Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
11. We deferentially concur with these directions, and emphasize that since these directions flow from the right to life E and personal liberty, enshrined in Articles 21 and 22(1) of our Constitution, they need to be strictly complied with. However, we may hasten to add that these are only broad guidelines and not rigid rules of universal application when facts and behavioral patterns are bound to differ from case to case. Since discretion F in this behalf is entrusted with the court, it is not advisable to lay down immutable formulae on the basis whereof discretion could be exercised. As aforesaid, it is for the court concerned to assess the situation and exercise discretion judiciously, dispassionately and without prejudice.
12. Viewed in this perspective, we regret to note that in the present case, having regard to nature of the complaint against the appellant and his stature in the community and the fact that admittedly the appellant was regularly attending the court proceedings, it was not a fit case where non-bailable warrant should have been issued by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. In our opinion, the attendance of the appellant could have been secured by issuing summons or at best by a bailable warrant. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the High Court that in the facts and circumstances of the case, issuance of non-bailable warrant was manifestly unjustified.
13. We shall now advert to a more anxious point, viz. the conduct of respondent No.2, at whose direction the warrant was c executed. It needs no emphasis that any form of degrading treatment would fall within the inhibition of Article 21 of the Constitution. In the present case, respondent No.2 was aware that the non-bailable warrant issued on account of failure on the part of the appellant to attend the court proceedings on 7th August 2002, was returnable only on 31st October 2002. Undoubtedly, respondent No.2 was duty bound to execute the warrant as expeditiously as possible but we are unable to fathom any justifiable reason for the urgency in executing the warrant on a National holiday, more so when it had been issued more than a week ago and even the complaint against the appellant was in relation to the offence punishable under Section 324 of the IPC. The complaint related to the year 2000.
At the relevant time, the offence punishable under Section 324 of the IPC was a bailable offence. It is apparent from the record that the warrant was executed at the behest of the complainant in order to denigrate and humiliate the appellant at a public place, in public view, during the course of Independence day celebrations at Radio Club. We are convinced that respondent No.2, in collusion with the complainant, played with the personal liberty of the appellant in a high handed manner. The unfortunate sequel of an unmindful action on the part of respondent No.2 was that the appellant, a practicing Advocate, with no criminal history, remained in police custody for quite some time without any justification whatsoever and suffered unwarranted A humiliation and degradation in front of his fellow members of the Club. Regrettably! he lost his freedom though for a short while, on the Independence day.
Here also, we agree with the High Court that respondent No.2 did not perform his duty in the manner expected of a responsible police officer. As a matter B of fact, being the guardian of the liberty of a person, a heavy responsibility devolved on him to ensure that his office was not misused by the complainant to settle personal scores. The so- called urgency or promptness in execution led to undesirable interference with the liberty of the appellant. Such a conduct C cannot receive a judicial imprimatur.
14. That takes us to the core issue, namely, whether the appellant is entitled to any compensation for the humiliation and harassment suffered by him on account of the. wrong 0 perpetrated by respondent No.2, in addition to what has been awarded by the High Court. As aforesaid, the grievance of the appellant is that imposition of a fine of Rs. 2,000/- on respondent No.2 is grossly inadequate. His prayer is that in addition to an adequate amount of compensation, respondent E No.2 should also be prosecuted and proceeded against departmentally for his wrongful confinement.
15. It is trite principle of law that in matters involving infringement or deprivation of a fundamental right; abuse of process of law, harassment etc., the courts have ample power F to award adequate compensation to an aggrieved person not only to remedy the wrong done to him but also to serve as a deterrent for the wrong doer.
16. In Rudul Sah Vs. State of Bihar & Anr. 3, Y. V. G Chandrachud, CJ, speaking for a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court had observed thus: "One of the telling ways in which the violation of that right can reasonably be prevented and due compliance with the H 3. (1983) 4 sec 141. mandate of Article 21 secured, is to mulct its violators in A the payment of monetary compensation. Administrative sclerosis leading to flagrant infringements of fundamental rights cannot be corrected by any other method open to the judiciary to adopt."
17. In Bhim Singh, MLA Vs. State of J & K & Ors. 4, holding illegal detention in police custody of the petitioner Bhim Singh to be violative of his rights under Articles 21 and 22(2) of the Constitution, this Court, in exercise of its power to award compensation under Article 32, directed the State to pay c monetary compensation to the petitioner. Relying on Rµdal Sah (supra), 0. Chinnappa Reddy, J. echoed the following views: "When a person comes to us with the complaint that he has been arrested and imprisoned with mischievous or malicious intent and that his constitutional and legal rights D were invaded, the mischief or malice and the invasion may not be washed away or wished away by his being set free. In appropriate cases we have the jurisdiction to compensate the victim by awarding suitable monetary compensation".
