Rultn-uJ-mulk SyltJ Abdul 'Yajid l/idayatullah J. SUPREME. COt{RT RE?Q~TS (1963] Aypangar v. Nataraja Ayyar (1).
There is no law to prohibit this, and in a small Court with limited number of Judges, this may be unavoidable. It is not to be expeoted'that ad hoc Judges would be appointed every time such a situation a.rises.
But what we have to guide ourselves by is the practice obtaining in the Courts with which we are dealing. If the practice there was common and inveterate no litigant can be said to apprehend reasonably
that he would not get justice, There are no less than four oases of the Mysore High Court in which a similiir procedure was followed, in addition to those already cited. In my opinion; in view of the
strength of the Court and the practice in vogue, the Judgment of the Full Bench cannot, on the circums- · ta.nee, be described as against the principles o~ natural justice. The next c:mntention in support. of the plea
that the decision of the Mysore High Court was coram non judice and against the principles of natural justice charges the learn•id Chief Justice and Balakrishniah, J., with unjudicial conduct
and prejudice and the former with interest in the · executors. · It is convenient to take the allegations iigainst the Chief Justice and Balakrishniah, J., separately. As regards the Chief J ustioe, it will be recalled
evidence was allowed to be led only on the question of. dissuading Mr. Raju from appearing in the case. But no direct evidence was led. What transpired be.tween the Cheif Justice and Mr. Raju
(If something did trftnspire) could only be depose,d to by one of them. None el~e was.present at that ·meeting, and neither was examined in the case. Mr. Raju had by then been imprisoned after trial and
cpnviction for an attempt on the life of Chief J us; tice, al)d was not avaiJa.b]e for examina:tjo~. H f¥,ICq\I'\ fll \~398) I :µt: 21 Mad· !19, 3 S.C.R. Su':PR:roME COURT RE)PORTS
that no serious effort was made to get his teoti- mony, and it is now said that 'legal difficulties' prevented his examination. But whatever the difficulties, the record shows that the sons of Rama-
lingam voluntarily gave up Raju as a witness, an<l now it is too late for them to complain of 'legal difficulties.' Nor can they for that reason make the worse appear the better reason. The other also
gave up Medappa O .• J. Indirect evidence wais, of course, sought to be led, but it does not help either party, and the party which must fail must obviously be the party which made the allegation. Here, the
sons of Ramalingam suffer from another disability. Viswanathan himself wrote letterl!I to say that the allegations were false, and were made under advice, referring most probably to Mr. Raju. No doubt,
these admissions were sought to be withdrawn but only when confronted with the btters, though Viswanathan, at first, denied their existence. The explanation was that these letters were written
under the pressure of Wajid. In view of the basic fact that the allegation itself was not proved by evidence, it is pointless to decide whether the letters were written under undue pressure. I can only say
that if Wajid's 1widence appeared to be untrue in part, Viswanathan impressed me even less. The fight over the dissuading of Mr. Raju thus, at. best, ended in a stalemate, if not wholly against the
sons of Ramalingam. Having failed to establish the only issue which was specifically raised, there was an attempt to revive the allegations on which evidence was not allowed. Reference wa.R made in this connection to
certain passages in the cross-examination of Wajid and the evidence of Viswanathan. This wa.s on the use of a car belonging to the estate by Mr. Medappa some years before, when he was the District Judge.
The foundation of R. l'tsh1Manalhan v. Rulcn-ul-ntulk )y•tl Ab.tul W~ii. Iltiiayotu/lah J. R. V ishwanathan v. Rukn-ul•mulk Syed Abtlul W l!i id Hiiayatultah J, SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [I963j
this allegation was in affidavita sworn by Viswana- than, who seems to have begun· each day of bearing with an affidavit. These affidavits were denied by the other side through Wajid's affidavits. This vehement
war of affidavits only resulted in the intere1t'ed testi- mony ofViswanathan, on the one side, and Wajid, on the other. The matter has thus to be examined rarefully. The evidence was not related to any
specific issue, there being none raised in the caset. Most of the evidence was in affidavits, which do no appear to have been ordered and could not, for that reason, be read as evidence. Such evidence as. there
was, was highly interested and uncorroborated from any independent souroe. The affair was extremely old even if true, to establish an interest, such as V17ould disqualify a Judge from hearing the case. In these
circumstances, it is evident that the case alleged, oannot be held to have been established. Next was the allegation of friendship between Medappa, C.J., and A. Wajid arid Manaji Rao. Mauaji
J:tao faded out as an execut.or, and took hardly any interest in his duties as such, and cannot, therefore, be said to have been a potent factor to interest Medappa, C. J. In support of his allegation that
Medappa, C. J,, and· A. Wajid were great friends, Viswanathan swore a few affidq,vits. A fairly long affidavit (No. 440 of 1950) in the High Court was reproduced in its entirety by Ramaswami, J., in his
Judgment. Some other affidavits were sworn in this Court when certain proceedings for a writ 'of prohibition were started, and they were also read in the High Court and were read to us.
Making a selection from these affid~ vita the allegations may be stated briefly as follows : . Medappa, C. J., was the Chief Steward of the Bangalore Raoe Club and A. Wajid, his Secretary, that A. Wajid was visiting
Medappa, C. ,J'., at the latter's house when the probate oase was going on and that they were great friends. It was also alleged that Chfof Justice 3 S.C.R. SUPRE?d.E COURT REPORTS
Medappa's attitude during the probate case was extremely hostile to the family, which was later reflected in the judgment of that case, and that Medappa, C. J., was extremely worth, when Viswa-
nathan asked him not to sit on the Full Bench and the Chief Justice forced Viswanathan to disclos~ the name of the <.Jounsel who had advised the move and said that he would see what to do with him .
All these . allegations were denied by A. Wajid both in affidavits and in his oral testimony. Balakrish· niah, J., was questioned about what happened in the Court and gave evasive replies .
The rule of law about judicial conduct is as strict, as it is old. · No Judge can be considered to be competent to hear a case in which he is directly or indirectly interested. A proved interef'!t in a
Judge not disqualifies him but renders his judg- ment a nullity. There is yet another rule of judicial conduct which bears upon the hearing of .case. In that, the Judge is expected to be serene and even-
handed, even though his patience may be sorely tried and the time of the Court appear to be wasted. This is based on the maxim which is often repeated that justice should not only be done but should be
seen to be done. No litigant should leave the Court feeling reasonable that his case was not heard or considered on its merit. If he does, then justice, even though done in the case, fails in the doing of
it. Can we say that Medappa, C. J., was so inter- ested .as to be disqualified, or that he acted in a manner that his conduct in Court was a denial of justice ? Apart from the fact that A. Wajid denied
familiarity, though not acquaintance with Medappa, C. J., there are no instances of undue leaning in favour of the executors. What happened in the case was engineered by Mr. Raju, as the letters of
Viswanathan himself suggested. The family which R. Vishwanathan v. Rukn-ul-mulk S,J1d Abdul Wajid Hidayatul/ah J. 196S R. JI ishwancdhan . v. Rukn-ul-mulk Sye~ Abdul,;WGjid Hitl•y•lullah J.
did ·not k.now how to get on the right side of a father, however obdurate, acted in muoh the same way with the Court. Their conduct on and from the announcement of the Full Bench was calculated to
exasperate and annoy any Judge, who held his own reputation dear. Of course, the more Medappa, C. J., showed irritation, the more Raju and liis clients got pubJicity value, which they hoped to
exploit with the Maharajah. In my ·opinion, the .conduct of tlie·aons of Vishwanathan was studied and designed to further their move for a different Bench.· If we leave out of consideration the
dissuading of Raju, as to which also there is no evidence, and the use of· the estate car, about which also there is no evidence, there remains a vague allegation of deep friendship denied on the otherside and •not
pro~ed otherwise by independent evidence. I say independent evidence, because the evidence .of Puttaraja Urs, J., about the conversation between him and Medappa, C.J., about this case oanriot be said to be disinterest:
ed became the witness had his own grievance against the Chief Justice, which he was ventilating to all . and sundry. He even went to the length of repor- ting to the Chief Justice of India. I am not required
to pronounce upon the truth or otherwise of Puttaraja Urs, J's personal aspersicins on Medappa, C.J., but is it obvious that he cannot be regarded as a witness who can be trusted to have taken no sides.
