Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
11. The High Court, after an elaborate consideration of the matter, in clear and categorical terms, found that the Sub-Divisional Officer had no F jurisdiction vested in him to grant/allot the Government land and the power vests only with the District Collector. The appellants did not plead and establish to the satisfaction of the Court that the Sub-Divisional Officer is conferred with the jurisdiction to allot/grant the Government land on the strength of applications by the interested parties. It is a fundamental principle of law that a person invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the ~igh Court G under Article 226 of the Constitution of India must come with clean hands and must make a full and complete disclosure of facts to the Court. Parties are not entitled to choose their own facts to put~forward before the Court. The foundational facts are required to be pleaded enabling the Court to scrutinize the nature and content of the right alleged to have been violated by the H A authority.
12. The appellants in this case failed to establish that they have lawfully secured allotment of land. It is the duty casts upon the appellants to plead and establish that the order of allotment/grant by the Sub-Divisional Officer in favour of their predecessor-in-title created any legal right and also further B establish the transfer of land in their favour has been validly made by the Sub-Divisional Officer. In such view of the matter we are of the opinion, justice has been done in the matter and the High Court rightly refused to resurrect or resuscitate the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer which is unenforceable in law. c
13. The "Rules regarding Management of Government property", upon which strong reliance has been placed by the appellants, do not provide for and contemplate for making any such transfer of Government land from one person to another person. The Parganadhikari (Sub-Divisional Officer) has no authority whatsoever even under the said Rules to make any grant in favour D of any individual or individuals. Rule 5, upon which reliance has been placed reads as under: "5. Land will be allotted on lease under Government Grants Act on the format prescribed by Revenue Board. Parganadhikari is liereby authorized to sign this lease deed on behalf of His Excellency The Governor. No registration is required for such deeds."
14. A plain reading of the Rule clearly reveal that Parganadhikari is merely authorized to sign the lease deed on behalf of the Governor. The Rules nowhere confer power upon the Parganadhikari to allot Government land on lease in favour of any individual.
15. Yet another aspect of the matter: The Sub-Divisional Officer did not allot the land in favour of the appellants after cancelling the grant made in favour of Mahanth Govind Das. Having found that Mahanth Govind Das violated the terms and conditions of grant, the Sub-Divisional Officer cancelled the grant of lease and imposed penalty of Rs.2000/- upon Mahanth Govind G Das and simultaneously effected transfer of the land in favour of the appellants. Assuming that the Sub-Divisional Officer had the authority and jurisdiction to grant lease of the land for non-agricultural purposes, at the most he could have considered the application of the appellants on merits in order to decide as to whether they were entitled to grant of any Government land, but under H no circumstances the Sub-Divisional Officer could have passed orders ·y_ RAJ KUMAR SONI v. STA TE OF U.P. [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.] 7 41 transferring the land in the names of the appellants.
16. It is true in the show cause notice issued on 5.4.1999 by the District Magistrate there is no mention about the order dated 9. 7 .1992 withdrawing the powers conferred upon the Sub-Divisional Officer in the matter of according grant of lease of government lands. It is, however, stated that the Parganadhikari/Sub-Divisional Officer is not authorized to grant land, under B the Government Grant Act, the authority to grant land to certain extent for residential purposes is vested in the District Magistrate. It is in the final order of The District Magistrate a mention is made about the proceedings under whieh the powers of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had been withdrawn as early as on 9.7.1992 much prior to the Sub-Divisional Officer according grant C on 20.5.199J.. The appellants may be technically right in contending that the order of the -pistrict Collector is based on the grounds which were not specifically ~entioned in the show cause notice issued to the appellants.
But at the same time we are required fo bear in mind that in the show cause notice it is clearly stated that the Parganadhikar/Sub-Divisional Officer is not authorjzed to grant land, under the Government Grant Act, the authority to D grant land to certain extent for the residential purposes is vested in the District Magistrate. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the appellants to plead and establish that the Sub-Divisional Officer had the authority to grant the Government land on lease for residential purposes. The High Court while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India had come to the conclusion that the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer upon E which the whole claim of the appellants rests was invalid and improper. The High Court itself could have set aside such invalid and improper order. Therefore, in our considered opinion nothing turns on this argument. Even if there was any technical violation of the rules of natural justice, this is not a fit case for interference, such interference would result in resurrection of an illegal, nay, void order.
17. In Venkateswara Rao v. Government of A.P:, a Primary Health Centre was formerly inaugurated at a particular village subject to certain conditions. Since those conditions are not satisfied, the Panchayat Samithi resolved to shift it to another village. The Government, in exercise of its review jurisdiction, interfered with the resolution so passed by the Panchayat G Samithi without providing any opportunity whatsoever to the Panchayat Samithi. The government's order was challenged in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The A.P. High Court held, the order passed by the Government on the review to be bad, but did not interfere on merits . l. AIR (1996) SC 828. SU~REME COURT REPORTS (2007] 4 S.C.R. A The Supreme Court, while confirming the order of the High Court observed that: "if the High Court had quashed the said order, it would have restored an illegal order; it would have given the Health Centre to a village, contrary to the valid resolutions passed by the Panchayat Samithi."
18. The Supreme Court opined that the High Court was right in refusing to exercise its extraordinary discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
19. In MC. Mehta v. Union of India2, this Court, relying upon C Venkateshwara Rao (1 supra) observed; "The above case is clear authority for the proposition that it is not always necessary for the Court to strike down an order merely because the order has been passed against the petitioner in breach of natural justice. The Court can under Article 32 of Article 226 refuse to exercise its discretion of striking down the order if such striking :- • down will result in restoration of another order pa5sed earlier in favour of the petitioner and against the opposite party, in violation of principles of natural justice or is otherwise not in accordance with law."
20. In our view, on the admitted and indisputable facts set out above, any interference with the impugned order of the District Collector would result in restoration of orders passed earlier in favour of the appellants which are otherwise not in accordance with law.
21. For all these reasons, we do not find any merit in the appeals. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. We make no order as to costs. N.J. Appeals dismissed. 2. AIR (1999) SC 2583