18. In Nilabati Behera (Smt) Alias Lalita Behera Vs. State of Orissa & Ors. 5, clearing the doubt and indicating the precise nature of the constitutional remedy under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution to award compensation for contravention of F fundamental rights, which had arisen because of the observation that "the petitioner could have been relegated to the ordinary remedy of a suit if his claim to compensation was factually controversial" in Rudul Sah (supra), J.S. Verma, J. (as His Lordship then was) stated as under: "It follows that 'a claim in public law for compensation' for contravention of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 4. (1985) 4 sec. 677. 5. (1993) 2 sec 746 the protection of which is guaranteed in the Constitution, is an acknowledged remedy for enforcement and protection of such rights, and such a claim based on strict liability made by resorting to a constitutional remedy provided for the enforcement of a fundamental right is 'distinct from, and in addition to, the remedy in private law for damages for the tort' resulting from the contravention of the fundamental right. The defence of sovereign immunity being inapplicable, and alien to the concept of guarantee of fundamental rights, there can be no question of such a defence being available in the constitutional remedy. It is this principle which justifies award of monetary compensation for contravention of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, when that is the only practicable mode of redress available for the contravention made by the State or its servants in the purported exercise of their powers, and enforcement of the fundamental right is claimed by resort to the remedy in public law under the Constitution by recourse to Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. This is what was indicated in Rudul Sah and is the basis of the subsequent decisions in which compensation was awarded under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, for contravention of fundamental rights." In the same decision, in his concurring judgment, Dr. A.S.
Anand, J. (as His Lordship then was), explaining the scope and purpose of public law proceedings and private law proceedings stated as under: "The public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. The relief of monetary compensation, as exemplary damages, in proceedings under Article 32 by this Court or under Article 226 by the High Courts, for established infringement of the indefeasible right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law .and is; RAGHUVANSH DEWANCHAND BHASIN v. STATE · 319 OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. [D.K. JAIN, J.] based on the strict liability for contravention of the A guaranteed basic and indefeasible rights of the citizen. The purpose of public law is not only to civilize public power but also to assure the citizen that they live under a legal system which aims to protect their interests and preserve their rights. Therefore, when the court moulds the relief by granting "compensation" in proceedings under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution seeking enforcement or protection of fundamental rights, it does so under the public law by way of penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which has failed C in its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen. The payment of compensation in such cases is not to be understood, as it is generally understood in a civil action for damages under the private law but in the broader sense of providing relief by an order of making 'monetary D amends' under the public law for the wrong done due to breach of public duty, of not protecting the fundamental rights of the citizen. The compensation is in the nature of 'exemplary damages' awarded against the wrongdoer for the breach of its public law duty and is independent of the rights available to the aggrieved party to claim compensation under the private law in an action based on tort, through a suit instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction or/and prosecute the offender under the penal law."
19. The power and jurisdiction of this Court and the High Courts to grant monetary compensation in exercise of its jurisdiction _respectively under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India to a victim whose fundamental rights under G Article 21 of the Constitution are violated are thus, well- established. However, the question now is whether on facts in hand, the appellant is entitled to monetary compensation in addition to what has already been awarded to him by the High Court. Having considered the case in the light of the fact- situation stated above, we are of the opinion that the appellant does not deserve further monetary compensation.
20. It is true that the appellant not only suffered humiliation in the public gathering, and remained in judicial custody for some time but we feel that for what he had undergone on 15th August 2002, some blame lies at his door as well. Being a practicing Advocate himself, the appellant was fully conversant with the court procedure and, therefore, should have procured a copy of memo/order dated 12th August 2002, whereby the c non-bailable warrant was cancelled by the court. As noticed above, admittedly, the appellant applied and obtained a copy of such order only on 16th August 2002. Though the conduct of respondent No.2 in arresting the appellant, ignoring his plea that the non-bailable warrant issued by the court in a bailable offence had been cancelled, deserves to be deplored, yet, strictly speaking the action of respondent No.2 in detaining the appellant on the strength of the warrant in his possession, perhaps motivated, cannot be said to be per se without the authority of law. In that view of the matter, in our opinion, no other action against respondent No.2 is warranted. He has been sufficiently reprimanded.
21. The last issue raised that remains to be considered is whether the Courts can at all issue a warrant, called a "non- bailable" warrant because no such terminology is found in the Code as well as in Form 2 of the Second Schedule to the Code. It is true that neither Section 70 nor Section 71, appearing in Chapter VI of the Code, enumerating the processes to compel appearance, as also Form 2 uses the expression like "non-bailable". Section 70 merely speaks of form of warrant of arrest, and ordains that it will remain in force until it is cancelled. Similarly Section 71 talks of discretionary power of Court to specify about the security to be taken in case the person is to be released on his arrest pursuant to the execution of the warrant issued under Section 70 of the Code. RAGHUVANSH DEWANCHAND BHASIN v. STATE 321 OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. [D.K. JAIN, J.) Sub-section (2) of Section 71 of the Code specifies the A endorsements which can be made on a warrant.