That leaves only the fact that Medappa, C. J., had heard and decided the probate case against the family. But I do not think that thiR circum- stance was enough to disqualify him from sitting on
a Bench to hear a case in which more evidence has been led. This happens frequently in all Courts. The same <lonclusion is also reached, when one · examines the allegations about the conduct of
Balakrishniah, J. There too, the allegations are in affidavits. These allegations are that Balakrishniah, J., made hostile remarks against the ·case of the sons of Rama.Jingam, while hearing the appeal with
a s.c.i:t. stJl>REME COtJRT REPORTS Kandaswami Pillai, J. If every remark of a Judge made from the Bench is to be construed as indica- ting prejudice, I am afraid most Judges will fail to
pass the exacting test. In the ,course of arguments, Judges express opinions, tentatively formed, some- times even strongly ; hut that does not always mean that the case has been prejudged. An argu-
ment in Court can never be effective if the Judges do not sometimes point out what appears to b~ the under lying fallacy in. the apparent plausibility thereof, and any lawyer or litigant, 'who forms an
apprehension on that score, cannot be said to be reasonably doing so. It has frequently been noticed that the objection of a Judge breaks down on a closer examination, and often enough, some Judges
acknowledge publicly that they were mistaken. Of course, if the .Judge unreasonably obstructs the flow of an argument or does not a.Bow it to be raised, it may be said that there has been no fair
hearing. The remarks of Balakrishniah, J., which have been quoted in the case do not bear that suggestion. He seemed to have formed opinions as the argu- ments proceeded, and if he had kept them to him-
self, there would have been no complaint. It is because they were expressed that there is one. No doubt, he expressed his opinion in the judgment and then. sat on the Full Bench. But I have explaia-
ed already that due to the retirement qf Kanda- swami Pillai, J., the incompetence of one other learned Judge who had acted as a lawyer, the choice was between him and Puttaraja Urs, J.
Perhaps that would have been equally objected to on the other side, as subsequent events disclosed. In any case, there was to be a rehearing, and if the Chief Justice, included Balakri,hniah, J., following
the inveterate practice of his Court, it is too much to say that the judgment was Coram non judice, or the principles of natural justice were violated. The further contention that Bala.krishniah, J., had
R. Vi.ihto0ft•llt1111 v. R~kn.·ul·mullt Syf(l .(bfiul W ojid Hiiayatullah J. 1962. 11. Y lsh;.anolhan llukn·ol-mul.t Syed A..iul W•Jill Hitl#.JGlu//sh J. SUPREME COURT REPOf-lTS [1963]
rendered himself a witness because the terms of compromise were discussed before him, loseH all significance in the face of the order that the com- promise, -if any, could not be recorded in the
interest of the estate. . Un a review of these allegations, I am not satisfied that the sons of Ramalingam have made an acceptable case. It cannot, therefore, be said that cls. (a) and ( d) of S. l3 are applicable, and
that the' judgment of the Mysore Full Bench is not conclusive. I should· not be taken to hold· the view that the hearing was without incident, or that the conduct of .these two Judges was always cor-
rect. But all the facts are overlaid with exaggeration and perjury, and no definite conclu- sion can be reached. I am, however, quite olef.l.r that the evidence falls far short of that degree of
proof which would entitle another Court to say of a foreign judgment that it was coram non judice or that it had been rendered violating the princi- ples of natural justice. I shall next consider the competence of the
Mysore Courts and the l'Xtent of the conclusiveness of the judgment of the Fn II Bench under s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. To decide these points, it is necessary to examine critipally . the.
pleas in the cases in the Mysore Courts and the decision on those pleas. In so far as the decision is concerned, I shall confine myself to the judg- ment of the Full Bench, for its is only the final
judgment, which can be considered conclusive. The suits were filed on identical pleas. Two suits were necesaary, ·because the property was situated in the jurisdiction of two different Courts.
In any event, both the suits were consolidated after the return of the Civil and Military Station · to the Mysore State. The suits were filed for declaration that . the properties were joint family
{. ,. ……. – a s.o.R. i47 -*· properties, that Ramalingam had no right to dis- pose of the same by a will, and for possession and accounts. As against this, the executors had contended that the properl ies were self acquired.
The basis of the claim of the sons of Ramalingam was contained in the following paragraph : "The. said V. Ramalinga Mudaliar came into possession of movable and immovable properties including some houses in Aruna-
chala Mudaliar Road, Civil and Military Station, Bangalore, which had belonged to his father, Vaidyalinga Mudaliar. The said properties were sold of by Ramalinga Muda.liar and the sale-proceeds were invested
in several businesses. In or about the year 1928 the first plaintiff · (Vishwanatban) joined his father and actively assisted him in the several businesses of the family. Apart from the fact that there was a nucleus
of ancestral property with which the busines- ses were carried on, the plaintiff submit that. the adult memb~rs of the family, viz., the first plaintiff and late Mr. Ramalinga Mudaliar were actively associated with the
family businesses and that all the properties were treated by Ramalinga Mudaliar as family properties.'' In dealing with the case, the Full Bench gave the following findings : (1) That Vaidyalinga Mudaliar who was
away In Shimoga and Mysore working as District Sheristadar had nothing to do with the contract business at the Kolar Gold Field Mines; (2) That Shanmuga borrowed Rs. 2000/- on a pronote, in which his father joined, from
a Bank and did business wiih it successfully ; JllJt R. YishWl&llfll/111n Rultn-ul-11111/k SY•i .l.bi/ul 1' ajii/ Hii/ayatu/lah J. R- Via"°ano1Aan v. Rutn-ul……ik S;ed Abdul 'WoJicl.
HiJayatullah J. i4s • {' ,v ' : ' (3) ' That this money was returned by Shanmuga to his father ; (4) That the other brothers, acknowled- ged in writing tha.t they had no title or interest in the business of Shanmuga which
were his self acquisitions ; . ( 5) That Ramalingam joined Shanmuga as a partner and later brought out his interest; (6) That Ranralingam did not come into possession of any movable property of his
father ; (7) That even if Ramalingam sold the houses left to him by the father they were his ·~ exclusive properties bequeathed to him by • Vaidyalingam whose self-acquisitions they
were ; (8) That the claim of the sons of Ramali- ngam that the properties were acquired with . the aid of the joint family nucleus and that werefjoint~familytproperties was disproved.
.,.!~ In the result, it was that the business and posses- sions were not of those of a joint family but the separate properties of Ramalingam. The question whether these finding or any of
them are conclusive in the subsequent litigation in Madras has been raised in connection with· the 18366 shares of the Indian Sugars and Refineries Ltd., by the sons of Ramalingam, who seek to 'r,.,.
avoid the Mysore judgment and in respect of the immovable property in Madras by the executors who claim the benefit of the s>tme under s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Though the question
is mainly one of interpretation. of s. 13, the argu- men ts were · reinforciid by reference to Book. s on , … Private International Law and oases decided by ,.. English Courts. , ..
3 S.C.R. The law as contained in s. 13 has been the result of an evolution. In the Code of Civil Pro- cedure 1887, the subject of foreign judgments was a part of the law of res judicata. It was enacted
in s. 14 that, "No foreign judgment shall operate as a bar to a suit in British India- ( a) if it has not been given on the merits of the case ; (h) if it appears on the face of the pro-
ceedings to be founded on an incorrect view of international law or any law in force in British India ; ( c) if it is in the opinion of the" Court before which it is produced contrary ·
~o natural justice ; (d) if it has been obtained by fraud ; (e) if it sustains a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in British India." That the section was to take its colour from the
preceding section ( 13) which dealt with res judicata is made obvious by the VIth Explanation to the latter section, which read : "Where a foreign judgment is relied on, the production of the judgment duly authen-
ticated is presumtive evidence that the Court which made it had competent jurisdiction, unless the contrary appears on the record ; but such "presumption may be removed by . proving the want of ;jurisdiction."
There was one other section (s. 12), which laid down the circumstances for the application of · the doctrine of Lis Alibi Pendens, with which we flle not concernedi IHll R. Vishwanathan
Rukn-u/-mulk Syed .1bdul Wajid H id~yatu//ah J . lt. Yiibw.inaela.at1 v. Nuh-ul-mulkSJ•I A•iul "•jU Ii iiaJ•tull•h J. . In the Code of 1882, an Explanation was added to s. 14 by Aot VII of 1888 (s. 5) that the
Courts in British India must examine, in a suit based on a foreign judgment of any foreign Court in Asia and Africa. (excepting a Court of Record established by Letters Patent of Her Majesty or
any predecessor of Her·Mll,jeety or a Supreme Con- sular Court established by an Order of Her Majesty in Council) the merits of that judgment when it was pleaded as a bar in a suit before the
Bdtish Indian Courts. Thie was obviously done to prevent the judgments of the Courts of Indian States to be placed on an equal footing with those in European Countries. The Governor-General in
Council was, however, given the power to declare which Courts in the Inci.ian States could have their . decrees executed in British India as if they were decrees passed by a British Indian Court. Some
Indian States were so declared, and it is interesting to know that Mysore State was one of them. In the Code of. 1908, with which we are concerned, the ban against the judgments of Indian
States.was removed and a. 14 was re-enacted as s. 13, and Explanation VI was ·re-enacted with slight modifications of language as s. 14. The change between the old s. 14 whioh worded in a
negative way ands. 13, which states affirmatively that a foreign judgment shall be conclusive is significant, and lies in the fact that duri~g this time there was . a corresponding advance in the
theories of Private International law in England .. But this much is evident that in dealing with the question of foreign judgments in India, we have to he guided by the law. as codified in our Country.
That , law attaches a presumption (though rebuttaihle) of the competen:Jy of the Court, whioh pronounced the · foreign judgment. '°' It makes it (a) conclusive (b) as to any matter
tltere by directl;r ad~udicat~d bet!een the 88¥1'? 3 S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title. The conditiovs precedent are contained
in six clauses of which the first clause is that it must be pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction. It may be mentioned at this stage that· e. 41 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that a final
judgment, order or decree of a competent Court in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdictions shall be relevant and also conclusive proof as to certain legal character. The
contention on behalf of the executors has been that s. 41 of the Indian Evidence Act provides the rules for judgments in rem, while s. 13 of the. Cod~ of Civil Procedure provides for judgments in personam
and the only judgments in rem are those mentioned in s. 41. To this argument, I shall come later. The first point to decide is whether the Mysore Courts were competent to decide the controversy
which they de'cided. What is meant by competency can be looked at from two points of view. There is the internal competency of a court depending upon the procedural rules of the law applicable to
that Court in the State to which it belongs. There is also its competency in the eye of international law. The competency in the international sense means jurisdiction over subject-matter of the con·
troversy amd jurisdiction over the parties as recog· nised by rules of international law. What is meant by competency in this context was stated by Blackburn, J., speaking for the Judges in answer to
the question referred by the House of Lords lin Castrique v. Imrie (1). Relying upon Story's Conflict of Laws, the learned Judge observed: "We may observe that the words as to an action being in rem or in person.am, and the
common statement that the one is binding on (1) 0870) L.ll. f IJ. L. fH. 196! R. Vishwanathan v. Rukn·ul-mulk Syed Abdul Wojid Hidayatul/ah_J. ~· Yis./J114atUhan l!ub-ul-lliulk. SJ•t
A~iul Wi.jii , Hida_,citul/ah J. · third persona and the other not, are apt to be -K used by English lawyers without attaching any very definite meaning to those phrases . We apprehend the true principle tci be that
indicated in the last few words quoted from . Story. We think the inquiry is, first, whether the subject-matter was so situated as to be within theJawful control of the State under
the authority of which the Court sits; and secondly, whether the sovereign authority of that State has conferred on the Court jurisdic- tion to decide as to the disposition of the
thing, and the Court has acted within its jurisdiction. If these conditions are fulfilled, the· adjudication i's conclusive against all the ·world." · . Story's exact words are to be found in para. 586
of his Book, and this is what the learned author . said: "In · order however to found a proper ground of recognition of any foreign judgment in another . country, it is indispensable to
establish that the Court pronouncing judgment should have a lawful jurisdiction over the cause, over the thing, and over the parties. If the jurisdfotion fails as to either it is …
treated as a mere nullity, having no obliga- tion, and entitled to no respect beyond the domestic tribunals. And this is equally true, whether the proceedings lie in rem or in personam or in rem and also in personam".
T·he opinion expressed by Story here is, in its tum, based on that of Boullenois in his Trait,e et de 'la Personnalite et de la Realite des Lois Ooutumes ou Status, (1766) Vol. I, pp. 618-620.
The law stated by . Blackburn,. J.,,has been universally llCC€pted by B n the Courts in 'the Jj:n~lish s~eakin~ coµµtrifs aµ.~ it was ~uoted r-·~tp .k :I 3 S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
approval recently by the Privy Council in lngenohl v. Wingh On&:: Go. (1). No distinction in approach to the question of competence is made between cases in rem and in personam. In Pemberton v.
Hughes (2). Lindley, M. R., stated the law relating to competency to be this: "Where no·substantial justice, according to English notions, is offended, all that the English eourts look to is the finality of the
judgment and the jurisdiction of the court, in this sense and to this ·extent-namely, its competence to entertain the sort of case which it did deal with, and its competence to require
the defendant to appear before it. If the court had .jurisdiction in this sense and to this extent, the courts of this country never enquire whether the jurisdiction has been properly or improperly exercised, provided
always that no substantail injustice, according to English notion~, has been committed. Th!'re is no doubt that the courts of this country will not enforce the decisions of foreign courts which have no jurisdiction in
the sense. above explained -i.e., over the subject-matter or over the persons brought before them: Schibsby v. Westenholz (•): Rousillon v. Rousillon (4); "Price v. Dewhurst(6) Buchanan
v. Rucher ( 6) Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v. Rajah of .Faridkote (7). But the jurisdiction which aline is important in these niatters is the competence of the Court in an inter-national
sense-i.e., its territorial competence over the subject-matter and over the defendant. Its competence or jurisdiction in any other sense is not regarded as meterial by the courts of
(I) A.I.R. 1928 P.C. 83. 12) (1899) I Ch. 781. (3) (1870) L R 6 Q.B. 155. (+1 1883) 14,Ch. D. 351. ~5) (1838) 4 My. Cr. 76. (6) (1808) 9 Est. 192, ~7) [1894] A. C. 670, 11Mft R. Vi,hw•natlion
f!ukn-ul-m!IZk Syed Abdul Wajitl. H iia_yatullah J. IlfB R. Vuhwanalhan v. Rukn·ul-mulk S,,,,. A•dtd WaJid Hiday<Jtullah J. .3UPREME OOU.RT REPORTS [1963] this comatry. This is pointed out by Mr.
Westlake (International Law, 3rd ed. s. 328) and by Foote (Private International Juris- prudence, 2nd -ed. p. 547), and is illustrated by Vancuelin v. Bouard (I) … It may be safely said that, in the opinion of
writers on international purposes, the jurisdic- tion or the competency of a Court does not depend upon the exact observance of its own rules of procedure … A judgment of a foreign court having
jurisdiction over the parties and subject- matter-;-i.e., having jurisdiction to summon defendant before it and to decide such matters as it has decided-cannot be impeached in this
country on its merits: Castrique v. Imprie (2 ) (in rem); Godard v. Gray (') (in personam); Messine v. Petrococchino (') (in personam). It is quite inconsistent with those cases and also
with Vanquelin v. Bouard (1) to hold that rnch a judgment can be impeached here for a mere error in procedure. And in Castrique v. lmprie (2) Lord Colonsay said that no inquiry on such a matter should be made."
The dint.um of Lindley, M. R., goes a !,it too far in reducing internal want of jurisdiction to nothing. It may be that the judgment, of the foreign Court may be a nullity, and it would be too
much to say that full faith should be given to such a judgment. Indeed, in England, this part of dictum was not applied; Papdopoulos v. Papado· poulas ('). That apart, in my· opinion, the above
passage admirably sums up the law connected with the competency of the foreign Court. Mere irregula- rities of procedure in the exercise of jurisdiction by (I) ·1863) 15 C.B. (N.S.) 341.
(2) (1870) LR. 4 H.L. 414. \ 3) (Itr;O) L.R.6 Q. B. 139. (4) (1872) L.R. 4 P.C.144. \5) p9301 J,'. ~' 3 S.C.R. SUI>REME COURT REPORTS the foreign Court are not enough: See Ashbury v.
Ellis (l ); but a total want of internal jurisdiction may have to be noticed if pleaded in answer to the foreign judgment. There is no real difference in so far as competen0y goes between actions in rem a.nd
actions in personam. In some actions in personam, the necessity of jurisdiction over any patticular thing may not arise. This is alwayR necessary in judgments in rem relating to immovable property.
Besides this a judgment in persona.m binds only the parties, while a judgmeJ'.!t in remi seeks to bind others also. Thus, the objection to the jurisdiction of the Court in a foreign country on other than
internatio:ial considerations, must be raised in that country. This is settled in Vanquelin v. Bournd (2). Objections to it internationally can be raised i11 the Court in which the judgment is produced. But even
if the objection to the jurisdiction be raised in the Court where the judgment is produced, that Court will consider in a.ct.ions in rem whether the foreign Court had jurisdiction over the 6ubject-matter and
t.he defendant and also in actions in personam, whether the jurisdiction was possessed over the subject-matter and the parties. In the approach there is no difference. · In the latter class, of cases,
the English Courts consider the defendant bound where:- ( 1) he is the subject of the foreign coun- try in which the judgment has been obtained: (2) he was resident in the foreign country
when the action began ; (3) he, in the character of plaintiff, has sel- ected the forum in which he is afterwards sued; (11 ~IR93l A.C.. ~ 19. 344. l2) (IR!!3) 15 C.B (N.S.J 341,.