Nevertheless, we feel that the endorsement of the expression "non-bailable" on a warrant is to facilitate the executing authority as well as the person against whom the warrant is sought to be executed to make them aware as to the nature of the warrant that has been issued. In our view, merely because Form No.2, issued under Section 476 of the Code-, and set forth in the Second schedule, nowhere uses the expression bailable or non- bailable warrant, that does not prohibit the Courts from using the said word or expression while issuing the warrant or even C to make endorsement to that effect on the warrant so issued. Any endorsement/variation, which is made on such warrant for the benefit of the person against whom the warrant is issued or the persons who are required to execute the warrant, would not render the warrant to be bad in law. What is_ material is that D there is a power vested in the Court to issue a warrant and that . power is to be exercised judiciously depending upon the facts and circumstances of.each case.
Being so, merely because the warrant uses the expression like "non-bailable" and that such terminology is not to be found in either Section 70 or Section 71 of the Code that by itself cannot render the warrant bad in law. The argument is devoid of substance and is rejected accordingly.
22. In view of the aforegoing discussion, no ground is made out warranting our interference with the impugned judgment of the High Court. We confirm the judgment and dismiss the appeal accordingly, but with no order as to costs.
23. However, before parting with the judgment, we feel that in order to prevent such a paradoxical situation, we are faced G with in the instant case, and to check or obviate the possibility of misuse of an arrest warrant, in addition to the statutory and constitutional requirements to which reference has been made above, it would be appropriate to issue t~e following guidelines to be adopted in all cases where non-bailable warrants are issued by the Courts:- c (a) All the High Court shall ensure that the Subordinate Courts use printed and machine numbered Form No.2 for issuing warrant of arrest and each such form is duly accounted for; (b) Before authenticating, the court must ensure that complete particulars of the case are mentioned on the warrant; (c) The presiding Judge of the court (or responsible officer specially authorized for the purpose in case of High Courts) issuing the warrant should put his full and legible signatures on the process, also ensuring that Court seal bearing complete particulars of the Court is prominently endorsed thereon; (d) The Court must ensure thatwarrant is directed to a particular police officer (or authority) and, unless intended to be open-ended, it must be returnable whether executed or unexecuted, on or before the date specified therein; (e) Every Court must maintain a register (in the format given below), in which each warrant of arrest issued must be entered chronologically and the serial number of such entry reflected on the top right hand of the process; (f) •No warrant of arrest shall be issued without being entered in the register mentioned above and the concerned court shall periodically check/monitor the same to confirm that every such· process is always returned to the court with due report and placed on the record of the concerned case; (g) A register similar to the one in clause (e) supra shall be maintained at the concerned police station.
The Station House Officer of the concerned Police Station shall ensure that each warrant of arrest issued by the Court, when received is duly entered in the said register and is formally entrusted to a responsible officer for execution; (h) Ordinarily, the Courts should not give a long time for return or execution of warrants, as experience has shown that warrants are prone to misuse if they c remain in control of executing agencies for long; (i) On the date fixed for the return of the warrant, the Court must insist upon a compliance report on the action taken thereon by the Station House Officer of the concerned Police Station or the Officer In- charge of the concerned agency; 0) The report on such warrants must be clear, cogent and legible and duly forwarded by a superior police officer, so as to facilitate fixing of responsibility in case of misuse; (k) In the event of warrant for execution beyond jurisdiction of the Court issuing it, procedure laid down in Sections 78 and 79 of the Code must be strictly and scrupulously followed; and (I) In the event of cancellation of the arrest warrant by the Court, the order cancelling warrant shall be recorded in the case file and the register maintained.
A copy thereof shall be sent to the G concerned authority, requiring the process to be returned unexecuted forthwith. The date of receipt of the unexecuted warrant will be entered in the aforesaid registers. A copy of such order shall also be supplied to the accused. Format of the Register The Case title Name& The Date of Date Date of No. number and particulars officer/ judicial of cancell- printed on particulars of the person to order issue ation, if the form person whom directing any used. against directed Arrest whom Warrant warrant of to be arrest is issued issued (accused/ witness) Due Report The date returned action of on taken return as reported Remarks c -0 ;;o m s: m 0 c ;;o m "U 'N 0 …… …… …… …… ;;tl Format of the Register
24. We expect and hope that all the High Courts will issue appropriate directions in this behalf to the Subordinate Courts, which shall endeavour to put into practice the aforesaid directions at the earliest, preferably within six months from today. R.P. Appeal dismissed.