196S R. YishlDIJn<>lhan v. Rukn-ul-mulk S.1 ed Abdul W oJid · Hidayilullah J, ' 1961- R. Y i•lrwanatlian v. Bukn-ul-mulk ·f>:J<d dbdUl W•Jid ll'i6 ( 4) he'has vohi.ntarily appeared ;
(5} he has contracted to submit himself to theforum in which the judgment was obtained. Hidayatullah J. ' I leave out the sixth ground added by Becq. uet v. Ma.cCarthy (1 ), as it has not been universally
endorsed and has btien said ·to go to the verge of the law. In addition to these, the English Courts take into conside;ration the conduct of the party raising the objection against the foreign judgment. If he,
has plaintiff, invoked the jurisdiction of thi- foreign Court, he cannot be allowed to complain against the judgment on the ground of competence. This was laid down in very clear terms by Blackburn,
J., in Schisby v. Westenholz (2 ) as follows : "Again we think it clear, upon principle, that if a person selected,. as_ plaintiff, the tri- bunal of a foreign country as the one in which
he would sue, he could not afterwards say that the judgment of that tribunal was not binding upon him." ·The contrary case is General Steam N a"igation Oo. v. Guillan('), where the conduct of the defendant
was not held binding. Recently, in Harris v. Tayalor ('), appearance conditionally by a defendant in ·a foreign Court to objeot to jurisdiction was considered not to be the sort of conduct to bind him,
but in Travers v. H_olley('}, Denning, L, J. (as he then was), has made certain obiter remarks against the last case, Since I am not concerned with the conduct of a defendant before a foreign Court but
that of_ a plaintiff, I need not rafer to these cases in detail. I I) (183') 2 B. & Ad. 951. . (2) (1870) L. R. 6 Q. B 155, (3) (1843) I) M. & W. 877. 894. (4) [1915] 2 ICB, 580, \5) p953J P.246,
3 s.C.R. Applying these tests to find out if the Mysore Courts were competent to deal with the case both internally and internationally, it is clear that they were. The subject of the controversy was the
stl\tus of Ram!l.linga.m, a subject ,and resident of Mysore State. His will made in that ju.risdiction wa.s admitted to probate there. His sons and other relative• who figured as parties-and those in poss-
ession of the property were in that State. The property which was the subject of dispute, includ- ing the Kolar Gold Fields business situated in My- sore State, but excluding the shares in the Indian
Sugars and l{efi1,ieries Ltd., (Which are disputed as to their situs) was also in Mysore. The sons of Ramalingam themselves commenced the two suits and invoked the jurisdiction of the Mysore Courts.
They claimed that the Kolar Gold Fields business belongQd to a joint family and not to Ramalingam alone. They in fact, succeeded at first, but lost on appeal. In view of these considerations and.
applying the dicta of Blackburn, J ., and Lindley, M. R., the conclusion is inescapable that the Mysore Courts were competent internally as well as inter- nationally to decide about the status of Ramalingam
and the rights to or in the Kolar Gold Fields bus· iness between thes 0 very parties. It may be men- tioned here that the competence is to be judged in relation to the subject matter of the suit in the
foreign Court and not in relation to the subject- matter of the suit in another country where the judgment is produced. Ex faeie, the Mysore Court exercised no jurisdiction in respect of the proper·
ties in Madras. They were never the subject-mat- ter of the Mysore suits and that subject-matter is wholly irrel.evant when considering the competency of the Mysore Court. What has to be considered
is the effect of the Mysore judgment upon the litigation in Madras in view of s. i3 of the Code. If, then, the Mysore Courts were Courts of compet- ent jurisdiction, the question, i1 how far a.re the
J901 R. V iJhwanalhaft v. Rukn-,,t-inulk Sysd Abdul Wpjid Hidayatullah J. 19~2 R. Yi1hwanathan v. ~_,,,ulk SmJ AW11t WaJitJ Hiayoturlah J. 158. SttPkEM~ count REPOR'l'S (1963) judgments conclusjye. The properties, with whioh
we a.re concerned, are the 16,000 odd shares of the Indian Sugars an~ Refineries Ltd., and the immov· · able properties in Mairas. The executors claim that in respect of the aha.res there is a decision
between the parties and in respect of the immov- able property, no question of status of Ra.m&linga.m or the ownership of the Kolar Gold Fields business can be reconsidered in view of the Mysore judgment
while the other side seeks to a.void the judgment altogether. Numerous cases from English Law Reports and some standar.d te:x:t-books on the subject of Private International La.w or. as it is sometimes ..
called, the Conflict of la.w, were cited in support . by the rival parties. It may, however, be said at the sbrt 'that the treatment of the subject in Iadia. is somewhat different from that in England. In
. out" country, the binding force of a judgment a.rises ps.rtly from adjective law and partly from the law of evidence. The Subject of res judicaf,a, which is baa- ed upon a. rule of public policy as expressed in Coke
on Littleton as intere8t rei puhlicae 1-f,t sit finis litium is · ·ma.in]y to be found in the Code of Civil Procedure, . while the evidentiary value of Judgments is dealt with in the Indian Evidence Act. In England, t~e subject
of res judicata is mainly dealt with as· pa.rt of the la-w of evidence, and a former judgment is said to c·reate an estoppal by record. The subject of the con- clusiveness of foreign judgments ie dealt with in
India. in the law of procedure, . while in England it is dealt with as a part of Private International Law~ This Jaw is not to be taken as a kind of law binding upon the States of the world a.rising
out of a communis consensus of the States. Th~re is no such consensus, though reciprocal laws exist. Ea.oh Country decides for itself how far the foreign judgments will be reoeived.
A foreign ';..:_ _{- ~ s.c.:R. SUPREM'.l!.': COURT RJllPOR'l'S judgment receives different treatment in different parts of the world. Apart from reciprocity between different Countries which have agreed to be mutually
bound, there are numerous approaches to the problem. In some Countries, direct enforcement of such judgments, if registered in the Country of origin, is permitted in the same way as in ss. 44
and 44A of our Code of Civil Procedure. In others, the judgments (unless reciprocal agreements exist) must be sued upon. There too, the question arises whether the original cause of action merges in the
judgment-transitu in rem judicalum, or survives. In some Countries like France, the judgment 01 a foreign Court is subjected to scrutiny, while in some of the Nordic Countries, the judgment has no value.
In TaUack v. Ta/lack (1) jurisdiction was refused, because the judgment of the English Court would not have bound the parties in the foreign Country. Numerous rules have been evolved in England
and the English speaking Countries, mainly by Judges, which show the extent to and the conditi- ons under which the judgments is received. In America, the f{estatemf:lnt has done much to sim-
plify the subject, but even so, it has proved inadequate. The subject has been made so compli- cated that one learned oothor has been provoked to say. "In one respect the la.w of Conflict of
Laws is nothing but an unmitigated nuisance, serving no useful purpose whatever." (Leflar -The Law of Conflict of Laws (1959) para 8 of Introduction). The salient point of English law on the
subject may be stated to be that all judgments are divided into two broad categories-judgments in rem and judgments in personam. The best defin- (1} (19271 P. 2II. R. Yia'-inathar.
v. Rukn·ul-mulfo 8y1d Abdul WaJi' R idayatullah J. 1) J96B R. V ishwanathatt v. Rukn-tll-mul_Jc Sfld Abdul WaJid Hidc7atul/ah J. $UPREME COUR'r REPORTS (1963) defitions of these terms are to be found in Halsbury:s
Laws of England, Vol. · ~2, p. 742, pata 1605, which reads: "A judgment in rem may be defined as the judgiµent of a court of competent jurisdi- – . ction determining the status of a person
or thing, or the disposition of a thing, as · distinct from the particular interest in it of a party to the litigation. A judgment in personam determines thE· rights of the· parties
int.er se to or in the subject matter in dispute, whether it be corporeal property of any kind whatever, or a liquidated or unliquidated demand, but· does not affect the status of
either persons or things, or m ~ke any dispo-. sition of pr.operty, or declare or determine any interest . in it except as between the parties litigents. .Judg- ments in personam include all judgments
which are not judgments in rem but, as many judgments in. the latter cla5s deal with the status of persons and not of things, the description 'judgments inter partes' is preferable
to 'judgment in personam'. The definition of Halsbury is merely a resta.tement of a· definition given by Bowers, and it has been ac"epted and applied by Evershed, M, · R:, in Lazarus-Barlow v. Regents Estates Co. Lt,d. ( '). Such
judgments, says l'hipson on Evidence, 8th Edn., p.401, are conclusive, .in – the case of judgments in rem against parties or their privies . or stran- ger•, and in the case of judgments in personam,
against the parties and t.beir privies only. In the matter of foreign judgments, the rule about judg- ments in rem bas been somewhat reduced in its extent in one direction and extended in another
in recent years in England. In the matter of (I) (1949) 2 ·K.B. 465, 475. y_· a s.c.R. status, it has been extended to give more and more faitn to foreign decrees but in the other direction,
it has been curtailed. In respect of things and determinations of rights or title to things (exoluding immovable property as to which I shall say some- thing later} judgments in rem are now confined to
Admiralty actions. There is, however, a remnant in respect of movables, which is represented in the three rules of Westlake (s. 149) which are: (a) judgments which immediately vest the
property in a certain person as against the whole world; (b) judgments which decree the sale of a thing in satisfaction of a claim against the thing itself; and ( c) judgments which order movables to be
sold by way of adminil':ltration. This distinction is summed up by Holmes, C. J., in Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration (1), as 'follows: "If the technical object of the suit is to
establish a claim against some particular person, with a judgment which generally in theory, at least binds his body, or to bar some individual claim or objection, ,so that only certain persons are entitled to be heard in
defence, the action is in personam, although it niay concern the right to, or possession of, a tangible thing ……… If on the other hand the object is to bar indifferently ail who
:r;night be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established, and if any one in the world has a right to be heard on the strength of alleging facts which,
if true show an inconsistent interest, t,he (I) (1900) 175 Mass. 71. R. V isAwanalhan v. Rukn-ul-mulk S;ed Abdul W ajid Hidavatul/ah J. R. VishwanatJ.an v. Rukn-ul-mulk …S)t£ .Abdul Wajid
proceeding is in rem ………… All pro.ceedings, like all rights, a.re really against persons. Whether they a.re proceedings or . rights in rem depends on the number of persons
affected." (Cheatham-Cases and Materials on Conflict of Laws, p. 168). . This elassic exposition, which has evoked the admiration of every text-book writer and also the. .5'~., Privy Council in lngenohl v. Wing On & Go. (')
sums up in an admirable manner the distinction between the. tw9 kinds of judgments. I shall now follow up and analyse the application of these pri.nciples in Englap.d and America where the law 1s almost the same, and
then show how the subject has been treated in the India Statutes. In dealing with this subject,· I shall not enter upon two subjects. They are the reciprocal arrangements and Arbitral awards, which
are two olasse~ apart. The first condition of reco- gnition of a foreign judgment is, of course, the competency of a foreign Court, about which I have said much already. The next condition is the
absence of fraud of collusion. Further still, the judgment which is propounded must not offend the public policy of English law, or must not be contrary to the principles of natural justice.
Barring these, the judgments of foreign Courts are received in actions based on them and gi..-en effect to under certain conditions arising from whether they· are in rem or in personam.
I have shown .x.. already that the judgments in rem are .concerned with res. But the word "res" is given a very large " meaning. Lord Dunedin in Salvesan v. Administr- ator of Austrian Property (
) observed '. . "The other point on which I want to say a few words is the question of what is a judg- . (I) A.J.R. 1g2s P.C. 83. (2) (1927) A.C. 641, 662. . J….I a S.C.R. SUPREME COURT Rll.:PORTS
…… ment in rem. All are agreed that a judgment of divorce is a judgment in rem, but the whole arP:ument of the judges in the Court of Srssions turns on the distinction between divorce and
nullity. The first remark to be made is that neither marriage nor the status of marriage is, in the ·strict sense of the word, a res, as that word is used when we speak of a judg·
ment in rem. A res is a tangibl0 thing within the jurisdiction of the Court, such as a ship or other chattel. A metaphysical idea, which is what the status of marrige is, is not strictly
a res, but it, to borrow a phrase, savours of a res, and has all along been treated as such. Now, th~ learned Judges make this distinction. They say that in an action of divorce you have to do with a res, to wit, the
status of marriage, but that in an action _of nullity there is no status of marriage to be dealt with, and therefore no res. Now it seems to me that celibacy is just as much as status as marriage."
See a.lso the observations of Lord Haldane at pp. 652-653. Commenting upon that case, Cheshire (op. cit. sup) says at p. 657: "Thus the word res as used in this con- text includes those human relationships, such
as marriage, which do not originate merely in contract, but which c&nstitute what may be called institutions recognised by the l::ltate." • In the same way, adoptions in foreign Countries
which were not recognised in England at one time are now being recognised. See Dicey's Con- flict ofLaws, 7th Edn., p. 460, particularly p. 461 where Dicey's Original view is shown to
b~ ;–.j obsolete. The subject of adoption is being treated R. Vishwanalhan v. Rukn-ul-mulk Sreti Abdul Wsjiti . Hiti&ystulld J, 19.§~ R. Vishwanathan v~, ' . – Rukn·ul·mulk Syed Abd.ul. Wajid
.HiJa.Y~ruliah J. 18<ic SUPREME'COUR',r REPQRTS 11963] as in pari materia ·with legitimation. Cheshire's views expressed in his book (pp. 442·443) show that on the analbgy of a case like In re Goodman's ~
Trusts ( 1) they are being equated. Cheshire then oi;iserves in forceful language: · "The genius and expansion of the common law would indeed wither away if the traditi- · onal practice were to be abandoned of applying
the principles already established for one ,<w type of case to another type substantially similar in nature." He then concludes that the existence of Y's status as fixed by the law of the domicile common to him
and his adopter must on principle be recognised in England. In England, judgments in personam . whic~ are anc~lla~y to such jud~ments in re:m. were _ 'y considered bmdmg at one time, see Phillips v.
""'- . Batko ('); but the view has since chang'ed somewhat. As regards the extent of conclusiveness of foreign judgments, the subject again gets divided into two parts .. Judgments in rem, according to
Foote on Private International Law, 5th Edn., p. 625, are received in respect of any matter decided ·</ ·. by them. The following passage gives his views : "Accepting then, as incontro.vertible the
principle that a foreign judgment in rem is conclusive in all Courts and against all parties, it remains to consider to what its con- clusiveness has been held to extend. As to the fact direot~y. adjudicated upon there can x
be no doubt; but there is often difficulty in;·· applying the principle to facts i~feren~!allr decided, as well as to the grounds, expressea or implied, of the foreign decision. The. sli.fes't
expression of the English law on the· subje'ct appears to be that the truth of every fact, (I) (1881) 17. C.H.D. 266.. (2} (1913) 3.K;B· !192. a s.o.R. which the foreign Court has found, either as
part of its actual adjudication or as one of the stated grounds of that decision, must be taken to be conclusively established." He, however, adds that the foreign Court will not be taken as having estaqlished any fact which it
has not expressly found as laid down in the judg- ment relied on. Short of this, not only the actual decree but every adjudicative fact is treated as conclusiv':}ly decided. Rattigan in his Erivate Inte-
rnational Law at p. 268 observes: "'l'his conolusiveness extends to every fact which the foreign Court has found, either as part of its actual adjudication or as one of the stated grounds of its decision,"
Dicey in his Conflict of Law, 7th Edn. (Rule 183) states the law in concise form: "A foreign judgments is conCJusive as to any matter thereby adjudicated upon and cannot be impeached for any error either.
(1) of fact (2) or of Jaw". )., In so far as judgment in personarn are concerned, any of the mattus decided inter partes are binding -,>. "' oil the parties and privies, though not on strangers. 'Tliis follows from the rule now firmly grounded that
a foreign judgment well be examined from the point of.;view of competence but not of its errors, subject, of course, to there being no fraud, collusion, breach of ~~e principles of natural justice or of public
~ policy of England or a wrong apprehension of the r · Jaw of England, if that law be involved. From the cppc)usiveness of foreign decreet>, it may be sii.i(l J9U2 R. Vishwonalhan
Rukn-ul-mulk Sy<d Abdul Wajid Hida;atullah J. R. Vishwonathar. Ru/m·ul·mulk Syeo .tltiul Wajid Hida,'}Jrifullah J. here that the penal laws of another Country or judgments involving a penal decree are excluded.
It is customary to quote Chief Justice Marshall's famous dictum in the Antelope (1): "The Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another." The same is the position of decrees, orders or judir-
ments in· matters of taxation and penalties under taxing laws. · The American Courts follow in these respects the law in England, and Goodrich in his Conflict of Law, p. 603, sums up the American
approach in · one. pithy sentence : "A valid foreign judgments ~hould be rHognized and given effect in another State as a conclusive determination of the rights and obligations of the parties. This is the
modern doctrine." He adds further : "On principle, the foreign judgment should be conclusive. The judgment has deter· mined that, under the law of the State where it was rendered, the plaintiff has or has not
certain rights, and that the defendant is or is not under certain corresponding legal obliga- tions, Those rights and obligations exist in · the State where the judgment was rendered
so long a.5 the judgment remains in force. When such a judgment is presented for recog- nition and enforcement in another State, it ought to be trea.ted no less favourably than any suit founded llpon foreign operative
facts." · Indeed, there is now a liberal approach in res- pect of immovable property outside the jurisdiction. At p. 217, Goodrich has cited instances of recogni- tion of· foreign judgments in respect of matters
which, normll.lly, would not come within the iurisdi- ction of the Court. He says : 11) (1825) iO 'Meat If, m. 6L. Jld·21i11· . '….-./ 3 S.0.R. SUPREME COUJl,T REPORTS "Plaintiff. asks defendant, who is before
the Court, be compelled to execute in plain- tiff's favour a conveyance of land which lies outside the State. Is there any defect in jurisdiction because the land is in another State? It is clear that the Court could not
make its decree operate directly to convey the land nor could it effectively authorize a master appointed . by the Court to make the decree if the defendant were unable or unwill-
ing to do it. ''But if, at the situs of the land a deed executed elsewhere wiU be recognized as effective, the Court may order defendant, who is before it, to execute a deed conveying
the land. This power bas been exercised by the Court even since the time of the historic litigation between Penn v. Baltimore (1), and is recognized in innumerable decisions." The same views have been expressed by Stumberg
in Conflict of Laws (2nd jj;dn.), p. 69, Nussbaum in his Principles of International Law (1943), pp. 299, 235 an~ others. In India, the la.was to conclusiveness of judg- ments is contained in ss. 40-44 of the India Evid-
ence Act and ss. ll-14 of the Code of Civil Proce- dure. Section 41 of the former makes certain special kinds of judgments conclusive, while s. 11 makes judgments in India and s. 13 makes foreign
jud~ments conclusive under certain conditions. I shall first analyse the sections in the Indian Evi- dence Act. Section 40 makes the existence of a judgment etc. which by law prevents any Court
from ta.kinll' cognisanc~ of a suit or holding a trial, a relevant fact when the question is whether such Court ought to take cognisance of such suit or hold such trial. This enables a judgment, order or dec-
ree, whether of a Court in India or a foreign Court, (I) (17511) I Ves. Sen. 444. R. ViJhwanathan v. Rukn-u/-mulk Sy1d Abdul Wajid Hiday . tullah J. R. Yitthwan!ft~an v. Rukn-ul-mulk Sje:l
Abdul IV ojid HidaJafullah J. to be propounded for the particular purpose men· tioned. Section 42 next mentions that judgmente etc. other than those mentioned in s. 41, are rele- vant if they relate a matters of public
na~ure relevant to the enquiry, but such judgments, etc., are not conclusive proof of what they state. The illustration shows What is meant by matters of a public nature. Section 43 then lays down that judg·
ments etc., other than those mentioned in ss. 40, 41 and 42, are irrelevant unless the existence of such judgments etc., is a fact in issue or is relevant •under some other provision of the Evidence Act.
Section 44 savs lastly that anY. party to a suit or other proceeding tnay show that any judgment etc., which is relevant under ss. 40, 41 or 42 and which has been proved by the adverse party was
delivered by a Court not competent to deliver it or was obtained by fraud or collusion. Section 41 which·! left out, provides for relevancy of certain kinds of judgment and for their conclusiveness.
It reads : "A final judgment, .order or decree of a coinpetent Court, in the <'Xercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency juris- diction, which confers upon or· takes away
from any person any legal character, or which declare~ any person to be entitled to any Sl!ch character, 9r to be entitled t·o any specific thing, not as against any specified person
but absolutely, 'is relevant when the existence of any such· legal character, or the title of any such person to any such thing is relevant. Such judgment, order nr decree is conclusive
proof- . that any legal character which it confers; accrued at the time when such judgment; order or decree came into operation ' · that any legal ·character tn which it declares llon1 Bl!ch person · .t!l be
e~titled, aoor1*eq t9 that person at the time when such judgment, order or decree declares it to have accrued to that person: that any legal character wbich it takes &way from any such person ceased at the time
from which such judgment, order or decree declared that it had ceased or should cease; and that anything to which it declares any person to be so entitled was the property of that person at the time from which such
judgment,· order or decree declares that it had been or should be his property." The judgments mentioned in this section are called judgments in rem. As far back as Y arakalamrna v. Ankal.a (') distinction. was made between judg-
ments which bound only the parties to it and judgments which bound also strangers. The terms of Roman Law which divided law into quod ad res pertinet and quod ad personas pertinet furnished the
root, and this classic distinction has been taken as the foundation. In Kanhya Lal v. Radha Oharan( 2) Peacock, C.J., gave a list of judgements in rem, and that list has been followed in framing s.41. The
list of such judgments is much longer in Taylor on evidence, and the present day Private International Law includes all question of status within it. Sir James Stephen is reported to have said that he
included only those judgments to which conclusive- ness could be given from the point of view of the law of evidence and the conclusiveness attaches as to a given matter of fact relevant to the issue, which
may be proved from the judgment. That there may be other provisions, of some other law which may also attach conclusiveness to judgment etc., of some other kinds goes without saying. Section 41
does not prohibit the making of other laws. The (l) 2 M H.C.R. 276. (2) (1867) 7 W.R. 336. R. Vishwanathan v, Rul:n-ul-mulk Syed • Abdul Wajid H ida.iatullah J. B. Vishwonathan v.
Ruk,..ul-mulk Syed .Abdul ;YGjid Hidayotu!lah J. 170 . SUPREME CO~T REPORTS (1963) provisions of s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for example, go much farther than s. 40 ors. 41 of
the Indian Evidence Act. Section 40 touches only the fringe of the law of res judicata ; but provision . for that has been made m·ore exhaustively in s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The difference between provisions in the law of evidence and the law of procedure is that one deals with the question of proof and the other, with a bar of suit. A fact which cttn be proved from a judg'llent l!lade c0.n-
clusive for that purpose need not be proved afresh. The proof of the judgment is enough. But a second suit can only be barred on the principle of res jUdi- cata if the . law says so ; and this bar is regarding
the adjudication of a controversy decided before. It is not possible to. add to the list of· subjects mentioned in s. 41 of the Indian Evidence Act, except by legislation. Conclusiveness there attaches
only to the subjects mentioned therein, and a fact established by a judgment of a competent Court on any of the subjects is taken to be proved, and established in all subsequent proceedings and does
not require to be proved again. The Judfcial Committee in Appa Trimbak v. Waman Govind (1) did not extend the principle of s. 41 to a cas·e of adoption and a former judgment on the question of adoption was considered under
s. 11 of the code and not under "· 41 of the Indian Evidence Act. The former judgment was not accepted under s. 11 of the Code as it did not· come within its terms, and the fact was allowed to
be proved de nova. The reason given for the non- applicability ofs. 41 was said to be that the deci- sions on adoption were excluded by Sir Barne Peacock in Kanhya Dal . v. Radha Charan (2) and
also in s. 41. From the above,· it follows that conclusi- veness, from the point of view of the law of fll i\.I.R.19~Irf·~· (2) '(J667J'W.R.33!1· ,,__.., .,__~ .• ·v 3 S.C.R. evidence, will attach to a judgment, order or
decree, only if it falls within the categories mention- ed in s. 41. Once a judgment etc. faHs within it, the law dispenses with the proof of the fact and the conclusion of the former judgment etc., about
the legal character which it confers or declares, together with the declarations of property arising from that legal character, is final. In my opinion, the conclusiveness under s. 41' of the Indian
Evidence Act cannot be claimed in this case for the Mysore judgment in view of the enumeration of certain jurisdictions in the section, bacause the status of being joint or separate in relation to a
Hindu coparcenery property is not one of the legal characters mentioned in it. The question thus to consider is whether s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure is confined to those judgments, which do not fall within s. 41, or in
other words, to judgments in personam as contended by the learned Attorney-General. There is nothing in the language of s. 13 to suggest this, as the section provides a genera.I rule about foreign judg-
ments and makes them conclusive between 'the same parties or between parties under whom or any of them claim litigating under the same title. From the mention of parties and their privies, it
does appear as if the section is confined to judg- ments inter partes, to borrow the language of Hals- bury. But a comparisoQ of the terms of the section with those of ss. 40-44 of the Indian Evidence Act
discloses a different meaning. Section 41 speaks of a competent Court, and s. 44 allows tl~e question to be raised whether the judgment was obtained by fraud or collusion. But ss. 40-44 of the Indittn
Evidence Act do not contain certain provisions which are contained, in s. 13 as conditions prece- . dent to the conclusiveness of foreign judgment. It j.lt i:nconceivable that a foreign jud~ent in rem of
R. Vishwanatha11 v.' Rukn-ul-mulk Syed Abdul Wajia Hida,v~ruU1h J, I96t R, Yi1hwanatlran v~¥-… Rukn""'l•mulk S)ed Abdul W ajftl Hidayatullah J, the class mentioned in s. 41 of the lndi1m Evidence
Act· was intended to operate as conclusive, even though it was opposed. to the principles of natural justice or though it was not given on the merits . of the case or if it was founded on
an incorrect view of international law or the law of India, or was in breach of any law in force in India. The existence of such prior conditions. in s. 13 of the Code and their absence in the Evidence Act compel one to hold tjlat
both judgments in rem and judgments in personam are contemplated by s. 13 of the Code. The only difference is that while the. Code makes foreign judgments conclusive inter partes, s 41 makes certain
determinations described there as conclusive proof even against strangers. But such de'termirtation,s, if found to foreign judgments, m~st also comply with the conditions stated in a. 13 to merit concltisi.
veness, and a foreign judgment will fail to bar a suit if those conditions are not also fulfilled. It is from this standpoint that I shall consider · these appeals, because, in my opinion, no other approach
is admissible. The judgment of the Mysore High Court cannot be brought within the terms of s .. 41 of tire Indian Evidence Act except in so far as it would have, if the probate granted by the Mysore Court
had been cancelled. Such an eventuality has not taken pla~e, and I need not consider it, because even there, some difficulties are possible. Here, the judgment of the Mysore High Conrt was given
· between the self-same parties, who are litigating under the same title in Madras. The executors rely here, as they did in Mysore, on the will of Ram;i.· Jingam, -and• the sons of Ramalingam rely on his··
·being a member of coparcenery. The will is effective or ineffective if it disposes of the separate proJJerty of . RaJllalin~am or the propertf' of II' y a s.c.R. coparcenery. These titles were finally decided in
respect of the properties in Mysore including the business of Ram.i.1ingam and the properties, movable and immovable, in Mysore State. No decision was given in respect of the property in Madras. The
matter relating to Hindu · coparcenery and the posi· tion of Ramaling.'lm were really questions of status, and why this is so I shall now explain. Ordinarily, a judgment upon status is consi-
dered to be a judgment in rem; see the classic definition pf a judgment in rem in Smith's Leading Cases which has stood unchanged through the many editions. There is, however, no settled definition
of 'status'. Paton in his jurisprudence (1946) at p. 256 quoting the analysis of Dr. Allen (Legal Duties) says :- "Status may be described as the fact or condition of membership of a ground of which
the powers are determined extrinsically by law; status affecting not merely one particular relationship, but being a condition affecting generally though in varying degree a member's
d c aims an powers. Dr. Allen calls it, "the condition of belonging to a parti- cular class of persons to whom the law assign certain peculiar legal capacities or incapacities or both."
Dr. Allen also adds:- ''We must—-distingnish three quite sepa- rate things:Status the condition which gives rise to certain capacities or incapacities or both; Capacity the power to acquire and
exercise fights, and the rights themselves· which are acquired by the exercise of capacity.'' ~963 R. V ishwan.than v. Rukn·ul-mullo S y1i. Ab~ul Wajid llida_;atullah J. SUPREME COUR1' REPORTS [1963)
IlliJS Thus status leads to capacity, and capacity to rights R. Yiahwanathan and to rights can be said to be embedded in status v. · and to spring from · it. Scrutton, L. J., in In re
Rukn-ul-mulk Sy•d Luck's Settkment Trusts (1) said: "Status is in Abdul Wajid every case the creature of substantive law.'' Bi••J•tuUah J. · According to Salmond, the aggregate of man's
proprietory rights constitutes his estate his assets or property. The sum total of his per)lonal rights, ·on the other hand, constitutes his status. According to him, substantive Civil Law is thus divided:-
Substantive Civil Law l 1——-1—. –1 Property · Obligations Status j Domestic I Status Domestic eta tus, as he explains in his Book is- Extra-domestic statue an appendix to "the Law of family relations, and deals
with the nature acquisition and loss of all these . personal rights, duties, liabilities and disabilities which are involved in domes- . tic relations.:' ·The conflict of law ordinarily recognises status
created by the law of another country. See In re Luck's Settlement Trusts(') at p. 891 and Salvesanlv. Administrator of Austrian Property('). In the domain of Domestic Status (barring marriage) there is no
element of contract, and Maine says in Ancient Law "the movement of progressive secirties has hitherto been a movement from status to contract". Hollond in · !I) (1940) I Ch.864,890.
(2) [1927] A.C. 641, 662 . ; ._.,,. 3 S.C.R. his Jurisprudence gives sixteen ·instances of status and includes in them 'patria potestas' which brings the matter very near a. Karta of a joint Hindu family.
All the above definitions have been judicially .noticed and applied by the Australian High Court in the exposition of s. 35 of the Judiciary Act, 1903, 'which allows an appeal to be brought without leave
from any judgment of the Supreme Court of a State ~ which "affects the status of any porson". In Daniel v. Dan~el( 1 ) Griffith, C. J. defined status to be:- "a condition attached by law to a. person
which confers or affects or limits a legal capa- city of exercising some power that unde.r other circumstances he could not or could exercise without restriction". In Shanks v. Shanks (2) this definition was accepted
and in Ford v. Ford(') all the definitions considered by me were referred to among others and the an- alysis of Dr. Allen was approved. It must therefore follow that where the source
of rights is birth and the domestic relationship leads t~ rights but not to proprietorship of property the rights can only be said to arise from status. A coparcener in a Hindu, coparcenery cannot be
admitted by contract. The right is obtained by birth. Even an infant "en ventre sa mere" is in Hindu Law relating to a coparcenery born for many purposes. His rights are thus determined by
status. In early laws there ·is always an emphasis on rights following on birth and writers of Jurisprudence have commented that · in such societies there is always difficulty in rising above
birth. No doubt the words status and estate had a common origin but in course of time they have acquired different legal meanings. See Pollock and Maitland History of English Law, Vol. II, 1st Edn.
(I) (1906) 4 C.L.R. 563, 566. (2) (1942) 65 C.L.R. 33-4- ( 3) (1947) 73 C.L.R. 524, R. V ishwaaalh&n v. Rukn-ul-mulk SJ•i .dtdul Wajid Riuyatul/ah J, R. Vishwantitkan Rukn .. u/-mulk Syed
.lbliul Wajid H idayalull1h J, SUPREME COURT R)CPORTS [1963] pp.10 and 78. In the law of Hindu Coparcenery, there is no ownership of properity apart from the coparce· nery and the rights in the property are such as are
determined by status. Where domestic relationship determines the status and the status, the rights all disputes and claims can only be based on status and not on proprietorship. Inheritance thus
depends on domestic status, and in the same way survivorship the right to share partition and iµainteriance are the aspects of domestic status. In this sense, a coparcenery is nothing more than a
kind of corporation not arising from contract but status and any matter relating to coparcenery is first a question of status and on!J when the status is e!!tablished that a source of material rights comes·
into being. If the matter had rested with the application of modern theories of Private International Law I would have been tempted to characterise .the decision of the Mysore High Court as partly in rem
and p11-rtly in personam, that dealing with the question of joint or separate acquisition of the Kolar Gold Fields business by Ramalingam ~as involving decision arising out of status a.nd thus in
rem. Such composite actions are not unknown. Story has adverted to them in a passage I have cited earlier and the Court of Appeal in England in In re Trepca Mines Ltd,. (1) found the action to be
partly in rem and partly in personam. The decision of the Mys'ore High Court w'as one on status and savoured of a deeision in rem. Limited as the Judicial approach is by the existence of s. 41 of
the Indian Evidence Act and the Judicial Committee in Appa Trimback's case(•), I venture to express this opinion. Private International Law today is developing by reciprocity and more and
inor'e kinds of judgments are being received as conclusive, which twelity years ago were not coiisi- r (1) (1960) I~ W. L(R· 1273. . (2) A.l .R. 1941 P.O. 524. 3 S.C.R. dered as conclusive. If we do not give faith to
foreign judgments on the subject of adoption family status and questions arising from such domestic relations, other Countries will also follow suit about our judgments. It will be quite amazing
if a judgmPnt on adoption in Ceylon (for example) ia not considered binding_in this Country and vice versa. Adoption is not one of the subjects mentioned in s. 41, and if treated as a decision on
status and thus in rem will be conclusive between the same parties and their privies under s. 13. The !'.lame must be said of judgments on joint family status or the position of any particular member
vis a vis the family. To treat judgments in this man- ner accords with the morlern notions of Conflict of Laws. Even if the subje-ct be viewed from the angle of a. judgment in personam, it is obvious that "the
matter" decided be the Mysore High Court was whether Ramalingam was a member of a coparce- nery and acquired the Gold Kolar Fields business and other properties as such member. That was
the res decided, the destination of the properties being ancillary to this main decision. It was argued on the basis of ruling of the Judicial Committee in Brijlal Ramjidas v. Govindram
Gordhandas Seksaria(1) that the words "judgment" ins. 13 of the Code means "an adjudication by the foreign Court upon the matter before it" and not the reasons for judgment. The words of the section
are '1directJy adjudicated thereby." What was meant by the Privy Council was that the adjudica- tive part of the judgment is conclusive and this part of the Mysore High Court judgment is that
Rama.linga.m was not carrying on the Kolar Gold Fields business as a ooparcener but independently. If t_hat was not the _ adjudici;itive part there was very (l) (l947) L. R. 74 I.A. 203, 210.
l R. Vi1hw1f11Glh•n _ Rukn-ul-mulk Syei Abdul Wajid • ii~atullah J. · Jt. Vishwan.itfltin v. · Ruln-ul-mulk Syed Abdul Jr ojid Hit aymtullah J. . I . . . little else. The language of s. 13 speaks not of the
judgment but ''matter thereby directly adjudicated upon" and the word "any" shows that all the adjudicative parts of the judgment are equally . conclusive in the sense in which Foote and Rattigan
and other ·have described them. It was argued that the subject-matter of the suit in Madras was immovable property over which the Mysore Court did not and could not exercise jurisdiction.
Reference · was made to Decey's Conflict of Laws and Oastrique v". Imrie (1) to show that only the Courts of the Country where immov- able property is situated have jurisdiction and the
lexsitus is applicable. In Oartrique v. Imrie (1) the question really was whether the sale of chattal (a ship) in satisfaction of a claim against the chattal itself was binding on . certain parties who had not
submitted to the jurisdiction of the .French Courts and it was held that a judgment ordering such sale was a judgment in rem if the chattal at that time was in the territory of the foreign State. The ship
in question had taken provision on board for which payment was demanded and the action in the French Tribunals was taken against the Commander Benaon who was required to pay 'par privilege sur ce
Navire'. Of course the owner Clause or Castrique the purchaser did not appear before the French Tribunal but jurisdiction of the French Tribunals was founded on the presence of the ship in French
waters at Havre. Such question can hardly arise in -respect of immovable property because the courts of the Country where immovables are situat- ed can alone have t~e jurisdiction and no
foreign Court can decide the dispute or enforce it effectively. Apart froin the fact that even in England the distinction between real and p1>rsonal property has · not been adhered to when the English Courts
(l) (1870) L.R. + H.L. +I+. :3 S.C.R. SlJPREME COURT REPORTS specify immovable property for purposes of Private International Law it is obvious that the distinction does not come within s. 13 of the Code. If the
Mysore High Court purported to decide about immovable property in Madras or the law applica- ble to the family was different I would have at once agreed with the argument. But the argument
confuses the jurisdiction and the law, on the one hand with "the matter decided" on the other. The rule in British South .Africa Company v. Oompanhia De Mocambique (1) that court can entertain actions
in re8pect of immovables which are 8ituated in a foreign country does not prevent in India under s. 13, the conclusiveness inter partes of a judgment as to any matter adjudicated thereby. That is
quite a different affair if the adjudication is about proprietorship based on status. The rule in the above case would have made the decree of the Mysore High Court a nullity if the Mysore High
Court had decided as issue about immovable property in Madras. But the Mysore High Court did not decide any such question. It decided a question of the status of Ramalingam and the
ownership of the Kolar Gold Fields business with complete jurisdiction betw<ien the same parties litigating under the same title. That· decision must .be viewed in the Madras suit as a conclusive
adjudication. The Madras Court could not decide the question of the ownership of the Kolar Gold Fields business de novo and as ancillary to that ·< decision determine the right to the property in
Madras. Of course the Madras Court was free to try other questions and coni>ider other defenres such as why the judgment of Mysore High Court was not applicable to the properties before it ;
but the fundamental question of ownership of the Kolar Gold Fields business, it could not try over again. In my opinion, e.ven the evidence led (I) [1893) A.C. 602. J962 R. Vi1hUJ11Mll111n
v. Rukn-ul-mulk Sye rl Abdul Wajid H iliayalullah J. R. V ishwanalhan v, Rukn-ul-mulk s,.1 .Ab~ul Wajid ilidayaluUah J. Hio in the Madras suit to reopen that question was m- admissible though evidence to prove bias interest J –
etc. on the part of the learned Judges was properly allowed to be led. It was not open to the Madras High Court to try the question of Ramalingam's status de nova and that part of the decision must
be treated as without jurisdiction. I am therefore not entering into that question nor considering the (. , evidence. Before 1 consider the question of the shares of the Indian Sugar and Refineries Ltd., Madras I
wish · to refer to a case . of the. Privy Council on which great reliance has been placed, That case is reported as Maqbtil Fatima v. Amir Hasan('}. The judgment that is printed in the All India Reporter –(
is of the Allahabad High Court which the head note says was "confirmed by" the Privy ·Council. I shall .content myself with citing the headnote: "A obtained judgment in the sub Court
Bareilly (British Indian Court) declaring his title to the properties of the deceased situate within the jurisdiction of that Court. Subseque- ntly B instituted a suit against A in Rampur,
a Native State for recovery of possession of the properties of the deceased situate within the Native State. Thereupon A filed the present s_uit for a declaration that the Judgment of the
Bareilly Court would operate as res judicata in the Rampur Court and for a perpetual injunc- tion restraining B from proceeding with the suit therein. The High Court held that as the
Court in British India were not competent to try suits with· respect to property situate in Native btate the judgment of the Bareilly Court would not operate as res judioota. )'-·
(I) A.J.R. 1916 P.C. 136. 3 S.O.R. It being urged that under s. 13 Civil P.C. the rule contained in which was alleged to apply in Rampur the Judgment of the Bareilly Court was conclusive between the. parties the
High Court held that it was only in proceedings on foreign Judgment that the question of the effect of foreign Judgment could properly arise." The second reason given by the High Court was
quite sufficient and valid. There was no ne,ed to decide the first point which was for the Rampur Courts to decide. The High Court however, went further and decided whether their judgment would
be res judicata under s. 13 of the Code of Civil Pro- cedure (as applied in Rampur which the High Court presumed was the same as in British India) in Rampur State and came to the conclusion that the
· .words" directly adjudicated thereby"· meant the act.ual decretal part of their judgment. . This ques- tion was not for the High Court to decide but for the Rampur Court. I may men~ion here this suit which was filed
for an injunction was one of a kind resorted to in the seventeenth Century of which the Reports do not exist apart from Lord Nottingham's manuscripts to be found in :1 Swanston 603607(46) which seems to
have long ago fallen in desuetude. No wonder the Privy Council judgment. was : "Their Lordships do not see their way to reverse the decision appealed from and will humbly advise His Majesty to dismiss the
appeal. As the respondents have not appeared there will be no order as to costs." It only remains to consider the argument in relation to the shares of the Indian Sugars and Re- {in,eries Ltd. It was contended that the shares must
R. V is/iwanathan v. Rukn-u/-mu/k .<>j,a Abdul Wajitl Hidayatullah J, be deemed to be situated where they could be effe- ctively dealt with and that was Madras, where the R. Vi•Jiwansthan
f v. Head ffice o the ompany was situated. Learned Rukn-u1 …… 1~.Syea counsel relied upon some English cases in support Jl.i":!._"•3•• – of his contention. It is not necessary to refer to
Hid•yalul/oh J. those cases. 'rhe situs of shares between the Com- pany and the shareholders is undoubtedly in the Country where the business is situated. But in a dispute between rival claimants both within the
jurisdiction of a Court over shares the Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the share scripts which are before the Court. The Mysore Court was in this position. Between the rival claimants the
Mysore. High Court could order the share scrips to be handed over to the successful party and if nece- ssary could order transfer of the shares between them and enforce that order by the coercive process
of the law. It would be a different matter if the Company refused to register the transfer and a· different question might then have -arisen; but we are told that the Company has obeyed the decision
and accepted the executors as· the shareholders. The judgment of the Mysore Court on the ownership of the shares is ancillary to the main decision. It is therefore not necessary for me to consider the .
argument of Mr. Desai that jurisdiction attaches on the principle of effectiveness propounded by Dicey, but which has been criticised by the present editors of his book and by Cheshire. In my opinion, this
controversy does not arise in this case, which must be decided on the plain words of s. 13 of the Code of Ci vii Procedure. For the reasons above given I would dismiss the appeal of the sons of Ramaliogam (Civil Appeal
No. 277 of 1958) and allow that of the executors (Civil Appeal No 278 of 1958), dismissing C. S. No. ,Y 214 of 1944 with costs throughout. In the light of \~ wli,at l ~a-ye decided l would ~ve coµsi~ere~ ~q~ c
a s.e.R. -….,1 remaining appeals and passed appropriate orders therein; but this is unnecessary as my brethren take a different view in the two ma:in appeals. BY CouRT: In view of the majority Judgment,
there will be decree in terms as stated in ·the '>' -< Judgment of the majority. KHARDAH COMPANY LTD. v. .,,-: RAYMON & CO. (INDIA) PRIVATE LTD. (B. P. SINHA, C. J., K. SuBBA RAo, N. RAJAGOPALA
AYYANGAR, J.R. MunHOLKAR and T. L. VENKATARAMA AIYAR, JJ.) Forward Contract-Contract for Bale ·of goods-Govern- ment notification forbidding forward contracts other than non- transferable specific delivery contracts-Validity of the contract- Clause providing' for arbitration-Clause, if valid even if con- tract were invalid-Parties appearing before arbitrator-Estoppel -Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952 (74 of 1952), ss. 2 (c) (f) (i) (m) (n), 15(1), 17, 18(1).
On September 7, 1955, the appellant company entered into a contract with the respondents for the purchase of cer- tain bales of jute cuttings to be delivered by the resp@ndents in equal instalments every month in October, November anc;I December, 1955.
Under cl. 3 of the agreement the sellers were entitled to receive the price only on their delivering to the buyers the full set of shipping documents. Clause 8 conferred on the sellers certain rights against the buyers such as the right to resell if the latter refused to accept the docu- ments.
Clause 14 provided that all disputes arising out of or concerning the contract should be referred to the arbitratiou of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. As the respondents failed to deliver the goods as agreed the appellants applied to to the Bengal Chamber of Commerce for arbitration. The
respondents appeared before the arbitrators and contested the claim, but an award was made in~ favour of the appellant. Thereupon the respondents filed an application in the High poµrt of Calcutta under. s. 33 · of the Arbitration Act, 1940, fl.. Vishwanitlhiin
v. Rukn·ul-mulk Sy1d Abdul Wajiit Hidaya/ullah J, May4 •